

## THE ZERMATT DIALOGUES

MACMILLAN & CO., LONDON

"In Mr. Fawcett's Imaginism we are, it may be held, faced with the operation of a leaven which will continue, to whatsoever unseen goal, to work within the frame of the philosophy of the future."—

*Times Literary Supplement*, Oct. 8, 1931.

"I doubt whether there is any writer at the present time from whom so many fresh suggestions about the larger problems of Reality can be gleaned, or by whom these problems are discussed with so much clearness and originality and so much literary grace . . . altogether a great achievement."—

Professor J. S. MACKENZIE in his review in *Mind*.

"Between them they discuss most of the 'cosmic' problems of metaphysics, and they do it with astonishing verve and variety. The dialogue is a difficult form to manage, particularly when, as must be the case nowadays, the participants number more than the usual Platonic two. But Mr. Fawcett has succeeded wonderfully well with it . . . this brilliant company . . . immensely interesting and full of living reflection and experience."—*Manchester Guardian*.

# OBERLAND DIALOGUES

*by*

DOUGLAS FAWCETT

MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED  
ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON

1939



**COPYRIGHT**

**PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN  
BY R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, EDINBURGH**

TO HIS OLD FRIEND  
PROFESSOR BERTRAM KEIGHTLEY

THIS WORK IS INSCRIBED  
WITH THE WRITER'S WARMEST THANKS  
FOR HIS ENCOURAGEMENT  
AND CRITICISM



# CONTENTS

	PAGE
FOREWORD, BY BASIL ANDERTON . . . . .	xvii

## CHAPTER I

WE MEET AT WENGEN . . . . .	1-6
-----------------------------	-----

On the Wengernalp — Professor Stark and Basil Anderton discuss the plan of the dialogues about the soul — the aeroplane, bringing Douglas Leslie and Professor Wortvoll, is sighted above the Little Scheidegg — First impressions touching the Professor.

## CHAPTER II

TOWARDS REDISCOVERY OF A LOST WORLD . . . . .	7-22
---	------

Leslie complains that physics has transformed Nature into a realm of shades — The Professors defend physics — Idealism and the external world — Anderton stresses the useful mythology of science — “Matter”, “Mass”, “Energy”, “Ether”, “Force”, regarded as creations of fancy — Space, Time and Relativity — Materialism and Energetics belong to fiction — A qualitative metaphysics of Nature is needed — Already metaphysics and physics begin to converge — Our business now is to search for the foundations of a rediscovered world.

## CHAPTER III

GOD IS DIVINE IMAGINING . . . . .	23-37
-----------------------------------	-------

A chat on the mountain side about truth — Faith and vague “intuition” are names often for aberrations of private fancy — Be critical — So far man has learnt most from intellectuals — What is a true mystic? — Anderton ignores the alleged “logically conclusive” arguments in favour of belief in God which were demolished by Kant — He prefers the method of hypothesis and verification of such proved worth in science — Two hypotheses which may be dismissed as unsound — God as the Mathematician — God as the Hegelian Divine Idea or Cosmic Reason — Hegel’s failure helps us greatly to understand Imaginism — Hypothesis mooting the spiritual Absolute is unsound.

## CHAPTER IV

GOD IS DIVINE IMAGINING ( <i>continued</i> ) . . . . .	38-55
--	-------

Dangling clues before Wortvoll — How Anderton came to accept Imaginism — The birth of Imaginism in modern philosophy — “The Cinderella of philosophy” — Hume and Kant — Kant on the “Fundamental Power” within the human soul — Wildon Carr agrees with Kant — Kant on productive imagining — Why the

Power is so often hard to detect — F. C. S. Schiller on imagining as including “not only all reality but all unreality” — Wortvoll has to admit that genuine novelty arises in the cosmos — Anderton points out the fecundity of the “Fundamental Power” in the case of man — The case of reason, considered as arising within the imaginal world-process, is dealt with at length — We are to pass from Kant’s “Fundamental Power” within the human soul to the “Fundamental Power” said to manifest in the cosmos at large.

## CHAPTER V

GOD IS DIVINE IMAGINING (*continued*) . . . . . 56-71

Agnosticism brought to book — There is nothing which Divine Imagining cannot comprise — The two sides of Divine Imagining; consciring and conscita = objects in general — When do we speak of Divine Imagining and when of Divine Consciring? — What do we mean by reality and existence? — Only finite things exist — Divine Imagining as one-many, as changeless and changing — Solution of the riddle of time-sequence; Bosanquet’s “central crux of philosophy” — Conservation, additive creation and destruction — A side-glance at Plato — Divine Imagining is above Truth and Thought — What is Divine Will? — Why so strong a case for pessimism? — About the “Logos” and Ishwara; fictions invented in defence of another fiction, the Absolute.

## CHAPTER VI

## DE PROFUNDIS: THE FONTAL CONSCIRING . . . . . 72-102

God is above “existence” — We re-discuss the names Divine Imagining and Divine Consciring — How our term “consciring” is related to the term “consciousness” of other philosophers — Its high value — How some writers misuse the terms “feel”, “feeler”, etc. — Irreflective and reflective consciring; a distinction of very great importance — The irreflective or so-called “unconscious” in my psyche and in Nature — On the useful metaphor of the “Threshold” — The philosophies of the Unconscious are wrong — The Ultimate World-principle is fully reflective, aware of what It is and of all that It comprises through and through — The “Radiance beyond reason” or God “ineffable” — God is above moral goodness — And not merely artist — On some features of Professor Whitehead’s God — God and feeling which is radiantly intense — Correction of an earlier view — We must rest content with vague knowledge — Consciring, “energy” and “mass” — Leslie scores a hit — The phrase “psychic energy” is a misuse of symbolism.

## CHAPTER VII

A CHAT ABOUT RELIGION. WE FLY ABOVE THE MATTERHORN.  
SOME REFLECTIONS . . . . . 103-119

A chat with Leslie — Wortvoll and I on the way to Berne discuss the bliss-aspect of Divine Imagining — Also religion — Definition of religion — Fancy runs amok in this field also — Religions need

# CONTENTS

ix  
PAGE

not be true to cheer their votaries even beyond the grave — Institutional religions are only one kind of religions — And have no necessary connexion with moral goodness — Anderton's religion — On mystical irruptions bettering the popular creeds — Our flight to the Matterhorn and Monte Rosa — The Matterhorn prompts a talk about external perception.

## CHAPTER VIII

### MORE COSMIC PROBLEMS . . . . . 120-161

Completing the metaphysical background — Our world-system is one of innumerable others in which shows the variety native to Divine Imagining — But we perceive now only its physical shell — It is finite throughout — The Initial Situation — Fallacy of simplicity — The primitive imaginal field described in general terms — A system will have many phases of restful conservation and additive creation — There are no cosmic days and nights — On Rhythms — Penetration — Conservative aspects of the cosmos — There are no strict uniformities in Nature and the mind of man — On the Imaginals: ought we to call them descendants of the Platonic "Ideas"? — Schopenhauer's "Ideas" — Whitehead's "eternal objects", Santayana's "essences" — The imaginals are exemplified in all actual things — Case of the light-imaginal — There are no specific imaginals of quantity and relation — Instances of imaginals are like one another, not the same — Our world-system comprises at the outset only certain primary imaginals which limit the possibilities of creative evolution — Among these is that whose instances are the souls of men — Feelings belong to conspiring, have no source in imaginals — On secondary imaginals and other problems connected with this topic — soul-imaginals — The riddles of Causation and the Imaginal Dynamic discussed at length — Getting behind surface phenomena — How events come to pass, how the drive of the world-process is secured — Interpenetration, conflict and the imaginal solution — The Imaginal Dynamic is the "universal and irresistible power" which Hegel thought he had found in Dialectic — Causation includes freedom and chance — Voluntary freedom and chance — Chance is illustrated lavishly in the evolution of Nature — Strict causality being mythical, imagining can "run amok".

## CHAPTER IX

### CREATIVE EVOLUTION . . . . . 162-193

Anderton makes two important statements — Evolution not explicable in terms of "matter", "energy", and like figments; Leslie's plea for a more concrete outlook — In the beginning — Only finite things can be perfect: in what way is the primeval imaginal field perfect? — The primary imaginals and Mill's "original natural agents" independent of causation — About spatio-temporal relations — The Present, the Past and the Future; their ultimate standing and significance — How the disruption of the primeval imaginal field begins — Passage from restful Being to Becoming, to the divisions and conflicts of creative evolution, is

the Metaphysical Fall — Birth of distinct agents in the time-process; origin of the "general atomicity" characteristic of the external world — Blake's "disorganised immortal", Nature — Dissociation, not association, opens the drama of evolution — On a great scale imagining must "run amok" — The higher imaginings manifest only as occasions permit — Don't derive the higher from the lower. Don't ask from Natural Selection what it cannot provide — Interplay of conservation and additive creation — Local initiatives and the amoral orgies of struggle — Problem of the appearance of man on earth. What made this remarkable creative leap possible?

## CHAPTER X

## THERE IS A SOUL INDEPENDENT OF THE PHYSICAL BODY 194-219

We fly from Berne over Mont Blanc, descending to Geneva for lunch — Wortvoll on the "running amok" — Which leads up to a talk about the human soul — On some crude beliefs respecting survival — Anderton gives his opinion about Psychical Research — Mistakes of the old Greek philosophers: Wortvoll asks for a modern statement of the case for belief in an enduring soul — Anderton responds — He states also what he holds to be its nature — Wortvoll requires the solution of a difficult riddle — And is satisfied fully by what he hears — "Somewhat else" than the body is manifested clearly at any rate in our higher life — We fly back to Berne over Lake Lemman and Fribourg.

## CHAPTER XI

## BACK TO PLATO AND PLOTINUS . . . . . 220-241

An important chat with Wortvoll during the drive to Lauterbrunnen — The soul lives to a great extent *its own* life not derivable from the physical body — The "intuition of pre-existence" rediscussed — Stark on the source of souls — Anderton shoulders his burden — Our workaday consoling lights only a small portion of the soul — A beacon of the first importance; the monad and its inseparable body as conceived by Leibnitz — The finite centre of consoling is not a monad, but possesses an indestructible highest body of this sort — The centre of consoling and its bodies — Our ignorance is formidable, but, urges Stark, there is evidence for the existence of at least three bodies — Anderton describes in general terms the origin and early history of a human soul — All is explicable without resort to a monad or "transcendental ego" — The physical body is only a *separable part* of the total soul, a bit of earth annexed for the while — What is a group-soul?

## CHAPTER XII

## BIRTH AND DEATH . . . . . 242-276

Some reflections about birth — Stark on the *primaeval* souls — These "descend" into evolution to pass from irreflective to reflective consoling — Anderton tells the story of a soul, beginning with its origin as part of the *primaeval* world-system and con-

# CONTENTS

xi  
PAGE

tinuing into its appearance as a "prisoner" on earth — He repeats and accents fundamental statements which require to be understood fully — The Wheel of births begins to turn — The soul and its prolongation into the physical body — The basic uses of this body — Population and the *Struggle for Births* — The fittest for the conditions available succeed — The soul and sense-content — Creativity present in all phases of dawning conscious life — Penetration and the percept — Creativity and the concept — More about the sense-world — Anderton tries to solve the riddle of Memory — On some other problems — Death as "part of the continually recurring rhythm of progress" (McTaggart) — But not without grim possibilities — Death's fundamental meaning — The alternating phases of reflective and irreflective consciring — When Death ceases.

## CHAPTER XIII

### THE GREAT ADVENTURE . . . . . 277-292

We fly from Berne over St. Moritz and the Rhaetic Alps to Innsbruck — The soul that falls like Lucifer — How did its first plunge earthward take place? — A predestined event or an experiment? — When did the sub-imaginals or group-souls of men become allied with physical bodies? — Science and the problem — The controlling imaginals — Variations — Man was not "derived" from an ape-like species, but such a species was adopted by the imaginals whose instances are men — Leslie voices his dislike of what he calls the experiment — Wortvoll comments on defects in the human organism — Stark and Leslie support him — Anderton replies — We return to Berne over the Arlberg, top of the Glarnisch and the Lake of Lucerne.

## CHAPTER XIV

### THE PLURALITY OF LIVES . . . . . 293-321

Wortvoll and Stark enjoy a preliminary talk — The term "reincarnation" condemned — Schopenhauer on palingenesis, the better term — Struggle and Birth — Wortvoll still won't accept the intuition of pre-existence — But is well countered by Leslie — What about things and events in our present lives on which *inferences* to former lives can be based? — The debate waxes lively — It seems that the familiar arguments, taken by themselves, are unconvincing and frequently feeble — Some words about population — Between the lives on earth — Massey's soul-cycle in which activity with contraction [=our additive or fruitful change] and rest with expansion alternate — Death and after — Full tide of the rest-expansion — Stark's witness — The core of sameness in the permanent soul; the deeper consciring that grasps all the lives.

## CHAPTER XV

### THE POWER THAT TURNS THE WHEEL . . . . . 322-340

An early morning talk with Wortvoll — Ixion's Wheel, the souls and the plurality of lives — The Wheel turns achieving purpose, not



actuated by Schopenhauer's blind will-to-live — Can we explain how it returns? — Not by resort to the "Law of Karma", which seems to betray confusion of thought — There is much more than morality in the universe; the familiar statement, man receives "nothing which he has not earned", is untenable — the arbitrary in life — Anderton throws fresh light on the intuition of pre-existence, impressing Wortvoll — We fly over the Oberland, intending to use the "Simplon corridor" and visit Milan — Engine trouble — We are forced down and land at Sion in the Rhône valley — A talk about justice outside the walls of Tourbillon Castle — We agree that justice belongs only to the morals of mankind and like finite sentient — In returning to Berne over the Wildhorn we fly through a storm.

## CHAPTER XVI

THE POWER THAT TURNS THE WHEEL (*continued*) . . . 341-372

Stark opens up the discussion — Equilibration and physical systems as observed from the outside — But useful mechanistic symbolism must not be pushed too far — Anderton on the Imaginal Dynamic gets beyond mechanistic symbolism — Pain and the conflicts of the Dynamic — The Lord of the Wheel is supermoral — On violations of harmony and the Divinity of Measure — Scraping the "law of Karma" — The arbitrary — Evolution "by grace" — Experiments — The way to perfection is paved with gifts — Why a soul returns to earthlife — Wortvoll asks for some light on the manner in which ethically-related souls act and react *inter se* during their many lives — Leslie, Stark and Anderton make answer at length — Compensations and the vicissitudes of palngenesis — The typical soul, S, and its many lives — One of its worst selves took form in the Middle Ages — How are we to pronounce judgment on the doings of such a soul, surface phenomena as they are? — Failure of "karmic" theory — Anderton on how the Imaginal Dynamic transforms the history of such a soul — Nemesis; what it means — But how many of the aggressors are victims? — More about compensations — More about evolution "by grace".

## CHAPTER XVII

## OUTLOOKS . . . . . 373-396

The last morning together — Stark gives an account of our progress during the talks — Wortvoll and Leslie disagree — Wortvoll wants to consider what outlooks, in our opinion, await the soul which is developed so long and painfully — These ought to provide the greater objects of thought and devotion which make life worth living — Leslie attacks the cult of the State; the only outlook which Wortvoll used to find satisfactory — He shows that the individual soul is more important than the State and Wortvoll, without an effective reply, is silenced — Anderton intervenes — No outlook, such as Comte recommended, is worth notice — The outlooks on

to the religions — The outlook on to the higher, superhuman societies — Belief in these societies is a corollary of the belief that souls endure — But what guarantee is there that a soul, which lasts a long while, is immortal ? — Leslie and Anderton answer — Anderton by request carries on alone, submitting some suggestions touching the higher outlooks — S, the typical soul of the talks, freed from the Wheel of lower births and growing very great, passes into a higher society — What sort of life does it enjoy ? — Its evolution “ by grace ”, impossible by mere “ merit ”, lifts it at last into the divine or supreme society of this particular world-system — This is God as conceived by Mill and James, finite in all respects — Beyond all particular world-systems and finite divine societies is our final outlook : Nirvāna — Anderton makes his contribution to the long-standing controversy as to what Nirvāna ought to mean — Once more it is seen how wise he was to think out his metaphysical background at the outset — Some last questions — Wortvoll, piloted by Leslie, leaves us.



## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Finsteraarhorn, King of the Bernese Oberland (Taken by the late Capt. Willi Eberschweiler)	. . . <i>Frontispiece</i>
The Jungfrau with Schneehorn and Silberhorn (Taken by Douglas Fawcett)	FACE PAGE 1
Looking from above the Aletschhorn at the Jungfrau and Monch (Taken by Douglas Fawcett)	57
Above the Fiescherhorner, Bernese Oberland (Taken by the late Capt. Willi Eberschweiler)	97
Across the Dent Blanche to the Matterhorn. (Taken by Douglas Fawcett)	109
Looking at the Dent Blanche over the Matterhorn. (Taken by Douglas Fawcett)	140
Matterhorn seen over against the Breithorn on a dull autumn afternoon. To the left in background, Monte Rosa (15,200 ft.) (Taken by Douglas Fawcett)	170
Sea of Clouds in the neighbourhood of Mont Blanc (Taken by Douglas Fawcett)	197
Near the crest of Mont Blanc (15,780 ft.) (Taken by Douglas Fawcett)	231
Matterhorn after heavy fall of snow (Taken by the late Capt. Willi Eberschweiler)	276
Top of the Obergabelhorn. In the background the Matterhorn all but hidden in cloud (Taken by Douglas Fawcett)	292
South precipices of the Matterhorn ; to the left in background the Dent Blanche (Taken by Douglas Fawcett)	322
The Weisshorn as seen from above Val d'Anniviers (Taken by Douglas Fawcett)	341
Crest of the Matterhorn glimpsed through cloud (Taken by Douglas Fawcett)	373
Above the Matterhorn ; the Gorner Glacier and Monte Rosa in the background (Taken by Douglas Fawcett)	391

## LIST OF THE AUTHOR'S PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS

THE author has stated already portions of the case for Imaginism in *World as Imagination* (1916), *Divine Imagining* (1921) and *Zermatt Dialogues* (1931). Books and papers on philosophy written by him before 1916 were not concerned with Imaginism at all. They dealt with adventures in philosophy that failed. But in the course of a long quest of truth the patient worker wins his reward. Hypotheses in philosophy, as in science, are the children of fancy ; while most of them have to be cast to the heap, a few at any rate may be found verifiable and thus of abiding worth. *Oberland Dialogues*, fruit of researches begun over twenty years ago, is as tentative and experimental as were its forerunners, as indeed all such readings of the Great Riddle must be. Yet of those who study the imaginist interpretation of life, many will be loth to return to the beaten tracks of current religion and agnostic thought. And even if, like Professor Wortvoll, they remain doubters, they will hardly make out a better case for suspension of judgment than he did. There is something in these "hypotheses" and "suggestions" that is countered with difficulty or not at all !

For experiments in ideas prior to the conception of Imaginism, cf. *Zermatt Dialogues*, Foreword xxiii-xxiv. Two books, *Riddle of the Universe* (1893) and *Individual and Reality* (1909), written during this stage of trial and error, had proved unsatisfactory and were cast aside.

# FOREWORD

By BASIL ANDERTON

Recorder of *The Zermatt Dialogues*

THOUGH independent of institutional religions,

holding no form of faith

But contemplating all,

moving by help of hypotheses which are verified whenever possible and, if not, are treated as mere suggestions, *Zermatt Dialogues* could not expect to win approval from all schools of philosophical thought. Thus Logical Positivists, Agnostics and neo-materialists, to name its most bitter enemies, are *ex officio* opposed to any spiritual interpretation of the universe. What man of these wants to reshape his fundamental convictions or — vanish the appalling outlook! — rewrite his books and lectures? *Zermatt Dialogues* was unwelcome also to those religious folk who like progress to be slow. It comprised, further, minor contentions which are debatable and which may not be true. But it may well claim to have succeeded in respect of its main effort. It drew support originally from a great saying of Thomas Traherne: "You never enjoy the world aright, till the Sea itself floweth in your veins, till you are clothed with the heavens and crowned with the stars; and perceive yourself to be sole heir of the world and more than so, because men are in it who are everyone sole heirs as well as you. Till you can sing and rejoice and delight in God, as misers do in gold, and Kings in sceptres, you never enjoy the world." Its idealistic philosophy has provided in full the atmosphere in which dreams such as Traherne's are to become true.

Men's worlds, compact in part of private imagination, comprise inevitably warring beliefs (πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ); creative fancy in philosophy and religion, as well as in art, science, politics, industry and the rest, is a garden of all sorts of flowers. Philosophical beliefs, such as those to which I have

referred, are tested exactly in controversy. Leave them to the talkers and writers, hopeful that truth, growing slowly through the centuries, may on the whole prevail. Truth, say come, is rarely reached, but it is at any rate held in respect, by philosophy. Meanwhile beware of obstructive, ultra-conservative religious beliefs, which have served their purposes and are delaying in many fields the liberation of man. Some of these creeds, like the Hindu and Mahomedan, resist denudation after the fashion of granite; others in Europe to-day are being eroded like clay. Let no one be surprised at conservatism even when extreme. The worshipper, having been allotted an oasis, is not going to leave it, merely to starve or die of thirst, perhaps, in the desert. His mind may be adapted to the oasis and nothing else. Nevertheless I would say to the enterprising among such men what I said to myself when getting rid of an inherited creed in my youth. I am supposing that these stalwarts desire to attain a wide outlook on the world, passing awhile from the pools and palms of their oases into the desert.

My counsel is: be critical of the religion thrust on you by your elders when you were docile and at the mercy of dogmatic, customary thought. Custom? Custom, once established in pride of place whether in the State, the family or in our private lives, tends to maintain itself not merely obstinately but irrationally. Thus routine, as the scathing language of Charles Dickens records, kept the Exchequer accounts on splints of elm wood (tallies) down to 1826, though this grotesque conservatism served no useful purpose. Again, "Catherine [the Great], finding the first violet of spring, ordered a sentry to be placed over it, to protect the flower from being plucked. She forgot to rescind the order, and the sentry continued to be posted there. It developed at last into a regular tradition of Tsarskoe, and so, day and night, winter and summer, a sentry stood in Tsarskoe Park over a spot where, 150 years before, a violet once grew."<sup>1</sup> Take thought, young man, lest some equally absurd sentinel, posted centuries ago, is keeping you off the lawns of knowledge. Above all avoid the fate of the automaton-dog of Arras, the drudge whose tale, coming from

<sup>1</sup> Lord Frederick Hamilton, *The Vanished Poms of Yesterday*, p. 74.

behind the lines during the war, was told by Lt.-Col. Fawcett, D.S.O., to the writer. Every morning at six a big mongrel appeared "from nowhere", mounted a stand and turned with its paws a wheel connected with a churn on the further side of a wall. The farm, save for this wall, was in ruins and deserted; only the dog toiled as in the days of peace. The dog had the churn-habit! If, when young and easily trained, you have contracted churn-habits in the domain of thought, don't prolong them into years of discretion. Distrust authorities, clerical or anti-clerical, who have sought to annex your mind, and break free. Churn-habits are illustrated lavishly in the history of politics and popular creeds, occasionally in the backwaters of science and even philosophy itself.

What purpose is served by this collection of conversations published as the *Oberland Dialogues*? *Zermatt Dialogues*, its indispensable predecessor, concerns metaphysics, that is to say an inquiry into the general character of reality — of the universe — of which the physical world-system, so interesting to our astronomers and physicists, is only a portion and, it may be, an insignificant one. This inquiry is called cosmic in outlook, since it does not seek to organise knowledge in any special and hence restricted field, but considers all its topics, God, consciousness, space-time and the external world, causation, evolution, etc., only in so far as they help to reveal to us the nature of reality at large, of the changeful whole — if whole there be — in which we finite sentient beings live, move and have our being. *Oberland Dialogues*, on the other hand, offers suggestions touching the solution of a special minor riddle, that of the standing and prospects of the human "soul". "Soul", as used by some writers, is a term of extreme vagueness and, in these days of "psychology without a soul", is regarded by many as best dispensed with. It is retained here with a meaning that will be quite clear. What is desired is to find out how much can be believed, how much suggested tentatively, about this soul on the basis of the metaphysical results reached in *Zermatt Dialogues* and of such empirical evidence as has been made available by "psychical research". This, at any rate, was the purpose of the original discussions held in Switzerland; and, since in the opinion of our circle



man's reasonings are never more than probably true, dogmatism was completely barred. West was not with us on this occasion so that, in Platonic language, very often only *δοξαστά*, not *γνωστά*, could be elicited from the speakers; matters of opinion rather than direct knowledge swayed the debates. Perhaps later on West will write us something about the *γνωστά* or directly conscribed features of a larger world of which he enjoys an acquaintance denied to ordinary folk. Such a book, penned in the "Thus spake . . ." vein, would dispense with the laboured reasonings by which we homuncules lessen our ignorance, giving something of the insights which reward the mystic by whom philosophy, along with other intellectual makeshifts, has been left behind. But for the present we have to sup with the philosophers, offering them a philosophy of mysticism which contains the seeds of something higher. Thus *Oberland Dialogues*, mooting the riddle of the soul, is strictly a philosopher's book, though three of the debaters are weary of the limitations of the rational, brain-correlated mind. The rationalists are met on their own ground, just as if Reason were the supreme tribunal which Hegel believed it to be. Noblest of Man's defining attributes, Reason tends, as we shall see, in the course of its development to "negate itself"; on the lower levels of its rule it towers above criticism victorious; on the higher, when very much is being asked of it, defects are noticed, and there arises a suspicion that it too is provisional and merely human. In the sphere of practical life this doubt arises only to be suppressed offhand; in that of speculative thought it is formidable indeed.

Readers of the *Zermatt Dialogues* will regret the absence of Arthur West, the mystic, and of Roger Delane, the explorer and Fascist M.P. The remaining members of the old group, Professor Joseph Stark, the physicist, Douglas Leslie, the "pagan poet" and ex-pessimist and myself, best described as an ex-Hegelian Oxford don convinced that West's Imaginism is sound, were not to meet in the harmony we had anticipated at Wengen, whence, by the way, this book derives its title, that of the (Berner) *Oberland* dialogues. Leslie, in the course of wanderings in Germany, had made friends with a Nazi prophet, the redoubtable Herr Professor Wortvoll (Höchst-gelehrter zu

Weinberg), who wished to have some conversations respecting our philosophy, while expressing already disagreement with the ethics and theory of the State associated with our views of the individual. Rumour had it that Leslie had been less interested in the Nazi than in his bride, but, be this as it may, he was sure to want to pit a pompous, cocksure personality against Oxford (supposed in my person to be well informed) and the cold precision of Stark. It would be necessary at the outset to give Wortvoll a compact account of what *Zermatt Dialogues* was intended to teach, and no doubt the main burden of this business would fall upon me. Nevertheless the responsibility was well worth shouldering. *Zermatt Dialogues* is a long and difficult book in which sometimes, perhaps, the forest cannot be seen for the trees; much had to be said therein about a great variety of topics. There would now be an opportunity of concentrating our attention on essentials and of considering, in respect of the riddle of the soul, the whole case for Imaginism from a new angle. The latter procedure would be all to the good. The beginnings of Imaginism date only from a by-suggestion penned by Kant; we contemplate a Western form of Idealism having no roots in Greece or India.<sup>1</sup> And such a recent initiative requires restating and reshaping with all the patience which we can muster. As the famous pragmatist, Professor Schiller, wrote: "So a really new and important truth will bear 'discovery' over and over again, for centuries. The first dozen times or so it simply is not comprehended; the next, it is not listened to, because the times are not 'ripe' for it. By the time they are, it can always be shown not to be really shocking because not really new at all; and someone can always earn a living by expounding the ancient sages who discovered it long ago and were forgotten for their pains."

We have then to discuss Imaginism till it is "not really new at all" and consequently quite tolerable! But, whether welcome or not, it will be found of momentous importance in the realms both of theory and practice.

There are, however, those calling themselves "practical" who are for expelling thought about ultimate reality from our

<sup>1</sup> For the history of Imaginism, cf. *Zermatt Dialogues*, pp. xx-xxiv.

lives. Neither Imaginism nor any other form of "first philosophy" or metaphysics is for them worth the labour which it entails. And a very numerous and influential body of writers bids us have done also with the fiction of an enduring soul. Clémenceau held: "The soul will have had its day — a day without a morrow — in the various philosophies that we have constructed of nothing except words. As soon as we began the study of thinking man through observing the living man and his antecedents, the existence of the scholastic entity came to an end."<sup>1</sup> André Maurois, describing the burning of Shelley's corpse, tells us that "the frontal bone of the skull where it had been struck by the mattock fell off, and the brains literally seethed, bubbled and boiled as in a cauldron for a very long time." On the showing of Clémenceau and the philosophers who agree with him, Shelley's life has been futile, has closed in utter defeat. The seething of the brains was last stage of a descent into eternal night. And is the outlook for the entire human species any better? Not at all. Mankind is waging a battle which it is doomed to lose; whirled round on the top of seas and continents in a mad adventure, it is borne hopelessly and helplessly towards final disaster. The struggle will have been in vain — Man has to perish. Observe now that a *practical* question is that of the mystic and metaphysician: is this adventure or, as some call it, martyrdom of Man to be taken seriously?

For, in view of the final disaster, the wisdom of the butterfly may be greater than that of the ant. If the last sleep is dreamless, we are free to live like butterflies and close our careers when we list; the cult of highest values taught by a Plato is to no profit. Few, like Earl Russell, will build on a "foundation of unyielding despair"; a course which the alleged rationalism of this thinker cannot justify. Pity 'tis that Earth's poor joys are bought dearly, while the higher gape with defect, but, after all, "omnipotent matter", a hard dictator, has no plan. Intellectual and artistic interests are welcome but cannot dignify conscious life now revealed as a cheat. Disenchantment rides behind the socialist; futility sets its mark on the "Federation of the World":

<sup>1</sup> *In the Evening of Thought*, vol. i. p. 45 (Constable, 1929).

Howsoever wise

The governance of these massed mortalities,  
A juster wisdom his who should have ruled  
They had not been.

Thus tendeth the reasoning sequent on repudiation of belief in the enduring soul. Even now an advanced community, losing the hope of survival, runs grave risks.<sup>1</sup> Life becomes too silly a business to be taken seriously ; our best course is to lessen its evils for ourselves and others, harvest such joys as are won easily ; help to realise Schopenhauer's dream and bring, so far as in us lies, the farce-drama of history to an end. On the other hand, if the hypothesis of survival (and pre-existence) is a sound one, some very important *practical* consequences will be deducible, of which Herr Professor Wortvoll will be hearing anon. Incidentally a letter from Professor Schiller, the pragmatist, may be cited. "It seems to me more probable than not that we are in for an indefinite number of lives in an indefinite number of worlds, largely nightmares, perhaps ; but at present we know nothing of the ways by which we can avoid the worse and attain the better. Perhaps only because we have never seriously *tried* to discover them." Further, the *practical* consequences concern vitally theories about the State. The Termite-State of Communism mistakes the standing of the individual ; the yes-men of Mussolini and Hitler are suffering from a false orientation of their lives. Enlightenment of these slaves achieved fully, revolt follows. Consider the Hegelian concept of the State, which underlies National Socialism. Hegel regarded Deity as showing in the State, and the well-being of individuals as of secondary importance when State interests are at stake. His general philosophy, as I have urged elsewhere, likens God to Moloch and great stress is laid accordingly on force. The State that succeeds is good. Practical results of his metaphysics, which influenced Marx, have been sinister. Fascists, again, who have drunk at Hegel's well, regard the State as an organism superior to the individuals and groups which it comprises. The State does not exist for the individuals and

<sup>1</sup> Macdougall, *Body and Mind*, Preface, p. xiii.

groups, but subordinates and "uses" them. Imaginism, on the contrary, urges that this attitude belittles quite absurdly the individual. Control of individuals is required *for their own good* and that of other individuals; the State is a form of association which *may* be useful in this respect, but like most human institutions, it has been and is abused shamefully. Great Powers plot and carry out murder, are perjurers, fraudulent bankrupts, swindlers, and mar their subjects' lives with repressions, obligatory service and excessive taxes. I am not of course an anarchist. I see clearly that the State, indispensable at this stage of human progress, has to be freed from its vices and conserved, lest what is worse comes to pass.

The State is a form of association, not a God. Take note that it has no conscious life of its own. With the dying of the last six Carthaginians Carthage died too and died out. But the six ex-Carthaginians, if belief in the plurality of lives is true, may afterwards have lived in, and helped to form, many states. Six souls may have "used" Greece, the Roman Empire, Germany, Italy, and Japan; hostels these fixed each to its "peculiar spot" and standing there for a few thousand years at most. When these State hostels have vanished into the past, six souls will still be continuing their adventurous careers. *Clearly a permanent individual soul is much more important than the short-lived form of association called the State.* It seems to be negligible as a member of a State only because it exists therein along with so many other visitors like itself. Our political ideal ought to be the State which ceases to be Moloch and exists to serve individuals both within and beyond the territories which it holds on trust.

Who says that the study of metaphysics can have no practical bearing on our terrene life?

My part as Announcer has been played; let me conclude with some remarks touching terms and definitions. A philosopher need not apologise to philosophers if he thinks fit to use technical terms freely. He has to frame concepts quite other than those of the market-place; and these novelties require names, having which they become factors in that establishment of relations which we call "thought". Words are so important that it has been urged that thought consists

mainly of "inner speech".<sup>1</sup> The plain man, who begins to study science, is compelled to master its language; only a glance or two are enjoyed before this language imposes itself. In respect of this book I am glad to say that the novel technical terms necessary are very few, though important. They are *Imaginism*, *Consciring*, *Conscita*, *Imaginal*; all the rest used are, or ought to be, familiar to the educated. The first of these indispensable terms can be defined at once. Imaginism<sup>2</sup> is the view that the *Fons et Origo* of Being, God, the World-Ground or World-Principle, that from which, directly or indirectly, all phenomena proceed, resembles not (as Hegel believed) what we call reason, but that veritable outlaw of academic philosophy, CONCRETE IMAGINING. We find, in Professor Mackenzie's words, that "the distinction between what is real and what is imaginary is not one that can be finally maintained . . . all existing things are, in an intelligible sense, imaginary".<sup>3</sup> This form of idealism is to be considered at length. The meanings of the three other terms will become sun-clear as the talks proceed; therewith many more subordinate terms, time-honoured in philosophy, will have vague or ambiguous meanings stabilised. Enough has now been said to introduce the speakers; it is my hope that what they have to say will justify the expectations which this Foreword has sought to kindle.

BASIL ANDERTON

<sup>1</sup> Earl Russell, *Analysis of the Human Mind*, p. 152.

<sup>2</sup> This useful term was coined by Professor Keightley.

<sup>3</sup> *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, p. 440.



# CONTRIBUTORS TO THE DIALOGUES

BASIL ANDERTON—an ex-Hegelian Oxford don	.	.	A.
DOUGLAS LESLIE—"pagan poet" and once pessimist	.	L.	
JOSEPH STARK—professor of physics	.	.	S.
KARL WORTVOLL—professor and historian of philosophy	.	W.	





THE JUNGFRAU WITH SCHNEEHORN AND SILBERHORN

## CHAPTER I

### WE MEET AT WENGEN

"The hills are shadows, and they flow  
From form to form, and nothing stands ;  
They melt like mists, the solid lands,  
Like clouds they shape themselves and go."  
TENNYSON.

"Nature is imagination."  
BLAKE.

"Life is an activity of imagination ; the world in which we live is a world of imagination." — Professor WARNER FITE.

It is a warm August morning and beneath a sky of sapphire Joseph Stark, begoggled Professor of Physics, with his air of a holiday-taking rector, and I, Basil Anderton, both well known to readers of *Zermatt Dialogues*, are lounging on the green Wengernalp gazing at the glaciers and cliffs of the Jungfrau. The topmost crags of the great mountain are lost to sight ; from a minor fastness of the Frost-Giants, the Schneehorn, I glance occasionally at the Mönch and Eiger, interpreting lazily a flood of sensation that overtakes mind. The mountains, actually three miles away, seem fantastically near ; there is only one cloud on them, a fat woolly one which conceals the Jungfrauoch and the hanging ice-fields under it. I ought to be enjoying all this contemplatively ; to tell the truth, I am overcome by the glare, losing my grip of the landscape and in peril of falling, like a tired philistine, asleep. The Professor seems severely alert and observant ; there is a holiday lesson to be learnt.

"A penny for your thoughts, Stark."

"I was thinking of Whitehead's remark about the crude deliverances of sense — that they need imaginative reconstruction 'which for each of us has the best claim to be called the real world'. He is right. Imaginative reconstruction controls perception of events in space-time, working from the

background of a man's experience and that of the race. Fancy, fusing with the sense-field, enriches aspects of it and makes them 'ours' — what *we* perceive."

"Yes, fancy welcomes thus nature which, as Blake says, is also imagination, though not ours." I broke in: "The external world penetrates our bodies in the form of crude sense-data and there is added to these what completes the perception. But do the so-called crude sense-data come straight into our lives from the external world, or do they show marks of modification by our brains and souls?"

S. "Some are modified greatly without question and all, I should urge, more or less. What a pity it is that West will not be here to deal with these and like riddles in detail!"

A. "West and Delane will have been away a year on their travels by next Monday. But have no fear — they will return. And meanwhile we must see what we can extract from *Zermatt Dialogues* unaided. Leslie's flashes of insight and this man, Wortvoll's, criticisms ought to be helpful."

S. "Is Leslie still an imaginalist or has he gone back to his pagan poetry and pessimism? He did not seem to me to be a very stable person."

A. "I hear from him pretty often — yes, he remains an imaginalist of West's making, but I gather that he has new unsolved difficulties which will task us."

S. "Well, you had some long private talks with West, of which we have heard nothing. Give us the benefit of them later, especially when we confront the riddle of the soul. . . . But about this man, Wortvoll, do you know anything of interest? He's a Nazi and is supposed to have absorbed several libraries, but he may be a bigot and there is such a thing as learned ignorance; you know what I mean — the hoarded verbal treasure of academics who, lacking genuine insight, write huge tomes, mostly about one another, while knowledge withers. It is the 'man with an eye', sufficiently well read in relevant topics — not the bookblinded — who gets us forward in philosophy. Books, as West used to say, are makeshifts to be used, but not abused. Intellect itself can be overvalued."

A. "I follow you, and the better because once I dulled my wits with too much reading. I was saved from verbalism,

Hegelian and other, by the teaching and example of Schopenhauer. As regards our visitor, I must decline all responsibility for his coming; Leslie has imported him probably to fight us! The Nazi champion, who has no use for the soul and adores, no other tolerable religion being available, the totalitarian State, may think us three crazy. Nothing, I am sure, would please Leslie better. A clash of disputants is inevitable."

S. "Very true. But, if we are to deal adequately with questions touching the soul and the Nazi State, we shall have to work through the whole text of *Zermatt Dialogues*. We can't solve the soul-riddle save within a system of metaphysics, and metaphysics, after all, is knowledge about the general character of reality or the universe."

A. "Quite so, but we need not do more than present West's thought in essentials, referring the man to the *Zermatt* talks for fuller enlightenment, if he wants it. We are here, not to instruct this critic at length about what we know — or believe that we know — already, but to achieve further progress. He must be content, accordingly, to accept our conditions. And, if he accepts them, we shall be very grateful for his criticisms."

S. "Good. And the two are to join us here to-night?"

A. "Yes, if the aeroplane gets safely to Berne; probably they have reached the Belp aerodrome already and may be paying Wengen a visit shortly by air. A long journey? No, they were staying at Munich last night."

S. "Have you flown?"

A. "Never, but I am looking forward to a visit by air to the Matterhorn. I want to look down on Zermatt without having tired a muscle. That awful grind up the Matterhorn, when I was roped between Delane and Kaufmann, is with me still. . . . Hallo!"

A rumble deepened into a roar as an ice-avalanche broke away from the hanging glaciers of the Silberhorn. Falling hundreds of feet into a hollow it drove the snow in its van down slope and frosted cliff into the depths of the ravine where the Trümmelbach takes its rise. Ordinarily avalanches on the Jungfrau, if detected, look like mere puffs of smoke — this was one of the rare great ones and held us fascinated during the three or four minutes it lasted. . . . Then silence, save for the

scurrying of belated blocks in the track of the vanished torrent. I felt a delicious languor steal over me and fell back to lie at full length on the turf. A horsefly made an attack on my nose as I sought to sleep and, though counter-attacked, maintained its offensive. Swearing angrily, I sat up to see Stark pointing in the direction of the Little Scheidegg.

“There’s an aeroplane.”

Not far above the top of the pass a biplane with silvery wings and red lined fuselage was climbing out of the Grindelwald valley towards the Jungfrauoch. Though using a glass, I could not read the registration letters at the distance, but was sure that the machine was Leslie’s Moth which I had seen once in a shed at Heston.

“There they are ! . . . Just picture what their game must be like. Better than the Matterhorn couloir of the Riffelhorn, eh ?”

Mounting to the level of the fat cloud, Leslie crossed the Jungfrauoch and disappeared ; he was regaling his passenger with the view of the Great Aletsch glacier which, seen thus from the air, is one of the glories of the Bernese Oberland. Returning soon he floated above the Schneehorn, crossing the entire face of the Jungfrau before, with a gliding right-hand turn, he swept down the Lauterbrunnen valley, at about the level of Mürren, and dropped towards our slope on the green alp.

“I don’t suppose he can see us and of course he can’t land”, said my companion.

“No, but I have told him of our favourite spot opposite the Joch and he may be trying to find and salute us.” Unfortunately the search was not successful and, after a variety of manœuvres, the Moth sped over Wengen in the direction of Interlaken, bound doubtless for the aerodrome at Berne.

“What a place in which to talk metaphysics”, quoth the Professor, as we sunk back on the turf. “Almost as inspiring as was the Châlet des Soldanelles. When we discuss the standing of the external world, space-time and so forth, I like to have before me grand objects such as may elicit a corresponding grandeur of thought. How easy here is the transition from contemplation of Nature to a comprehension of its roots in Divine Imagining.”

"Well, we were not very easily won over to West's Imaginism even at Zermatt ; and I don't suppose that Herr Professor Wortvoll will yield ground readily. He is possibly too absorbed in the measuring that satisfies so many men of science to care about what is measured."

"But he may get beyond his measuring as I did ; anyhow we shall descend later not without hope of meeting an acute and open-minded inquirer at dinner."

\* \* \* \* \*

The dinner proved excellent and the company, who found themselves on the best of terms, did it justice. Leslie and his German friend, after laying up the Moth, had taken a car, choosing the fine route that leads along the south bank of the lake of Thun through Interlaken to Lauterbrunnen, whence a mountain railway climbs to Wengen. We dined in our private sitting-room, and my diary records both my first impressions and the understanding reached with Herr Wortvoll about the talks. I cite the passage :

"Aug. 28. Leslie and Wortvoll turned up after tea ; the 'pagan poet' as merry as ever and looking as bonny as a 'plus four' costume permits, while Wortvoll, at first disappointing, promises well. He is a tough disputant, but a man open to argument even if directed against himself. He fought as an infantry officer in 1918 and was wounded in the left leg during the drive on our 5th Army. Limps noticeably and will certainly have to do his Alpine work by aeroplane. His appearance as a Professor of Philosophy must be very different from that of the smart lieutenant of 1918 ; hatless he has thin black hair with the top of his head bald, an impressively high forehead ; dark, piercing eyes set well apart over a pale determined face ; and a long, black beard which at dinner was to dip perilously near the soup. A reach-me-down, shiny, lounge suit and big clumsy boots fail to save him for the ranks of beauty. His voice is friendly and even jovial but rather harsh ; shouting at soldiers and bawling his lectures across large class-rooms have not improved it. I thought of Frau Wortvoll leading a starved life in her dull university town, one whose heart beat once perhaps the quicker for dreams of a Lancelot ! Leslie, however, has assured me that my sympathies are wasted. Frau Wortvoll,

who is plain and dowdy, is busy bringing up six Nordic boys and has no time to spare for visions of which good Nazis might not approve. Slaves of the Termite-State, the six will be conscripts, breathing, talking, mating and thinking in order in the drab days to come.

Have arranged with Wortvoll about the dialogues. Our time, I told him, is limited ; he will not expect us therefore to discuss in full detail all the text of *Zermatt Dialogues*, to be referred to, by the way, by me hereinafter as *Z.D.* We three will draw on that work sufficiently for the purpose in hand ; namely, a consideration of the problems of the soul against the necessary *cosmic* background. If to know thoroughly a flower 'in the crannied wall' would involve knowledge of the universe, an attempt to solve the soul-riddle will impose on us a like task, one to be confronted with courage. The task cannot be finished, but it may profit us greatly, however our treatments of it vary. He agreed. I said also that we should value highly such questions and criticisms as he might feel disposed to proffer ; these to concern the actual imaginist contentions, not what writers not present had to say about them. *Höchst-gelehrter zu Weinberg !* Quite so ; I am against displays of erudition that consume time and do not instruct. But, having taken care to control a local tyrant, I am glad that this learned and possibly acute man of forty is here to fill the gap between young Leslie and us old men, the former needing restraint, ourselves perhaps more initiative. A master of our tongue, he will follow us through all parts of the labyrinth which he is asked to enter. And so — to bed with the satisfaction of having played my part not too badly."

## CHAPTER II

### TOWARDS REDISCOVERY OF A LOST WORLD

"The mechanistic theory of Nature has vitiated the metaphysics of the man in the street. This theory, which proved so useful to science from the seventeenth to the twentieth century, was justified solely by the interests of practice. It was not a revelation about the character of ultimate reality. Unfortunately, many men of science and very many plain men interpreted the theory amiss. They held that the classical mechanics led inevitably to materialism in metaphysics; that Büchner, Moleschott and their like are the only legitimate descendants of Galileo. The reaction is setting in apace. Nevertheless, let those who are ruled by this mechanistic mythology have a care. They have taken too seriously the fictions of conceptual thought. . . . Let them turn from abstract instrumental concepts and look once more on the real world." — *Zermatt Dialogues*, p. xxv.

"Science writes of the world as if with the cold finger of a starfish; it is all true; but what is it when compared with the reality of which it discourses?" — R. L. STEVENSON in *Pan's Pipes*.

THE next day we wandered as caprice stirred us. In the evening after dinner we sat in cosy long chairs on the balcony of our sitting-room, whence there is a fair view of the valley in the direction of the Tschingel pass and a splendid one of the steep Grütschalp. Cigars were lighted, while our German friend drew consolation from a formidable pipe. Then, as the stars began to come out, Leslie observed:

L. (LESLIE). "We shall miss 'The Good Companion'" — the aeroplane — "but later we shall find her a comrade in which two more of us can fly. I have talked to a pilot already."

W. (WORTVOLL). "That will be fine indeed, and, of course, all will be visiting the Matterhorn. Ah! I shall never forget that flight across the Jungfrau's cliffs yesterday; since we left Munich I live in wonderland."

L. "And don't you feel that you are rediscovering a lost world?" Let me confess that I had asked the poet to open the discussion discreetly. Leslie is referring to a defect of physical science, namely, that it maroons us in a realm of



shades. *W.*'s reply must disclose in part his attitude towards the "material world". Is his thought clouded by the useful mythology in which so many plain men and even workers in science have put their trust? Certain ghosts that haunt text-books have to be laid before our main hypothesis, that of God conceived as Divine Imagining, can be approached.

*W.* "I don't quite catch your meaning."

*L.* "Just this: when I take up a book on physics I enter a shadowland, the home of gaunt concepts; when I fly amid the mountains I live once more enthusiastically in the concrete splendour of Nature, emerging from the dreary realm of Persephone into light. Having bartered my birthright, the external world, for a mess of abstract 'knowledge', I repent and recover awhile the treasure which I had lost."

*W.* "Science is not inviting you into a picture gallery. 'Grey is all theory, the golden tree of life is green', as Mephistopheles said to the student. Eddington, like you, takes note of the 'empty shell' of physics and asks no more of this science than a certain insight into 'structural form'. Even this limited insight, you will admit, has its value, though dearly bought. And how much knowledge of this kind is acquired during a mountain flight?"

*S. (STARK).* "One gets near the picture gallery in some sciences as discussed in well illustrated text-books, *e.g.* in geography, geology and zoology, though these too deal only with aspects of the complex world. Other sciences invite us to a realm of shades. Physics, to which Leslie referred, stresses 'structure', and for this measurements are essential; this is why Planck states the physical criterion of objectivity thus: everything that can be *measured* exists. If now what is observed and inferred concerns quantity to the prejudice of quality and a language is used written in mathematical shorthand, poets may be repelled. Nevertheless relations of very great importance are being revealed. This is one side of the matter. The other is that it is the feebleness, not the greatness, of the human mind which requires such a science; our attention has to be selective to a high degree and cannot deal otherwise with the complexity of the world. It may be, as Schelling urged, that a time will come when all the theoretic sciences will

perish, their services to Mankind being no longer required. Immediate intuition will replace this abstract conceptual thought. But the 'massed mortalities' are very far distant from this triumph which would be one worthy indeed of gods — of gods who grasp complex reality as easily as we homuncules breathe air."

W. "It is not my business to worry about what may or may not happen a hundred million years or more hence. Men have to get on with their jobs. Leslie cares only for his poet's world; physicists find out much about realities such as have failed to interest Leslie, and yet cannot for that be expelled from *the* world. The poet's outlook also is narrow and exists at the price of ignoring much."

L. "Quite true but, while noting my prejudice, don't miss my point. (He is looking at a sheet of paper in the light of an electric torch.) Anderton has just handed me a quotation which bears on it. The reference is to the effect on many men's minds of the stressing of quantity rather than quality which set in so strongly during the seventeenth century. Useful to calculators, this practice spread from science into philosophy and men felt somehow robbed of their familiar world. 'The world that people had thought themselves living in — a world rich with colour and sound, redolent with fragrance, filled with gladness, love and beauty, speaking everywhere of purposive harmony and creative ideals — was crowded now into minute corners in the brains of scattered organic beings. The really important world outside was a world hard, cold, a world of mathematically computable motions in mechanical regularity. The world of qualities as immediately perceived by man became just a curious and quite minor effect of the infinite machine beyond.' (Burt in *Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science*.) The resentment of these folk finds an echo in Lord Balfour's regret about the 'glory of the heavens' which, taking this calculator's science too seriously, he thought had been driven from Nature.(1) And assuredly, if light exists only in our heads, while drab mechanical, mathematically computable motions occur in Nature, he is right."

A. (ANDERTON). "There is an appeal of course from philosophy drunk to philosophy sober, leaving science to do

its work in the ways it finds most convenient. And such philosophy may decide that Nature is psychical or mind-like in character, comprising all the qualitative variety of our experience and indefinitely more. In this case, as Professor Wortvoll will note later, Imaginism's campaign is won easily. He will note also that some men of science are not averse from this solution. Thus Eddington holds that 'all through the physical world runs that unknown content which must surely be of the stuff of consciousness'.(2) Similarly Jeans is of opinion that 'the stream of knowledge is heading towards a non-mechanical reality; the universe begins to look more like a great thought than like a great machine'.(3) I would not say 'a great *thought*' for reasons to be given later. Thought is too abstract; does not comprise all phases of spiritual reality. Suffice it for the present that the reality argued for is non-mechanical."

W. "All three of you are idealists?"

S. "Yes, in the sense that we regard the world-principle as fundamentally akin in character to that which wells up in us as conscious life."

W. "Not Kantians?"

S. "No — no. We reject Kant's theories about space and time, the categories and indeed almost all the views which he stressed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant was charged by Hegel with being a subjective idealist, and our expert, Anderton, assures me that Hegel was right."

W. "He is, but you are not Hegelians."

S. "We don't believe in Reason as the world-principle, but we welcome the kind of idealism which Hegel taught about the standing of the external world. Nature, he urged, is 'established' on God, is not a mere show in and for finite percipients. His God, however, is Cosmic Reason; ours is Divine Imagining."

W. "Well, we shall come to that issue later. *Inter alia* I shall be interested to learn how Nature, as 'established' on God, is related to the different glimpses of natural events which finite centres confront."

L. "Quite so. Meanwhile tell us what you think of the standing of our familiar so-called 'material world', which, as

Bradley observed wisely, is probably a 'very small part' of the reality 'to be taken into account.'

W. "Ah! now I am cornered, as you British say; I have no definite answer to give you. Consider me as regards this and indeed many philosophical issues of moment as an agnostic. I am here to question you all closely but also to be instructed. Perhaps I shall have learnt much about the external world and how I perceive its different levels before I return to Germany. I plead only that your thinking shall be so inclusive as not to leave anything real without a home."

L. "We shall house any fact that anyone wants a home for. In Divine Imagining are 'many mansions'."

W. "You have referred to the plain man's 'material world'; also to the mechanistic beliefs of many men of science and a few philosophers. There has arisen in your opinion a conceptual mythology which helps common sense and science to control the external order. The mythology is merely convenient; no mirror of what exists in Nature independently of your thought."

L. "Well put. The key-concepts are man's imaginal creations, devices compact of fancy, which are useful rather than true. But perhaps Anderton will say something about this mythology?"

A. "This mythology aids workaday, practical response to environment, including that measuring so vital to science — to the 'calculators'. It suppresses in part, alters in part, the realities for which it is substituted in our thinking; all our concepts, we contend, are *substitute-facts* and there are no concepts outside human and like minds. Such a substitute-fact — a fact on its own level quite as 'hard' as a star or colour — need not resemble closely that which it represents and for which it is substituted in our thinking about the world. Thus the concept of 'matter' suppresses qualities on the great scale; thus the conceptual blind 'energy' of science simplifies radically and alters profoundly for us the character of the power symbolised.

I propose to submit first a statement about 'matter', the concept-in-chief of man's invention, the so-called 'material world'. 'Matter' and its allied concepts are best dealt with

by being explained at once, not by being treated as surds till our fundamental hypothesis has been mooted. They are often formidable obstacles preventing students from even understanding what we imaginists have to say. Some critics, for instance, think that denial of the presence of 'matter' in Nature means denial of belief in an external world independent of our perceptions! Well indeed does 'matter' mythology serve the thought of the market-place, but it may become a positive obsession dominating the uncritical user. Thus the materialist Büchner, who writes that conscious life *is* 'matter' in motion, is so dominated that he has overlooked his own conscious life. Awareness is certainly not the same as an object rotating or moving through space! When opening *Z.D. (Zermatt Dialogues)* West wished to combat this 'matter' obsession at once. Otherwise at least one of us would have been haunted, like Frankenstein, by a monster of his own creation. A student whose thought is confused in respect of 'matter' cannot aspire to become 'crowned with the stars', as is the mystic of Thomas Traherne.

No one perceives 'matter', if by this term he means a stuff which, allied with 'energy', shows in the spatio-temporal events of Nature.(4) A dumb man could not point out 'matter' to a savage. For the savage *perceives* only complex objects, rich in qualities, whereas 'matter' is *conceived*; is a substitute-fact used in thinking of a grade to which rude folk cannot aspire. The concept stresses only extension (occupation of space) and resistance, the latter measured originally in experiences of touch and muscular effort. Any object is 'material' which, occupying space, resists being moved or, when in motion, being retarded or stopped. Resistance is fundamental; is noted accordingly by Bain and Mill as the characteristic defining attribute of 'matter'. Herbert Spencer's 'material' object is similarly an assemblage of co-existent positions that resist. Why was it so long before air was considered a form of 'matter'? Why is a ghost called 'immaterial'? Why are distant mountains often described as seeming 'immaterial'? Because resistance to movement is not suggested vividly by them. On the other hand, Dr. Samuel Johnson, droll defender of 'matter', kicks a reply to Berkeley. That which is

'material' resists his boot. When Dante visits Hell, his 'material' presence is noted by the Centaur Chiron :

Are ye aware that he who comes behind  
 Moves what he touches ? The feet of the dead  
 Are not so wont.

Dante's feet resist being stopped by an obstacle. The materialists of the *Theaetetus*, mentioned by the Platonic Socrates, are persons who consider nothing real save what they can grasp — that which resists the movement of their hands. And similarly a belief that 'matter' resists and what does not resist is of secondary importance prompted the invention of the Democritan atoms. These entities, battling in the void and maintaining their solid singleness despite impacts, are in truth children of human fancy, bits of resisting-extension not actually discoverable in the course of our exploration of the external world. They are of no use to philosophy. They comprise no contents from which a world of variety could be evolved and are without power to originate them. All they can do is to move in different ways, while resisting impacts. A crude hypothesis indeed. But this practice of trying to elicit a world of variety — and individuals who are aware of it — from beggarly elements, devoid of promise and potency, has always secured support. Materialists to-day as of yore set themselves this fantastic task and, as long as fools are available, will find sympathisers. Even neo-theosophy at the outset acclaimed materialism as part of its revelation to mankind. A 'Mahatma' Letter overawed the profane: '... we believe in *matter* alone . . . as the omnipresent omnipotent Proteus with its unceasing motion which is its life'. God, either personal or impersonal, is a word, but 'matter we know [*sic*] to be eternal' and matter 'is Nature herself' (5). This poor stuff was forgotten as the cult began to tap Hindu and Buddhist thought ; it suggests much, withal, touching the headwaters whence modern theosophy took its rise. Koot Hoomi is no wiser than Democritus."

S. " Splitting up the atom — the bit of resisting-extension — makes no difference ; Anderton's contention holds good. Materialism, in exalting 'matter', mistakes a man-made

concept for a cosmic substance and then finds the substance too empty to account for the world we know. To bring in protons, electrons, neutrons, positrons, etc., avails nothing, if these too are only very small bits of resisting-extension. As such they are without promise and potency, too devoid of qualities to render fecund combination possible."

L. "What says our agnostic?"

W. "That my agnosticism cannot stomach a crude philosophy of cosmic matter. But there is a growing tendency on the part of chemists and physicists to shift their ground and the materialists may learn wisdom from them. What if protons, etc., are only symbols of complicated natural agents which elude our intellectual grasp?"

L. "Have a care. The tiny protons are not then merely bits of resisting-extension after all? If so, 'matter', acclaimed as cosmic substance, is vanishing and Materialism will have to vanish with it. Nay, the veiled natural agents symbolised may turn out to be 'psychoids', centres of psychical activity akin to that which seethes in ourselves."

S. "It would be absurd to call oneself a materialist in a Pickwickian sense, just to preserve the name. The actual situation, however, is rather amusing. While Marxians and others are celebrating the victories of Materialism and showing themselves as bigoted as mediaeval Christians, the very foundations of their philosophy are crumbling. But Anderton will be telling us about this later."

A. "When a man, using a concept, says that  $x$  is material, he predicates of it two attributes — extension and resistance or inertia. *How much* of the latter? Workaday purposes may not require a precise or any answer. If, however, he is specially interested in 'quantity of matter', he will be considering mass. Symbolism now becomes very noticeable; sensations and ideas of muscular effort persist at best only as faint accompaniments of thinking. Thus the sun's mass stated in grams is brought before the mind in very indirect and makeshift fashion by numbers, for the new physicist treats mass itself as a symbol, not even asking what it symbolises in Nature. He cannot, therefore, be assailed by the critics who confound the materialists. The torch . . . thanks; I will read a passage from

*Z.D.* showing how distant this convenient language is<sup>4</sup> from metaphysics, materialistic or other.(6) In this passage you will confront another leading symbol or instrumental concept, that of 'energy' :

'Appeal is made to the precise measurements of instruments and the "mass" of a body becomes, as Eddington puts it, a mere reading on a scale ; the actual nature of what is dealt with being unknown to, and ignored by, physics. It suffices in this domain of symbolism to say that "mass" is inversely proportional to the acceleration due to a "force". Thus Man has created a splendid working tool, a co-efficient used in calculations (Poincaré) when certain metrical relations of surface-phenomena are discussed. On the other hand, "mass", which men believed once that they knew perceptually, has been conceptualised. Even so it gains ground. Thus this conceptual attribute is ascribed nowadays not only to bodies ordinarily so called, such as stars, stones, sticks and atoms, but also to "radiation", the periodic processes covered by this name being credited with "mass" and exerting pressure. Nay, there is a tendency to maintain either that all "energy" has "mass" or that "mass" is identical with "energy". But if "mass" is a mere reading on a scale, such statements are, metaphysically speaking, elaborations of no value. For the mere reading called "mass" has been coupled with an instrumental concept called "energy", sometimes indeed defined as "capacity for work", but yielding nothing explanatory such as Plato's "spectator of all time and all existence" would have desired. It is not in this way that the heart of reality is to be reached. Indeed we are noting the artificiality of the atmosphere in which physics breathes. "Energy" is only another imaginal device furthering practical inference. James called it a "magnificent economic schematic device for keeping account of the functional variations of the surface phenomena". It is useless to metaphysics, as the rival definitions, "capacity for work", "name for the quantitative aspect of a structure of happenings" (Whitehead), reveal. Apart from its services as symbol in the measurements of physical science, it is a bald, uninstrutive concept. Nevertheless it has misled many, and more especially those believers in



"energetics" who find in "energy" the very heart of the world. We must be careful not to follow in their train. The complexity of time-strung, space-hung phenomena does not emerge from "capacity for work" or the "quantitative aspect of a structure"!'

Professor Wortvoll may agree with Jeans that the picture of 'energy' as a stream flowing through space 'leads to absurdities'.(7) 'Potential energy' too has often amused the critics. But if we use the concept, in the spirit suggested by James, as a device, we must admire greatly the men who invented it."

S. "Thus the formula of Einstein  $m = E/c^2$  makes appeal to the physicist, but, since it contains  $m$  and  $E$ , leaves fundamental reality quite unexplored. The statement that one gram of 'mass' = so many ergs of 'energy' leaves us seeing as in a glass — very darkly. It symbolises a relation whose terms are, at best, very incompletely known. What say you, Wortvoll?"

W. "An agnostic, who regards the inwardness of Nature as unknown, I have no option; I accept the symbolism. But I suppose that you and your friends hold that it is practicable to indicate what the realities symbolised are."

S. "Our optimism is sufficiently strong. 'Energy' will be dealt with when we discuss *consciring*; 'mass' takes us to the doings of the 'psychoids', those minor centres of *consciring* that glow amid the contents of Nature. But, though Nature has been called the home of a 'great society', man will have to toil long before he gains adequate knowledge about its groups. Meanwhile I am digressing. Anderton, please continue your remarks touching the concepts of physics."

A. "'Space' and 'time', discussed until quite recently by *physicists* as independent, have been merged in 'space-time'. Philosophers, of course, long ago were rid of these separate entities; merging them in the spatio-temporal contents to which they belong. A qualitative cosmic continuum exists in the manners called spatial and temporal; and we may be able to surmise how this spatiality and even time-succession came to pass.(8) Anyhow, absolute space and time may be dismissed, as by Whitehead, as 'metaphysical mon-

strosities'. Relativity within the range of physics, of which we hear so much, is imposed; but the best statement of it is, perhaps, still to be sought. Relativity of the philosophical order subordinates minor regions of relativity such as that which concerns physics. This too is a truth of importance, though one frequently overlooked. Philosophy also is interested in ascertaining what the aspects of reality named 'space-time' truly are. It is not, like physics, busied solely or mainly with measuring. It cannot accept mythology, whereas any useful hypothesis that secures accurate measurements suffices for physics. According to Rignano, Einstein's theory of relativity involves mathematical construction 'to which, as it is now formulated, no reality corresponds'.<sup>(9)</sup> Some physicists, again, believe in homaloidal space and some don't. But, if, as pragmatists say, their constructions 'work', they are free to consider space homaloidal or not as they like. Note incidentally that all constructive hypothesis is built by fancy, to which indeed we owe all initiative in reasoning, in mathematics as elsewhere. Such fancy, when verifiable and only then, becomes truth.

'Force', the veiled cause of 'mass' accelerations, is a mathematical fiction, a child of fancy, but it too symbolises the drive of 'psychoids'; of minor centres of consciring distributed throughout the external world in numbers almost incredibly great.

Fancy also constructed the 'ether', but to this no reality in the physical world corresponds. Credited with incompatible qualities, 'ether', now widely discredited, was nevertheless for long useful; users of mathematical formulae, who had studied certain physical waves, wanted to conceive space astir with others not too markedly unlike them. Now the surface waves of water need, as a medium — water; waves in space, it was urged, may need similarly, as a medium — ether. But water at any rate is a verifiable physical fact, while no one can produce evidence showing that ether exists outside his fancy. Ether is just the ghost of 'matter' (resisting-extension), the concept which, as we saw, belongs solely to the domain of the human mind. It is a fiction of service to calculators, not a natural agent which functions independently

of their thought. It 'veils', urges Whitehead in his *Organisation of Thought*, the abstractness of scientific generalisation 'under a myth', allowing our imaginations to work more freely. Exactly."

L. "The behaviour of light has been held to suggest particles as well as waves; laymen like myself find this complication puzzling."

S. "Quite so, apart from the fact that the meaning of 'particle', after what Anderton has been saying, is not obvious. I don't want to launch my explanatory hypothesis now — yes, I am nursing one — but I will say this. The complete solution of this riddle will not be found so long as light (properly so called, the light of vision) is held not to exist outside our brains. It will be reached, on the lines of Imaginism, as part of a *qualitative* metaphysics of Nature. Nature, since the seventeenth century, has been robbed of flesh and blood in the cult of the skeleton. All the colours of the artist, and probably indefinitely more, exist in the external world whether they behave as 'particles' or are accompanied by waves. Observe that I say 'accompanied'."

L. "And these 'waves' too seem somewhat odd, compared, say, with water waves which, I take it, prompted the imagining of them."

S. "Don't accept the familiar troughs and crests in ether (for some purposes conceived as jelly-like, for others as more rigid than steel!) as more than pictorial makeshifts; suspect that there is much more in 'undulatory transmission of light' than mathematical formulae and 'electro-magnetic' symbolism allow for. Equations, illustrated by wave-like curves, represent but don't mirror the facts. And the major fact is the travelling of light itself. Do you suppose that the external world is unlit or that God, called by us Divine Imagining, is *blind*? Is there no glory of the heavens outside our petty brains? We are becoming rid of the age of faith as regards the popular religions. Let us be rid also of the superstitions of the age of science, inevitable when beliefs useful in a limited sphere of inquiry are thrust uncritically on metaphysics. As to transmission I refer you to West's words about Penetration as recorded in *Z.D.* All such transmission is penetration of one

part of the psychical continuum of Nature by another; an invasion of quite a complex kind.”(10)

*L.* “As a scribbler of poetry I welcome all this of course; it brings back romance into a world which science had made as devoid of charm as a dried-up leaf. Yes, I recall well our talk about Penetration; it helped us later to solve the problem as to what occurs when causal change takes place. But I fear that Wortvoll will regard us as running amok; we were listening to Anderton on symbolism and, lo!, in a trice we are heading towards the heart of things.”

*W.* “Kant would have disapproved of any raid into the domain of ‘noumena’, in search of things-in-themselves as they exist independently of our perceptions. But, after all, I am not a Kantian and an agnostic cannot be quite sure that even his agnosticism is sound. What has been said by Stark and Leslie is suggestive. I could tolerate Nature being restocked fully with qualities, though difficulties arise when I ask myself to what extent the sense-data which I perceive reveal these qualities. One does not obtain such knowledge on demand. But as to the alleged minor centres . . .” and he shook his head.

*S.* “Yet, accepting them, you would be in excellent company. Royce considered that Nature ‘constitutes a vast society’, though the details are only faintly hinted to us men. Whitehead regards even the atom as a minor society and classes protons and electrons with organisms in general.(11) And later we shall be able to suggest how such a vast society was born.”

*A.* “Your raid into Wortvoll’s unknown ‘Back of Beyond’ is over. Well, whatever your final conclusions may be, you have broken with mechanistic theory. ‘Mass’ and ‘energy’, sometimes ‘energy’ alone, sometimes ‘matter’ and ‘force’, sometimes merely ‘matter that moves’ have been exalted as sources of the phenomena of the external world and even of our conscious lives, but we have seen how woefully empty these concepts are. You can no more get the variety of the world out of them than you can draw the solar system out of a conjurer’s hat. Such simplifying devices are to be regarded as inevitably unsound, as foredoomed to be inadequate to the

reality which they confront. And so I take leave of this bad metaphysics, passing to the thought that is worth the tribute of laborious days.

The philosophically-minded men of science are opposed to crude declarations such as those just noted. They favour a symbolism that is extremely cautious and are ready to change their symbols as soon as better are devised. The tiny marbles, of almost Democritan simplicity, which did duty as the original electrons, protons, etc., have vanished as no longer of use to such symbolism. In one passage Eddington calls the electron a 'dummy', sometimes not even 'a useful aid to comprehension', and suggests that later on *Psi* — the occult agent which the fancy of some workers places in the background — may be called a 'dummy' as well. 'Dummies' indeed have to take their turn until metaphysics and physics, under the pressure of the real, begin to converge. Nature is in fact very complex and will not tolerate formulae which are too empty. 'Wave-mechanics', for instance, cannot possibly mirror the variety of Nature as upheld in Divine Imagining. 'Waves' were dealt with decisively by Stark. A diet of wave-equations leaves us, like *Oliver Twist*, wanting more and unable to get it.

But obviously we have no quarrel with symbolism of this type which may be that of an agnostic or of an Eddington for whom the inwardness of the physical world is of psychical or mind-like character. Such symbolism may well be allied with idealistic philosophy. Idealists with a liking for extremely abstract thought may study the Theory of Groups to profit. But here they will be in the realm of logical imagination and marks on paper; there will be no pictures to lighten toil, and only an arid scheme of relations rewards research. Deduction of planet, mice and men from the knowledge of structure obtained is impossible; the work is hard and the wage is poor. And so even competent men may prefer to fill their time differently. Each to his taste, if wisdom is to rejoice in her children."

*L.* "Give me art, sport and a fair working knowledge of philosophy. What's the good of sham knowledge very hard to acquire and too abstract for enjoyment when possessed?"

I'll wait till wisdom about the insides of atoms comes to me in another and concrete form. *Vita brevis!*"

W. "But allow me to find what you call sham knowledge interesting. And I can't wait till a hypothetical career after death enlightens me. Knowledge deferred may never come."

S. "Don't dispute about tastes. But as regards a career after death I am making a suggestion. This thirst for hardly won knowledge is surely instructive, especially when the said knowledge is of no practical value in the struggle for existence. There is revealed in this thirst a soul living *its own life*, not a life dictated by the body. But, if so, what becomes of 'psychology without a soul'? And, if there is a soul and that soul survives the death of the body, even Leslie's dream of wisdom may be realised at long last. I am now off to bed and I leave you, Wortvoll, this suggestion for criticism. We shall be discussing, as you are aware, the problem of the soul later."

\* \* \* \* \*

A. "Well, what do you think of our talk, Wortvoll?" The two others had gone to their rooms, taking care on the way not to miss the bar.

W. "A capital start; we can now go full steam ahead. Of course you were anxious to be rid of the obstacles which a mechanical view of the world must present, and you were not sure whether I cherished a certain liking for materialism or not. You find me to be an agnostic quite ready to be enlightened and curious to learn what your new form of idealism is worth. Get to the essentials at our next meeting."

A. "Yes, we shall be dealing next with the hypothesis of God regarded as Divine Imagining. You will be interested also in our views about the evolution of Nature, but, as I warned you before, don't expect us to discuss this part of the programme as fully as is done in the book *Z.D.* We three imaginists are in agreement respecting *Z.D.*, and our desire is to reach as quickly as may be the talks which concern the soul-riddle. We shall approach the latter as inquirers who want to experiment with ideas on the basis of West's teachings as recorded in *Z.D.*, a copy of which I shall be asking you to accept. Study and criticise it by all means, but I trust that our spoken summary

will be a sufficient introduction to the main business of this gathering."

W. "Thanks, I won't fail to prepare myself for the fray. The adventure promises really well."

A. "Rediscovery of a lost world is worth an effort. And, if further the two most interesting of all problems, those touching God and the soul, find solutions, our holiday will have been well spent. Good night and pleasant dreams."

#### NOTES BY BASIL ANDERTON

(1) *Introduction to Science, Religion and Reality*, p. 8.

(2) *Space, Time and Gravitation*, p. 200.

(3) *The Mysterious Universe*, p. 148.

(4) Cf. *Z.D.* (*Zermatt Dialogues*), pp. 31-41, on "matter". No one perceives "matter" in Nature and so no one can learn to be a materialist from Nature. Professor Hogben, *Mathematics for the Million* (5th imp.), p. 222, writes that "astronomers are materialists so long as they remain in their observatories", but he means, I suppose, "radical empiricists". Materialism is a kind of metaphysics, a result of thinking, not of gazing at perceptual objects.

(5) A. T. Barker, *Mahatma Letters*, pp. 52, 53, 55. These and like ideas inspired A. P. Sinnett to write *Esoteric Buddhism*, which aimed at the reformation of Western philosophy.

(6) *Z.D.* pp. 37-38.

(7) *The Mysterious Universe*, p. 108.

(8) On space-time, cf. *Z.D.* pp. 422-458.

(9) "Psychology in its Relations to Philosophy and Science", *Mind*, Oct. 1926.

(10) On Penetration, an understanding of which is presupposed if we are to solve the historic riddle of causation, cf. *Z.D.* pp. 322-325, and on causation, pp. 378-410.

(11) "The atom is only explicable as a society with activities involving rhythms with their definite periods . . . there is every reason to believe that rhythmic periods cannot be dissociated from the protonic and electronic entities." — *Process and Reality*, p. 109.

## CHAPTER III

### GOD IS DIVINE IMAGINING

Our method of approaching the solution of a fundamental problem — What can we say about the Power manifested in the external world and conscious life ?

“The distinction between what is real and what is imaginary is not one that can be finally maintained . . . all existing things are, in an intelligible sense, imaginary.” — JOHN S. MACKENZIE, *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, p. 440.

“What does Schiller say ? The hypothesis of Divine Imagining ‘can really afford to be what other metaphysical principles falsely claim to be, viz. all-embracing. It can be represented as including not only all reality but all unreality.’ The most exacting of all tests !” — *Zermatt Dialogues*, p. 75.

“The world of imagination is the world of eternity.” — BLAKE.

LESLIE and I were sitting in our snug hollow on the green slope of the Wengernalp, gazing across the Trümleten valley at the Jungfrau. The great avalanche, seen the day before, had crashed into the ravine, and its track of fouled snow, ice and rocks had turned our thoughts first to geology and kindred topics. But our friends were coming and interest was switched on to the coming talk.

L. “So you like Wortvoll — well, he is able but be careful. In his university haunts he deals in piles of useless knowledge. Overstress intellect and there result new ways of wasting time. Don’t let him talk too much during the first part of our palaver ; after all Stark and I will be hearing nothing new ; the recapitulation is only for his convenience. But when we come to discuss the soul, the more difficulties he can suggest the better.”

A. “I’ve seen to that — he will allow for our time being limited. You were pleased with the first talk ? ”

L. “Decidedly. All agreed that mechanistic science was right in suppressing qualities for practical ends ; with intent to direct us better in predicting and bringing about changes in



the world. But mechanistic theory, mistaken for metaphysics, is wasted breath. This obstacle removed, we are free to infer, if we can, the reality of an external world such as perception itself suggests ; of Nature, superlatively rich in qualities and even 'societies', beside which the conventional 'mass'-and-'energy' phantom will seem absurd. Even Wortvoll concedes that we are justified in trying ; as an agnostic he can't say more. Hallo ! here they are."

When the Professors had done reverence to the outlook and found comfortable lounging places in the hollow, Leslie chose the speaker : " Won't you open the ball, Anderton ? "

A. " As metaphysicians, students of *πρώτη φιλοσοφία*, inquirers into the character of ultimate reality, we seek truth. And truth ? I will not call it, as is the fashion, an 'eternal value' — it began in finite minds and, were all finite minds to be destroyed, would perish with them. Truth for us ought to be a name for the hypothetical sum of true human judgments ; judgments formed in separate minds, but referred to as if they constitute, in some unspecified manner, a whole. This whole is known to nobody in particular and, were it known, would be found unstable, untidy and with ragged edges, made up indeed of fragments utterly inadequate to the universe. Shall we define truth as the system, a whole organised according to plan (which is perhaps only a useful fiction) of all true judgments ? "

W. " You won't halt for a wayside chat about truth ? There are competing views."

A. " I am stating the imaginist theory which has been labelled by a critic 'representational pragmatism'. And I shall be seeking to give you a brief summary of Imaginism in general before we pass on to consider the minor riddle of the soul. No ; we must avoid unnecessary delays ; so put questions and raise objections only when my summary seems unclear, too condensed, or refutable off-hand."

W. " Right. You hold that there may be no whole of truth. But what about the indefinitely many 'true judgments' ? "

A. " The true (treu in your language = loyal, faithful) judgment is loyal to reality, *i.e.* to that phase of reality of

primary interest which it is 'about'. I repeat 'about'. A true judgment is aspect of a relation; there can be truth 'about' the State, but the State itself, like rivers, stars and stormy seas, is not truth but reality. A true concept or idea 'of' the State has been won when a *substitute-fact* resembles the original sufficiently well to represent it, for limited purposes, in my thinking. The truth about God is not God the reality; merely a substitute-fact, agreeing in important respects with the original and of value, therefore, in conceptual reasoning. Reality in this case is obviously higher than truth, the mere makeshift which it is difficult for puny man even to 'verify'. Someone might ask at this stage: 'What now of reality? Can that term, also "existence", be defined?' I will return to this issue when the main hypothesis interesting us to-day has been stated."

W. "Hegel, who believed God to be the rational *Truth-Whole*, would dissent, unless he has learnt wisdom in the Elysian fields."

L. "If he is now able to intuit the 'radiance beyond reason', the reality to which Anderton refers."

A. "Hegel will give us no trouble. Any other questions facilitating my task?"

S. "The substitute-fact of truth is of course itself a minor reality within the expanse of reality?"

A. "Always and inevitably, whatever be the form that it wears. All appearances are real, but their local habitations or levels differ. All have power; even a dream of fancy, of an empire, invention or new religion, may alter the civilised world. 'One brilliant thought', writes Fisher in his *History of Europe*, 'gave to mankind the empire of the mines with all that followed from such a conquest.' He refers to Watt's separate condenser, which started its career in fancy as an airy nothing. But is there need to multiply illustrations?"

W. "How do you deal with symbolic logic which disdains verification external to the logic itself?"

A. "Strictly formal logic, as Schiller remarks, does not concern truth; let it rest content with 'formal validity'. It is a by-way of thinking not concerned with judgments such as a man makes about himself, his like and the cosmos at large

and, to this extent, is useless knowledge. A logic of truth has to be the handmaid of common-sense, science and philosophy — a science of inference aiding us in the battle of life.”

S. “There is a science of transfinite numbers which invites like criticism. There can be no experimental verification of a belief in such numbers, which, indeed, have been described as ‘numbers which are no numbers’ and thus as self-contradictory fictions. Self-contradictory or not, these numbers are *command-concepts*, offspring of the ‘logical imagination’. They are ordered to exist — or subsist timelessly, as perhaps safer! — and are then discussed as if the order had been executed. A science dealing with them may be carried far and is very interesting.”

L. “Yes, but the world offers such glorious fields for thought that I should grudge the time required. Sport also draws pleasantly on my fund of leisure. Terrene life is short, so let me cultivate my small garden wisely.”

A. “Leslie, a poet of imagination all compact, has a poet’s prejudices — he wants art, percepts and thoughts about percepts; he won’t allow ‘logical imagination’, as stressed by Earl Russell, a hearing. . . . But let me continue.

We have been talking about truth; we have now to feel our way towards the truth about Divine Imagining, a term which makes clear what we conceive to be the nature of God. The method or manner of making such inquiries is important; it will be well to consider briefly what lines of approach ordinary folk like ourselves ought to avoid and what one promises best, always supposing that we are not in quest of some oasis of petty religious satisfactions but are loyal to reality at large. An oasis of charm can be found among the popular faiths; our way, a hard one, is through the wilderness and, as some think, may end there. Wortvoll, I see, smiles.

Ultimate reality is sought for and adored often in the realms of faith. Thomas Aquinas held that faith and reason, being both gifts of God, must agree. Experience, however, has shown us that faith, an ally of popular religions in all regions of the planet, answers questions with a hundred conflicting voices. It has shown too that reasoning yields conclusions which at best are only probably true, that, far from being a

divine gift above criticism, it is tentative and experimental, always taking a risk. Faith is a phase of fancy, lit with emotion, which, in the sphere of religion, creates sometimes the most perfect reality in our lives ; sometimes alas ! as history reveals, the ugly and abominable. It creates differently for different persons ; variety is the mark of its freedom. Reasoning itself, as we shall see, cannot stir without fancy. Accordingly the war of good reasoners, aggressive and wearing the shining armour of logic, is incessant. Even in philosophy one hero, it would seem, cannot take up the pen without disagreeing with another. 'Emotional bias ? Fixed habits ?' These are potent but perhaps more potent is the innovating fancy that permeates all thought which is not merely verbal. An alliance of faith and reasoning will not secure certitude. And in practice faith ordinarily dictates what a servile reason has to defend.

Faith may dictate belief in a personal god such as Zeus, Marduk, Baal, or in a deity such as Malebranche worshipped, a celestial egoist who created the world just to manifest his own glory. What Whitehead terms the 'Semitic concept' of a definitely personal god is a dream of faith, which hampered for long the progress of Western philosophy. At last, in countries enjoying some freedom, even plain men began to murmur. What favoured this special person that 'he' (for there was a tendency to regard this person as male) should be President of the Immortals ? And philosophers made answer : we know of no persons that do not arise in time, of none which are not cradled in, and conditioned by, limitations which they did not make. A person or persons, conceived as eternal and unconditioned, the creative source of other persons and minor sentient, as well as of the external world, have no explanatory value. Personality is not basic ; signifies a life 'cabined and confined' beyond which every high mystic seeks to pass.

Another alleged way of approaching ultimate reality is by 'intuition'. Did not Schelling predict that at long last the theoretic sciences will perish and immediate intuition reign in their stead ? Direct acquaintance with ultimate reality, it is urged, is perhaps possible. There are cases in which this so-called intuition is not distinguishable from faith. The

reports differ, the 'revelations' are not enlightening. But, ignoring these, I have to stress a grave difficulty. Is not our position in the cosmos too lowly, can we expect men to exchange on demand their faulty faith and reasoning for the insight of gods? Is it well to try to anticipate what perhaps only a very remote future may bring? There are possibly here and there men who have realised to some extent the dream of Schelling, but they are not celebrities of the university or market-place. And Schelling himself has written no book showing that the intuition of his meditations has profited him. His later works record a riot of private fancy rather than profound mystical insight. Thus we learn the need of extreme caution in accepting what intuitionists assert. Further, even if these men enjoy special illumination, how much of their information derives from their intuition and how much from ordinary sources? There's the rub."

L. "Thus Wordsworth takes joy in that intuited Presence :

Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns.

But how much does this kind of experience disclose? One man might welcome it as evidence of the reality of a personal god; another might greet therein the Divine Idea of Hegel; yet another would do reverence to Spencer's Unknowable. Edward von Hartmann would have acclaimed the impersonal spiritual Power, unaware of its doings, which is discussed in the *Philosophy of the Unconscious*. So many men, so many claims. I must urge that this vague experience discloses in fact little. It solves none of our great riddles. And assuredly it cannot enlighten us as to what form of idealism is the best. Blinkered as we are on the low level of human conscious life, we shall have to be critical and exploit reason for what it is worth. We may intuite, but we don't intuite enough."

W. "Yes; be critical. For we must allow that man has up to the present learnt much more from the intellectuals than from the mystics. I ought to add that the minor mystics, who claim illumination from above, have had hard things written about them. Doctors have noted in purveyors of religious other-world-lore symptoms of 'diseases of personality' and even erotomania. Your F. W. H. Myers, who would have

welcomed wisdom coming from 'the other side', found that in most cases of alleged ecstasy the 'revelations' were of no worth, interesting only to the experient.<sup>(1)</sup> Swedenborg, who believed in hell and sent there for punishment members of Christian sects which he disliked, had a crude idea also of heaven, with denizens of which he had talks. You must permit me in this connexion to judge the tree by its fruit."

*L.* "Quite so. Strongly held beliefs don't of themselves make truths. Catherine de Medici found her personal god an ally 'who always helps me'. But, in spite of the lady's belief, possibly intense, I remain unconvinced. It would be interesting to have her opinion to-day!"

*S.* "I won't discuss the psychology of so-called minor mystics" — the Professor wore the look of one calling an unruly class to order — "I am suggesting that the term 'mystic' is often misapplied. Ghost-seers, explorers of heavens and hells, clairvoyants, supposed wonder-workers and the rest are not mystics in the sense in which West — in my opinion quite properly — used the word. These persons are credited with special perceptions and special powers, but, apart from this, they remain very ordinary folk, often stupid slaves of some inherited creed. They may confront genuine phases of reality, but we all do that; everything that appears in space-time is real; even a hallucination is real in some centre of conscious life, if not beyond it. The important question for the philosophers is that of the width and depth of reality confronted. A mystic on the Platonic scale, 'spectator of all time and all existence', would be the man for them. But such a one, if he exists, is not to be got into the witness-box, while his full report assuredly could not be understood. Bergson's 'experimental proof' of deity might be enjoyed by a great mystic, but we poor human gropers must feel our way tentatively and painfully into the light."

*W.* "Can we have a definition of the term, genuine mystic?"

*S.* "All in this hierarchy are troubled with homesickness. Let me read the passage in which West, himself a true mystic, made the matter clear: (2) 'According to Nettleship, mysticism grows out of the belief that "every 'fact' is an element in

'the fact'". Blake saw 'a world in a grain of sand' and Wordsworth sings :

Our destiny, our being's heart and home,  
Is with infinitude and only there.

What then is '*the fact*' . . . it is God regarded as Divine Imagining. There is a hierarchy of mystics, rank in this indicating how far the soul in question has risen towards 'our being's heart and home'. Only quite humble mystics bear names honoured in the temple of Fame. But all share, though with very different degrees of competence, one conviction. You will recall that Socrates, when dying, asks Crito to sacrifice a cock to Asclepius — is he not recovering from the disease of earth-life ? The mystic also is ready to sacrifice to God — is he not passing from the defective isolated life, whether suffered on earth or elsewhere, towards a divine completion of his being ? "

W. "Not so bad. But the soul and its home may both be figments of that private fancy of which we have heard so much of late. Continue, Anderton."

A. "In battling for Imaginism I shall ignore compulsorily faith and intuition, neither being welcome to modern critics. I shall dispense also with the three time-honoured lines of alleged 'logically conclusive' argument considered and rejected by Kant, the Ontological, the Cosmological and the Teleological. These were invented to secure *absolute proof* of the existence of God, conceived as 'the most real' of realities, infinite and yet also personal. Kant showed that they fail. This failure, which cannot be remedied, is no concern of mine. I am not in quest of 'logically conclusive' proof of the reality of God conceived as Divine Imagining and, even if I were, am sure that I could not find it. Man on our low cosmic level reasons towards the merely probable. Further, if by mending the old arguments, I could infer rightly, I should not attain Divine Imagining at the end of them. A schoolman's abstraction would be my reward. I shall have recourse to a far more promising method of research. It continues that which has been found so satisfactory in science. I shall make use freely of hypothesis and thus give fancy a free swing. This

fancy provides the initiatives of thought required. Verification imposes the necessary check on fancy ; truth issuing gradually from experiments with ideas, confronted with experience."

*L.* "What could be better for blind gropers such as we are ? No arid syllogising ; no putting sily into the logical hat of what we are to take ostentatiously out of it. I *create* in hypothesis for thought what I proceed to *find* also in the larger reality, if it is to be found at all. If my creation agrees sufficiently well with that which it is used to represent, fancy becomes truth ; if not, I can close the experiment and try again. Thus bit by bit I can make my original hypothesis more adequate to the complex reality. It is pleasant too to hope that my fancy or private imagining is to bear me towards Divine Imagining, substance of the universe."

*W.* "The 'bit by bit' progress is to body forth cautiously the hypothesis 'God is Divine Imagining'. Quite so, but the verifying business seems to me rather formidable."

*S.* "No doubt, but we have to face it ; we can't be aware directly of the infinite ocean of Divine Imagining, can't *be* the reality we talk about as substance of the universe. Nevertheless we are drops in this ocean — at least I think so — and in our petty ways have direct acquaintance with it ; are immersed in what is co-essential with, and permeates, us. Our task is to better a knowledge which we already, but as a rule unwittingly, possess. In doing so, we make use of substitute-facts, *i.e.* concepts, and stitch together these rags to clothe the nakedness of our minds as best we can. Leslie spoke of hypotheses, glad to find that philosophy and science, as well as poetry, are in debt to fancy. Fancy indeed underlies all non-verbal inference, deductive and inductive. A deductive step in advance is always a creation of fancy. In the more pictorial sciences, *e.g.* physiology and geology, hypotheses also are clearly of imaginal origin ; but few of us allow sufficiently for Earl Russell's 'abstract' or 'logical' imagination manifested in the sphere of pure mathematics ; or for the 'direct philosophic vision', 'the new effort of logical imagination' which succeeds when routine work fails.(3) 'Even in abstract calculation mathematical thought is essentially inventive and constructive, and every analysis presupposes the synthesis



completed in the act of definition', writes Aliotta.(4) Metageometry is inventive; 'I have created another wholly new world', said Bolyai. But after all I am but citing examples of an imaginal activity which, according to Ribot, 'is everywhere'."

W. "I see that you have come here well furnished with munitions" (commented Wortvoll drily, as he watched the last speaker stuffing his notes into a pocket). "I must be armed suitably next time. Meanwhile I should like to know this. Are there any creative powers in the universe, as you conceive it, besides the imaginal?"

S. "None; the entire drive of creative evolution, Bergson's *élan vital*, is imaginal. I am naming it with reference to its content-processes. But, if I were naming it with reference to the activity displayed, I should speak of CONSCIRING, the Power behind the throne. You will hear about this later. Anderton, I fear, finds this digression too long drawn-out."

A. "'What is now proved was once only imagined', wrote Blake; I am to imagine hypothesis which, though not provable once and for all, seems at any rate to be very probably true. Before stating it, I will refer you to two unsatisfactory examples of world-theory which may be treated as hypothesis, though one of them at least was not advanced originally as such. The first, which is very modern, regards God as the mathematician. This suggestion completes the movement, dating from the seventeenth century, at the end of which the external world, stripped of its robes of glory and losing its flesh and blood, became a skeleton of interest only to calculators who measure. This skeleton is not to partner metaphysics in a 'danse macabre'. Our need is for the fulness of reality, not dry bones; we don't want the measuring science to be overstressed."

Mathematics deals with far too little to be dominant in metaphysics. Hear what a famous living mathematician, who is also a philosopher, has to say. Mathematics, according to Whitehead in *Universal Algebra*, consists 'in the organisation of a series of aids to the imagination in the process of reasoning'. It deals with number, quantity, geometry, 'in modern times also including investigation into yet more abstract concepts of order and into analogous types of purely logical relations'.(5) Emphasising its main value in the service

of man, Hogben describes the science as 'the language of size'. Important then to man as is this science, it concerns only a few aspects of the complex reality that confronts philosophy. So long as we remain mere men, we need and are grateful for its 'aids' — so long as we have to reason, this facilitation of our toil is indispensable. I pass on.

My second case of unsatisfactory world-theory is that of Hegel's conceptual rationalism which contrasts in most illuminating fashion with the Imaginism which I defend. It will be easy to understand and appreciate Imaginism if the essentials of Hegel's philosophy are stated and criticised first. Hegel completes a development, the origin of which is to be found in Greek thought. Some of the famous Greeks had exaggerated the importance of Reason. Plato was devoted to the 'divine principle of Reason', not merely as it shows in human mentality, but as the highest reality in the universe. This view took final shape far later in the Reason-based idealism of Hegel which is as thorough and systematic as Plato could have wished it to be. Of course in more direct historical sequence Hegel's thought derives in notable respects from the work of Kant,(6) though the advance — if we are to call it an advance — is very considerable. Kant's shade would have opposed Hegel as the living man opposed Fichte. Philosophers are loth often to tolerate developments which their works may be held, not unfairly, to suggest.

Hegel's venture in penning a 'romance of the infinite' (Rénan) was magnificent; and the missing of the truth mattered little. The failures of thinkers have a high value, exhausting experiments in certain fields and so furthering them in others. The guiding assumption in Hegel's researches is not far to seek. He declined to treat reason as 'one among a crowd of other faculties'. He exalted it into the 'universal' or common source of all that Nature and finite mind comprise — accepted it as the 'basis of everything',(7) or, as he calls it in *Philosophy of History*, the 'energy' and 'sovereign', of the world, 'substance as well as infinite power'. The real is the rational and the rational is the real. Logic becomes the 'all-animating spirit of all the sciences', and its categories or types of rational thought a 'spiritual hierarchy'; the heart

and centre of things. Logic, now of cosmic scope, is the system of the pure types of thought, and the philosophy of Nature and Mind, regarded as ensouled by logic, has as its problem 'only to recognise the logical forms under the shapes they assume in Nature and Mind — shapes which are only a particular mode of expression for the forms of pure thought.'<sup>(8)</sup> Even the modes of a particular human mind are only 'additional specifications' of logical thought, which is also the 'indwelling nature or substance of external things'. The 'universal and irresistible' power, the immanent self-movement of the categories, is Dialectic which is not a mere philosopher's method, but the very pulse of cosmic life. It lies 'at the root of' every natural process, present 'wherever there is movement, wherever there is life,' and penetrates, as compelling dynamic, into the varied regions which concern philosophy of Mind. It is this Dialectic, of cosmic scope, that Imaginism has discarded in favour of the Imaginal Dynamic,<sup>(9)</sup> but of that anon."

L. "This Logical Idea, or system of Reason, which is Hegel's God, has been also called a spiritual Absolute. I don't recall well what West said about this term."

A. "The Absolute is spiritual reality 'complete, perfect and finished'. It confronts us also in the chief form of the Vedānta philosophy of India. It may have been conceived first by tired, hot men in the plains, men who liked finished tasks, rest and quiet in their practical lives and invented an alluring theoretical haven where nothing happens. *Brahman* is above change. But what of the changing show which we are aware of? The answer is that it has only 'practical reality'; appeal to Maya saves the situation — for not too exacting critics. Professor Deussen of Kiel welcomed this Absolute, defending it on Kantian lines with the plea that space, time, causation, etc., are merely features of the phenomenal world. But those who believe that spatio-temporal processes take place, whether we perceive them or not, require a different hypothesis about the world-principle.

The Absolute, as it confronts us in Greek thought, responds to what Dewey has called the Greek 'joy in what is finished'. This is the forerunner of the German and British Absolutes.

Hegel's Absolute, for instance, is the spiritual whole of Reason which I was describing just now. It is *said* to be both 'accomplished' and 'accomplishing itself', but as 'accomplished' is hostile to real novelty. This exclusion of real novelty characterises the attitude of the British Hegelian McTaggart for whom time is unreal. It is illustrated too in the thought of Bradley whose onslaught on 'appearances' recalls Vedântist subtlety. He tells us plainly in *Appearance and Reality* that, if time-succession and change are not unreal, the Absolute is a delusion. He regards change as an idea which is self-contradictory, discrepant with itself.<sup>(10)</sup> Imaginism accepts change; regards time-succession as the form or manner of additive creation. It destroys the Absolute by making change and time-succession reveal the very nature of God, of Divine Imagining."

L. "Thanks — I had forgotten this fundamental achievement. Wortvoll, you will hear something later worth waiting for."

W. "I have no use for the Absolute and am indifferent as to how you assail it. But your attempt to understand time-succession will be interesting. Some idealists consider the riddle as to why succession forms part of finite experience insoluble. How and why does the 'perfect' Absolute give rise to what *happens*, more especially as what happens is often sheerly bad? The Absolute, which disgorges the foulnesses of life, seems to me imperfect, but maybe this semblance is 'unreal' like the other unwanted appearances!" (and he laughed disagreeably).

A. "A little more and I have done. Our statement of Imaginism will be the best reply that we can make to Hegel. Meanwhile take note that God's reality, whatever it is held to comprise, is itself, in Whitehead's words, 'the ultimate irrationality';<sup>(11)</sup> no rational explanation will avail to show why this eternal principle is what it is. We are seeking to explore more fully the ocean of the infinite, not to reach an impossible infinite beyond it.

The Hegelian venture — 'God is Reason' — is only one of the experiments of human imagination or fancy. Hegel declined to treat reason as 'one among a crowd of other faculties'. He *selected* reason, exalted it as 'basis of every-

thing' and articulated it dialectically in a logic which is ontology. Selected! But this procedure is risky. Unless Hegel can show that reason is 'basis' of all the phenomena of the external world and conscious life, he has failed. Attempted verification of his hypothesis shows that there is much for which reason cannot account. And, further, we may urge that reason was itself generated *during* the time-process and was not therefore a reality which, as 'sovereign of the world,' (Hegel) is above time. The real is not always the rational, as too confiding Hegelians had been led to believe; even the master had to allow that Nature is 'too weak to display reason everywhere'; much that occurs is accidental, devoid of meaning. The history of Man, let me add, contains very much which is not rational, if that term refers us to the co-ordination of events fulfilling sane purpose. . . . And now, perhaps, I have said enough."

L. "Just a word. Confusion would be avoided, were some inquirers to use the term 'rational' more carefully. Thus the term, in the context of Hegelian hypothesis, denotes a Power ensouled with logical categories or 'thought-determinations'. In another context it may mean merely 'purposive'. Thus rational conduct for the majority of us is conduct which furthers realisation of a clearly conceived purpose. But Ruysbroeck's 'Radiance beyond Reason' also realises purpose. We are not committed to belief in a world devoid of purpose just because we hold that God is above Reason."

A. "Well said. Don't you think so, Wortvoll?"

W. "Yes, yes. But next time let us be rid of Hegel and the rest. I don't want to live too much in the past, but to pick such inspiration as I can from the present. Back to our quarters. This slope is becoming too hot and the big horse-flies are positively vicious."

#### NOTES BY BASIL ANDERTON

- (1) *Human Personality* (1913 edit.), p. 317.
- (2) *Z.D.* p. 30.
- (3) *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 241.
- (4) *The Idealistic Reaction Against Science*, p. 333.
- (5) *Science and the Modern World*, p. 30.

(6) *E.g.* Kant's categories "form really the substance of Hegel", writes Hutchison Stirling, *Secret of Hegel*, vol. ii. p. 401. Yes, but lifted out of Kant's narrow idealism, multiplied, raised to the position of "souls of reality" at large, interconnected dialectically and set in the rational thought-system which is Hegel's Idea or Cosmic Reason (God).

(7) Wallace, *Logic of Hegel*, p. 39.

(8) *Ibid.* pp. 41-42.

(9) *Z.D.* p. 399 *et seq.*

(10) Change "points back to the dilemma of the one and the many, the differences and the identity, the adjectives and the thing, the qualities and the relations. How anything can be anything else was a question which defied our efforts. Change is little beyond an instance of this dilemma in principle." Chapter on "Motion and Change and its Perception" in *Appearance and Reality*. Bradley overworks the law (or better maxim) of contradiction. Cf. *Z.D.* p. 24 and pp. 244-245. Everything in *fact* is something else as well as itself; all things "by a law divine in one another's being mingle".

(11) *Science and the Modern World*, p. 249.

## CHAPTER IV

### GOD IS DIVINE IMAGINING (*continued*)

On clues leading to the statement of a fundamental hypothesis  
in metaphysics — Passage to *cosmic* philosophy.

“Imagination is the best name for that activity by which the creative work may be supposed to be initiated and carried through.” — JOHN S. MACKENZIE.

“ . . . Our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness, as we call it, is but one special type of consciousness, while all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there are potential forms of consciousness entirely different.” — WILLIAM JAMES.

“Since a wise man may go wrong, and a hundred men, and many nations; nay since even human nature, in our belief, may for many centuries go wrong in this thing or that; what assurance can we have that it will at some future time cease to go wrong, and that in this century it is not on the wrong track?” — MONTAIGNE.

Nor long after 8 A.M. next day we settled down in our hollow on the green alp. Wortvoll, Stark and I had brought our note-books in anticipation of a discussion which might exact quotations. Leslie, who disliked erudition and put trust in the vision of the “man with an eye”, relied on his mother-wit.

A. “Well, Wortvoll, I have to discuss the problem of God and you find me partially disarmed. Have I not dispensed with the Ontological, Cosmological and Design arguments so dear to the old Christian philosophers and ecclesiastics? Give me some credit for a pacifism which sets such a good example.”

W. “Not I. Like a modern pacifist, you seem to me most unpleasantly aggressive. Your old guns, as Kant showed, are unsafe, so you have invented a more promising weapon with which to enforce peace. Hypothesis is convenient as well. You are in search only of the probably true, hoping to overwhelm us agnostics but securing your retreat in the event of failure. You will say, when in flight, that you were only experimenting with ideas. You are against all cocksureness of

course, but surely I detect an *ex cathedra* flavour in some of the remarks I heard yesterday."

L. "I'll allow frankly that the talks at Zermatt put an end to our doubts, though the riddle of this painful world requires, in my opinion, more discussion; a point with which I shall be dealing anon. If, however, you suggest that we are treating hypothesis as if it were truth, you have your remedy; you can point to truths that conflict with it. Your campaign is won offhand and we are prisoners of war."

W. "Tell me first how the main hypothesis was reached. You contend that 'God is Divine Imagining', not Hegel's 'God is Reason', states the truth. Now this contrast certainly throws your attitude into relief. But why was this alternative 'Divine Imagining' thought of at all?"

S. "Personally I had exhausted all other alternatives, so that West's teaching, so freely verifiable, proved convincing."<sup>(1)</sup>

L. "I had drawn from poetry belief in a Wordsworthian 'Presence' in Nature and made this more concrete by calling it Cosmic Imagining. But I made a mistake rectified by West; I thought at first that this Power is blind on the lines of German philosophies of the Unconscious."

A. "I, like Stark, had exhausted the alternatives."

W. "But must the last supposition you reached be beyond reproach; are you sure that all possible alternatives, like mannequins inviting your admiration, have been in view?"

A. "All that could be taken into account were paraded and one proved overwhelmingly attractive, as I shall be pointing out. But for the moment put yourself in my place. You have rejected many hypotheses about the roots of reality. You hear, never mind how, of yet another, Imaginism. You have to choose between this one and being an agnostic who has despaired of solving, even in terms of vague thinking, the riddle of the universe. You observe the facts of finite mind and the external world from a new angle, and you find much that makes the new hypothesis very plausible indeed. You adopt it provisionally, keep on applying, verifying and developing it. It asserts itself always more stubbornly. What could be more instructive? At the same time don't suppose that your task is ended. On the low cosmic level of us men you



will never be quite certain that you have reached truth. But then who of us is quite certain that he is not alone in a dream, a solipsist whose world is a mirage? The important fact is that he is not troubled with doubt amid the jungles of *practical* life. A petty centre of consciring, conditioned by a brain, cannot possess the direct, far-reaching intuitions of a god. Nor, for the making of ordinary adjustments to its environment, does it need them."

W. "You don't propose to consider idealism in general before dealing with the hypothesis."

A. "No, I don't, and the reason is not far to seek. I am not a subjective idealist who believes that the external world exists only in the experience of finite creatures like ourselves. I don't even hold with Kant that space-time is an appearance which does not belong to things-in-themselves as they exist when unperceived. Spatio-temporal Nature is established on Divine Imagining and is perceived by us as in a glass darkly. All the 'stuff' used in the evolution of Nature consists, we hold, of contents drawn from Divine Imagining, which of course is spiritual through and through. During our chat on the balcony we got rid of the silly materialistic and allied theories, and cannot now make use of fictions, 'matter', 'energy', etc., with which to construct in thought a world. In *Z.D.* the evolution of Nature is discussed as creative transformation of an imaginal field in God and of that only.(2) Current 'refutations of idealism' are irrelevant. Idealism for us does not mean that the external world has its being solely in the perceptions of men, tom-cats, worms and what not. It is the belief that the ultimate source of phenomena of all sorts is akin to the conscious life that is active in you and me. It need not allow for any  $\nu\lambda\eta$ , 'raw materials', 'elements', etc., which, even on the very lowest cosmic levels, are not of psychical or mind-like character."

W. "That much I follow and can appreciate. Concrete imaginal Nature could emerge conceivably from such a source, evolving in space-time independently of our perceptions, just as the plain man believes. The *esse* of the sun is not *percipi* — by Berkeley."

L. "Though the sun is established as a content or con-

scitum on Divine Imagining and has its foundations entirely there."

W. "Let us get on. Tell us, Anderton, how Imaginism began to interest those in search of a new outlook."

A. "Imaginism was born in modern philosophy; has no forerunner, to the best of my knowledge, in Greek and Indian thought. Strange, if Imagining is the universal Power:

Whose secret Presence, through Creation's veins  
Running Quicksilver-like eludes your pains;  
Taking all shapes from Máh to Máhi; and  
They change and perish all — but He remains,

that the philosophers were so slow in recognising It. Strange indeed since, in our own mental life, this Power 'is everywhere', according to Ribot. Hegel's 'Reason' drew its strength from an oversight; from being treated unwittingly as an imaginal power. It was accorded in the Dialectic, which rules 'wherever anything is carried into effect', a *transformative magic* that belongs only to Imagining. Thus the 'Presence' eluded the 'pains' even of Hegel and his many disciples. Amazing!"

L. "Just because it was 'Quicksilver-like' and a Proteus. And so centuries of philosophical work missed the truth. This is why J. S. Mackenzie had to call Imagining 'the Cinderella of philosophy'."

S. "But Cinderella was to prosper. Now let me give you an example from physics, showing how slowly some things rise in importance in the minds of men. Amber — ἤλεκτρον — when rubbed with certain things, was seen to attract light bodies. The ancient Greeks and mediaeval verbalism made nothing of this discovery. At long last Dr. Gilbert of Colchester improved on it; he found that many other things have this property and called them 'electrics'. Even this advance seemed of restricted interest. Yet not so very long afterwards men of science were finding electricity 'everywhere' — just as Ribot found imagining 'everywhere' in our minds — and enthusiasts were framing an 'electric' theory of the world."

W. "But without really instructing us. For the world does not consist of *amber*; and what reality this name 'electricity'

denotes physics cannot say. The solid globules of 'electricity', protons, neutrons, etc., are vanishing in the mists of the symbolism of 'wave-mechanics'. . . . But, Anderton, we are digressing; please continue."

A. "Imagining in man has been regarded often as a special field for the working of the 'Laws of Association', a makeshift of an explanation,(3) or as a 'faculty' among other 'faculties', providing at best for pure imagining, such as that of poet and inventor, for memory and expectation but nothing more. Since pure imagining or day-dreaming may issue in the fantastic and ridiculous, the 'faculty' was contrasted at times unfavourably with reason. This, in the history of philosophy, was the Cinderella stage of the eventual Queen of heaven and earth.

Cinderella interested Hume, to whom she owes the beginning of her regal career in philosophy. This thinker found in imagination 'a kind of magical faculty in the soul which, though it be always most perfect in the greatest geniuses, and is properly what we call genius is, however, inexplicable by the greatest efforts of human understanding'.(4) Hume was glad to make further use of this imaginal magic. Having got rid of the 'ego' and productive causation, he made imagining rule the 'units' of his disintegrated soul; reuniting elements which his pseudo-empirical method had torn apart. Thus the 'idea of a substance' is a 'collection of simple ideas that are united by the imagination'. This suggestion of an underlying controlling imagination, like Hume's attitude to causation, seems to have influenced Kant. For what does the sage of Königsberg tell us about imagination? The advance is startling. ' . . . In the human mind we have sensation, consciousness, imagination, memory, wit, power of discrimination, pleasure, desire, etc. Now to begin with a logical maxim requires that we should reduce, so far as may be possible, this seeming diversity, by comparing these with one another and detecting their hidden identity. We have to inquire whether imagination combined with consciousness may not be the same thing as memory, wit, power of discrimination, and perhaps even identical with understanding and Reason. Though logic is not capable of deciding whether a *fundamental power* actually

exists, the idea of such a power is the problem involved in a systematic representation of such a multiplicity of powers.' (5) A *fundamental power*, 'imagination combined with consciousness', is suggestive of modern Imaginism. But note that Kant's suggestion was made in connexion with the problem of the finite individual, of you and me. It was not a contribution to a positive metaphysics of cosmic range. *The Critique of Pure Reason* was opposed to all such adventurous flights of reasoning. Nevertheless later writers, at work on independent lines, won for Cinderella at last a full cosmic standing. A brief history of this development is available.(6) In *World as Imagination* (1916), *Divine Imagining* (1921), and *Zermatt Dialogues* (1931) Imagining becomes the all-explaining world-principle.

In an interesting article in *Philosophy*, April 1931, on 'Imagining and Reasoning' the late Professor Wildon Carr expressed his agreement with Kant's original suggestion. Popularly, he wrote, imagination is held to be 'a subjective activity dependent on the passive power of receiving and retaining sense-impressions, recalling them as memories, hence of recombining them more or less fantastically', but he decided that 'Imagination is more original, more fundamental, and more essential a factor in the mental life than sensation or understanding or reason'. It creates, he urged, among other indispensable products *Gestalten*, perceptual as well as memory images. In the language of Imaginism, this power is conservative and additively creative throughout the entire domain of conscious life."

W. "What about sensations or, as some writers call them, sense-contents? The imagining, however productive, must be fed."

A. "True. And what feeds it? Kant replied — 'unknowable things-in-themselves'. Imaginism answers otherwise. Sensations, other than those reporting events within the body, are end-points of lines of connexion uniting my body with the external world. The external world is made of psychical contents akin to those which fill my experience; the senses, or rather some of them, are routes by which this mind-like outer world penetrates by way of the body my soul."

*W.* "The routes don't let the penetrating contents pass unaltered? The inflow, I take it, must be modified considerably?"

*A.* "The external world is perceived as in a glass darkly; there is rich qualitative complexity in the spatio-temporal cosmos outside our bodies. Having got rid of the skeleton world of science, we must revise our account of perception accordingly. Thus an amazing complexity in the spatio-temporal order conditions my perception of a simple-looking patch of green; and the reduction and alteration of this complexity for my sense-field must be allowed for. I cannot at this stage deal with the difficult soul-body problem involved. Besides, you are in doubt as yet, Wortvoll, as to the existence of soul. Everything in its place."

*S.* "Whitehead observes that the material world is 'largely a concept of the imagination which rests on a slender basis of direct sense-presentation'.<sup>(7)</sup> This 'slender basis' indeed is that for which Anderton's reduction and alteration take place. It seems possible that soul and body may co-operate in the making of the 'slender basis', in which case the sense-contents are not, properly speaking, 'given' at all. A time-honoured assumption is menaced. Sense-presentation itself may attest soul-activity."

*L.* "Kant, I believe, contrasted the productive with the merely reproductive imagination?"

*A.* "He did. The reproductive imagination, using what experience has supplied, feeds in his opinion, memory and expectation. But productive imagination, working in the depths, is a creative activity by which even perceptions are controlled and which may be the 'fundamental power', underlying the many minor powers credited to the soul."

*W.* "If this 'fundamental power' underlies all modes of the human soul, its presence cannot elude wholly even our superficial observations. Can we detect it always? Or is the power sometimes hidden entirely under the load of its creations?"

*L.* "Remember that the power may be hard to grasp, being 'quicksilver-like', as the poet told us, nay a Proteus which can vanish into each of its metamorphoses in turn or show in sextillions of different metamorphoses at once. You

are about to identify and name it and, lo ! it is gone."

S. "But not without having created the metamorphoses and thereby displaying its transformative magic. One might compare it with a lava-stream, hidden under the slaggy crust of its own making and yet ever and anon sighted through clefts in the crust, or when whitehot at the growing-point of its advance."

L. "Bravo, Stark, the physicist has not killed the poet. I welcome the correction. It comes to this : the conservative aspect of the 'fundamental power' may mask, but cannot always mask, the aspect of additive creation or transformation. What say you, Anderton ? Wortvoll's questions deserve your attention."

A. "We shall not find easily the mark of additive creative work in all contents of the human soul ; the lava-stream, as Stark so well put it, may be hidden often under what it has generated. Conservation stabilises. A flood of creative novelty in ourselves may be followed by regularities or uniformities said to illustrate the reign of law. Similarly in the external world there arise habits, natural sequences sufficiently like one another to be included in 'laws' ; the convenient syntheses of fancy. Overstressing these man-made 'laws', most philosophers regard all events as determined with rigorous necessity. An absurdity results — man is awed by a grim monster of his own making, the world that behaves like a machine."

L. "But an ordinary machine serves someone's purpose. This determinist's machine is supposed sometimes to fulfil no purpose at all ; it just goes on working, a mindless automaton in mindless space-time."

S. "The imaginal creation of men who know not what they do."

A. "That is so, but for the present let us consider a much more important point. Imagining, used as a principle of explanation, is 'all-embracing', as no other metaphysical principle can claim to be. That is the view of the famous pragmatist, F. C. S. Schiller. Imagining is also the fount of novelty ; *'it can be represented as including not only all reality but all unreality'*. Home of all possible variety, imagining conceived

as 'fundamental power' embraces all features and 'faculties' that the fully adult soul can comprise. Further, its additively creative aspect, as Wortvoll requires, can be described often clearly. I am not saying any more at this stage about perception, but can refer you to conception, expectation, willing, pure imagining, and even conceptual reasoning as being among those soul-contents that glow with novelty."

W. "On reflection, I have to accept novelty born from pure imagining in the human mind — you will excuse me not saying 'soul' — there is creation *ex nihilo* in this domain, I allow. I will follow the example of Z.D. and call it additive creation, since it adds a reality to the universe. To point to the 'antecedents' of this kind of creation is not, of course, to explain it. To make a list of the chronicles and tales, etc., which Shakespeare had read, to pry into his adventures and observations of men, will not account fully for his artistic creations, for Hamlet, Othello, and Lear for instance. The poet has imagined the veritably new; the universe comprises now what it never comprised before. Some writers have said that, when the conditions of an event are fully complete, the event is *ipso facto* born. Well, take the case of Hamlet, which for my present purpose is just a complex event. State the conditions of this event. Included in the list is the condition of being imagined when, lo! the universe contains a novelty.(8) The old associationists talked about 'combination' and the transformations that occur in chemistry. But getting the new solely out of the old is just as hopeless a quest in the metaphysics of chemistry as it is in that of mind. Associationism, moreover, is rubbish."

Evidently Wortvoll had been reading Z.D. to profit.

L. "A frank statement of a truth of great value to us in this discussion. For, if there can be additive creation, that is to say creation *ex nihilo*, in human imagining, why not elsewhere? You have also committed yourself to reconsider that vitally important problem, Causation, and, I might add, to take note of what we call the Imaginal Dynamic."

W. "Plato, thou reasonest well, but I have yet to accept all thy views about God and the external world. . . . Tell me, Anderton, what have you to say about brute pleasures and pains and the emotions?"

A. "The Great Imagining, if you believe in it, is 'all-embracing', adequate to numberless modes of protean manifestation, as I remarked just now. This adequacy is suggested, though very imperfectly, by my own surface-imagining in my daydreams; thus I imagine stars, emotions, oceans, symphonies, willing, mathematical concepts and even processes of reasoning. But, despite Hegel's reference to human faculties as 'additional specifications' of world-logic, I cannot reason into existence imagining; I can only reason by its aid and *about* it. And in the history of creative evolution this reasoning seems to be quite secondary, a generated feature of the time-process.

Brute feelings and the emotions are present in my surface-imagining — it is just as easy to imagine Hamlet's emotions as the rest of him, including his reasonings. Though my surface-imagining is weak, owing to psycho-neural conditions, it displays nevertheless that power to 'embrace' which I ascribe, with Schiller's approval, to the fontal Divine Imagining.

The feelings will interest us later when we have discussed the Power behind the throne — conspiring, the active aspect of Divine Imagining and of the power at the roots of our souls. It is obvious that we must not anticipate too freely. At present we are noticing stray clues such as *suggest* the statement of a far-reaching improvement in metaphysics. When what is suggested is available, when Wortvoll has accepted provisionally the hypothesis 'God is Imagining', a different mode of exposition of our philosophy might impose itself. I might explain the manifested world and all that therein is by deriving it from the basic hypothesis and such minor hypotheses as empirical knowledge allows me to frame. This experimental procedure, innocent of dogma, takes its risks, but the results can be modified and amended at will. As we are ordinary folk and not high mystics, we must pick up our knowledge in fragments as best we can."

W. "I see the point and won't fuss unduly over these stray clues. I may say that they *do* suggest to me the advisability of trying out your basic hypothesis. But first I should like to hear something more about reason and reasoning. These may well bear the mark of the fundamental creative power at work below our surface-selves."



S. "You won't expect our 'fundamental power' to have jobs such as Kant imposed on his — in 'schematising categories' and so forth. We don't need 'categories' in our account of finite experience. In other respects we work this power very hard. One of its transformations, indispensable to our present kind of life, is precisely reasoning. The scent of constructive imagining clings to reasoning still; in this domain at any rate the creative mark you seek leaps to the eye."

A. "Let me begin by getting rid of the name, reason, and asking you to focus your interest on reasonings. There is no complete system of reason beyond or within any particular human mind; each of us hives the merest scraps of knowledge and, were all our minds fused into one, the fragmentary and very unsatisfactory character of our wisdom would be obvious. 'Propositions' recorded by unintelligent objects, books, etc., are not only fragmentary, but don't count; wisdom is in us, not in objects. Reasonings again, logical or practical, are at best only incidents in our lives. 'Our logical thoughts dominate experience only as the parallels and meridians make a checker-board of the sea. They guide our voyage without controlling the waves.' (9) They present themselves as only a portion of the ongoings within the soul. 'We stop' — Schiller draws our attention to the phrase — 'to think'; have much else to do and suffer outside rational thinking."

W. "By reasoning you mean the process of drawing conclusions? Organising the great body of these into a system, however defective, assists man in this changing world and so has practical value, some theoretical value perhaps as well."

L. "A high theoretical value, if we idealists are right and you agnostics are wrong!"

A. "Yes, Wortvoll, that is what I mean. And now you will follow me easily. The practical adjustments of life required the evolution of reasoning. Reasoning confronts a difficulty and seeks a conclusion. In reasoning I include all doings subsidiary thereto, such as the making of concepts. I continue, approaching this topic quite slowly.

The fundamental power in us takes shape partly in what psychologists call Conation, one phase of which shows in our conscious volitions. Will in us, according to Bradley, is

'realisation of an idea'; I prefer to say that it is 'conservation (maintenance), or creative realisation of, an imaginal field'. Willing is not always towards change in the world or ourselves, but also for holding fast to that which exists. It acquaints us directly and vividly with the 'striving' aspect of the soul. Memory, Expectation, and Pure Imagining also refer us plainly to the parent stream, to the fundamental power. They continue aspects of it; Memory is private imagining concerned with the past, reconstructs conservatively; Expectation again is partly conservative, partly constructive; Pure Imagining such as that of poet, artist, daydreamer, industrial inventor, statesman, etc., may be charged with novelty and highly constructive. In Pure Imagining the fundamental power is less overlaid and concealed than usual by its products. The fire of the deep-working magma penetrates freely into our surface-life. But reasoning . . .? What rises from the depths into that? Proteus at first sight seems to have lost himself in one of his transformations.

If you turn your attention too soon to conceptual reasoning, stiff with words or mathematical symbols, you will be puzzled, for with the achievement of such thought a big step in creative evolution was made. So trace first, as a psychologist, the advance of practical reasoning in animals and men up to those heights where systematic logical thinking becomes possible. Practical reasoning also has its 'conclusion', one, however, that has to be of use and is drawn with interest limited to what is being done. In this kind of inference, conservative and constructive imagining (or fancy), with a physical response to follow, do the work. This imaginal guidance of course, as in all our reasonings, is fallible. It may hesitate too long, err badly; yet at times is sufficient unto itself and very quick — like a flash of intuition impatient of premisses. When practical reasoning (which Romanes in *Mental Evolution in Man* called 'receptual') makes way for conceptual thought, complications supervene, yet the red strand of primitive imagining can be descried throughout. The concepts used are themselves imaginal constructs, substitute-facts valued for what they represent; sometimes merely command-concepts to which nothing in reality corresponds. Reasoning in general is dis-

cussed by Rignano in *Psychology of Reasoning* as imaginative experimenting, which on its higher levels deals with general ideas. In *Essay on the Creative Imagination* Ribot urges that 'underneath all the reasoning, inductions, deductions, calculations, demonstrations, methods and logical apparatus of every sort, there is something animating them that is not understood, that is the work of that complex operation, the constructive imagination.' In fact Ribot contends that imagination 'is everywhere' in the human mind as on the lines of Imaginism one would expect it to be. In *Ways of Knowing* Professor W. P. Montague tells us that 'imagination is the main source of all new ideas and of all variations, not only in the life of art but in the life of science. . . . This fusion of old matters of memory into new forms of imagination is the same process, whether it occurs in the scientist or the poet. The difference lies only in the kind of elements and in the kind of interest by which the fusion is wrought.' Incidentally I may remind my hearers that in deriving certain simple ideas, *e.g.* those of colours, from experience we must not confuse ideas = images with ideas = concepts or substitute-facts. And I add that by way of the simple images we are connected directly with Nature. For Imaginism, as for Blake, 'Nature is imagination', actually penetrating our souls through sense.

Constructive imagining or fancy turns up then in reasoning. Montague urges that the function of reason is 'not so much to originate as to prove. Reason is the censor of fancy, selecting from the wealth of new ideas those which can successfully stand comparison with the old and be made harmonious with them.' Earl Russell also refers to the 'controlling force' of reason which harmonises rather than creates.(10) These phases of conflict and harmony resemble like phases in the Imaginal Dynamic which takes place on the cosmic scale.(11) The 'controlling force' in us checks the pest of miscreations of fancy of which the history of reasoning is full and from which we are never secure. Nations as well as individuals may become insane."

*L.* "Fancy wins, if fancy is kept in order. And I suppose this truth bears on the 'paradox of the syllogism' which Mill took so seriously. I refer to the talk as to whether the syllogism

is or is not a *petitio principii* or begging of the question."

A. "Who to-day uses stiffly formal syllogisms and who expects the absolute proof that these were intended to give? Schiller and Sidgwick have stressed the ambiguity of the middle term, but I am not arguing from that. I am stressing the truth that in all fertile reasoning there emerges the novel. For, confronting a problem, I may *have* to solve it; have to live by my reasoning. I have to body forth in imagination what was *not* present in my 'premisses'; otherwise my adjustments to circumstances cannot be made accurately. Consider my innumerable inferences when flying, motoring, catching a train or even dodging people in a crowd. In all these situations fancy builds the *new* in the conclusion. Begging the question? In generalisations too there is a leap from known cases to unknown; cases are anticipated in a statement which serves to guide fancy when the statement is applied to fresh cases. 'Dogs may bite' is useful for inference, for application to a new case. Thus a perceived sitting dog is prolonged in fancy into one about to leap. What subtle plasticity there is in psychical contents! Associationism wastes our time; no one ever made a picture of a leaping dog out of bits of mental canvas already painted. The anticipation is a new *total gift* of fancy."

S. (also consulting notes). "Science is robed in fancy. The axioms and postulates of Euclid are imaginal constructions, though they don't resemble a story-teller's inventions. 'The laws of science are products of the creative imagination', urges Karl Pearson.(12) They refer us to sense-presentation, it is true, but that is not the whole truth. Sufficiently like selected sequences are subjected to the 'law', which is the creative synthesis of fancy, and from known cases we leap at a risk to unknown when the 'law' is set down in words. 'Laws' too are often decorated with myth. I cite again the arid-looking formula  $m = E/c^2$ . Has fancy done work on this? Assuredly. 'Mass' and 'energy' were children of fancy. 'Mass' and 'energy' are not perceptual objects harvested by empirical research — they are instrumental concepts invented by man. What say you, Wortvoll?"

W. "I have listened and I say that you have convinced me about one issue that lies near your hearts. Reasoning is

utterly permeated by imagining and you are justified in suggesting that it may be just a phase in the transformations of the fundamental power. I say 'may'. I am now quite ready to discuss your main metaphysical hypothesis 'God is Imagining', if only to give myself the pleasure of seeing what you can make of it. So consider me as having had the clues to your alleged discovery dangled before me long enough. I shall now be with you, critically but perhaps sympathetically, in your attempts to show that Imagining is the basis of all that is. Meanwhile, and without asking you to defer our lunch too long, I will close my share of to-day's talking with a request. Let us have a few more words from Anderton as to the standing of reasoning in his world-philosophy. Reason is thrown off, he says, by Imagining in the course of its transformations — that may be so. But I don't think that he has said all that he wishes to say on this topic."

*L.* "Don't miss one leading consideration, Wortvoll. With this stressing of imagination the Platonic dissension between philosophy and poetry promises to disappear. I don't want to prejudice you in favour of Imaginism but, if you ever become one of us, this reconciliation will open up prospects of amazing interest."

*W.* "The court will give due weight to your representations but has to hear other learned counsel first."

*A.* "We may be sure that the birth and development of reasoning took place during that struggle for existence, animal and human, in which victory is not always to the strong. Reasoning at the outset was little more than an asset, and a poor one, in the equipment for practical life. And we can see that the conservative and constructive fancy, that gave it birth, permeates and shows in it 'everywhere', as Ribot contends, still. Even now the initiative in reasoning is with fancy, while in the spheres of proof and harmonisation of results operates the 'controlling force' wherewith fancy is curbed. Further progress is dependent both on the fancy and the curbing, though often, as in 'direct philosophic vision' (Earl Russell) or Faraday's insights fancy will out, ignoring, or making light of, logical method. But every development attained by the fundamental power has its distinctive novelty ;

the stage of full-blown reasoning is controlled normally by devices, which are discussed by logic and psychology. *Useful Logic* (13) or *Psychologic* (Schiller) is much more important for us than the logic of abstract form, which is a by-study of 'propositions', not quite securely based. *Useful Logic* aids us in our judgments about the actual changing world, though the 'man with an eye' goes his way with only occasional indebtedness to it. A relevant fancy, successful at a stroke, may move mountains. The genius may not need this logic, but those who organise in his wake may profit thereby exceedingly."

W. "You don't even allude to a third sort of logic which once perturbed the learned world."

A. "Cosmic Logic? We buried that with Hegel. What an Avernian descent is there from that proud eminence to the standpoint of Lord Russell: 'propositions which form part of logic, or can be proved by logic, are all tautologies'. (14) What a revelation of the weakness of that purely logical reason which was once equated with Deity!"

S. "We have to use reason for what it is worth. It is sufficiently fallible to allow us to dream of a remote possibility; the mystic's 'radiance beyond reason'. Agreed, but here and now while mere men we have to be as sanely rational as our knowledge and temperaments allow."

L. "Ostracise reason and the follies of faith replace it."

A. "Reasoning, obviously indispensable, bridges a gap in the transformations of the fundamental power within ourselves during creative evolution. Neither reasoning nor truth, which is its aim, are eternal values — they come and they go. As Indian Sankaracharya urged, thought and its logic belong to the story of finite conscious life and to that only. We here have to solve our riddles; and on the more difficult levels of research reasoning, confronted with mere relations, becomes most abstract. It wins through with difficulty and what it achieves is sometimes a possession hardly worth having. It annexes, as in high mathematics, a realm of shades. In this way and in virtue of its own development it tends to negate or destroy itself. Faust becomes disillusioned. What he would grasp seems to vanish."

L. "Reason proclaims itself a makeshift which cannot

endure ; Plato's 'divine principle' dies of pernicious anaemia. Science becomes nescience even as we read of the more startling measurements in physics and astronomy."

*S.* "Of a certain wave being  $5893 \times 10^{-8}$  centimetres long, for instance. Yes, this is makeshift knowledge no doubt and the lore of 'wave-mechanics' is much worse. But again what do you want ? We will not be content with complete ignorance and, being merely men, ought to rejoice in such crumbs of wisdom as we get. There is a different outlook before the genuine mystic — perhaps. But when ?"

*W.* "Produce your mystic or leave him out of the account. As to reasoning, Schopenhauer anticipated all the pragmatists ; he held that it was developed originally in the struggle for existence and primarily for practical ends or, as physiologists say, with neuro-muscular adjustments crowning its work. Reasoning succeeds ; man survives. But as man climbs higher and higher rungs of life's ladder, harder and harder become the problems to be solved, until reason at last is concerned with pure theory, having no 'adjustments to environment' to close its toil. It staggers and has to make use of the crutches of language. Even the analysis of a complex object prior to description exacts this aid. Some writers notice only the crutches ; the word 'intellect' has been said to mean 'certain habits in the use of words',<sup>(15)</sup> 'thought' described as consisting mainly of 'inner speech'.<sup>(16)</sup> True thought, however, implies loyalty to reality, so more than speech is involved, but such over-statements show how potent language is felt to be. Supported thus reasoning is forced finally into tasks beyond its power and its grasp. I am not therefore surprised that Leslie and his mystics become impatient and clamour to breathe in knowledge as we now breathe in air. They are perfectly at liberty to do so, and I ask for nothing better than to profit by their wisdom. I shall be a reasonable critic of this wisdom. But I shall look for notable contributions to the wealth of science and philosophy. Will these be available ?"

*A.* "Well, you will be able one day, perhaps, to talk over these matters with West or even to read something from his pen. . . . Later too we four shall be discussing the career of the mystic in the light of such knowledge as our feeble reasoning

attains" — a laugh from Leslie. — "For present purposes enough has been said.

Next time, Wortvöll, we shall not be offering you mere clues and hoping that you will reach Imaginism offhand. We shall regard you as entertaining the suggestion that the fontal reality may be Divine Imagining and studying this hypothesis and its supporting hypotheses dispassionately, as the historian of philosophy curious to note how they provide for the variety of things. Is that right?"

W. "Capital. We shall pass from Kant's 'fundamental power' said to transform itself in the individual to the 'fundamental power' said to manifest in the cosmos at large. Good. Let me add that these last two talks have not been wasted — I shall understand now fully the meaning of the great hypothesis towards which you have been leading me."

#### NOTES BY BASIL ANDERTON

(1) For some of these alternatives cf. *Z.D.* pp. 66-73.

(2) *Z.D.* pp. 482-538.

(3) There are no atomistic units to be "associated"; no originally separate bricks to be put together and rearranged. All cases of so-called association occur in the psychical continuum of the soul and are aspects of conservation and additive creation among contents belonging to it. Assemblages of sensation-units and idea-units are mythology. To attend specially to a content does not lift it out of its context and isolate it.

(4) *Treatise*, vol. 1. § 7.

(5) Professor Norman Kemp Smith, *Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 265.

(6) *Z.D.* Foreword, pp. xxii-xxiv.

(7) *Organisation of Thought*, p. 155.

(8) *Z.D.* pp. 396-397.

(9) Santayana, *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*, p. 261.

(10) *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 21.

(11) *Z.D.* chap. xvi., "On the Signal at Champex", touching Causation and the Imaginal Dynamic.

(12) *Grammar of Science* (3rd edit.), pp. 34-35.

(13) "I am more than willing", observed Schiller in *Mind*, discussing Mace's suggestions, ". . . to recognise that there are (as I have maintained) two logics, and that attempts to guide actual human thinking are not *ipso facto* utterly contemptible and scientifically negligible, but are entitled to exist side by side with what he regards as the purely theoretical analyses of Formal Logic. He proposes to call this more human and less abstract logic *Useful Logic*."

(14) *Analysis of Matter*, p. 171.

(15) Earl Russell, "The Meaning of Meaning", Symposium, *Mind*, October 1920.

(16) Earl Russell, *Analysis of the Human Mind*, p. 152.



## CHAPTER V

### GOD IS DIVINE IMAGINING (*continued*)

"In the dialogues God and Divine Imagining are treated as interchangeable terms. When there is discussion about the nature of God, the second term is apposite. But for many purposes the first is superior. And it possesses the advantage of making instant appeal to the plain man. A caution, however, is desirable. . . . God or Divine Imagining is no merely personal being — no finite sentient such as is evolved gradually within the time-process. And it is best to discuss the problem without reference to the dogmas of a particular creed. The sublime must be parted in thought from what is often ridiculous. Thus the Miltonic god, who sits on a throne, directs a chariot charge and invents hell, is of no more philosophical interest than Odin, Yahveh or Zeus." — *Zermatt Dialogues*, Foreword, p. xxiv.

"Which wields the world with never-wearied love  
Sustains it from beneath and kindles it above."

SHELLEY.

"Thinking and logic belong to the level of finite life, while ultimate reality transcends thought. The real is present to itself and has therefore no need to think." — *Indian Philosophy*, ii. p. 509. Radhakrishnan on Sankara's Vedântism.

ANOTHER superb morning finds us in our nook on the slope of the green alp. Notebooks and even some philosophical works come out of the rucksacks.

W. "We left off after I had been offered some tempting clues which made me eager to hear more about your basic contentions. I am to listen to Anderton's statement about Divine Imagining, test its explanatory worth; entertain it provisionally as a working-hypothesis, nothing more. But consider me a friendly critic. I am ready to allow that yours is the best hypothesis available, if hypotheses are worth examination at all."

L. "How good of you! The Aristotelian magnanimity of the giant who consents to hear! As if agnosticism rendered you immune from attack, free to go forth to war brandishing a





LOOKING FROM ABOVE THE ALETSCHHORN AT THE JUNGFRAU AND MONCH

sword and dispensing with shield! Yet agnostics also have their working-hypothesis — they *say* that ultimate reality is unknowable. But how do they know?"

W. "They don't. . . . But can't they hold that there is no way of being sure whether it is unknowable or not?"

L. "But that too is only a 'safety-first' hypothesis at best. And at worst it is self-contradictory; it takes ultimate reality itself for granted. It knows more than agnosticism ought to know. It leaves you among the fighters, not above them; you will need a shield as well as a sword."

W. "Maybe, but observe how many fighters have been killed, while I survive. The hero smokes along the plain in his chariot and perishes; a single shaft from the Scaean gate may suffice. The historian of philosophy walks through an abattoir in which the butchers and the butchered alike have to die. Great metaphysicians shoot up like rockets on a moonless night; there is a burst of splendour, which compels admiration, but darkness swallows the last spark. How much of the teaching of Vedântists, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer and Bradley is accepted to-day? We admire the men but discuss their beliefs, which in great part conflict, as amused critics. Marvel not at my scepticism. I have no need to cite the history of philosophy. Turn to present-day thought; are not eminent philosophers disagreeing as in the past, making a tumult which discredits itself?"

S. "We are here to suggest that there is a way out of the chaos. And if we can point to it, your agnosticism, Wortvoll, which, as Leslie remarked, is self-contradictory, is doomed. So when you covet our scalps, you will be fighting for your own skin as well. That being so, I will ask Anderton to get to work."

A. "You wish to penetrate to the very heart of the real, so far as human description on our low level of awareness permits. Good. Try to describe, then, ultimate or fontal reality in terms of that fragmentary portion of it which shows in ourselves. Let the drop declare what the ocean — the ocean of the infinite — is like. After all, its testimony must have value; the drop belongs in some way to the ocean which includes it and, in part at any rate, makes it what it is. Now

the drop called Hegel has told us that the ocean is Reason; the drop called Schopenhauer avers that the ocean is Will; a drop, called Herbert Spencer, maintains that the ocean is unknowable; a . . .”

W. “A pest on these back numbers. What does the drop Anderton say? I am to test his working-hypothesis, am I not?”

A. “I say that the ocean is like pure imagining in myself; the imagining which amazed Hume and therefore his critic Kant, thus dating the birth of the most promising movement in modern Western philosophy. Kant’s ‘fundamental power’, as we saw, works in the depths of the human soul, underlying all its so-called faculties, including perception, but it streams into our surface-life *least disguised* in the form of productive fancy.”(1)

S. “And what Kant supposed to work only in the depths of the human soul is later held to be also the ‘fundamental power’ of the universe. ‘In the beginning was activity.’ This cosmic activity resembles, distantly but essentially, a creative power present even to agnostics like Wortvoll and Hume. Ultimate or fontal reality reveals itself in us, though only to the extent that a drop can hold the ocean. Agnosticism is refuted once and for all.”

L. “And *inter alia* one understands the meaning of Blake’s saying ‘Nature is imagination’. Nothing, Wortvoll, that you can *imagine* as perceived by you *or as existing unperceived and independently of you* is such that it could not be *imagined* — sustained or created additively — also by the ‘fundamental power’, by the Imagining that is fontal reality. Every kind of sense-content that you can fancy, spatio-temporal and all other relations you wot of, are mere *samples* of what could, or do, exist in this ‘fundamental power’. Kant’s famous ‘thing-in-itself’, the noumenon, has been denounced as a fiction, but it refers us really to the object as it exists in full richness within Divine Imagining. What we perceive is merely fragmentary and shadow-like. There’s a new outlook for you, sceptic, and also for Kant.”

S. “Well said indeed. There is nothing existing apart from our apprehension of it, not even a mathematician’s Val-

halla, which an imaginal world-principle cannot hold. Remember, too, Wortvoll, F. C. S. Schiller's words, to wit, that Imagining provides not only for all reality 'but for all unreality', for facts that are as yet non-existent, unborn. You are embarrassed at having to house 'phenomena' somewhere in your Unknowable which to this extent comprises the known! But we can house easily all enumerable existing objects of any and every sort, mental, physical, mathematical, etc., and we can point to a fountain-head of novelty as well."

W. "Such a power certainly could hold anything imaginable by me. It could also originate and organise a cosmos more easily than I invent castles in Spain. God, if imagining, creates. Agreed. There is a clear case for investigation. . . . But tell me, Anderton, when you speak of Divine Imagining as the 'fundamental power', have you said all that you can respecting this power?"

A. "Divine Imagining, I take it, has two main sides or aspects; two sides which your own finite experience also presents. These are the side of *consciring* and the side of *conscita* or contents which the *consciring* is of. The name Imaginism, which is very convenient, stresses the *conscita* or contents. When I compare:

Si parva licet componere magnis

Divine Imagining with your 'private imagination', I have the aspect of *conscita* or contents in view. When I refer to 'God's works', to spiral nebulae, stars, sun, planets, seas, continents, the imaginal succession that is world-history, etc., I have similarly contents in view. When I have in mind the other and most radical conserving and productive aspect, I have to speak of Divine *Consciring*. *Consciring*? You will hear much about it anon. It is literally the heart of reality, the Power behind the throne, God '*ineffable*' as contrasted with God manifest in known or knowable objects and relations; the basic spiritual activity that conserves, creates additively and destroys. It is Keyserling's '*life itself*' from which objects are poured forth '*like sudden fancies*', as clouds — shall we say? — appear above this valley seemingly out of nothing when the foehn begins to blow. Don't refer to it, after the fashion of

a modern writer, as 'prehending activity'. That symbolism is too arid. It ignores the reign of miracle whereby all conservations and novelties subsist. It suggests too that a 'dry light' of no emotional worth characterises the 'radiance beyond reason'; a suggestion which high mystics, who are radical empiricists and reach sometimes depths of genuine insight, would reject. We have to dwell later on this and allied topics."

W. "Some might shy at the name 'imagination' as denoting the unreal. I do not set store by this objection but have heard it raised."

S. "The typical imagining is the divine; below this all the levels are imperfect. As to reality, according to Plato (I am referring to the *Theaetetus*, which is one of his later works) the common feature of all that is called real is power; power either to influence anything or to be influenced in however small a degree; so-called passivity implying reaction. If then on the most imperfect level of imagining there is anything that *acts*, that thing is real. It does not follow that anything, which *acts* on one of the levels, is *actual* — note well the familiar epithet — on two or all of them; a nightmare of some drunkard, a fancy of some poet, does not affect Mont Blanc but they act very potently on their own levels and there are real enough."

L. "And of course there are human fancies that act not merely in Cloud-cuckoodom but alter the course of history. Fancy, moreover, is the source of all our fecund inferences, as was observed before, controlling accordingly our physical actions. All appearances are real, even hallucinations, but we mistake them at times for what they are not. A green dragon is real in the private world of the drunkard, though not in Fleet Street."

S. "When we discuss 'energy', as concept or substitute fact symbolic of conscurring, reality will be understood even better. Meanwhile I suggest, Wortvoll, that the conservative features of Nature, *e.g.* rocks, oceans, stars, which are obtrusively real, are perhaps less enduringly so, after all, than certain inventions of human fancy, always supposing that our souls persist. Even the granite cores of mountains come and

go, but must all the alleged 'unreal' figments of human fancy perish too?"

W. "If in truth souls exist and persist — no. One can hold that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* endure along with such souls for ever. There remains the belief in the souls, not to be justified easily. . . . But now for a question more helpful to our present inquiry. After what has been said, are you prepared to define reality and existence?"

A. "At the outset of my answer I cite once more John S. Mackenzie's saying that 'the distinction between what is real and what is imaginary is not one that can be finally maintained'.(2) Once more too I stress the concrete Divine Imagining, that is to say what men call God with His 'works' (=conscita) and His 'working' or creating (=consciring, conservative and additive) alike noticed in thought. When I speak of Divine *Imagining* I refer to this concrete creative consciring as bodied forth in what is conserved and created additively, in what is contained in and added to the knowable cosmos. God is basic imaginal reality but does not, properly speaking, exist. He is that which conditions the beginning and conservation of anything that is said to exist.

Existents are all *finite* realities. A conscious individual, aware, however vaguely, of what it does, enjoys and suffers is said to exist. A colour, which is not aware of any events in its history, is also said to exist. It exists, however, not 'for itself' but as a content or object of which God, you and I may be aware. Now existents which are conscious and existents, which are not, have this feature in common. They 'stand out' like islets in the ocean of the infinite. Conscious existents like you and I are in some way separate *de facto*; other existents stars, stones, sounds, colours, or what not are such that they can be attended to separately and considered for certain purposes as separate in fact. When this separation is felt to be questionable, we sometimes state that they exist 'only in relation'. This is the best account of the reality-existence puzzle, so very often dodged, that I can offer. The existents that 'stand out' possess of course that Platonic 'power' of which Leslie spoke just now; power to influence and power to react when influenced."



W. "You ignore 'potential' existents?"

A. "An egg has been called a potential chicken but this is merely useful phrasing. The chicken exists neither here nor in the 'Back of Beyond'. Some of the conditions presupposed by its creative development are actual — many are not. A boy calls himself a potential President. More phrasing. The only existent is a vague field of fancy which holds his interest. Creative realisation is very far off."

W. "You stress the unity of Divine Imagining? 'The One remains; the many . . .' and so on, as your Shelley sung."

A. "No; Divine Imagining is at once one and many, just as It is at once changeless and changing. We have to take account of features which only the word one-many recognises. This truth confronts the inquirer into the problem of consincing. It will be illustrated throughout our later talks."

L. "The logic of human linguistics must call God super-logical in certain respects, Bradley's protest notwithstanding. Bradley denied even the reality of change in the interest of this logic, man's invention which becomes for him Censor of the real."

W. "You are always at war with Absolutism."

A. "I dealt with that matter before when criticising Hegel.(3) Belief in the Absolute 'complete, perfect and finished' involves, as Bradley so frankly stated, the companion belief that time is unreal. The Absolute is lifted above 'self-contradictory' change, so change, which implies time-sequence, must go."

Dislike of change and of the unfinished, which suggests toil, furnishes psychological support for Absolutism. This dislike overflows into philosophy and prompts dreams of rest. In the West Parmenides and Plato led the attack on change, wishing to contemplate reality which is not destroyed by the passage of time. How many others have followed their example! In the sphere of religious poetry Dante resented the idea that change takes place in God, believing in the eternal, perfect life with past, present and future merged. A schoolman urged that belief in the temporal world may be an act of faith. These men, delighting in the accomplished, left a grim problem ignored. Change renders possible destruction; and destruction

is the desirable end of much that has fouled the past. An Absolute such as Bradley's, which has to find room for all its 'appearances', harmonising them but unable to destroy even the worst, is in evil case indeed.

Change is 'real', since it occurs, and inevitably, within Divine *Imagining* or what men call God. It is welcome to the virile and strong; it will not be kept out of their philosophy. Thus Goethe has found in shaping and reshaping the 'eternal pastime of the eternal spirit'. Goethe, however, some may say, is crediting the eternal spirit with a mentality like his own; he has not dealt with 'the central crux of philosophy' (Bosanquet), the time-riddle; he has taken a particular solution of it for granted. John S. Mackenzie calls this riddle 'the most difficult in the whole range of philosophy'. Bradley, again, is puzzled as to why timeless reality should extrude the unreal 'appearance' of time-sequence and why also *many* finite individuals arise whom this 'appearance' deludes. He disbelieves in Goethe's shaping and reshaping within the eternal spirit, but at the cost of inventing a God or Absolute even less communicative than the Sphinx."

W. "Well: Bradley's failure is your opportunity. Say on, I am all attention."

L. "We shall be equally interested in your criticism."

A. "Divine Imagining is changeless in that It is unalterably Divine Imagining. As such, however, It is both conservative *and* additively creative. Imagining is never merely conservative; it originates the new. But additive creation, the making of novelty within the universe, implies change. Thus eternally what It is Divine Imagining is also the source of change and changes accordingly within Itself. The riddle of time-sequence is solved. Time-sequence is just the Form of additive creation; the manner in which novelty is born into the medley of existents. There is no situation or event without its distinctive novelty which adds somewhat to the wealth of the universe. There is something, *e.g.*, in *Hamlet* and this blade of grass, which no rummaging among 'antecedents' can explain. Nothing is brought to pass unleavened by creation *ex nihilo*, though conservative factors may be cited by the score. Our account of causation will accent this truth."

L. "Well, Wortvoll. You have accepted our working-hypothesis provisionally. It seems to promise well at this stage." But the Professor was not aggressive. He pulled hard at his pipe and took an unconscionable time in re-lighting it.

W. "You are beyond the bank at which Bradley and Bosanquet fell, but the jumps ahead are many and formidable. On with the adventure."

S. "Only one phase of time has been dealt with and that because it brings the Absolutists' dream to nought. Duration and simultaneity are ignored for the present. Have you some further telling questions which serve to throw Imaginism into relief?"

W. "You contrast freely conservation with additive creation but an imaginal world-principle creates presumably in both these ways."

S. "Yes, conservation, as Descartes held, is also creation; no content conserves itself like the hypothetical dead precipitate 'matter' of some theorists; it exists only as *conscièred*; its conservation is the expression of this activity. In the case of the other kind of creation the epithet 'additive' means that it adds novelty to the universe. We have also, as was mentioned just now, to stress destruction. All transformation involves destruction so far as this sublunary world is concerned, but I have something else of a more radical character in mind. Destruction may await portions of the past which is conserved as static, 'made', reality in the Divine Experience. God has no makeshift 'memory' in our sense of the term; the past of our world on His level is present reality which has been 'made'. It may be conserved as such but not permanently, perhaps, if it is entirely without value. May I add that this problem of past-present-future has been dealt with in *Z.D.*, a copy of which you possess." (4)

L. "Shelley neared truth when he told us of a world sustained from below and kindled from above — kindling refers us to the jets of consciring that bring novelty — to the *élan vital* that compels the march of events:

All new successions to the forms they wear.

Conservation and additive creation secure balanced evolution. Plato tried to reconcile the changeless being of Parmenides

with the Heracleitan becoming, but he did so rather brutally at the expense of the latter. He did not hold our clue. He put faith in the 'divine principle of reason' and exalted the Forms or 'Ideas' which are reason's concepts freed from us, their makers, and allotted celestial dignity. The instability of the world of becoming seemed to him to flout reason. We, however, can see in this world the domain of creative evolution, by which hangs ever-fresh romance within enriched Divine Imagining. Wealth streams into the cosmos through the gates of change."

S. "We can also see the mistake made by Plato in connexion with the Forms or 'Ideas'. In the place of these we can offer the Imaginals which are not hypostasised concepts — static entities aloof from this world of change — but which *act* and serve as a background for creative evolution."

W. "Nevertheless be duly grateful, for Plato was pioneer in a brave adventure. And he leans sometimes to Imaginism as well. In the *Sophist* a speaker is of opinion that 'the products of Nature . . . are works of divine art'. Another of his characters seems to have additive creation in mind. Says Diotima: 'that which is a cause of anything coming out of non-existence into existence is altogether a creation. So that all the operations effected by all the arts are creations; and all the workers of them are creators.'<sup>(5)</sup> Of course since novelty does not pre-exist, it cannot be said to 'emerge' into the time-process; it arises there *ex nihilo*, whatever its 'causal antecedents' may have been. Causation indeed presents a great problem, so great that your Bradley refused to see in it more than unreal appearance."

S. "Coming from Herr Professor Wortvoll this admission is of high value. I will take the opportunity, in connexion with Diotima's statement, of saying that we don't over-accent artistry in the world-system, don't hold that God is *merely* artist, as some critics of Imaginism believe. Even human imagining concerns a vast deal more than art; it 'is everywhere', as Ribot attests. A particular world-system such as ours may well end in a 'divine event', in Plato's language in a 'work of divine art', but very much that occurs in its history is entirely outside art's pale."

W. "Leslie won't hear of Plato's 'divine principle of reason'. I know that, when Leslie urges that God is not rational, he does not mean that divine activity is devoid of purpose. He means that the activity does not resemble the processes which are displayed in so-called rational human thought, defective and fallible as this is. I should like to hear some comments from Anderton."

A. "I have said a good deal about thought or reason already and am able accordingly to make the comments required short. Divine *Thought* is not a tolerable synonym for God. Thought, as we know it in man, occurs only at intervals and all the evidence suggests that it is dependent and secondary; a useful novelty generated within the world-process in connexion with organisms. Indispensable as it is for individuals living as we do, its worth, withal, can be overstressed. In the higher fields of contemplation it is so tied to language as to have been called 'inner speech'. Despite their logics (note the plural) philosophers, mostly devout worshippers of thought and truth, disagree radically. They have common observations on which to build but, as we saw, fancy the maker of inferences, not wholly under control, sows discord.

Some promote thought from its modest position in the service of man into that of a metaphysical first principle. Insuperable difficulties arise, as illustrated by the failure of Hegel. Thought, as we know it, excludes much; confronts, and contrasts with, will and feeling, offers no explanation of the sense-contents on which it depends. In its developed form it is concerned mainly with relations, and the more it strays from the concrete in quest of these, the more abstract it is forced to become. It is too abstract to be a candidate for the position of World-principle. On the other hand, Imagining is a candidate with no assignable rival. It can include, as was stated before, not only all reality but unreality, being able to hold all that exists and to pour forth in part *ex nihilo* the new. All *imaginable* qualities, quantities, relations, will and feeling — all the finite centres of conspiring as well — can show within Divine Imagining. Conceive this Power as in an eminent sense concrete, combining fullness of contents such as we find in perception with active awareness of all their relations. Further,

it does not think about finite centres ; it conspires them directly, through and through. Compared with such veritable 'radiances beyond reason' selective 'thought' seems almost absurdly thin.

Truth, loyalty to reality, is the aim of human thought. But Divine Imagining is above truth. It is the ultimate reality which human philosophical truth is — or ought to be — 'of' or 'about'. Truth concerns an 'other', and its statements are such that they agree with what this 'other' dictates. Thus the truth of my belief in Divine Imagining does not lie in my bare statement, but depends on whether the reality so called resembles what I fancy It to be. Thus, again, alleged geographical truths depend on what the facts pointed to reveal. Neither Divine Imagining nor rivers and lakes are truths. They are reality and aspects of reality about which we say something. And what we say is true, if the something is a substitute-complex sufficiently like reality to stand for it, for certain purposes, in our thinking.(6) In advanced mathematical speculation about what goes on inside electrons, etc., a statement is held to be true when the likeness concerns only structure. It fulfils a very limited purpose indeed, but that is enough."

*L.* "Men have worshipped Truth, yet on our approach the goddess dissolves into fragmentary statements ! It will now be clear why for us this rag-bag of true statements is not an eternal value. Direct concrete conspiring is to thought what the sun is to a flickering candle."

*W.* "All very interesting. But what do you make of divine will, which conservation and additive creation, I suppose, are held to express ?"

*A.* "We describe such will as (1) maintenance or (2) creative realisation, of an imaginal field ; conspiring being implied. When I say 'imaginal field' I have in mind a concrete cosmic system ; not, as a student of human psychology might think, an 'idea'. The physical part only of one such vast cosmic system interests our astronomers. It goes without saying that we can know no more of divine will than events in the system indicate. Purpose may reveal itself well in the story of a long-drawn-out development. Purpose, the divine

activity kindling an as yet unrealised imaginal field, may be inscrutable. Friend Wortvoll's agnosticism is a valuable discipline for some of us. Even philosopher-'impulsives' are apt to speculate too recklessly and pass off their own wishes as the will of God."

L. "Divine Imagining does not weigh alternatives in realising additively an imaginal field?"

A. "Replies to such questions are unverifiable and best avoided. But in this case I may suggest that alternatives belong to the level of weak minds such as ours; that God realises purpose in a world-system without hesitations and always in the best possible way; that is to say, in the best way *imaginable*. Some, Wortvoll perhaps among them, may consider this a strange answer, for the world we live in is in many respects extremely bad. The divine activity, however, as we shall suggest later, is not to be blamed; the problem of evil, as dealt with by Imaginism, finds a solution which seems complete."

W. "I consider that the case for pessimism is hard to answer but, like all good modern Germans, I put up as brave a fight in life's battle as I can. I don't get much out of it; above my petty cares, however, towers the State."

L. "What a pity the State is not conscious so as to profit by its citizens' sacrifices!"

W. "Ah! there speaks the individualist again. Never mind, convince me that the world-order is guided with something like sanity and I shall be grateful. By the way you were alluding, Anderton, to feeling in connexion with Divine Imagining; do you hold that this Power has what we should call an affective aspect?"

A. "Most assuredly, but I will postpone my answer till we have discussed consciring. I will postpone also consideration of another very important allied problem — are we to hold that God is aware of His activity or is the 'philosophy of the Unconscious' to triumph? Power to answer pessimism, to cheer millions for whom institutional religion is dead, to better even your present blind loyalty to the State, may be your reward. Agnosticism is a poor battle-cry, prolonged sometimes into a wail of despair."

W. "On with life's battle, whether pleasant or hard! A lion's hour is better than centuries lived by sheep. Over the top and talk about philosophy afterwards."

L. "And perhaps talk too much about it. For men may say: to what end all this toil of battling? Behind the modern knight sits the pessimist. With pessimism, whether formulated as a creed or not, civilisation languishes or dies."

W. "Civilisations come and go. But the lion has his day, while the pacifist sheep is eaten by man and beast. The sheep can't call even its pelt its own. . . . And now a further question. You three have said much that is highly suggestive about Divine Imagining, a most noteworthy substitute for the plain man's God. You are silent, however, about the Logos in which so many writers on mysticism, European and Indian, ancient and modern, have put their trust. Have you any comments to make on this topic?"

S. "Logos meant once 'gathering' and later came to stand for both speech and reason which were not always distinguished clearly by the ancients, as they are not by Lord Russell today.(7) Cornford writes that 'English provides no single equivalent for *logos*, a word which covers (1) statement, speech; (2) expression, definition, description, formula; (3) "tale" or enumeration; (4) explanation, account, ground'.(8) Such a term, infected with ambiguity and lending itself to obscure thinking, seems of little value to serious philosophy. But the 'reason' meaning — and reason's value had been exaggerated by Greek metaphysicians such as Plato and Aristotle — made appeal to Hellenistic thinkers for whom Logos (with a capital L) took rank as a god. Logos in this capacity is a mediator between the changeless ultimate Power and the changing spatio-temporal world which had come to be regarded with a certain contempt.(9) Plato had spoken of the Idea of the Good, the Demiurgus and the Soul of the world. The Idea of the Good is the highest god but, enjoying *otium cum dignitate*, requires partners to do the creative and controlling work of the cosmos. The triadic form of such speculation was perhaps of Pythagorean origin but phallic traditions also favour three!

Note that a similar difficulty is met in a similar way in Indian



thought, whence Ishwara, 'first existent from' the Absolute. But it will suffice to contemplate the error as it swayed the thought of Plato and his students. There is invented and lodged in the 'Back of Beyond' the transcendent Form or 'Idea' of the Good. This cannot change. But a changing world, which comprises changing conscious lives, has to be accounted for ; to call it illusory avails not at all. So there is invented the Demiurgus who, contemplating the 'Ideas' in general and using 'matter' (which, in a Platonic context, has been regarded by some as =space), proceeds to create. Is it contended that the supreme god in the background suffers no alterations of content during this process ? Is he unaware of any of the changes which Demiurgus has brought to pass ?"

A. "Change, as we saw, is a *bête noire* of many philosophers. It expresses, however, the very nature of the Ultimate Power. This Power is present sustaining and creating additively in all quarters of the cosmos. Its imaginal dynamic is behind and within creative evolution. There may exist very exalted centres of individual conscious life whose influence affects us ; there may exist divine societies superior even to these ; let the evidence, if it ever becomes available, decide. But ignore a Logos that serves to stop a hole in bad theory — we can dispense with this artifice without further ado."

L. "There is a possibility which I should like to mention. Can we suppose that Logos-talk is not merely verbiage but symbolism ? There is no Logos, but there is *consciring* that 'lighteth every man that cometh into the world'. Now only very little of the divine consciring suffices to 'sustain' and 'kindle' our world-system. This very little may have been described as though it were a personal god, emergent at the dawn of evolution."

W. "But who knew enough in those days to reflect on consciring at all ? Consciousness as such is not discussed even by Plato, and consciousness, I take it, is a mode of what you call consciring."

L. "That is so. Yet possibly there were experts in the Mysteries who knew much more than Plato. And they may have veiled with symbolism certain important truths."

W. "But why symbolise, why refer to these alleged truths

at all ? Why lure some acute mind into the chase after them ? ”

L. “ Don’t ask me ; perhaps they wanted a few acute minds to enjoy the truth.”

W. “ Perhaps, but you don’t know. And you don’t know anything about the Mysteries. So leave it at that.”

L. “ I know this, however. We have been talking long enough and one at least of the company will be the better for lunch.”

#### NOTES BY BASIL ANDERTON

- (1) Cf. Chapter IV. pp. 42-45.
- (2) *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, p. 440.
- (3) Chapter III. pp. 34-35.
- (4) On the problem of past, present and future, cf. *Z.D.* pp. 444-449.
- (5) In Plato’s *Banquet*, Burges’ translation.
- (6) *Z.D.* p. 104.
- (7) Thought consists mainly of “ inner speech ”.—*Analysis of the Human Mind*, p. 152.
- (8) *Plato’s Theory of Knowledge*, p. 142.
- (9) “ Zeller remarks that, since a similar distinction of the highest God from the creator of the world appears before Numenius in the Christian Gnostics among whom the Valentinians adopted the name ‘ Demiurgus ’ from Plato, it was probably from them that Numenius got the hint for his theory ; and that in addition Philo’s theory of the Logos doubtless influenced him . . . with Philo the Logos is the principle that mediates between the supreme God and the world formed out of matter. Essentially the conception is of Greek origin, being taken directly from the Stoics who got at least the suggestion of it from Heraclitus. Philo regards the Logos as containing the Ideas in accordance with which the visible world was formed. By this Platonising turn it becomes in the end a different conception from the divine ‘ Reason ’ of the Stoics, embodied as that is in the material element of fire. On the other hand, by placing the Platonic Ideas in the Divine Mind Philo interprets Plato in a sense which many scholars . . . have refused to allow.” —Whittaker, *The Neo-Platonists*, pp. 34-35.

## CHAPTER VI

### DE PROFUNDIS : THE FONTAL CONSCIRING

“Si la conscience qui sommeille dans l’instinct se reveillait, s’il s’intériorisait en connaissance au lieu de s’extérioriser en action, si nous savions l’interroger et s’il pouvait répondre, il nous livrerait les secrets de la vie.” — BERGSON in *Évolution Créatrice*.

“The secret of consciring is the greatest of all problems to the solution of which the mystic aspires. Supreme power, supreme wisdom, supreme delight lie in the far-off solution of this mystery. In all the revelations which await the ‘initiate’ of popular repute there is nothing so fundamental as this secret of consciring.” — Douglas Fawcett in *Zermatt Dialogues*.

PIPES were being lighted, note-books were being consulted, in our now familiar nook on the mountain-side.

S. “I think, Leslie, that your suggestion made yesterday deserved a better reception than Wortvoll gave it. Logos (or Ishwara), personified as a god deputising for a changeless Absolute, is without philosophical value ; Logos as symbol of divine consciring, in so far as this is expressed in our particular world-system, is of interest. It may help the plain man towards the truth ; the truth about the ‘light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world’, every animal, plant-cell, atom, electron or neutron as well. If, as is probable, there exist innumerable world-systems, then somewhat of divine consciring lights each. Can we suppose that the symbolism was invented deliberately ? That would be merely a guess, quite unsupported by evidence. The enthusiasts in the foreground, philosophical and religious of whom we read, talked of and meant a Logos-god, and one indeed identified him with the Jewish Messiah ! Regard the term then as meaning Divine Imagining in so far as manifest in a world-system. And, having thus emptied it of mystery, cease using it. We want metaphysics here, not quasi-theological symbols.”

W. “To hell with symbols. Further, what I want are not stray *aperçus* and suggestions but an account of consciring

as systematic as the topic, or rather your knowledge, allows it to be. Let me be frank. You call your kind of philosophy Imaginism. Why? Because the world-principle, considered in respect of its conscita or contents, resembles more or less what we call private imagination or fancy in ourselves. So far, so good. But this world-principle, Divine Imagining, you suppose, has two aspects, that of these conscita or contents and that of consciring. Now the consciring seems most fundamental, since it conserves and creates additively all the contents on which you have laid such stress. Should it fail, all the contents in all the world-systems are brought to nought, leaving not an electron behind :

The cloud-capped towers, the gorgeous palaces,  
The solemn temples, the great globe itself,  
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve,

if ' God ineffable ' wilts. This consciring, on your showing, is the activity at the heart of what exists. Anderton, will you be good enough to discuss it as such ? ”

A. “ Yes, and you will find that our hypotheses affirm themselves ever more strongly during the process of being tested ; a complete ‘ logical ’ proof is not to be had, but in the end you will be unable to dispense with them. Does that matter, seeing that all human reasoning is probable and derives its thrust, as we noted, from fancy ? You will come to accept these hypotheses as you accept belief in other individuals, a belief which logic is quite powerless to guarantee ? ”

W. “ I have no diet save the probable and the directly known contents of my workaday life. So ply me with suggestions as before — I am all attention.”

A. “ You referred to the infinite activity at the heart of things, what we called ‘ God ineffable ’. Only finite things, we saw, *exist* ; Divine Imagining does not therefore exist ; nor of course is it narrowly spatio-temporal, though its deeds or ‘ works ’ show in part in the frame of space-time. It is perficient rather than statically ‘ perfect ’ ; perhaps only finite existents can be said to become perfect, *i.e.* ‘ thoroughly made ’, a world-system for instance.”

S. “ Spinoza, I believe, urged that activity is of the very

essence of the real ; God for this thinker is self-source, *causa sui*, and radiating existents, as it were, inexhaustibly."

L. "Self-source is good ; but Spinoza's God seemed to me in His chief rôle to be a vague 'substance' with 'attributes' ; and this writer failed also to solve the all-important riddle of time. Imagining, however, is a genuine self-source and source of everything in virtue of its character ; time-succession too is explained by it. . . . But Anderton holds the field."

A. "Fichte wrote of 'infinite activity', the character of which is to create. We say outright that creating is imagining ; Divine Imagining radiates alike old and new, sustaining and innovating in ways beyond perfection. A 'perfect' cosmic principle would be aloof from change. Let me now take up my burden and get to grips with the crux of consciring.

I have to repeat an important statement : it is convenient to speak of Divine Imagining when we have in mind both the *creating* and the *created*, in other words both God's working and God's works ; it is best to speak of Divine Consciring when the active spiritual creativity is being considered by itself. We may then have to contrast such consciring with conscita, creata, contents, call them what you will. But consciring and conscita are not like two cliffs which face one another across a void. Only the weakness of the human intellect compels us sometimes to discuss them as thus opposed. As soon as a conscitum exists and so long as it endures, it is for consciring ; consciring, again, which is creativity, implies a conservative or additively novel filling of some kind. The cliffs, thus opposed, belong to one another as parts of the complete landscape. Similarly there are no such separations between conscita, *e.g.* star-systems, as men invent for their abstract studies. The phases of Nature belong to a continuum of interpenetrative contents. A light-ray from Sirius leaps across the great spaces and invades my brain, becoming of one tissue with my own spiritual being. A cart, bumping over rough ground, troubles the sun.

All things by a law divine  
In one another's being mingle

are not set apart to be related externally only at intervals.

Within world-systems (which may indeed lie apart) is mutual 'influence' of contents which means 'inflow' of each into very many others and perhaps, to some degree, into all. Bergson and Whitehead emphasise this truth, Whitehead observing that 'each object is in some sense ingredient throughout Nature'.(1) We are to use our abstractions then with due care.

We cannot identify ourselves with Divine Consciring, so we have to frame concepts or substitute-facts about it. And we are able to do so because we are acquainted primarily, though very inadequately, with finite consciring in ourselves. We do not *observe* this consciring as we do objects, *e.g.* a colour or stone; we are or live the reality which is named thus. Ordinarily we use the term 'consciousness' to denote this immediate living which shines in its own light and cannot be described in terms of any objects. We contrast our 'consciousness' when we are awake with the black night of the 'unconscious' which entombs us during dreamless sleep. 'Consciousness' has been likened to a light which lights those who come into the world, and the simile is of use, but only because it refers us back the more directly and intensely to 'consciousness' itself. 'Consciousness', however, not being observable as is an object, mental or physical, is overlooked easily by a philosophical writer in a hurry. There results nonsense such as this: 'psychosis is vesiculo-neurosis', consciousness is a 'misdescription of conditioned reflexes' or, again, 'simply the electro-magnetic field of force associated with the electro-chemical reactions of brain-patterns'."

L. " 'Simply' ! Peter Bell is less ignorant."

S. "Wortvoll will note soon how we contrast irreflective with reflective consciring. The earlier reflective awareness is of different sorts of *objects*, of importance in a practical regard. The riddle of awareness itself was overlooked even by great thinkers such as Plato.(2) It is overlooked entirely by the cruder empiricists to-day."

W. " 'Consciousness shines in its own light; don't labour that point. The reality is obvious — name it, since you can't ignore it. Tell me, however, why you have thrust this new term 'consciring' into the discussion. I have been uneasy about it for some days. It is used, I know, in *Z.D.*, but my

readings in that quarter as yet are few. I don't like the multiplication of terms without good excuse."

A. "Good, but this term is indispensable. Let me explain. It would be useless to discuss further Divine Consciring until we know how the term 'consciring' is related to the term 'consciousness' so long in use.

The term '*consciousness*' — how abstract it sounds — has been held by some critics to denote a 'neutral light' which illuminates without doing anything else; like a will-o'-the-wisp hovering idly over marshes. Now there is a reason why 'consciousness' seems to us sometimes, but by no means always, a realm bathed in neutral light. I will return to this topic; for the present let me say that, for competent metaphysical thinking, an *active power*, conserving, creating additively and destroying, has to be placed at the roots of our being. '*Consciousness*', James's '*inert diaphaneity*', is exchanged therefore for '*consciring*'; for what Professor R. Werner has called *conscience-énergie*. This live *consciring* is Pierre Janet's '*activité agissante*' which creates novelty even within conditioned finite centres. Looking in thought beyond these centres, we descry the ocean of the infinite, Fichte's 'limitless spiritual activity' for which we have now a suitable name. Count Keyserling's 'ultimate, essentially non-objective Reality from which objects are poured forth like sudden fancies' has been christened at the same time." (3)

W. "You are bold. It seems a far cry from *consciring* as fundamental power in the finite centre to Divine Consciring, however hypothetical you consider this latter to be."

L. "As was said before, we are gropers on a low cosmic level. Wortvoll grumbles about the lack of an experimental proof of the reality of Divine Consciring; he wants to be immersed fully in It, to live Its life. But he wants the moon. He has not taken the trouble to become even an ordinary mystic. Not that the ordinary mystics we read about seem to go far; some who found religions and write books make bad mistakes; they appear to know less about fundamentals even than the philosophers. Better stick to our hypotheses for the while; we can grow our wings later."

W. "Yet on your own showing Divine Consciring under-

lies all happenings in this sublunary world. So those who dream of an experimental proof may be tempted to find the Presence intuitively even now."

L. "They can and they do find It. But they lack sufficient direct grasp of It, clothing their poor knowledge too often with the fancies of petty man-made creeds. Let us get on ; radical empiricism, normal or supernormal, has not enlightened Wortvoll at any rate. Why should it profit others lavishly ?"

S. "Though God is the source of finite centres and their worlds, the source is very remote. Wortvoll will hear later about this. Creative evolution has, to a great extent, forgotten its birthplace and run amok. Anderton, please continue."

A. "The term 'consciring' then has merit. It suggests to us a dynamic, eruptive presence, conscience-énergie, activité agissante, élan vital, énergie spirituelle, etc., and it accents, as e.g. élan vital does not, the spiritual character of this power in the depths. This is not all. Belonging to a family of words, conscience, consciousness, conscionable, etc., whose etymology furnishes a clue to their meaning,(4) *consciring* (*con* scio) prompts us to think of a ground both of qualities and relations. Quantities too, extensive, protensive and intensive, are interpretable as functions of consciring. Consciring supplies literally the 'energy' of the universe. On its conservative side it upholds in God that 'made reality', immeasurably great, which we call The Past (5); is what persists, despite endless transformations, in the process symbolised as 're-distribution of energy' by science. The riddle of Causation can be solved only when this *vis creatrix* is borne in mind.(6)

The word 'consciring' is a gerund, i.e. usable as a noun or verb. I can say also either that *x* conscires or that *x* conscires (transitive verb) an idea or tree. And, when I am concerned with clear thinking, I ought to use the words 'conscire', 'conscita', etc., in place of the misleading 'feel', 'feelings', etc., which are slipped too often into philosophy. Instances are: 'consciousness is the feeling of negation', 'the feeler is the unity emergent from its own feelings',(7) 'the stream of consciousness feels its own current'(8) and the use of 'feeling', 'felt mass', 'felt totality', 'self-feeling', etc., by Bradley and other writers. Are we to whittle down consciousness into 'feel-



ings'; the unity of experience into connected contents?(9) Consciring, on the other hand, furnishes that 'transcendental unity of apperception' which intrigued Kant. It is a protean creative power by which sense-contents and others are grasped. Relations presuppose consciring; continuity, as the Cambridge Platonist More urged, is spiritual."

W. "'Consciring' covers a much wider field than the familiar 'consciousness' which one well-known psychologist narrows down to 'attention'."

A. "Yes, a much wider field. Thus we speak of *irreflective* and *reflective* consciring and of different levels of these. When a man awakes from dreamless sleep, he is said to become conscious; but in our language his soul re-attains one of the levels of reflective consciring, perceptual or other. When asleep this soul existed in a state, not necessarily sluggish, of *irreflective* consciring, being described popularly as 'unconscious'. A clear distinction has to be drawn between the mere absence of consciring, in the case, *e.g.*, of a block of wood or stone which is not allied with a dominating soul, and the presence of consciring, but *irreflective*, in the case, *e.g.*, of a human soul. At any given moment during my waking life almost all the experience which I have harvested, almost all the morsels of wisdom which I have enjoyed, are buried far down in the *irreflective* depths of the soul; little from this past is needed to feed the present, when mind-body responds to the calls of the surround. I shall deal with this topic of *irreflective* and *reflective* consciring at some length. Without mastering its main difficulties we have no prospect of solving the riddle of chief interest to us in these talks, that of the soul." I was silent awhile, wishing to sort my notes and allow Wortvoll and the others to speak.

W. "Reflective consciring? Well, we know what is meant by 'reflection' and 'reflective' thought; making use of a metaphor, we conceive conscious life as 'bent back' (*re flecto*) on itself in the act of knowing more about itself and its contents. 'Reflect on what I have told you' is a command to 'bend back' attention on words already heard so as to elicit their full meaning. But the word 'attention' = 'stretching to' also makes use of metaphor."

*S.* "Metaphor apart, the 'attention' is reflective consciring, focal consciring which becomes specially intense, specially creative in the domain of the words. 'Eliciting' the meaning of the words is also metaphor; what occurs is imaginal construction according to cues which the words supply. Much creativity too may be required to fit such a construct into the setting of a new situation. The levels of irreflective and reflective consciring differ in respect of intensity and creativity. On the lowest levels of Nature creativity must be poor, while irreflective consciring, I suppose, is the rule."

*L.* "'Ears they have but they hear not!' Agents penetrate, and are penetrated by, the contents of other natural agents, but know not what they do or undergo."

*S.* (continuing). "They perceive without being aware that they are perceiving; they conscire irreflectively. 'It is certain', wrote Francis Bacon, 'that all bodies whatsoever . . . have perception . . . and whether the body be alterant or altered, evermore a perception precedeth operation; for else all bodies would be alike one to another.'(10) The collapse of Materialism renders this suggestion forceful; Nature, Wortvoll, may consist only of contents akin to the contents of our minds, along with the innumerable lines of world-consciring that energise them. Well, leaving the levels of the lowest natural agents, we suspect a few plants of perceiving very vaguely objects, and we credit the higher animals, which are not yet fully 'persons', with live reflective consciring as regards their perceptual world. On the human level the advance may be great. 'Reflective' perception, reflective thought, reflection on the fact that we conscire, reflective analysis of the self, are in evidence. But take note that we live very near the abyss. Thus intense reflective consciring marks our highly creative, novel adjustments of act and thought, but wanes as habits begin to form. Habit, wrote Bain, is 'the enemy of consciousness', i.e. of reflective consciring. My past, again, slides away incessantly into the darkness and what I am now for reflective consciring is the veriest fragment of my complete being. In deep sleep and at death I sink, at any rate temporarily, into blackest night, into irreflective consciring such as obtains on the lowest levels of Nature. My waking life is only a light amid

encircling gloom ; a petty clearing in a forest that threatens to invade it on every side and, in a not very distant future, will overrun and annex it. . . . Excuse me, friends, I have been holding the floor too long."

W. "Not so. You have given me lots to think about. These levels of irreflective and reflective consciring are of great importance, if I mistake not. And now a question — you have spoken freely of God ; do you hold that fully reflective consciring characterises this level ?"

S. "Yes, fully reflective both as regards the conscita or contents and the 'activité agissante' itself. Finite consciring, *e.g.* man's, is incompletely revealed to itself ; it lights more or less the contents before it, contents to which we are said to 'attend', but itself very partially indeed. If you liken our finite consciring to a spear, you must add that at present it is reflective only at its extreme point. This limited reflectivity has been stressed by many philosophers not otherwise agreeing with us ; expressions such as 'transcendental subject', 'noumenal ego', 'unknown substance of the ego', 'attention' which cannot attend to itself, etc., are common. There is good reason why a critic of your school should consider this topic thoroughly. The story of the soul, as we interpret it, begins with stages of sheer irreflectivity continuing on to reflective levels more and more adequate without end. Its earliest reflective career, as recorded by ordinary psychology, is not the dawn of its existence. It 'cometh from afar'. Of which anon."

L. "I tried, Wortvoll, to maintain against West the belief of many German and other thinkers that the world-principle, though mind-like in character, is unconscious. I failed.(11) The issue is a very important one. A world-order believed to emerge from Schelling's Immemorial Being or Schopenhauer's blind Will cannot be trusted. It is without purpose ; at any stage cosmos might end in chaos, so far as finite life is concerned."

W. "The pessimists ought to welcome chaos. All their legions of alleged sufferers might find death therein ; sleep that lasts through eternal night. Not even Hardy's unconscious god, the 'dreaming, dark, dumb, Thing' of *The Dynasts*, could plague them again."

L. "But what is to prevent this power from dreaming into existence a new cosmos as bad as, or worse than, the old? It can't learn wisdom. No, no, we must seek for a less grim President of the Immortals. . . . Ah! Anderton is on the warpath again."

A. "Thanks to Stark, our terminology can now be improved. The term 'consciousness' denotes some level of reflective consciring; while 'attention' is a name for focal consciring of this sort. Ward wrote of 'distributable attention'; man's conscience-énergie, we can say, being limited must be canalised in effective use. The glow-point of creativity must be at selected regions of content; intense working has to go by favour, favour accorded, in the main, to adjustments furthering our practical life. I stress a further reform in terminology. Irreflective consciring, which underlies and over-  
lies the reflective — you heard what Stark had to say — is best not called unconscious. A spiritual reality is at work, though not so intensely as for content above the Threshold of 'consciousness'; we need to emphasise the presence of this reality, not the fact that *we* are not directly aware of it. Henceforth, when not making quotations, I shall dispense with the term 'consciousness' and speak only of consciring, irreflective and reflective, with great gain to clarity of thought in metaphysics.

Consciring is dynamic. I take this opportunity to deal with a difficulty noted by me some while back. Why do some fields of consciring seem bathed in 'neutral light', and not foci of conscience-énergie at all? The answer is now simple. The consciring implied is, in the main, irreflective. Thus a stable colour may look an inert presence but consider, with the aid of physiology and physics, the complicated consciring, that of your soul and of very numerous natural agents, which makes the colour appear! The colour is thrust above the Threshold of your reflective consciring, but the thrusting dynamic escapes notice. Is anyone aware directly how the external physical world, brain and soul furnish the sense-content which he calls a patch of red?"

W. "Plausible enough that suggestion, if the external world is psychical or psychoid in character, as you three believe it to be. But now tell me something more about irreflective

consciring and reflective too in respect of the problem of God."

A. "Belief in irreflective consciring may be reached by students of isolated problems; *e.g.* those of memory, 'dispositions', dreams, instincts and urges. How suggestive too is that twilight, quickly passing into darkness, which veils contents outside the range of attention, *i.e.* focal reflective consciring. There is a veritable gradation of contents from those of interest, which are conscired vividly, through those which are just sufficiently insistent to show dimly down to those which are glimpsed at intervals only or form parts of a vague, total background in which nothing stands out. Incidentally, it is possible for me to remember that which in the original consciring I was not aware of noticing at all; the irreflective in this case is lit up in the retrospect. You aviators, Leslie, and the motorists will assent.(12) Below this level of marginal contents, the background of attention, lie the strata attributed popularly to 'the unconscious'. Medico-psychological writers have written freely on this topic. They contend rightly with Jung: 'He who would fathom the psyche must not confuse it with consciousness'.(13) But the 'fathoming' ought to be thorough. You are familiar with the theories of 'psycho-analysis'. They take account, I allow, of important fields of research connected with the soul, but not of enough of these. They concern the practice of 'psycho-therapy' rather than general philosophy."

L. "In the soul, it may be, are many mansions and there is no call to be interested always in that part of it which is sunk in the physical body. If we believe certain psycho-analysts, the contents of their 'unconscious' are not only few but poor; one says that they consist largely of infantile reminiscences.(14) Much poor stuff has been written about 'libido'. Medico-psychological literature of this kind won't carry us far."

W. "Why dwell on side-issues now? These psychologists don't believe in your version of the soul and would be loth to credit it with any soul-strata independent of the body. Stick for the present to general philosophy."

A. "You are right. General philosophy, lightened with allusiveness, is here our portion. Well, we can't whittle down our topic into a discussion of 'infantile reminiscences', 'repressed elements', racial 'inherited urges' and the like. The

field of irreflective consciring is indefinitely wider than petty happenings connected with human brains. It transcends this psychological outlook altogether.

You have read or will be reading shortly, Wortvoll, the story of the evolution of Nature in our particular world-system, as suggested by West and recorded in *Z.D.*(15) You and we alike have got rid of the superstition, not yet fully discredited in science, of a mechanical world and are prepared to consider a cosmology which requires imaginal structure and constituents alone. Divine Imagining is a realm in which all the needed building materials can be made or found ; nothing which any man can think of would be lacking ; even the Kantian ' things-in-themselves ', were they real, would be merely so many imaginal existents about which we mortals know very little. Now let me suppose, Wortvoll, that you accept a cosmology of this kind. Consider, then, how world-history opens. Nature begins as an imaginal field, a system of content, upheld within God. Were Divine Consciring to fail, it and all things which belong to it would vanish. I won't discuss now this *primaeval* imaginal field and its evolution into Nature as it exists to-day — you can read about that at leisure — I will insist at present solely on this. *Primaeval* physical Nature exists only for Divine Consciring which may uphold innumerable other Natures belonging to innumerable other world-systems. It is not itself a centre of reflective consciring ; but a *conscitum* existing,(16) *i.e.* 'standing out' as a finite whole amid world-contents, not for itself but for God. As such it is phase of a harmonious, organised system which pre-exists to creative evolution.

At the outset, then, there is no consciring, irreflective or reflective, save the Divine. *Primaeval* Nature is *conscitum* only ; time-succession with its multiplicity of finite creative agents is unborn. But inevitably, in a manner which has been described elsewhere, this imaginal field becomes astir with *its own* inward life ; innumerable natural agents, centres of irreflective consciring, arise. The so-called material world is mythical ; the actual world, revealed by idealism, is, what Royce called it, the home of a vast society of societies. ' The atom is only explicable as a society with activities involving

rhythms with their definite periods', observes Whitehead.(17) 'Biology is the study of the larger organisms; whereas physics is the study of the smaller organisms.'(18) Rocks are clusters of organisms, though not organisms themselves; 'the great globe itself' consists only of such organisms and the societies in which they live. In the mutual influence of the societies is manifested the power of which I have said so much — CONSCIRING. Physics, deprived at the gate of metaphysics of its last symbols and dummies, capitulates to psychics."

L. "You say that consciring is always irreflective on the lower levels of Nature?"

A. "Yes, on all levels below that of biological organisms at any rate. But I am no West and speak without authority. What say you, Stark?"

S. "We must, I think, resist any attempt to describe the minor natural agents as finite centres of consciring like our own. Yet there is a risk of over-simplifying in this domain. For the parts of Nature may be organic to higher souls, as Bradley thought; and the behaviour of the minor agents in such parts will certainly be complicated, if these disturbing factors are at work. The behaviour of my brain and nervous system, for instance, is altered very considerably by the fact that I exist!"

W. "Not necessarily, if you are just an epiphenomenon, the fly on the wheel. I agree with you, however, about not assigning too high a development to the minor agents. If this is done, the case for your interesting external world will suffer."

S. "Let us try to consider the lowest agents, 'atomic' and 'sub-atomic', as interrelated merely with one another. Their contents are restricted, lacking variety; these centres have a poor filling, 'siring' rather than 'consciring' what they include. Now a certain strength of consciring is needed for the passage from irreflectivity — the so-called 'unconscious' — over the 'Threshold of consciousness'. The consciring that sustains the meagre filling cannot, ordinarily at least, attain sufficient strength. Further, in these depths where habit is entrenched, encouraging us to invent 'laws' of Nature, and where creativity, accordingly, is minimal, strength is sapped in

an obvious way. Habit, as was mentioned before, is the 'enemy of consciousness', i.e. of reflective consciring as required for very creative response. The minor agent penetrating, and penetrated by, another possesses a petty field of content open to irruptions of alien content. It responds to an invasion almost exactly as it has responded sextillions of times before; the leaven of novelty is infinitesimal. Such an agent, I need hardly add, cannot comprise even the rudiments of what we call 'self' and is thus conveniently discussed by chemists and physicists, when one of a very great number of like agents, *as if* it were a mechanical item in the economy of a mechanical world. For what is almost solely conservative lends itself to predictions with the dependability that the mechanical world-units were supposed to secure."

W. "If we accept these minor natural agents, we must certainly regard their consciring as irreflective. Even when we consider biological organisms, which are much higher in the scale of being, we are not clear of the irreflective. Who will credit, *e.g.*, the Paramecium or slipper-animalcule with a rudimentary 'self', memory, emotion, power to learn or anything but a vague sensibility spread over a succession of vanishing presents? In truth very many animal and plant species exist below the level of reflective consciring; recourse to the facts, now easily reached, can leave no reasonable person in doubt. I will assert further that consciousness or, as you call it, reflective consciring did not show in this planet's history till it was of practical use, till important novel adjustments to environment needed it."

L. "Quite so, and incidentally you have admitted that consciring is dynamic indeed. But our minor agents hold the field. . . . I read that Starynkevitch in *The Structure of Life* credits all the parts of an organism with a 'pre-conscious intuition' of what the whole organism 'wants', though 'wants' must not be understood in terms of human volition. This primordial or 'pre-conscious intuition', which secures co-ordination of the cell-activities of the body, is irreflective consciring asserted of cell-life. What is not clear is how much each cell is held to conspire of the regions beyond it. Very little indeed, I gather, after what you said about Paramecium, but that little might



suffice. A few colours, refracted by lenses, may instruct a general about an army."

W. "I am quite clear as to what is meant by irreflective consciring. Let us get on."

L. "Say something more about the 'Threshold' and reflectivity; and let Wortvoll know what ground we have for regarding Divine Consciring as fully reflective."

A. "Fechner's statement about the 'Threshold', which I cite, considers the intimate relations that exist between human consciring and the physical body. This body itself consists, in our view, of psychoid contents, fertilised by their own rills of consciring, of the very many minor agents of which we were talking just now: 'Consciousness [=reflective consciring] is present and awake when and where the activity of the body underlying the activity of the mind . . . exceeds that degree of strength which we call the Threshold'. 'Consciousness is extinguished whenever the bodily activity, on which it depends, sinks below a certain degree of strength called the Threshold. The more extended this activity, the more it will be weakened and the more easily it will sink below the Threshold. There is such a Threshold for our consciousness as a whole — the limit between sleeping and waking — and a particular one for every sphere of the mind. Hence, in the waking state, the one or the other idea will rise up or sink in our mind, according as the particular activity on which it depends rises above, or sinks below, its respective Threshold."

L. "This statement refers only to man and seems therefore to concern the psychologists who exploit the 'unconscious'. Further, it makes man's psyche too dependent on the activity of the physical body."

A. "This 'Threshold' metaphor has been adopted very widely and is useful; the statement just quoted has man in view, but you can generalise it as desired. Consciring in all finite centres attaining a certain degree of strength or intensity becomes reflective; *i.e.* consciring which may 'bend back' on itself and become aware of what it does. This strength may derive from that of invasive contents upheld by alien consciring, from creative innovation, or both. But, the brute strength of invasive contents apart, the stages of reflective consciring are

creative. Thus the self, which is on a much higher level than reflective perception and is not fully achieved in animals, is a product of construction, a novelty that is *made* and added to the universe. Occasionally many such selves are created within one centre of consciring, existing then simultaneously or in succession. And, if it be true that one human soul can manifest in a plurality of births, different selves will be constructed for all the different adventures.

As regards the dependence of reflective consciring on bodily functions, there is this to be said. This consciring, once established, acts and reacts on the body and almost always, it would appear, through the brain ; mutual influence, then, not a one-sided dependence, is indicated. But it is the consciring of innumerable allied minor agents in the brain that helps to furnish the 'strength' enabling the human soul to cross the 'Threshold' and keep awake. Human consciring, in this respect, is obviously dependent on the body ; a little fatigue, a very little mishap in the cortex reduce the soul to irreflectivity. Death of the body is decisive. Later I shall be suggesting why the soul needs a physical body and how soul and body co-operate in the very intimate manner noticed. But the way has not been prepared sufficiently for a discussion of that kind."

S. "Useless to talk of the mutual influence of soul and body before we are clear as to what we consider the soul to be ; and what, further, we mean by causal influence. The 'Threshold' also will have to be reconsidered in a new light."

W. "I will wait. But about reflective consciring — it begins, I take it, when mere perceiving passes into awareness of the perceiving, a level reached on low rungs of the ladder of animal life. In the case of man it may develop into awareness of a constructed self and of 'reflective thought' about a great variety of things. 'Reflective thought' — how familiar and also how suggestive is the adjective ! — is just a stage in the process of general reflectivity which begins below thought and may end beyond it. Have I got your meaning rightly ? "

S. "Admirably. We hold also that man enjoys a very inadequate but genuine glimpse of consciring itself ; and this too can form a topic for reflective thought. We have stressed already the riddle of consciring, we who live in and by its light

and yet are too blind to gaze into its more profound depths."

*L.* "An American writer refers to man's 'present semi-conscious state' (19) and observes that 'quite a number of people suffer intermittently from a feeling of unreality in relation to their ordinary experiences in the waking state' (20) Is it surprising? Our perceived world, as Schopenhauer avers, is a 'cerebral phantasmagoria', whether we incline to believe in an independent external cosmos or not. And the very consciring in and by which we live is a Sphinx. The mystics, it goes without saying, will never lack recruits."

*W.* "Fully reflective consciring would be a consummation for which there are no secrets; darkness would be swallowed up by light all-penetrating. Your Divine Imagining is said to enjoy such consciring. Not profiting by a central, super-human point of view, you have to fall back on inference and the probable. Appeal from the probable to intuition, when made by ordinary folk, must fail. It did not enlighten the philosophers of the Unconscious, Eastern and Western, who were quite as able as their adversaries and quite as interested in the search for truth."

*L.* "It may be possible, nevertheless, for certain high mystics, transcending the poor fancies that riot in the popular creeds, to intuit better than the wisest philosophers. But they ought first to be trained as are the philosophers, gaining thus the power to write effectively and instruct aspirants. Much of mystical writing is extremely poor stuff.

Well, we four at any rate are forced back on reasoning and hypothesis. We find that many eminent sages of the past believed in an unconscious, but spiritual, world-principle which is not aware of itself save in finite sentient, centres of consciring if you prefer the phrase. And to-day a famous thinker, Whitehead, tells us that, if we make a 'distinction of reason' and discuss God abstractly as primordial actuality, we can ascribe to Him 'neither fullness of feeling, nor consciousness' (21) But, if the *fons et origo* is unconscious, what of the world, and how can we put trust in the future? The pessimists may have the last word after all. An unconscious world-principle is below purpose."

*W.* "So that an unconscious world-principle, if imaginal,

may imagine, like Hardy's 'dreaming, dark, dumb Thing', nightmares in which the Spirit Sinister triumphs? An unpleasant possibility, no doubt. But how are you going to rescue us from this menace of thought?"

L. "I fought the case for the unconscious against West and failed. I was forced to admit defeat. Anderton, will you state why we three now hold that Divine Consciring is fully reflective?"

A. "The Cambridge Platonist More held rightly that the mere continuity of the cosmos is spiritual; and *consciring*, which is spiritual, does connect the multiplicity of all possible contents. But does this connecting imply reflective *consciring*? There are those who connect the contents in an unconscious world-principle such as Schopenhauer's Will, though it is not clear how the connecting is achieved. Both the 'con' and the 'sciring' solve problems for which solutions are no longer offered!

This line of reasoning stresses the unity in multiplicity of contents. A more important one stresses the creativity embodied in the bare existence of the contents themselves. It is to be found in *Z.D.*(22) but can be stated briefly now:

In the case of a man, to make use of the quotation once more, habit is the 'enemy of consciousness', *i.e.* of reflective *consciring*. But when novel physical adjustments are being made or problems of thought are being solved, the man has to attend very closely to his task. This attention, which is highly selective, is the 'friend of consciousness', and the more creative is the *nisus* required, the more intense the effort of focal reflective *consciring* has to be. Creative *nisus* indeed may imply intense reflective *consciring*. Take note of this truth.

Man's creativity, however, is limited; his attention is directed on very much that he has not made, on a 'given' which he merely confronts. Let us get beyond this finite sentient and enjoy a cosmic outlook. Creative *nisus* in man, I said, may imply intense reflective *consciring*. What then of creation on the level of Divine Imagining?

I cannot better the answer as summarised in *Z.D.*: 'Owing to our limited power of attention, we cannot create — even in such modest spheres as the study of a problem or the

apperception of a tree — without ignoring very much. We can be intensely conscious, but in a restricted way ; to concentrate, as Ward put it, is also to excentrate. Our creativity is pitifully selective ; occurs only in portions of the presented content. And it only remoulds the “given”, lacking the radical character of creation in the cosmic depths. Divine Imagining, on the other hand, sires and drives all the world-steeds abreast. It does not *concentrate* selectively ; It “attends to” centre and circumference at once. *It creates entire the roots of being and it creates in every aspect, conservative and additive, of an infinite field.* It conscires accordingly throughout this field with the intensity that such creation involves ; Its consciring is not a shifting spot of “phosphorescence” like that of the attention of petty man, but “radiant”. This is why I have spoken of Divine Imagining as “fully reflective”. And now take thought of the sequel. Radiant Imagining has place for that which we call “feeling” ; also for immanent purposiveness embodied in Its imaginal structure. Ultimate reality must not be symbolised as “grey in grey”. And in realisation with awareness of an imaginal field is found that end-seeking discussed popularly as “the will of the Lord”, “the decrees of Fate” and so forth.’”(23)

W. “Good for you ! A tidy bit of pleading not, I allow, to be countered easily. And yet I am not satisfied. Suppose that your case is sound, as it may be. *Why* should creation and intense consciring be allied in this way ? ”

S. “Come ! Come ! Anderton need not push his metaphysics into the ‘Back of Beyond’. If creation somehow implies intense reflective consciring, that knowledge is illuminative. We are able to infer that God’s ‘strength’ of consciring is indefinitely intense. The philosophies which have declared God to be unconscious are wrecked.”

L. “Anderton said that creative nisis *may* imply intense reflective consciring, not that it implies it always. If the nisis is not great, there need not be any reflective consciring at all. Doubtless a slight creativity colours the reactions of electrons and amoebae to their surrounds, but this would not suffice to raise their consciring above the ‘Threshold’. The creativity, however, stressed by Anderton in the regard of Divine Imagin-

ing is *radical*, by which hangs the force of his suggestion. I don't think that Wortvoll will weaken it by piling up difficulties, Pelion on Ossa."

W. "I don't want to weaken it; the vistas opened up are too alluring. But I like to crawl out of Plato's Cave as far as I can, even though others may prefer the darkness."

A. "Creativity, as Leslie says, may imply consciring of 'strength' insufficient for the crossing of the 'Threshold'. All creativity points to consciring, but not always to reflective consciring. Creativity pervades so-called inorganic Nature, which is a society of societies of little organisms; is illustrated lavishly among the biologist's organisms, very often working in the dark. Even in the case of our own souls creativity, which is not the work of reflective consciring, plays a great part.

Creativity on the level of Divine Consciring is unique, radical and utterly thorough. Conservation (a Cartesian would assent) in these depths is also creation, implying active maintenance, failing which the foundations of the cosmos would vanish, leaving 'not a rack' behind. Additive creation provides inexhaustibly the new. The creative nîsus is such that it implies indefinitely or infinitely intense consciring. There is no question of a 'Threshold' on this level; 'Thresholds' are for finite centres whose consciring is of low intensity.

Wortvoll asks why creation and intense consciring are allied. They are not — always. The nature of consciring is to create and there is no creation without it. When the creative nîsus is of wide range and radical, the consciring is intensely reflective. When the nîsus is weak, consciring is irreflective. The rest must be silence.

The full secret of consciring is not for the intellectual; this 'Radiance beyond Reason' escapes the ken of thinkers. What this power, 'God Ineffable', is and what It does must be studied first in the history of the external world and of us finite sentients who are now only semi-conscious but hopeful that, at long last, they may become fully awake. Its works cannot but declare in part Its character. Not that difficulties will not arise as knowledge widens. This small planet, for instance, is the haunt of much sheer evil and we have to decide how deep lie the cancers which infect life. What is the outlook for man

stormtossed on the ocean of the infinite ? Will he reach after many adventures the Isles of the Blest or have to meditate with Schopenhauer on closing his career in a night of eternal sleep ?

Put your trust provisionally in Divine Consciring which, considered along with Its content, we name Divine Imagining. An imaginal universe can comprise anything and everything — the lovely, the odious, the splendid, the abominable, etc., etc., are aspects of an unlimited variety of content — but it has at any rate this outstanding merit : the world-systems admit of the greatest betterment *imaginable*, the basic imagining being of that supreme excellence called divine. Bear in mind, friends, that to imagine on the highest level is to create what exists in fact, though in the case of a world-system the process is long-drawn-out, conflicts innumerable seething within the system."

W. "An agnostic is cautious and I must consider my reply carefully. Meanwhile I think that your conclusions, if sound, may prove welcome both to the philosopher and the plain man. The plain man's God is not swept away ; you are trying to say more about the reality which he describes with symbols, often not too well, often indeed as if God has crude urges and emotions like a magnified man. You make light of the myth of a personal god, but you dethrone the unconscious world-principles exalted by modern atheism. Incidentally, I suppose, you don't call God, *i.e.* Divine Imagining, moral ?"

A. "We look beyond moral values which, like truth, are not eternal. Call God *ὑπεράγαθος* or supermoral, as Plotinus called 'the One'. Only finite individuals, borne on the stream of creative evolution, can be moral or immoral. Moral values include very important discoveries or inventions, though the moralising founders of religions, plain men and the philosophers have made many blunders. Even conscience is not reliable, and there is no universally applicable code of morals ; in this sphere, as in others, life is full of risks when we act."

W. "So the variety, native to imagining, shows in man's moral initiatives ; and certainly the moral codes of the modern nations vary formidably. Is anarchy then to be welcomed ?"

L. "There is a guiding consideration. Act so that creative evolution shall enrich best the lives of yourself and others, and

keep the balance as well as you can. If you don't keep the balance, you take a risk which we shall be discussing later. Men and nations are always taking such risks."

S. "In the story of the external world, as in that of finite centres like ourselves, there are constant violations of an equilibrium which in the long run is re-established always. You take your risks even when seeking moral goodness — you take others when mischief is in view. There are compensations, not anarchy."

A. "We can't deal now with an aspect of human life such as moral goodness. As regards Divine Imagining, bear this in mind. The very nature of Divine Imagining is to create, as was said before. Evil — brute pain, ugliness and moral evil — seems inevitable in a developing world-system, but creative evolution does not halt for that. God, in short, does not deny evil its field. Let us get on."

W. "Why world-systems at all? What profits the pother, signifying nothing; leading, perhaps, to nothing?"

A. "You can weigh different opinions, but, being unable to grasp the secret of consciring, you may not find any answer quite satisfactory."

L. "God has been called an artist, but He is very much more than that; He has been called the 'tremendous lover' with mystics and saints seeking in Him 'the state of love in love', but this narrowing of reality condemns itself. Similarly Ravaisson's 'absolute beauty', creating for love of what is created, confronts the ugly and intolerable that foul the world-systems. Consider, too, Goethe's 'Bond of Love' while standing beside a wounded animal which is being eaten by ants. Turn awhile from dreams of God's 'dynamic love' and study the grim happenings recorded in the book of life, widening thereby your outlook."

S. "Leslie, who was our pessimist, Wortvoll, at Zermatt won't have the dark side of life ignored and he is right. Divine Imagining, the spiritual creativity, is not concerned merely with our lover-like moods and the religion of beauty. It is the ultimate *fons et origo* of all variety whatever and, as fundamental principle, cannot be explored fully by man. Not all able modern writers, who believe in God, stress His lover-like aspect.



Thus, according to Whitehead, God is 'unmoved by love for this particular or that particular' — His purpose in the creative advance is the evocation of intensities. 'The evocation of societies is purely subsidiary to this absolute end.' Cosmic possibilities, beyond the petty outlook of man, must be allowed for by votaries of the cult of love and beauty."

W. "Well and, after all, what do the votaries know? As a rule only what they are told. And, if a few have managed to graduate as mystics and explore for themselves, how are we to know whether they have got far or not? Is it so easy to reach the Hinterland? And, once really established there, what will the pilgrims retain of their old human ideals and aspirations? As Whitehead's words suggest, they may be stirred by cosmic possibilities rather than love-dreams and, if then evil and pain reappear in new forms, why should they care? Why not more adventures? We Nazis prefer Valhalla to Lotus-eating."

S. "Have what you want for as long as you want it, for maybe, in this imaginal universe, all are served and continue their banquets just as they like. Still choose your dishes wisely; *you take your risks*. . . . But to return to Whitehead's God: what 'cosmic possibilities' are included in the steps by which God fulfils Himself? God has no love for us *qua* individuals (finite centres) or for the old and the new as such. 'He cares not whether an immediate occasion be old or new, so far as concerns derivation from its ancestry. His aim for it is depth of satisfaction as an intermediate step towards the fulfilment of His own being.' It might be that many grim adventures, interesting Wortvoll, belong to this fulfilment, in which conservation and additive creation of cosmic scope find their place."

L. "I see Wortvoll realising his dreams of adventure as long as he can. But I won't apply for a post under him. For Whitehead's God seems interested only in Himself, a Moloch, of a type by no means unfamiliar."

A. "Defer further debate on such issues till we discuss the Divine Event. . . . We have agreed so far, assuming that the hypothesis of Divine Imagining works, that a certain measure of agnosticism is timely. We are unable to penetrate far into

the heart of This Power, considered as the source of manifestations ; we must seek to study It in the manifestations themselves. We hold also that religious and semi-religious revelations about It are probably misleading, at best most one-sided. The safest method of approach for the student is through philosophy, a wide acquaintance with science and a sympathetic understanding of the Calvary of human and animal history. He will then perceive, not too poorly, the actual complications of the world-pattern showing on the loom of time ; to take refuge in cloistered devotion would be to open eyes that cannot see. Intellect's prodigal son may go far."

L. " In considering the fontal Divine Imagining, we make no list of Its 'emotions', an absurd study lacking observations and experiments, but we are not forced to ignore the general topic of feeling altogether. Bradley did not try to stare at his Absolute ; nevertheless he thought on general grounds that this Absolute is, on the balance, happy."

S. " If we regard Divine Imagining as basic, we must treat Its affective side (as we call it) or feeling (should we say feelings ?) as equally basic. All intense reflective consciring in finite centres is aglow with feeling, brute pleasure and pain, the emotions, urges, sentiments, etc., and, when indefinitely intense consciring is discussed, the attendant feeling will be held indefinitely intense too. We thus decline to paint the Ultimate Power 'grey in grey', drab and flat as Spencer's Unknowable, that most fantastic and most hopelessly unverifiable of the ghosts invented by man. The Divine Imagining may be happy in a manner *that includes, and transcends, pain*, itself colourful and of radical importance in things cosmic."

W. " Well, it comes to that. If God is Divine Imagining, as perchance He is, one must suppose that this fontal Imagining owns feeling like every finite centre. Or rather, unlike the finite centre, It owns feeling radiantly intense. I am only running the hypothesis for what it is worth controversially — don't turn on me later and charge me with deserting my post."

L. " Well and good, but what a situation, if we are right and your scepticism is only a passing noise ! The all-embracing, intensely-active Power penetrates your very blood and brain, and yet you are asking whether It is hypothesis or fact. Its

intense consciring leaves you in outer darkness; if It enjoys irony, your doubts respecting It must have their savour. Meanwhile you talk about It, as if Its reality depended solely on your *fiat*."

W. "I am not forgetting that the postman may be at my door, and, when he knocks loudly enough, I'll let him in."

L. "But, Anderton, say something more, put shortly but incisively, about feeling."

A. "Speaking generally, in view of reports the body is able to give us and of others which we derive from studies of our souls, we can say this: pleasant, joyous, happy feeling attends free or furthered activity (the old 'unimpeded activity'); all painful feeling attends conflict (the old 'impeded activity'). I am not talking with psychology in view and assume that the reports are correct.(24) These feelings, in their many modes, are not presented to consciring as is, *e.g.*, a colour or sound; they belong to the side of consciring, are bright spots in which we glimpse transient, but actual, features of consciring itself. Furthered and thwarted phases of consciring are expressed often poignantly. There is no instant when centres of consciring, such as ours, are not astir with sentiments, emotions, simpler pleasures, pains and perhaps neutral feelings; marks of the dynamic on which they float.

Think awhile of the highest level of human pleasant living; happiness. Laetitia, writes Spinoza, est hominis transitio a minore ad maiorem perfectionem — transition to a greater perfection, in which consciring is reflective in a richer way. But what is our 'greater perfection', marred by mostly stale, flat living, after all? Rise then in thought to Divine Imagining. Transition to a greater perfection will not bring disillusionment now. Along with maximal 'unimpeded' consciring goes maximal, it may be infinite, bliss. Can we indicate by words this peak of happiness in not too intolerable a way? An attempt was made in a work published in 1921 and it was suggested that Delight-Love-Beauty might serve this purpose. It was urged that the supreme affective life 'is, at any rate, crowned with *love*; that, allied with harmonious infinite activity, it is *bliss* or *delight* ineffable, *i.e.* delight such as no concepts, used in human thinking, can express. And what of





ABOVE THE FIESCHERHORN, BERNESE OBERLAND

*beauty* which has that immediacy that attests itself ? ' and might even be the highest end of all." (25)

L. "The lovely is loved and the adorable adored where beauty reigns. So that the 'state of love in love', of which mention was made just now, is realised. Redeunt Saturnia regna. Moral goodness and truth, not being eternal values, of service only to finite centres, are transcended and all is well. What say you, Wortvoll ?"

W. "I had my say over a similar thought before. This is a tale told by Lotus-eaters who dream dreams. Men have made for themselves gods in religion ; they continue the process of inventing in mysticism and philosophy. I don't blame them, but this outlook won't do for me."

A. "Everything in its place later. Meanwhile let me finish. I too came to think that this Delight-Love-Beauty triad is best dispensed with. Let it suffice to speak of the Bliss-consciring without suggesting that we can guess our way to less vague knowledge. Was it not said that, if oxen had made a god for themselves, they would have made him with the head of an ox ? Would Wortvoll's Lotus-eaters be reliable students of deity ? For within Divine Imagining may occur oases of very different joys without number.

I will close by citing a passage from *Z.D.* It serves to herald a discussion of the soul which could not have been undertaken before and cannot be delayed very long. We are curious to see how much useful and suggestive speculation about the soul can be based on the cosmic metaphysics learnt by us during the making of the *Zermatt Dialogues*. We have been summarising, and adding to, those teachings at Wengen, and we begin to want to profit further by them. And so we are inclined to enjoy a sober retrospect and prospect :

'Radical creativity has enforced belief in radiant consciring. Such consciring, being "unimpeded activity", has, as aspect of itself, Joy or Bliss. But joyful consciring, both sustaining and innovating on the cosmic scale, suggests purpose ; hence we are free now to interpret in philosophy the many signs of purposiveness which the world-process contains. The world-process, as purposive, is creative realisation of an imaginal field. And what is the outstanding feature of this purposiveness?

Not just the "play of love with itself", not the construction of titanic world-systems of mere content, wherein Divine Imagining conspires things which are not conscious of themselves. More is required than characters which, like those in *Hamlet*, exist not for themselves but only for the artist. The supreme artistic triumph of evolution is the making of conscious individuals who, passing at long last into the divine life, are to swell and diversify Joy'." (26)

L. "I don't suppose you want to be unhappy, Wortvoll, whatever forms your later adventures may take, whatever dreams of development may stir you. To each his initiative and the accompanying dangers. But perhaps you are among those who would like to have the standing of your soul in the world-system explained clearly. Not everyone is content to believe that he came to exist only on his birthday and some years after will end in the incinerator. The silliest episode ever!"

W. (rather gruffly) "I begin to see whither your subtleties about Divine Imagining are carrying me. Well, I shall drift for the present along the river of speculation, enjoying these new landscapes of thought.

I am really grateful to you three for leading me to consider this mode of approach to the topic of the human soul. You don't try to 'spring' the soul on a man who has no system of thought in which to house it and who has not so far made this soul a landmark in his map of life. You don't bombard him with eerie tales of spooks and hint what amazing things can be done with astral bodies, especially in countries where observers are bad. Mediumship and ghost-lore, as you know, bring little wisdom and many doubts; rare and isolated happenings, scraps of truth, build no science, much less philosophy. My position is stated simply. Belief in a soul cannot stand alone; if there exists a human soul, the world-system must be such as to aid and abet it. Show that this world-system is ordered according to plan and that the plan includes innumerable souls and their histories and you will have no more exemplary student than my agnostic self. I have said."

A. "Any more questions? It's nearly time for lunch."

W. "When you say that feelings in us belong to conspiring,

do you refer also to those brute pleasures and pains said to proceed from the body ? ”

A. “ Certainly. The centre of consciring is connected very closely with the body by way of the brain. And the brain, like other portions of the external world, consists of psychoid contents in which very great numbers of minor centres conscire irreflectively. The dominant centre of consciring and certain minor centres of the brain can interpenetrate. The contents of the centre reveal that. The rest is a matter of ‘ mind-body ’ explanation, not now relevant.”

W. “ Soul and centre of consciring are not convertible terms ? ”

A. “ No, no, but of the distinction later. We have had consciring as our theme to-day, and possibly too much of it for your taste. Nevertheless we have made good progress, having secured an indispensable background for research. But consideration of the soul will open up a variety of new problems.”

S. “ Have you gathered, Wortvoll, that consciring is literally the universal drive, and all talk of other agents, including ‘ energy ’, mere symbolism ? ”

W. “ Oh ! yes, I took that in fully after our chat on the rediscovery of Nature, the ‘ lost world ’. I had never done more than use the symbolism of ‘ energy ’ ; you can’t make ‘ capacity for work ’ flow about space or stagnate in structures. That way lies folly.”

L. “ The general public and I suspect that many physicists still take ‘ energy ’ and ‘ mass ’ too seriously. ‘ Energy ’ is said to do this and that ; and is often stated to be identical with ‘ mass ’, which is treated as if it were a substantial fact, not a symbol. Stark must allow that his physics has favoured the rise of a lot of bad metaphysics. But Anderton dealt with all that long ago.”

S. “ You are referring, my dear poet, to the work of physicists regarding the equivalence of ‘ energy ’ and ‘ mass ’ ; a topic assuredly outside your beat. Leave all that to the calculators whose instrumental concepts work well. But respecting ‘ energy ’, Professor Bridgman’s saying will interest you when interpreting, as well as using, the concept. Don’t, he urges, look on ‘ energy ’ as travelling or localised in space ;



regard it as the 'property of a system as a whole'. (27) Having rediscovered Nature as an imaginalist, you might even welcome this view."

L. "I could pass through it easily to that of the consciring which sustains the worlds. And consider! In doing so, I could account for something which science, interested in quantity rather than quality, has to ignore. I could account for the *transformations* of 'energy' which science mentions incidentally, because it must, but which are taken for granted, not admitting of an explanation. How does 'capacity for work', which is the accepted definition of 'energy', bring about these truly magical transformations? Of course the symbol 'energy' exercises no transformative magic at all. What does exercise it is the creative consciring of which this concept 'energy' happens to be the symbol. Do you follow me?"

S. "A hit, Leslie, a hit. What are conservation and transformation as secured by 'energy' but the imaginal power seen as through a glass darkly?"

W. "Take the salute. For your power seems to behave exactly as it ought to. Excellent."

A. "And the so-called redistribution of 'energy', with transformed qualities themselves to be transformed in their turn, suggests—does it not?—a vast cosmic balancing process, an immanent design or plan making for 'divinity of measure' or proportion which is essential to the well-being of the world. Remember we are discussing a world of qualitative fullness, not the skeleton of scientific fancy."

W. "I see, I see, but I don't feel competent to criticise the contention off-hand. Another time; we need truth, not hasty decisions."

L. "This transformation, which brings the new, is a most ordinary happening and yet has the look of a miracle. Have you thought, Wortvoll, that all causal events whatever may comprise miracles, a leaven of creation *ex nihilo*, for which no cataloguing of antecedents can account fully? Yet this was West's teaching, and it brings out still more clearly the imaginal character of our cosmos." (28)

W. "Press your advantage, before the counter-attack opens. Over the top."

L. "So much for 'energy' as asserted of the physical world. But I have read also of 'energy' as asserted of conscious life, of course at a greater risk. Does it profit a man to symbolise when the actuality itself is before him?"

S. "What is 'capacity for work', such as is useful in physics, standing for here? We are living the psychical life, not making equations. Yet we hear often of 'psychic energy'. We are invited, indeed, to conceive mind 'as endowed with psychic energy just as the body is endowed with physical energy'.(29) The 'libido' of psycho-analysis is just 'psychic energy attached to a complex and discharging through a conative channel'.(30) 'The intensity of pleasure and pain depends on the intensity of the energy developed in the conation', etc. (31) The 'energy' concept thus stressed is borrowed from physics; a device or dodge as used in that science, it is a very poor makeshift when adopted by psychology. What is called 'energy', of course, is consciring. Similarly the phrase 'hormic energy' wastes breath. A drive of consciring, at source irreflective, is indicated. Enough said. I don't think that many students are misled by abuse of this term lifted from physics."

A. "The fact that it is abused shows that resort to consciring has been delayed too long."

#### NOTES BY BASIL ANDERTON

(1) Bergson, *Creative Evolution* (Eng. Trans.), p. 171. Whitehead, *Concept of Nature*, p. 146. Cf. also *Z.D.* pp. 322-325, on Compenetration.

(2) They had "no perfectly general term for the consciousness with which we follow any mental process whatever, as distinguished from the process itself".—T. Whittaker, *The Neo-Platonists* (2nd edit.), p. 52.

(3) *The Travel Diary of a Philosopher*, p. 335.

(4) Thus conscience (con-scio). If I know an act by itself and it seems pleasant, I may incline to do it. If I know it *along with* its consequences to myself and others, I may refrain from doing it, a conscientious abstainer.

(5) *Z.D.* pp. 444-448.

(6) *Z.D.* pp. 384 *et seq.*

(7) Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, p. 123 and p. 225.

(8) Stout, *Analytical Psychology*, vol. i. p. 160.

(9) Cf. Bosanquet, "the connexion of contents, I suppose, is the same thing as the unity of consciousness".—*Life and Finite Individuality*, p. 191.

(10) Cited by Whitehead who observes (*Science and the Modern World*, p. 59) that this view "expressed a more fundamental truth than do the materialistic concepts which were then being shaped as adequate for physics."

- (11) *Z.D.* "A Dialogue on Divine Consciring", especially pp. 182-188.
- (12) *Z.D.* p. 221. See also *Z.D.* note (10), p. 241.
- (13) Jung, *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, p. 84.
- (14) ". . . les matériaux dont dispose l'Inconscient sont en grande partie des réminiscences infantiles".—Jung, *L'Inconscient*. Payot, Paris.
- (15) Cf. *Z.D.* chap. xix. "Above Murren", and chap. xx. "The Birth of Creative Evolution in Space-Time".
- (16) On Existence, see Chapter V. 61.
- (17) Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, p. 109.
- (18) Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, p. 145.
- (19) Daly King, *Psychology of Consciousness*, p. 209.
- (20) *Ibid.* p. 220.
- (21) *Process and Reality*, p. 486.
- (22) *Z.D.* chap. viii. "A Dialogue on Divine Consciring", especially pp. 182-188.
- (23) *Z.D.* pp. 216-217.
- (24) In *Z.D.* feelings were called the "robes of consciring", but the phrase does not do justice to their intimate character. On Feelings cf. *Z.D.* pp. 256 *et seq.*
- (25) Douglas Fawcett in *Divine Imagining*, pp. 101-102.
- (26) *Z.D.* p. 287.
- (27) *Logic of Modern Physics*, p. 153.
- (28) *Z.D.* chap. xvi.
- (29) Tansley, *The New Psychology*, p. 59.
- (30) *Ibid.* p. 63.
- (31) *Ibid.* p. 68.

## CHAPTER VII

### A CHAT ABOUT RELIGION. WE FLY ABOVE THE MATTERHORN. SOME REFLECTIONS

"We have no right whatever to speak of really unconscious Nature, but only of uncommunicative Nature, or of Nature whose mental processes go on at such different time-rates from ours that we cannot adjust ourselves to a live appreciation of their inward fluency; although our consciousness does make us aware of their presence." — Royce in *The World and the Individual*.

"Except in relation to our ignorance we cannot call the least portion of Nature inorganic." — F. H. Bradley in *Appearance and Reality*.

"To-day, happily, it is recognised that abstract physics, once a sworn enemy of the poet, deals at best only with 'structure'. . . . With the ensouling of "structure" by Imaginism, Romance invades physics with all her merry rout. She restores even that 'glory of the heavens', which Lord Balfour, taking the working concepts of science too seriously, thought lost to us. The world of the nature-lover is once again ours. All that the poet and traveller ascribe to their surroundings, all that and much more, is found, not merely in our perceptions, but in the book of things. But of course the knowledge to be re-interpreted and transformed is much wider than the realm of physics; it is on the Universe, indeed, not on a mere fragment of it, that Romance is to set her throne." — Douglas Fawcett in *The Zermatt Dialogues*.

LATE in the afternoon I had strolled with Leslie along the path that brings into view the Staubbach. I had expressed my satisfaction at having secured for Wortvoll so good a background for his examination of the problem of the soul. I had found him much more considerate and open to argument than I had ventured to anticipate; some of his criticisms too, I said, had been telling.

A. "He gave you full marks for your point about 'energy' and sees clearly that Imaginism *may* swallow all opposing hypotheses."

L. "Yes, all's going well but progress is slow. Wortvoll is amiable, on the whole, so far; Divine Imagining is a topic which, he thinks, will not bring us into opposition of practical moment. His political self is not yet suspicious; he does not

realise all that this liberating philosophy has in store for dictators, bullies, party dogmatists and the like ; how it works for freedom and the rights of the individual. But what of that ? . . . My concern at present is that we are going far too slowly, with criticisms and comments all useful to Wortvoll but too long-drawn-out for us three. We have not begun to discuss seriously the soul-problem."

A. " Well, what suggestion have you to make ? "

L. " This. Take a few hours' holiday to-morrow and visit Monte Rosa and the Matterhorn by aeroplane from Berne. Start from the aerodrome at 9 A.M., returning about 11.45 A.M. Lunch at Berne, getting back here by car for a long afternoon's talk. During this talk we are to dispose of all, or most, topics essential to Wortvoll's initiation into Imaginism. We don't want to study the whole of *Z.D.*, which he can read at leisure ; we take note of just enough of its contents to lead up to the discussion of the soul."

A. " And the comments ? "

L. " Summarise the stuff and get Stark to help you at need. Tell your hearers that time presses and that they must make their criticisms as short as possible."

A. " I dare say we can manage. And about the flight ? "

L. " The party is my affair. Come with me in the Hornet Moth which is a 130-H.P. two-seater ; the others will be with a Swiss ace in a Leopard Moth of the same power. It's a wonderful trip, the most picturesque outing in Europe. And think of how keenly we shall replunge into Nature-philosophy after circling round the crest of the Matterhorn. What an object to recall during our analyses of external perception ! "

A. " A thousand thanks. The idea's a splendid one."

\* \* \* \* \*

The next morning we left Lauterbrunnen early by covered car for Belp-Moos aerodrome, Berne, taking the road that winds along the north side of the lake of Thun and from Thun down the Aar valley through Munsingen, whence a side-road took us to Belp. Leslie drove with Stark beside him ; I sat with our German guest who, after his recent wanderings in the air, seemed indifferent to mere ground scenery and kept me busy

talking philosophy. I report such portions of our conversation as are worth chronicling.

W. "I have been thinking over our talk yesterday and have been unable, so far, to discover that one of your most important contentions is unsound. Radical creativity does most certainly imply radiant consciring. In other words the fontal divine consciring, if we have to believe in it, must be regarded as indefinitely or infinitely intense. But even finite consciring, as you and I live it, is always coloured with feeling. You conclude accordingly that God, the 'Radiance beyond Reason', has a radiantly affective aspect. You call this aspect Bliss."

A. "I don't like Bradley's description of the Absolute as enjoying a balance of 'pleasure' or even 'happiness'; a balance may be conceived as small, while pleasure and happiness suggest petty passing experiences of man. Blake, the mystic, calls energy 'eternal delight'; if he means by energy the fontal divine activity, he would not be far wrong. For this 'unimpeded activity', which is infinite, is consciring, while its affective aspect belongs to it inseparably and is not of measurable amount. I don't, as you know, try to conceive this 'Bliss' adequately; my highest emotional moods find me too poor for such flights of fancy."

W. "You are wise. The 'Bliss' may transcend all the 'pleasures' and 'pains' of all the worlds and yet incorporate them as elements in some humanly unimaginable synthesis. We are unable to lift fancy on to this level of feeling, hypothetical for us at best. We are able, however, to assert plainly that some of the mystics are wrong and that God is not merely love. We can take note of the suffering which darkens the history of this planet. Goethe reminds us that Mephistopheles is on friendly terms with God; a famous English poet greets Slaughter as 'God's daughter'; and surely many men of blood have missions fulfilling high purpose. Anything is better than lotus-eating and stagnation. But I am digressing. . . . I had an important question to raise."

A. "I'm all attention."

W. "Let us take leave awhile of the riddle of consciring and consider once more God in His concrete fullness, His works and His working alike symbolised in thought, that is to say as

Divine Imagining. What is the significance of this Power for religion ? ”

A. “ You have not read the chapter in *Z.D.* dealing with this issue ? No, then I’ll answer you at some length.

Let me warn you at the outset that I shall have to define the term ‘ religion ’ and that, in doing so, I shall be opposed by Bergson. This philosopher urges that there can be no religion without rites and ceremonies which serve to discipline the faithful as drill does the soldier.(1) Institutional religions of this kind are only some of the religions, and the definition forced on me will make that clear.”

W. “ The definition must rope in much more than the rival creeds of the herd. Is it given in *Z.D.* ? Well, repeat it now and justify it at leisure ; I can do most of the work for myself after our flight.”

A. “ Human religion is attachment or devotion to the most useful or perfect reality present, or seeming to be present, to experience. A savage who worships a bear, while ready to eat it and acquire its strength, a fetish wheedler and beater, a bargainer (‘ here is butter, give us cows ’) are ‘ attached ’ to the supremely ‘ useful ’. We cannot speak properly of ‘ devotion ’ and ‘ perfection ’, and the definition has been stretched accordingly. *Do ut des* is of simian crudity. Much is done, too, to induce the powers worshipped to refrain from mischief, whence the familiar saying that fear first made gods on earth.(2) The word religion suggests a bond or tie ; primitive religions tie men to their objects only in so far as these seem of use or placatable in life’s struggle. We must avoid the very common error of discussing religion as if it existed only on the higher levels of human feeling and conduct ; a typical philosopher’s fallacy. The lowest levels of religion are worthy of the folk whose fancy is working.”

W. “ Fancy — yes. Here too on a great scale additive creation is at work, throwing off the fair and the foul. A hard world, not the light of intuition, forced man to be religious ; and the allies he needed but could not find, fancy invented, too often hideously. This play of human fancy, rioting almost unchecked, was to continue long after civilisation had begun to thrive. Take note merely of its constructions in India, in

the Nile valley, in Phoenicia, Scandinavia, beside the Euphrates and Tigris, among the Jews, among the Aztecs, among the crudely practical Romans, among the Greeks whose religion, writes Santayana, was 'nothing but what imagination added to the rudiments of science'. What were Marduk, Yahveh, Zeus, Wodan, Tanit and the rest but potent fictions? You imaginists have stressed assuredly a mighty force. And whether we accept your wider contentions or not, we can but chronicle its work in this domain. The higher invented powers, like Frankenstein's monster, controlled their creators and helped to shape history."

4. "And after allies have been made for the struggle for life and conquest,(3) man learns something of the vastness of the world and finds his personality depressingly empty. Fancy constructs further, inventing gods and heroes much greater and higher than their inventors, much more interesting, fit to be admired and not merely made use of, supermen for those who do them reverence and whose hearts go out to them. Wodan and Thor are welcome — Siegfried as well. A new day is dawning. There will be very many such theological constructions; for variety is inevitable in an imaginal world. Come they will, however irrational they may seem, because they are wanted. A world-saviour or prophet need not be above criticism — he never is. The founder of Islam is described as 'cruel and crafty, lustful and ignorant, lacking in physical courage and the gift of self-criticism' (Fisher). What of that? What of the 'wearisome confused jumble' (Carlyle) of the Koran? Perhaps a portion of mankind needs a new creed; an occasion arises and imagination forthwith escorts the novelty into being. It *may* further man's advance for some centuries before disappearing or being transformed, while preserving its old name, into something else. It may, on the other hand, prove, what so many religious creeds have proved, a curse. An irrational conservation is the bane of the institutional religions, even though their histories should be beyond reproach.

In the cases of the higher institutional religions there is devotion to what is believed to be the most perfect reality (or realities) present to experience. Yet ordinarily human fancies, unverifiable from the points of view of science and philosophy



but accepted by faith, are too numerous. A thinker also may have his religion, liberated from such parasitic fancies according to plan. It is interesting to contrast Spinoza's disinterested 'intellectual love' of God with the worship of the faithful concerned to save their terrene possessions and their souls and with the brutal self-seeking of the savage. The 'perfection' of the adored reality all the while is only what the imagining of the individual allows it to be."

W. "But on your lines Spinoza too was wrong, missing the truth. And you also may not be more fortunate."

A. "We have all to bid fancy to construct hypotheses; some of these are verifiable and some not. Only the verifiable can be labelled true. But it is something to live not merely in *our* fancy but in fancy that mirrors, not too darkly, cosmic reality as well. In this adventure he who fancies last ought, other things equal, to fancy best; behind him and helping him are the bolder spirits of the centuries. The very errors of the past are of value."

W. "Yes, but why should not Peter Bell dwell in his dream-land, if he prefers it? His religion may be the one oasis in the desert of his life."

A. "You don't speak now as a man of science at all but as the lotus-eater you despise. Please understand that it is not my business to make Peter Bell's decision for him. I acquaint him with what seems to me the truth and leave him to his choice and its risks. There is room in an imaginal world for every form of faith, more room perhaps than you have allowed for. Thus when you use the word 'oasis', you prompt speculation. What if a crude religious outlook due to Peter's fancy is prolonged beyond the grave? What if the worshipper, who has shuffled off this mortal coil, becomes able to contemplate later in a more adequate form that which claimed his heart-felt devotion in the flesh? It may well be that apart from their practical utility in cheering and, at their best, moralising believers, the dogmatic creeds may bring compensations which freethinkers overlook. These oases may continue to charm the faithful on other levels after death, since vast populations, far below the rank of philosophical thinkers, need them. Within Divine Imagining are innumerable regions; gardens in





ACROSS THE DENT BLANCHE TO THE MATTERHORN

which all the dreams of human and other folk can flower. I mention this now only to pass on. What further questions ? ”

W. “ Religion is a term of wide denotation, as logicians put it ? ”

A. “ Assuredly. Your own agnosticism, for instance, is compatible with religion. Don't you, as a Nazi, avow your devotion to the most perfect reality you are aware of as yet — the State ? Is not Bolshevism one of the religions, though it knows nothing of God and a future life ? (4). It has its bigots too and the support of blind faith. There is, or was, a religion of Humanity, the Grand Être of Comte. Royalism, Art, Love have had their devotees, while Fisher writes of Pizarro ‘ gold was his religion ’. Neo-theosophy, at first materialistic, was described well by a French critic as a ‘ religion manquée ’. Anything, which secures the ‘ attachment ’ or ‘ devotion ’ implied, is called popularly and accurately a man's religion. The objects of religion seem to have no features in common ; the emotional attitude of the man acknowledging the ‘ tie ’ is the essential mark. Rites and ceremonies, as stressed by Bergson, concern only the institutional religions. They would be wholly absent from the religion which I find of supreme interest in connexion with Divine Imagining.”

W. “ You don't consider that institutional religion is needed to keep the torch of morality alight ? You spoke of dogmatic creeds ‘ at their best, moralising believers ’, but you will allow that religion and moral conduct often fall apart in history.”

A. “ I have no prejudices ; I would subscribe to the funds of societies exporting the better of these religions to Tierra del Fuego or darkest Africa, and I am sure that in Europe peasants and the disinherited of the towns cannot be torn from faith to profit. Strong meat for men able to digest it ! But the trust of the future must be put in an improved economic system, in education and the growth of sympathy. Among the other phases of education philosophy will count for much. A clear understanding of Man's place in the scheme of things is indispensable, for pessimism and degeneration are a menace. Is life's adventure worth our efforts, and why ? There can be no answer that considers merely this terrene plane.”

W. " You damn with faint praise and suggest that education and sympathy are more fruitful than the quarrelsome popular religions can ever be. And surely morality and institutional religion do often fall apart. Your Gibbon mentions that there were more Protestants executed in a single province in a single reign, that of Charles V, than martyrs were done to death in three centuries of the Roman Empire. The Massacre of St. Bartholomew's Eve was celebrated at Rome with infamous pomp by the Pope. Medals were struck in honour of the crime. Again, after Christianity had been supreme for over a thousand years in Western Europe, the longest period of slave-raiding, and the most evil, was due to Christian States.(5) But why dwell on these lapses, the list of which can be lengthened all too easily ? The Inquisition alone fouls the story of two continents. And what a foolish ideal ! If a man believes that Thor's beard is red, can one by torture make him decide honestly that it is grey ? "

A. " A Thug questioned by Sir Bindon Blood said that his murders gave rise to no qualms of conscience. ' Sir ! It was my duty ! ' A religious ceremony, conducted by a Brahman priest, had persuaded him that he was to perform ' acts of devotion ' to Bhawani.(6) An Inquisitor would justify his crimes in much the same way. But, come, are these sins of long ago worth our attention ? The institutional religions have accomplished much of moral value after all. Any more questions ? "

W. " Yes, you have talked about other people's religions, what is your own ? "

A. " The emotional aspect of my philosophy ; devotion to the most exalted reality of which I seem to have experience. Rites and ceremonies don't interest me and seem indeed, in the contemplation of this Power, almost contemptible. God is supermoral and I am not concerned that His will shall be done. It is only to a very limited extent that I can forecast the plan embodied in the world. Take care of men and other animate beings and leave the Fundamental and, in the main, unrevealed Imagining to take care of Itself.

My attitude accepts the Wordsworthian Presence with which at times I seem to be in communion, so far as a mere

surface-sentient can be said to commune at all. But it minimises the self-abasement and fear which the religious sentiment is said often to include. For the roots of my being are in Divine Imagining, and Divine Imagining unfolds Itself creatively in me.

Though a philosopher, holding no form of faith, I respect the creeds of Christendom in so far as they have a practical value. Times, however, have changed since the days of Charlemagne when Rome had on view the ark of the covenant, the table of the Last Supper, the heads of Peter and Paul, part of the sacred cradle, etc., and when every man, rejoicing in faith, was ready to believe what he was told. To-day sceptics are more numerous than the faithful. Christianity now resembles a walking-stick. The strong man does not need it ; nevertheless he may still feel more ' correct ' when carrying it. If, however, he leaves it behind or loses it, the mishap is not grave. The best hope for this religion would be to undergo one more transformation. It might declare itself symbolism which veils great truths serving to orientate afresh the human mind. But, of course, the new generation, so suspicious and critical, might treat the re-interpretation as purely an after-thought. Hegel's attempt to rethink Christianity as the ' Absolute Religion ' is not encouraging."

W. " You stressed the amazing manner in which human fancy has constructed parts of the popular creeds. But we know that the work of philosophers has been drawn on as well, and we have to allow of course for the historical events on which fancy builds. Must we allow for anything else ? "

A. " When you come to consider our account of evolution and the metaphysics of ' causal succession ', you will be told that every event whatever has a leaven of novelty. Evolution, as imaginal, is genuinely creative ; nothing that begins to be is explicable as issuing entirely from ' antecedents '. In the cases of the higher religions the novelty may be contributed in part by way of mystical ingression ' from above '. That view is expressed by Bergson in his work on the two sources of morality and religion. It was expressed earlier by that luminous thinker, William James. Let me read you the passage from my notebook :

‘The mother-sea and fountain-head of all religions lies in the mystical experiences of the individual, taking the word mystical in a very wide sense. All theologies and all ecclesiasticisms are secondary growths superimposed; and the experiences make such flexible combinations with the intellectual prepossessions of their subjects, that one may almost say that they have no proper *intellectual* deliverance of their own, but belong to a region deeper, and more vital and practical, than that which the intellect inhabits. For this they are also indestructible by intellectual arguments and criticisms. I attach the mystical or religious consciousness to the possession of an extended subliminal self, within a thin partition through which messages make irruption.’ ” (7)

W. “Mystical irruptions might feed the higher, hardly the lower religions; I can’t suppose that these experiences fuse with the fancies issuing in Moloch, Cloacina and Terminus. But, if we allow for them, we shall be saying that all the better modern creeds are being modified favourably in this way.”

A. “Certainly; but much depends on the beliefs which are being altered. Masses of habit-fixed verbiage may bar the way to truth. Should benign infiltration take place, we shall witness an instructive event. The creeds, retaining their old names, will be held, despite their transformation, to persist. They will have been replaced in fact by something else. A collection of beliefs, crystallised in propositions, lacks the continuity of a living body. It has no development of its own; all changes are thrust on it by the men who make it.”

The car swung round a curve and stopped by a big hangar in front of which were two aeroplanes with engines just ticking over. We had reached the aerodrome. I was to confront a new experience, perhaps the most impressive open to the wanderer in Europe. I knew little of the theory of flying and nothing of the practice. Leslie was a good pilot no doubt, but I felt rather like a clumsy swimmer about to take a high dive. Had I been quite wise in climbing up to the diving board? Well, there was nothing to be done now but look as if one liked flying which, after all, might prove delightful. Once off . . . “Come along, Anderton”, called Leslie, leaping down and opening the door. “It’s just on nine. Don’t forget the wine

and sandwiches. Here's the famous Swiss pilot waiting for us." "Right-o", said I, trying to look like a man on his wedding-day, but feeling somewhat as if I had an appointment with Atropos. It was late in my career to begin riding the winds.

Our new Swiss friend, who had taught Leslie the art of flying in high places, lost no time in getting Stark, Wortvoll and himself into the three-seater Leopard Moth, a high-wing monoplane in which he had toured the Alps from end to end. I was directed into our Hornet biplane through the right-hand door, being told to take care not to step on the unprotected part of the wing. Leslie used the left-hand door, lifted our impedimenta on to the luggage shelf behind us, closed both doors carefully and sat down, looking at the instrument board. He put (what I learnt later was) the turn and bank indicator into action, ran the engine fast to check its revolutions and the two magnetos, satisfied himself as to the petrol level, glanced at the oil-pressure gauge and found the circulation good. No need to waste the minutes; he waved to the ground-engineer and the chocks in front of the wheels were pulled aside. "Think yourself lucky", he observed, "to be free of goggles and Eskimo clothing in a cabin plane. After 8000 to 10,000 feet the cold above these mountains is intense. You will have a splendid view since the nose of this beast is flown low. You're sound physically, you told me, but, if you feel odd during the high flying, let me know at once. Sitting side by side in this way we shall be able to chat as well as on the mountain-side above Wengen. Ready? Then we'll taxi into position and get off." As he spoke the Leopard Moth's propeller began to revolve briskly and our companions made for the east boundary of the aerodrome to be able to take off into wind. As we followed I asked what was the power at the call of the planes.

"130 h.p. The Leopard is somewhat the faster, but our beast takes off and climbs better, lands more slowly too, a consideration in a country like this where getting back to *terra firma* in trouble is seldom easy. No hospitable English fields in the places on which you will look down to-day. On the other hand nothing banal."

The two machines neared the boundary and swung into



position, nose into wind. We waited while Leopard settled her internal problems and prepared to take off. "Get some idea, Anderton, of the handling of this craft. My left hand is on the throttle which regulates the supply of gas. In front of us is the control column, ordinarily called the 'stick'; it does business with the nose and ailerons and you can play with it to your heart's content high up. In front of your feet is the rudder-bar. Use it as a foot-rest, since it has been put out of action on your side; the rudder is not a thing for beginners to toy with. To my left are the wheel and air brakes and overhead, also to the left, the nose-trimmer which has uses you will learn later. This is the Air Speed Indicator — watch it well. As you know, this crate only rides the breeze at a minimum speed of about 40 m.p.h., and let me suggest that nothing below 70 will be the safe minimum for you. Cut down its air-speed too much and the crate will cease to be airborne and 'stall', if it does not spin. That's all you need to know as yet; watch me and put questions as we go. As soon as we are high up, I can give you a lesson, if you care for one. Ah! off they go." And the Leopard, after rather a long run, got its wheels off the grass and rose above the boundary in the direction of Berne.

"Now! . . . I open throttle slowly to the full, ease stick a bit forward so that tail comes up and nose goes down, then pull stick a trifle back again. I keep machine from swerving with the rudder . . . look! she is running at 45 and feels nearly airborne. Stick goes just a half-inch back and we are off the grass; we don't climb too steeply but gain speed . . . now she is doing 65 and can get aloft . . . she's about 500 feet above the grass, heading towards Berne; I drop her nose a little and turn to the left in chase of the others. More steady climbing! And what a view! Don't you find the game worth while?"

Seated next an observant critic I had taken care to enter smiling into his sport. Now enthusiasm was mastering any slight fear I may have felt in being borne skyward. The plane was quiet, its motion delicious; the outlook, always changing, even more alluring than my dreams had made it. We were now beyond the Belp-berg looking down on a reach of the Aar

which led the eye to Thun and its lovely mountain-girt lake. In the background to the east and south-east behind ranges of foothills rose the Jungfrau Massif and the great peaks of the Oberland. As we crossed the aerodrome near Thun at some 7000 feet, Leopard Moth fell back somewhat behind us, no doubt in order to let Leslie shape his course as he liked.

"See the aerodrome? That and another in the Rhône valley are the only landing-places worth making for in the event of trouble. We have to fly high all the time so as to secure a long glide. So up we go now across the lake and over the mountain to our right, the Niesen. We'll reach the Rhône valley over the Gemmi Pass; on our way back we'll sail over the Aletsch Glacier and the Jungfrau. So you won't have to complain of the scenery."

Over the Niesen at 8000 and soon above Adelboden, the winter sports' centre, at 9000 feet, offering us pictures of the Oberland, Interlaken, the green lake of Brienz and far-off misty Lucerne, the craft purred its way to the line of the Kanderthal, giving us a peep at Kandersteg with its blue tarn, another peep into a big crevasse gaping on a slope of the Balmhorn. Bumps here were vicious and pursued us over the Gemmi Pass and Loèche-les-bains into the Rhône valley. What a grand natural trench, and what an outlook towards the Valaisan Alps bounding it on the further side! The bumps now ceased; all was peaceful in a flood of sunlight, with just a reminder in the cabin of the cold that prevailed without.

"12,000 feet. Try handling the stick — we are running at about 100 m.p.h." I tried but found, as have many others, that even straight flying is not learnt offhand. The nose rose and fell, yawed surprisingly, while my corrections were excessive or too late.

"Not now, thanks. I want to enjoy the mountains."

I had chosen the better part, for from mid-valley I could look down delightedly on Sierre, Sion, Montana and the Rhône that vanished with a right-angled turn twenty miles or more away in the direction of Martigny. Said Leslie:

"We don't go over Zinal and up the Val d'Anniviers; but over Evolena in the Val d'Hérens. If the engine cuts out, we get a glide down this valley to a landing-place near Sion. I

know of no other good port in a storm."

Over Evolena at 13,000 ; over the Col d'Hérens at 14,000 feet. To our right the Dent d'Hérens, to our left the Dent Blanche. I began to feel the rarity of the air, having a slight headache and breathing fully. The craft veered to the left.

"The Matterhorn !"

And surely about a mile away to the left of the nose was the crest of the Matterhorn, an unfriendly, frosted monster with all its grim north precipices in view. I recalled my struggle up the eastern ridge and enjoyed all the more keenly this luxurious, armchair method of approaching the Presence :

Old Titan after ten million years thou carriest high thy head,  
While death comes quick to pigmy men on the roads they have  
to tread.

But my pride is still unquenched. What's the fruit of thy share  
of time ?

Art thou more than a soulless monster, compact of ice, rock, and  
rime ?

Time-flow is only the way in which a stress divine takes form,  
As Imagining Creative adds the new to Being's storm ;  
Nature's objects, shaped on levels below the human soul,  
Are not dominating aspects of God's balanced cosmic whole.  
Titan ! thou showest *but once* in this world-stream varied and  
vast,

Bound for that realm of changelessness which we mortals call  
the Past.

But *I* grow through numberless lives, now awake and now  
asleep,

Heir of the wealth of all time, my home in th'Eternal I keep,  
Knower, not merely something known. . . .

L. "What's that ?"

A. "I'm quoting from the poem of an imaginist airman ;  
the Matterhorn, as well as a crannied flower, makes men think."

L. "You would find a text for a sermon on metaphysics in  
anything, but I see your point. You are meditating forth-  
coming pronouncements about the soul. I wonder how  
Wortvoll will take them. He's more open to argument than  
I've ever found him before, and may give Imaginism his blessing  
in the end. Not, however, without some struggles. The old  
agnostic will die biting."

On we sped over the snow-wastes and glaciers past Breithorn and Lyskamm and exploring the different peaks of Monte Rosa. "16,000 feet", cried Leslie as we looked down on the Dufour Spitz. Followed descent of the great Gorner Glacier to the crest of the Matterhorn whence we curled down across the familiar pyramid and, allowing the Leopard Moth to take the lead, set off for home. Over Zermatt and past the giants on the left side of St. Nicholas valley we reached Visp and, turning up the trench of the Rhône, recrossed the Oberland above the Aletsch Glacier and Jungfrau. In sight of the lake of Thun I could have groaned to find that this wonderful journey was near its end. A superb glide from 14,000 feet down to the Aar country completed my baptism of the air.

We had enjoyed two hours and twenty minutes of flying at its best, returning not tired but pleasantly lazy. It was decided not to meet for the dialogue on the mountain-side, but on the balcony outside our room at the hotel after dinner. Meanwhile we lunched simply beside the car and afterwards Stark and I had some lessons in "The Good Companion", by no means, I fear, covering ourselves with glory. Leslie had said that ordinary flying was just sitting behind an engine while enjoying scenery, but, as soon as we were put in charge of the "stick", the engine took charge of *us* and there was no time to give to scenery at all. We saw the plane pushed to rest in the hangar with a certain relief and settled down on the grass with the others for a chat.

S. "Let me thank you again, Leslie, for the best outing I can recall. Grand surroundings too, I find, quicken my thinking. I realised Imaginism vividly this morning in the high places wherein Monte Rosa and the Matterhorn declare their standing so unmistakably :

Are not these, O soul ! the vision of Him who reigns ?

I had hopes also that friend Wortvoll's agnosticism might be weakening."

W. "Must I change my philosophy just because I am elated with sport ? or because one sort of spatio-temporal object is rather big ? "

L. "Philistine ! Anderton greeted the Matterhorn with

metaphysical poetry, happily not his own. And the symptoms suggest that he will shortly be talking about the soul. No — not to-night, as we have some topics in cosmic metaphysics to discuss first. We must make our background complete."

S. "By the way, Wortvoll, can you remember the Matterhorn well?"

W. "A pyramid on a ridge — yes, very well. But it looks so different from different points of view. I could make from memory quite a fair picture in water-colours of the peak as we saw it from above the Gorner Glacier."

S. "And, if you had climbed it on foot, would you be able to remember other features of it, noises, stones, rocks, snow, verglas and anything else which you perceived when ascending and descending it?"

W. "Yes, yes. But I forget much. A perfect memory would conserve everything accurately, even the nascent movements which attend perception. What's the point?"

S. "The point is this: your perceived Matterhorn and your recollected Matterhorn consist of exactly the same sorts of contents; are both 'such stuff as dreams are made of'. Yet the perceived Matterhorn is held by most persons to acquaint you directly with external reality, while the recollected one is regarded as only a part of your mind and, as such, quite unlike anything external. If, however, external reality were accepted as itself mind-like in character, no muddle of this kind could arise. There would remain no barrier between percipient and what is perceived. Our ordinary perceptions would be supposed to bring us gifts from the external world, while our memory-fed minds would be recognised as of one tissue with this world."

W. "The same sorts of contents are present in the perceived and the recollected Matterhorn, though they strike the mind as a rule differently. But does the perceived Matterhorn resemble closely the corresponding portion of the independent external world? There's for me the rub."

A. "Wortvoll is aware already of the general case for idealism as stated by our philosophy. There is no quality, quantity or relation in Nature, no complex existent or action, *imaginable* genuinely by a man of science which could not be

furnished by Divine Imagining. The famous 'thing-in-itself' is only one of the more vaguely imagined inventions of man ; and this, a *flatus vocis* in the pages of Kant, could name concrete reality within the Fundamental Power. We are not nihilists, solipsists or subjective idealists ; nay, the external world in which we believe is indefinitely richer, and therefore more real, than the realm of shades ruled by physics. It will comprise all in physics which is verifiable and will satisfy the plain man and the poet as well. Our friend will lose nothing, but his gains may be very great."

L. "In fact heads you win and tails you win more, Wort-voll. And now, I think, we must be getting back. A glorious day surely. I don't suppose the followers of Plato and Aristotle ever combined sport and dialectic more pleasantly."

S. "I seem to recall a Banquet, but ordinarily Plato's merry men had to find their fun in the dialectic itself."

#### NOTES BY BASIL ANDERTON

(1) *Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion*, p. 215.

(2) "Or le point de vue des, Assyro-Babyloniens, comme celui des peuples très antiques, est purement religieux. Tous les menus faits de la vie de chaque jour sont dominés par un principe, la crainte des dieux."—Dr. G. Contenau in *La Civilisation d'Assur et de Babylone*.

(3) Gods could be annexed ! "Parfois la renommée du dieu d'une autre ville était telle que la cité lui élevait un temple de plus que celui de son dieu local, parfois, lorsqu'une cité, à la suite d'une campagne heureuse, acquérait l'hégémonie sur les cités voisines, elle annexait, en quelque sorte, les dieux de ses nouveaux sujets."—*Ibid.* p. 88.

(4) Earl Russell, *Practice and Theory of Bolshevism*, pp. 113-114.

(5) "It is a terrible commentary on Christian civilisation that the longest period of slave-raiding known to history was initiated by the action of Spain and Portugal, France, Holland and Britain after the Christian faith had for more than a thousand years been the established religion of Western Europe ; and it is the graver since the new slavery was worse and more inhuman than the old."—A. L. Fisher, *History of Europe*, p. 1029.

(6) General Sir Bindon Blood, *Four Score Years and Ten*, pp. 134-135.

(7) In a letter published by his son, *Atlantic Monthly* (Sept. 1920), cited by Professor Montague in *Ways of Knowing*, p. 67.

## CHAPTER VIII

### MORE COSMIC PROBLEMS

"Nature . . . enters perception in condensed, abbreviated and very defective forms, sufficiently rich in content, withal, to guide our actions. The sun and a grain of sand conceal indefinitely more than they reveal. Considered, however, as a phase of the world-system, Nature, even at this instant, is a radiant splendour; the 'disorganised immortal' of Blake, wonderful indeed, and yet giving birth to 'screaming shapes' and 'Urizen's army of horrors', included in which are the creatures who 'reptilise on the earth'. Blake has sighted the 'immortal' in the disarray of the Metaphysical Fall; in what F. C. S. Schiller has called the corruption of Being in the time-process. This corruption, seen by us as through a glass darkly, shows very much, however, in which an artist can take joy, and is even welcome, if believed to be the mark of creation in travail. It may be that the 'army of horrors' will be demobilised and that in a remote future will dawn the reign of beauty and joy. Vindication of the natural order is not to be achieved here and now; it must be looked for in the reality which may declare itself in the divine event." — *Divine Imagining*, pp. 185-186, "The Evolution of Nature".

"You understand clearly what our business is to be to-night", said I, as I strolled along Wengen's crowded street with Wort-voll after dinner.

"You want to complete your account of the metaphysical background before discussing the riddle of the human soul. I'm really much obliged to you."

"That's it. The riddle must not be shot into notice like a rocket fired unexpectedly in the night. To present it in a setting of Psychical Research, spiritistic gossip and the pious reasonings of schoolmen and the faithful already demolished by Kant would certainly not be showing you respect. We must 'explain' the soul by suggesting how it may have come to exist, how it plays a definite part in an ordered world-system and what are its radical significance and prospects. We may be able to throw some light on the phenomena of birth and death, but our place in the cosmos is not such as to make a complete understanding possible. We live too near the realms

of irreflective consciring, into which we actually re-pass in dreamless sleep and death ; and our semi-conscious activities explore a mere fringe of the real. Be sure then that I won't shock an agnostic overmuch. Still I insist that suggestions and guesses belong even to induction, and may not a bridled human fancy achieve much in an imaginal universe ? Does not fancy create truth-propositions as well as day-dreams ?

*W.* "A man wandering in the dark is better with a lantern than without. He won't see far ahead or behind, but what he does see will be important. So use your lantern of fancy for what it is worth. You will avoid 'Borderland' gossip—good. Supernormal phenomena occur but they belong in the first instance to science, not philosophy, and anyhow they don't concern fundamentals. Spook-intelligence too, if credibly reported, seems minimal ; and the less we hear of 'secret doctrines' and Mahatmas the better. If you discuss the origin of man on this planet, hold in respect the verified, relevant results of science, not forgetting, however, that many mere 'suggestions and guesses' are mistaken by biologists for truths. Don't regard me as taken in by mechanistic clap-trap ; my agnosticism extends also to much of current evolutionist doctrine."

*A.* "Thanks ; you have an open mind and you hate sham-knowledge ; we shan't quarrel. And now a request. Time won't permit us to do more than glance at the rest of the metaphysical background. So I am going to ask you and the others to confine your criticism to essentials. The topics I have in mind are discussed at length in *Z.D.* I dare not ignore them to-night, but I cannot do them justice. Will you therefore let the book supply the fuller treatment that may be required ?"

*W.* "I won't bore the others by making them cover the whole of the ground again. And now, I suppose, we ought to be going back."

\* \* \* \* \*

On the balcony with the cool night wind blowing up the valley. Anderton, looking serious and armed with electric torch and notebook, subsides into a chair.

*S.* "We want to carry the discussion to-night up to where the soul-riddle becomes the centre of interest. For time presses."



W. "Let Anderton, if he will, shoulder most of the job, allowing us an occasional gibe or criticism. We can resume our rights at the next gathering. All agreed? Good. Anderton, we await your good pleasure."

A. "In philosophy condensation may be vexation, but I will do my best."

Let us prepare to consider a retrospect of the evolution of our world-system up to the stage where human bodies, and along with them the allied centres of conspiring, appeared in the history of the earth. I say 'our' world-system because, once aware of the character of Divine Imagining, I posit an infinite *variety* of such systems, each perhaps insulated from the rest during, at any rate, its initial development and each rendering possible modes of reality that otherwise would not obtain. 'Perhaps the whole contents of the space and time in which we live form only one of many universes [world-systems], each seeming to itself complete.'<sup>(1)</sup> Held provisionally apart, these systems, as they mature, might be brought together in a succession of harmonising Divine Events of progressive splendour."

W. "When you speak of 'our' world-system, you are not referring merely to the physical cosmos which interests the physicist and astronomer? This is sometimes called absurdly the 'universe', but for you is the shell only of one of the world-systems."

A. "Yes, just the physical shell. Vast as it is (one modest estimate of the radius of space runs to a hundred million light years), it seems limited in a spatial regard. It seems limited also, on the testimony of notable facts, in the regard of time, some astronomers being constrained to date its origin in an event, or series of events, not infinitely remote. Prejudice only, contends Earl Russell, fosters belief in infinite space and time.<sup>(2)</sup> Space and time, I submit, implying relations between contents, the finiteness of the system in these respects depends on the limited quantities of its contents which are relatable. The world-system, finite in respect of contents, is finite also in respect of them when related as space-time.<sup>(3)</sup> Now this system, finite assuredly in all other respects as well, arising not fortuitously but as an *imaginal field* within Divine Imagining,

had a beginning about which some statements can be made. Of course we are not compelled, as imaginists, to speculate in this way. We do not profess to solve all problems, and this one may be too difficult to admit of even a makeshift solution. But let us try our luck since the attempt, possibly futile, will enable us to become more familiar with the factors wherewith we work.

The name Initial Situation is used to signify our world-system as it pre-existed to evolution within Divine Imagining. It is a state of Being (conservation) in which no novelties arise ; an imaginal field as yet immune from Development or Becoming. It may have issued out of a remote creative event and become stabilised." (4)

W. " Created out of the void ? "

A. " Out of the Imaginals, the modern substitutes for the Platonic Ideas. I shall be dealing with these factors.

This phase of conservation or Being is followed by that of Development or Becoming which opens with the stir of additive creation and constitutes what we mean by world-evolution. Evolution is additively creative, erupts novelty, and changes radically the primitive imaginal field. There ensues the time-process with portions of which astronomy, physics, chemistry, geology, biology, universal history, psychology, etc., are concerned. The phrase Metaphysical Fall refers us to this same *process*. The ' Fall ' is from the *state* of harmonious Being into a phase of change, division, conflicts and evils. I shall suggest how it comes to pass and why."

L. " We are up against the *fait accompli* anyhow."

A. " Before I do so, I must complete this prelude. First, then, let me stress the Fallacy of Simplicity, born in physical science, which simplifies in the interest of calculators. We have rediscovered our lost world ; we have hived wisdom which is to profit us now. Simplicity, important to the calculator, may falsify, we urge, philosophical thinking. Those who, outside physics, believe that Nature consists of ' radiation and mass ', those who in any sphere of thought derive the higher and complex from beggarly ' elements ' variously combined, waste their breath. An irreducible qualitative wealth belongs to Nature ; ' combination ' and ' novel products ', I

might add, imply influx from the Imaginals and additive creation. The new never emerges solely from the old ; those born in an imaginal universe have to learn that this cult of simplicity is absurd."

S. " Mill himself warned us that this conceptual simplifying can be overdone. And, had he discovered the secret of causal sequence, his protest would have been vigorous indeed.(5) Simplicity, however, is indispensable for the success of mathematical shorthand."

A. " We have put science in its place and regained our lost world of perception. But we have not yet stressed fully this world of qualitative splendour, as established integrally on Divine Imagining. Well aware of the defects of percipients badly served by their eyes ' and other senses let us strive to think in our poor symbols of the primitive imaginal field. This field is concrete reality, not a region of pale, bloodless thought ; concrete reality with all its qualities, quantities and relations complete. It was the fruit, I am supposing, of some remote additively creative act as I conceive all the world-systems to have been. It is being considered in the first rest-phase of its rhythmical history ; conscurring, ἐνέργεια ἀκινήσιας (6), sustaining it conservatively in God. Conservation, we saw, is a form of creation. We may identify this imaginal field with the ' organised immortal ' of the mystic Blake and recall also Sir Arthur Eddington's symbolism in which ' organisation of energy ' is at first perfect, devoid of the ' random element ' which marks the ' running down ' of the physical system : ' There is no doubt that the scheme of physics as it has stood for the last three-quarters of a century postulates a date at which either the entities of the universe [world-system] were created in a state of high organisation, or pre-existing entities were endowed with that organisation which they have been squandering ever since. Moreover, this organisation is admittedly the antithesis of chance. It is something which could not occur fortuitously.' (7) And reasoning, prompted by this and other reflections, has made the beginning of ' our ' changing world-system seem not intolerably remote." (8)

S. " Blake's ' disorganised immortal ' is inevitable in a system wherein ' there is no strict causal behaviour anywhere ' ,

as Eddington contends. It is significant that Eddington reached by the route of physics and mathematics what was reached in 1921 independently by way of philosophy in the book *Divine Imagining*.<sup>(9)</sup> Wortvöll, you will note later that for us causation includes freedom and chance; the old Antinomy disappears; Kant may well turn in his grave."

L. "It has been said that the entire physical system will vanish as 'mass' disappears slowly into 'radiation' which, being interpreted, means that Divine Consciring will not maintain indefinitely the gross shell of our world-system.<sup>(10)</sup> The ascent of the system has begun. At this very moment its 'masses', such as the sun, are melting."

A. "Deal first with the descent into creative evolution, with the Metaphysical Fall. Let me continue.

Back to the primitive imaginal field, our primordial world-system; a stably harmonious whole of content in which a Plato might descry the archetypal beauty praised in the *Symposium*, though in truth the test exacted in that dialogue could not be passed.<sup>(11)</sup> This conservative whole, into which no novelty enters, is not, like a picture, devoid of inner life" — the electric torch flashed again on the notebook — "It is by no means a frozen immobility; it is like a composition, as Mozart heard it, when that gifted musician was aware of all its contents, including its successions, together. Sustained thus . . . the Initial Situation is a harmony of compenetrant contents which, regarded as a whole, suffers no change. It is a radiant splendour present to Divine Imagining as part of Itself. But take note that it is present only as content, just as a poem might be present to human sustaining fancy. It comprises at first no sentient. It will comprise indefinitely many. And on this change will hang other changes of enormous significance; in fact, the beginning and continuance of the differentiation of the phenomenal order. Nay, the entire imaginal dynamic, whence causation in Nature, presupposes the arising of these sentient, which become active in the contents of every fragment of the system." <sup>(12)</sup>

W. "This imaginal field is not above time?"

A. "What in the realms of content is? No: it perseveres in its being, endures, has aspects which are simultaneous,

successive. *But as a whole it suffers no change*; is not the seat of *additive* creation which implies the time-process, Becoming. Becoming has been called a corruption of Being, but it secures in fact a fresh creative achievement. The correct contrast is not drawn between Being and its corruption but between a rest-phase and an additively creative phase of the Fundamental Power."

W. "Once this imaginal field has been made, it seems to be perfect, as only a finite whole can be. Why then does it change when the phase of creative evolution dawns? You compared it with a poem sustained in the consciring of a poet. If the poet finds the poem perfect, he won't want to alter it. He can't gain anything and he may lose much."

A. "Perfect means 'thoroughly made' and, as you observe, only finite wholes can be perfect. God is not 'complete, perfect and finished' as the additive aspect of His activity shows; His life does not exclude change. But note that the imaginal field or nascent world-system is perfect only as a whole of content. If a novel purpose has to be bodied forth in it, relative to that it becomes imperfect. You will have occasion to consider such imperfection and the ensuing creative unrest."

W. "Are we to suppose that a world-system may have many phases of restful conservation and creative evolution?"

A. "Why not? But the later phases in which *finite sentient*s arise and develop are essentially different from the first one of existence as content only. The content-whole exists for God, *not for itself*. But in its first phase of creative evolution portions of it come to exist *for themselves*; are no longer just conscita but seats of reflective consciring. On the higher levels of reflective consciring flower what we call 'individuals'. . . . But we have to consider this amazing transformation later. In respect of the phases, let me read to you a passage from Z.D. which answers Wortvoll's question. Scotus Erigena, the first great schoolman, who learnt so much from neo-platonism, stresses a double movement whereby our system issues from, and returns to, God. But a neo-platonic outgoing and ingoing (*πρόοδος* and *ἐπιστροφή*) may solve our problem too simply. The accomplished ingoing constitutes what, after Tennyson, we call the Divine Event. 'Is this rest-phase eternal in the

sense of having no end ? Much more probable is a rhythmical series of rest-phases and phases of additively creative evolution. . . . The ultimate destiny of a world-system, you may urge, lies beyond these phases of rest and creative evolution : it is to enter at last, finally and completely, into the "joy of the Lord". With all my heart, but this crowning glory is not to be won in a trillion years. World-system, at first insulated, may have to unite with world-system, and systems of these, again, with super-systems through aeons of cosmic integration which seem "eternal" to mortal mind. And it may be that expectation of a final rest will vanish at last unregretted. For the "joy of the Lord" is the bliss-consciring and His joyful being is just His activity ; activity which is conservative but which innovates ceaselessly as well. We must not allow the human experience of "tiredness" to sway us when there is discussion as to the likelihood of a finally static Divine Event. The cult of the static in philosophy may spring from the thoughts of men *who get tired.*' (13) This is all that need be said at present."

W. "You don't speak in Eastern fashion of cosmic days and nights ?"

A. "No ; there is only the day of Divine Imagining ; Its noontide consciring cannot fail. The phases of this and that world-system are mere incidents in the general romance of conservation and additive creation.

A few words about rhythm in general. We have taken note of cosmic rhythms controlled by ebb and flow of Divine Consciring, but rhythms are present in all quarters of spatio-temporal fact as well. Herbert Spencer made the Rhythm of Motion (a very important mode of change) a pillar, an essential part, of his philosophy ; Earl Russell suggests that 'the world consists of steady events accompanied by rhythms, like a long note on the violin while arpeggios are played on the piano, or of rhythms alone'. Steady events are of various sorts, and many sorts have their appropriate rhythmic accompaniments. Quantum changes consist . . . 'of the substitution, suddenly, of one rhythm for another.' (14) 'The atom is only explicable as a society with activities involving rhythms with their definite periods . . . there is every reason to believe that

rhythmic periods cannot be dissociated from the protonic and electronic entities', observes Whitehead.(15) Even the mysterious *Psi*, invented by some of those who think about the inwardness of atoms, has its 'beats' with a period which is that of light emitted."

L. "Call *Psi*, the empty verbal symbol, by its right name — consciring. Irreflective centres of consciring are at work."

A. (not noticing the interruption) "Even sensibly continuous motion may overlie discrete phases of motion and rest. The concept of continuous motion may be a convenient 'symbolic device for dealing with the time-relations of various discontinuous changes'.(16) Some writers have described motion as both discrete and continuous. The continuity is not on the content side of the steps of change. It refers us to *consciring* which is the other aspect of an imaginal cosmos." (17)

S. "The testimony of the rocks — geology — acquaints us with rhythms in the earth's history. Rhythms occur in the evolution of organisms and the history of mankind. Rhythms hold also of the working of our private minds. Even in reading the eyes do not move smoothly but in a series of short movements with rests between."

W. "Enough. Let us get on."

A. "Among topics furthering our grasp of creative evolution is that of Penetration.(18) I deal with it briefly.

In the Democritan tradition, which has counted for so much, each atom (=a bit of resisting-extension) was held to exclude all other atoms from that part of the 'void' temporarily occupied by it. But even impacts left it intact and self-sufficient. This primitive concept and the thought based on it are now obsolete.

Max Drossbach's atom 'fills from its centre the whole infinity of space, through the mutual interpenetration of all atoms'.(19) Though we have to discard the 'infinity' of space, this statement heralds the modern way of thinking. Faraday's 'force-centre' (easily interpreted as a centre of consciring) behaves similarly; its influence (inflowing) permeates all quarters where it is found to make a difference. Whitehead generalises this belief when he asserts that 'each object is in some sense ingredient throughout nature'.(20)

In the book *Divine Imagining* mention is made of 'tentacular fact', at once within and independent of my perception, *e.g.* the great mountains which we visited to-day.(21) These mountains are located in the independent external world, but are prolonged also in part into our brains, *penetrating* these as they penetrate also the sun and moon."

W. "Not integrally."

A. "Obviously not. But 'tentacular' influences don't involve the total presence of the body whence they come. We can allow, however, as stated in *Z.D.*, that 'the sun is in the green grass; the stars kiss the dimples on the face of Lake Leman'."

S. "This penetration must be admitted before there is any hope of solving the riddle of causation. Why is it of universal occurrence? The answer is made easily. It continues the interpenetration characterising the primitive imaginal field wherein literally:

All things by a law divine  
In one another's being mingle.

The objects of this world of division and conflict have as their very remote source the unitary imaginal field or nascent harmonious world-system conserved in God. Of that *primaeval* system one might say, what Plotinus said of his 'intelligible' world, 'everything there is all and all is each thing'. This complete interpenetration does not persist on our level of world-evolution, but there is enough of it left to render causation possible and to remind us of the long ago."

L. "If an electron — or rather the reality denoted by this symbol — pervades the space-time of our system, our own souls must do so far more effectively. What an encouraging thought for the mystic who seeks to better the range of his conscurring! One is stirred, eh, Wortvoll?"

W. "Pegasus is off again. Go on, Anderton; answer this question. One connects change promptly with your Fundamental Power. What now are the main conservative features of the universe? You don't believe in a Heraclitan Flux."

A. "First and foremost the superlogical Divine Imagining. It is eternally Itself, the Imagining that creates; It is in



conserving this character that It achieves endless changes, changing also Itself as novel conscita, *i.e.* contents, arise ! Other conservative features are : the *made reality* we call the Past in so far as it is conserved, the innumerable world-systems that are in rest-phase before a fresh phase of *making reality* begins, the Imaginals and the physicist's ' Constants of Nature ', such as Planck's constant of action,  $h$ . Centres of consciring on our human level, and possibly far below it, are at least as enduring as their world-system ; their passage in sleep, death, etc., into irreflectivity need not mislead us. Then there are the ' divine societies ' of which we shall take account later. The habits of man, individual and social, are often hard to alter ; harder still is it to change those habits which we describe as the ' laws of Nature '. These last are not, withal, inflexible ; as said before, strict causal behaviour is probably an invention of human fancy."

S. " What a retrospect from our human point of view is that Past ; the flood of ' made reality ' frozen hard within Divine Imagining. As regards the other conservative features, we shall no doubt hear more about them shortly. But Anderton has ignored one feature ; the treasures of Divine Imagining which do not support, or result from, the births and histories of world-systems. Perhaps we attach undue importance to these systems, mere flecks of foam on the ocean of the infinite."

A. " Well, we are in one of these systems, and no doubt have our prejudices which exalt their importance. But I ignore what Stark mentions for an excellent reason : I have no evidence that forces me to consider this feature at all."

L. " You have what you stressed before, namely the conviction that variety of contents within Divine Imagining must be infinitely great. So let us allow that Stark's objection holds good, while limiting our attention to treasures suggested by realities which we know, those of the cosmos in which we live."

W. " Get along, Anderton. Don't give a receipt for goods which cannot be produced."

A. " A word now on what are called ' laws ' of Nature and Mind. The ' laws ' of science are not found in the book of experience ; they are called by Karl Pearson ' products of creative imagination '. They are made, as we saw, with a

certain artistry ; our fancies are built into them, even in the cases of relativity-theory and seemingly ' dry ' statements about ' mass ' and ' energy ', both of these last-mentioned concepts being creations of fancy. But what of the ' uniformities of sequence ' with which laws for the most part are concerned ? The view is gaining ground among physicists as well as philosophers that the uniformities are not what they were once thought to be. There are no strict uniformities in Nature and the mind of man. The sequences are sufficiently like one another to be described by rules which facilitate compendious statement and prediction. But they do not justify the invention of *inflexible* laws either in the domain of Nature or that of our minds."

S. " The word ' law ' is unfortunate and misleads many. It suggests authority and control of the sequences by this authority. Royce held that the concept of unvarying law was of social origin, having practical value, inflicting itself later as a dogma on thought.(22) But of course what concerns us chiefly are the sequences which tolerate the invention of ' laws '. On the side of modern physics now are men who discard belief in strict uniformities of sequence. On the side of philosophy protest began far earlier, prompted, not by physico-mathematical considerations, but by a new metaphysics with the revision of the concept of causation entailed.(23) Anderton will be giving us the results of this revision shortly. The upshot is to show that causation, freed from the myth of inflexible ' laws ', embodies freedom and chance."

W. " Awkward for Western interpreters of Indian philosophy who defend their ' inflexible law of Karma '."

L. " Knowledge widens. The greater world is not controlled by ' laws ', nor is its last state a rigorously determined outcome of its first. And there are no unvarying rules that shape man's destiny."

W. " You have spoken, Anderton, of habits manifest in the sequences said wrongly to be controlled by ' laws '. You could not, of course, credit objects in a materialist's world with habits."

A. " No ; those who deny that Nature is of psychical or mind-like character will be against us. To speak of habits is to

refer to the actions of finite sentient ; of centres of consciring, irreflective and reflective. These actions in Nature are more or less constant manners of response to 'stimuli', *i.e.* to the *penetration* which we considered just now, and, as such, are phases of conservation stabilising the flow of novelty. Nature is actuated by sextillions of minor agents, the outcome of whose consciring is predicted in science by use of the symbolism of energy. 'There is consciring, which is conservative, among the minor sentient, and with that the uniformity, facility and obstinacy characteristic of habit supervene. But action is, to a certain extent, plastic while habit is being formed. And the formed habit, again, will never be quite stable, since no two instants of the world's history are exactly alike ; and the sentient will not behave at the second instant quite as they did at first. Even the best generalisations of science, being dependent on this changeable behaviour, are menaced and may become obsolete with the process of the suns. But the rate of change of the behaviour, in respect of the more important "laws", is so slow that it makes no practical difference to human generalisers.' (24)

S. "Habits presuppose the actions whose repetition forms them ; hence the inquirer will want to know how the first action came to pass. Actions on the levels of so-called inorganic Nature cannot be credited with such novelty of response as may mark the initiatives of a man. Conservation is potent among the lower natural agents, whose behaviour is very much more constant than ours. That being so, these agents cannot frustrate the immanent design that finds embodiment in the world. Even if some respond amiss, there is a 'uniformity of averages' which overrides chance. Divine Imagining has set bounds to their powers and makes use of their collective acts."

W. "Not all 'laws' concern sequences."

S. "There are so-called 'laws' touching uniformities of co-existence, 'laws' of identity, contradiction, excluded middle, better styled maxims (25) and others, but the 'laws' stressed by Anderton are the important ones for us. They raise the riddle of causation, compelling us to shed light on the working, not of mere human minds, but of the Fundamental Power. What if we discover the *vis creatrix* operative in these much

discussed causal sequences ? We shall then become acquainted with the drive of the world, with the Imaginal Dynamic as it has been called."

W. "The truth about causation will not shatter belief in human freedom ? You recall Kant's darkening of counsel in this matter ?"

S. "The solution of this problem will be obvious during our discussion of the soul. Causation, as said before, includes freedom. The old Antinomy is without force."

A. "I pass to consider the topic of the Imaginals which is of primary importance, in respect of thought as to the origin and evolution of our world-system and of the minor and very interesting inquiry into the standing of the soul. This is not of course the first time that the objects thus named have been considered.(26) But, should they be unknown to Wortvoll, let me introduce them as descendants of the Platonic Ideas."

L. "Though it seems doubtful whether the ancestors would approve of such relations."

W. "Never mind that ; Plato's speculations are not sacrosanct ; the *Timaeus*, for instance, is full of errors which no modern thinker would perpetrate. His triumph was to open powerfully discussions that go on through the centuries. Only a great genius can do it. Kant's initiative is fruitful similarly. His writings contain many mistakes, and in fact one disrespectful critic has called him a 'disaster'. But what useful controversies have raged since his death !"

S. "I yield to no one in my admiration of Plato, but I am sure that no thinker, however great, can be independent of the intellectual atmosphere of his day. Plato believed that ultimate reality was to be conceived on Eleatic lines. He belittled spatio-temporal experience as tainted with change, generation, destruction, clashing multiplicity ; sought veritable reality by way of thought, through that Cult of the Concept later to be celebrated to self-destructive excess by Hegel. Concepts, indispensable instruments for the thinker, were mistaken too readily for the ultimate reality thought about. This reality, as we have seen, is above thought."

W. "You are saying *inter alia* that the Platonic Ideas suffered from this Cult of the Concept."

S. "I am, but I will ask Anderton to justify this statement at greater length."

A. "There are different opinions as to what Plato meant by the theory of the Ideas. And Plato, like all of us, seems to have lived through different phases of thought, modifying, for instance, his attitude towards the sensible world. Difficulties raised by statements of the theory are grave and are certainly not removed by study of the dialogues."

L. "An eminent scholar has suggested to me that Plato's Ideas derive from an imperfectly understood doctrine of the Mysteries. Hypostasised concepts were mistaken for something else."

W. "But what evidence can be produced? Have we not here old maids' gossip? Is not Plato 'explained' sufficiently by his own genius, the influence of Eleatic beliefs and the cult of the concept due to Socrates? Socrates, however, was interested mainly in ethics, while Plato exploited concepts for metaphysics."

A. "We have no time to lavish on such topics. Our business is to make clear to Wortvoll what we understand by Imaginals. To contrast these with the Ideas is instructive. In doing this I assume that the Ideas set above the flux of Becoming, immune from change, were originally, at any rate, what they have been called — hypostasised concepts, constants exemplifying the immutability of the 'divine principle' of reason. This assumption suffices for our present purpose."

S. "It suffices also in my opinion for those who want the truth. Men's concepts such as 'bed', 'table', 'justice', 'absolute swiftness' and the rest are promoted to positions in the firmament of Forms or Ideas. But, promotion once accorded, these now immutable, far-off Ideas prove useless in accounting for the actual world we know. Criticism of them is severe in the writings of Aristotle, and indeed even in the *Parmenides* itself, and the objections cannot be answered. This abuse of concepts, modified by Aristotle, infected mediaeval thought in which some of the developments neared the grotesque.(27) Anderton need not, however, treat as philosophers schoolmen who are free only within a domain assigned them by faith. Let us fare onward to our next landmark, the

works of a really free philosopher, Schopenhauer. The Ideas, set by him above this changing world, contrast markedly with the constants hitherto noticed."

A. "I don't like this term 'Ideas' any more than I like 'Forms'. 'Ideas' mean for most present-day students certain contents, to wit concepts, private to their minds, and the term is used most conveniently in this way. The term 'Form' can be defined as 'mode or manner of existing'; there is no abstract form which exists by itself. The way is now open for clearly stated criticism.

Schopenhauer's Ideas stand midway, as it were, between his world-principle and particulars, showing in the stream of time, not kept aloof from the empirical world in a philosophical firmament. This world is said to be 'nothing but the manifestation of the Ideas in multiplicity'. And these Ideas are not concept-universals: 'the Idea is the unity that falls into multiplicity; . . . the concept, on the contrary, is the unity reconstructed out of multiplicity by the abstraction of our reason'." (28)

S. "Can't we be rid of the word 'universal'. Plato's 'Justice' is a 'universal'. It is exemplified in what just acts are said to have in common. But why call this feature shared by a relatively few human acts universal? Terminology seems defective. The term, further, is ambiguous, meaning also a single, organised whole or system. (29) What is the plain man to make of this?"

L. "Nothing; but, as the late Professor Schiller used to say, some philosophers could not venture to write so as to be understood; they would be found out."

A. "These Ideas, out of which are built the starry heavens and a pat of butter are obviously vastly more important than the 'logical universals', of which we hear so much at Universities. They are not inert, verbal abstractions, mere tools of thinking men, but *cosmic powers*. Still I have to ask: what are these Ideas doing in the galley of Schopenhauer? What is their *locus standi* against a background ruled by blind Will? They appear to be features of a purposive world-principle. And is not Imaginism competent to provide their true spiritual home?"

*The Ideas, modified considerably by Imaginism, become the Imaginals.* The name was coined for *World as Imagination* (1916). Some of them, the primary Imaginals, are comparable with Whitehead's 'eternal objects' which are 'exemplified in everything that is actual, according to some proportion of relevance' or with Santayana's 'essences' which are the cosmic store-house of contents showing in the empirical world. They are 'objects', however, from a finite point of view; oppositions such as subject-and-object are transcended, we may surmise, by Divine Imagining. We are considering realities that must not be confused with concept-universals; must discard the Hegelian tradition which infects idealism still. Hegel, like Plato, was a master of abstract thought, not too friendly to the sensible world (he called Nature 'weak'). Thought, he averred, is 'sovereign of the world'. The existence of the universal, which is 'neither seen nor heard', is the 'secret of the mind'. The universal is 'visible only to reflection'; an attitude in harmony with his statement that Nature-philosophy takes the place of applied logic.(30) For him pure thought finds expression in Nature and Mind. But for imaginists there is no thought, logical or other, at the source of things; the fully concrete fontal reality is that which our thought seeks to embrace, only to fail."

W. "You hold that the independent external world is even richer in qualities than those parts of it said to be perceived by us. I gather that you credit it *inter alia* with colours, indefinitely more numerous than those observed by man. You believe then, I take it, in a light-imaginal. You do — good. Now let us use this light-imaginal as a target for questions. Answers must prove illuminative."

A. "An excellent suggestion. Proceed."

W. "Would you say, in Hegel's language, that this light-imaginal is 'visible only to reflection'?"

A. "The character of the imaginal is indicated by our own experience of light. 'Blinded by our eyes', we conspire little of it but that little resembles assuredly the rest. We regard it as a conservative feature of God, an eternal, inexhaustible source of all the varieties of light in the universe. It is one of the primary imaginings, out of which world-systems are con-

structed, as contrasted with secondary and later imaginals created additively during the career of one such system. No man can say anything about the manner in which the complete imaginal is sustained in God, save that it must needs be as a totality of light. Now for the answer to your question. Were merely the *concept* of light being discussed, we could certainly say that it can be 'visible only to reflection'. The concept is a substitute-fact and may be verbal, nay, definable also in words. The light-imaginal is a *cosmic agent*; the concept an instrument created in the service of thinking man. The concept is unity remade out of multiplicity, out of many different perceptions and memories, and its use is to facilitate reasoning. It does nothing, however, of itself, has no inward development of its own; is a creation of our imagination of great practical worth, a more or less stable rock amid the yeast of waves that show in mind."

L. "Sunset splendour does not emerge from a concept! It is a direct glimpse of the imaginal as it enters a tiny region of our world. Many modern critics will object that 'vibrations' have ousted light from their 'real' external world, urging that there is no light, properly so-called, outside human and animal brains or the rudimentary structures behaving like them. Do they hold that God, in Whom some of them still believe, is blind, sovereign of world-systems wrapt in eternal night? We have read books that discuss unseen worlds but none yet that declare them to be 'unseeable' as well!"

S. "There is nothing which justifies theory in ousting light from the independent external world; physics, we saw, in stressing quantity and measure has to ignore much else. Nothing is known to science which robs the poet and plain man of their sunset.(31) Nature has been whittled down for the convenience of calculators; philosophy has, as part of its task, to restore what is missing. Look askance on this word 'vibration'; it belongs to the metaphysics of a mechanical school. All we here need say is that certain *periodic processes*, incompletely known, take place in Nature, and that, among the events happening therewith, appear the colour-qualities. And they appear, because the processes, symbolised as waves, furnish the occasion. If I turn a tap in a certain way, water flows, but the



water is not produced by myself and the tap. It pre-existed to what has been done. Similarly the imaginal pre-existed to the periodic processes."

L. "It strikes a layman as odd that light should exist only in connexion with parts of an animal body and that elsewhere all is 'vibration' and — darkness. That way surely lies nonsense. Meanwhile I have to say that the light denied to the external world has not been refused consistently; after all, nervous systems belong to that world and, if light shows in them, why not in other portions of Nature as well?"

W. "Rather a good point, but now for some more information. How do imaginals stand in regard to qualities, quantities and relations? And are instances of them, *e.g.* red, blue and green, to be considered in any sense as the same — a time-honoured problem?"

A. "We are on dangerous ice. Skate prudently. My view is: there are no specific imaginals of quantity and relation. Quantities, measuring the ways in which things *occupy* reality, seem functions of consciring. No consciring (which sustains and creates additively) no support for the conscitum; vanishing of somewhat actual from the domain of phenomena. Relations? These may be defined as *manners of compresence* of terms to consciring. No terms, no relations, which are particular, though one may resemble another closely. Thus simultaneity, *e.g.* of a colour, a sound and warmth, presupposes terms which are together, not successive; they are compresent in this manner to consciring, divine or finite. No terms, no such relations. One such relation is very like another, but they are not for that the same. Likeness, again, presupposes at least two terms. If one of the terms vanishes, the relation vanishes too, but not the other term.

Imaginals, exemplified in everything that is actual, may comprise also many quantities and relations, also sub-imaginals similarly complex. If there is a primary imaginal (or group-soul), Man, it illustrates this truth. Regarding light as one such primary imaginal, manifested in our world-system, I have to allow for all the varieties of it, their interrelations and their quantities. It will be obvious that the Platonic 'Form', lifted above multiplicity and change, is once more

left behind. For such imaginals, complex and extruding multiplicity the elements of which can be in conflict, changeable too as factors in a changing world wherein novelty thrives, are not set aloof from empirical things, but invade and control them.

Sameness, identity ? The only reality 'universal' in the sense that it is fundamentally the same in all its manifestations is consciring. The stupendous fact of being aware of anything does identify sentient in a manner that is unique. Though conscita differ so much, there is in consciring somewhat, known directly not definable, which is shared by all of them. But the members of imaginals, in so far as they are conscita or contents, *e.g.* red and blue or two reds, are merely like. As stated in *Z.D.*(32) certain philosophers had a strong motive for substituting identity in difference for likeness. They ignored consciring and wanted to import unity into a world-system which for them was only connected *contents*. We here do not need to seek a cement in identical contents."

S. "All the contents are sustained by the same fundamental consciring, but radically different, as well as like, contents have this support."

W. "The light-imaginal is a particular, albeit complex, whole, seething in its manifestations with change ?"

A. "Yes, particular. It may be contrasted with other primary particular imaginals such as Sound. Seeing that these imaginals are eternal objects, their relations of likeness and difference are eternal as well. I mention this to illustrate once more what I said about relations. Note that, though its manifestations in a world-system suffer change, its conservative character persists. It is ever the light-imaginal and no other. The conditions being favourable, the light-qualities appear; are *born into* the world-system in question. Consider well this phrase 'born into'. *Other imaginals are 'born into' systems as well.* That, for instance, of Man!"

L. "These primary imaginals constitute a part of the treasures of Divine Imagining which are not all factors in the making of any given world-system. These world-systems are finite; fields for the flowering of the variety expressive of the Fontal Power. Each, we may infer, is constructed out of a

limited number of imaginals, and creative evolution is based on this selection. There is no additive creation save on a basis of conservation which restricts the field of possibilities ahead."

W. "There is no imaginal of beauty?"

A. "Beauty is neither a Platonic 'Form', nor an imaginal. 'Any whole, combining variety in unity, is beautiful if I can conscire it awhile (for the beautiful object is not always a "joy for ever") with delight fully satisfied within the limits of the whole.'(33) Mill urged powerfully that 'agreeableness' is all that the objects, called by man beautiful, have in common; our definition has therefore to be of width. There is nothing necessarily glorious about beauty or truth. Beauty is often evil as so much of truth is ugly. And one man's ideal of beauty, as one would expect amid the riots of an imaginal world, may not be another's. The African women with enormously expanded saucer-like lips have adorers — and critics."

L. "The beautiful present to God is covered by the definition; what we cannot symbolise adequately is the divine 'delight'. Delight, an essential aspect of the beautiful, comes from no imaginal of its own, but *belongs*, as do all pleasant and painful feelings, to consciring."(34)

W. "Another point. Proclus would not allow that there are Forms of things evil and of things of the 'instrumental arts'; yet to this was he driven, if he had to posit Forms whenever he came across common names. Plato's 'bed' and 'table' are sufficiently embarrassing; my pipe-cleaners also. I won't ask you to provide corresponding imaginals. I recall that you spoke of primary and other imaginals, arguing that creative evolution can achieve much. But throw more light on the situation."

A. "The essential to bear in mind is this: the superstition of a mechanical cosmos does not concern us. A world-system is created out of a limited number of primary imaginals, whose qualities with their quantities and relations constitute its skeleton, flesh and blood. These imaginals furnish all the 'stuff' required for the nascent system, justifying literally the saying of Blake, 'Nature is imagination'. But we have here only the Initial Situation; the *primaeval* divine field before its plunge into creative evolution. After the plunge much



LOOKING AT THE DENT BLANCHE OVER THE MATTERHORN



novelty will be produced and, as part of this, what we have called secondary, tertiary, etc., imaginals. At the meeting-points of interpenetrating imaginals, on the so-called 'inorganic' and 'organic' levels of Nature, new Kinds or sub-imaginals may arise. Great numbers of these are generated which were not among the original imaginals, *i.e.* those embodied in the nascent system and those waiting to be embodied in it. It will be hard, perhaps impracticable, to make a complete list of the primary ones; I shall not attempt to do this now. But in studying at leisure the evolution of Nature, with a full understanding of what 'causal sequence' implies, we shall achieve results of high value.

The difficulties mentioned by Proclus don't concern the imaginist at all. None of us look for primary imaginals of beds, tables, pipe-cleaners, powder-puffs and the rest. All these things begin late in the history of our world-system, when human fancy is at work on specimens of Kinds of relatively recent origin. The new patterns are imagined by us; tolerated, shall we say? by some of the things altered. Habits in Nature vary; some things oppose our plans."

S. "Professor Schiller thought that Darwinism accounted best for the different Kinds of 'organic' Nature; the likeness of members of a Kind being due simply to their common descent and Platonic universals being superfluous assumptions. Kinds for Schiller are 'conveniences of human classification'." (35)

L. "Of course human classification is at work; otherwise we should have no books on botany and zoology. And of course organisms of common descent will be of one pattern; heredity counts. But what needs explanation is the descent itself and the 'variations' accompanying it."

S. "Bergson writes about creative changing in definite directions, terming it an 'effort common to most representatives of the same species, inherent in the genus they bear' and so securely transmitted to their descendants. What is the source of this 'effort' which determines the character of the descent?"

W. "Habet! And now, Stark, give us some information bearing on this question of secondary imaginals. Draw it from the animal and vegetable kingdoms."

*S.* (torch and note-book in action). "I must remind you. that there are about half a million kinds or species of insects. If numbers and total weight decided the issue, one would have to say that insects are the most important occupiers of the land. Now these insects are adapted exactly to surroundings such as only this planet, it would seem, can provide. And what is to be said about, *e.g.* the two hundred thousand or more kinds of plants and the many thousands of kinds of birds, fishes and mammals? Are there primary imaginals manifested in all these? Parasites, cheese mites, bacteria would hardly qualify for representation even in Plato's celestial hierarchy of 'Forms'; they are certainly, as we know them, of pronounced secondary origin within a lower world. Consider the phylum of the Vertebrates. Do its many classes, sub-classes, orders, sub-orders, sections, families, sub-families, genera and species (not to mention varieties) record a mass-invasion of 'eternal objects'? Or are we to say that a relatively small number of primary imaginals are modified in their manifestations, in the course of which new kinds appear on the great scale? New kinds, unlike those of the parents and breeding true, have arisen, we know, through crossing. Local influences count. As Darwin wrote: 'We have the truly wonderful fact that, in James Island, of the thirty-eight Galapageian plants found in no other part of the world, thirty are exclusively confined to this one island'. Natural Selection, again, must be potent indeed. The changes on which it works begin in the history of this globe, some quite recently."

*L.* "Yes, but Natural Selection only selects from among 'variations' which it does not make. And 'fortuitous' variations are not accepted so readily as they were when Darwin wrote. Professor Arthur Thomson found that they are often definite and congruent with the past, the random one is rare; nay, often they look like experiments! You too, Stark, mentioned Bergson's creative changing in definite directions, so I am not convinced that blind varying obtains in any quarter. Anyhow blind varying won't issue in the eye, however many organisms struggle for existence and perish. For the production of the eye, which takes place on independent lines of evolution, solves, as Bergson points out, a problem.

'Fortuitous' variations, with no definite direction, cannot co-ordinate the many developments implied."

S. "You speak to the converted, so far as I am concerned. But I must insist on the great rôle played by Natural Selection, once the 'variations' have been provided. It eliminates defective organisms; leaves the breeding to those which function best. 'Variations' are inevitable in an imaginal world and arise in many ways; among these the 'effort' from higher levels is only one. Even on the level of the body and its cells there is novelty; 'response to stimuli' implies a leaven of the new which is additively imaginal. I agree with Leslie that too much stress was laid on *blind* Natural Selection in Victorian times. Is it to be wondered at? Men of science disliked the Churches which talked without knowledge. They were tired of the Babylonian legends of Genesis and of theological nonsense such as Milton's vision of the origin of animals:

The grassy clods now calved; now half appeared  
The tawny lion, pawing to get free  
His hinder parts

and were glad accordingly to substitute Natural Selection for the Miltonic personal god. Natural Selection has now been weighed in the balance and found wanting. Evolution and creation are reconciled; are seen to belong to the same process."

L. "Amazing inventiveness — there is no other word for it — reveals imagining in the 'adaptations' of the animal and vegetable kingdoms. And, remember, these inventions come from the side of the organisms as a rule, as Darwin allowed.(36) The organism is the meeting-place of many imaginings and, maybe, of a dominant imaginal."

S. "Dominant imaginal! Don't forget in this connexion the saying of Professor McDougall when considering the evolution of species as having purposive direction. 'Is it possible that the phrase "the soul of a race" is something more than a metaphor? That all this wonderful stability in complexity, combined with gradual change through the ages, which Weismann attributes to the hypothetical germ-plasm, is in reality the attribute of an enduring psychic existent of which the lives of individual organisms are but successive



manifestations.' Conservation and additive creation, shall we say? exemplified once more." (37)

W. "Why silent so long, Anderton? Come over and help us."

A. "I have been listening to instructive comments. In an imaginal universe our free imagination must often work to profit even in philosophy, but the wise man checks its results when he can. We here are not seeking, like religionists, to own oases of private fancy, but to dwell in thought about reality at large. I am apt to question the worth of my inferences when these are touched with emotion. It is so easy to rest in an oasis.

The final suggestion I submit respecting the imaginals is this: the *primaeva* imaginal field (we called it the 'Initial Situation' of our nascent world-system) is constructed out of a relatively few imaginals, some of those veritable 'eternal objects' whence the contents for all world-making are drawn. This finite world-system — which will have its own space-time — is to realise a certain phase of additive Divine Imagining. Its primary imaginals, constructed *ad hoc* out of the 'eternal objects', are such as to body forth this end; though present at the very birth of the system, they are thus themselves in a sense secondary. Later, when the system, becoming unstable, gives rise to what is called evolution, these imaginals, as they interpenetrate, are the ancestors of all the rest that are functioning now. How such generation takes place will be understood when we have made clear to ourselves what causation is. We must suppose that the vast majority of Kinds are 'evolved' creatively during the career of the world-system. And now let us reconsider 'the Concept' which is not an agent, is only *about* other reality and has no inward activity of its own. It is a name, nevertheless, for a Kind of contents created as instruments to serve our minds in thinking. As such it is a Kind of substitute-facts seemingly of low rank among the Kinds. Its just noted defects bring, however, their compensations — *for us*. It enables us to confront practical life, to discuss realities of which we have no direct knowledge and in philosophy to grasp in thought the universe. The Kind of concepts is an indispensable and wonderful feature in the development of the human mind. It furthers, not only practical life, but, in the

domain of contemplative theory, the unification of a world most of whose aspects seem to us at first sundered. Conceptual thought is a transitional form of knowledge and will be superseded at long last by direct conscurring. Its makeshift character is indicated by its dependence on language. Nobody, outside the groups of true mystics, is likely to be perturbed by this reflection."

*L.* "Ah! now we have the position and standing of the concept-universal made completely clear. This Kind lacks the power of, say, the imaginal controlling an animal group. Observe, however, that many of the Kinds evolved during the life of our planet are in like case. Consider the Kinds paper, ink, bottle-brush, cork, etc. None of these so-called universals are agents controlling directly the instances in which they are exemplified. They merely convenience us men, furthering our practical life. I make a concept 'bottle-brush' after I have perceived objects which are like in certain respects; I unify in a measure experiences which came to me separately at different times. But I don't suppose that 'bottle-brush' manifests itself in multiplicity as if it were an agent of which the instances partake. The concept merely guides the actions of myself, manufacturers and others."

*W.* "Anderton and Leslie score heavily; we began by opposing imaginal to concept and we end by treating the concept as an imaginal 'oh! so thin' which is of or about reality other than itself. We seem now to have dealt with the topic sufficiently for immediate needs."

*A.* "I should like to add a few words. 'Bottle-brush' does nothing directly to its instances, but the imaginal behind the Phylum of the Vertebrates certainly does.(38) Don't press me for a list of the imaginals which perhaps we may enjoy when our able colleague, Wortvoll, has become an imaginalist and shouldered the burden. We have to bear in mind that even the primaeval world-system is very complex, not the skeleton which mechanists represent it to be. It comprises active and waiting imaginals. How many of them and how interrelated? At what stage does the production of novel secondary, tertiary, etc., imaginals begin? So-called 'inorganic' Nature presents a difficult problem; the animal and vegetable kingdoms perhaps

a harder. Overshadowing all inquiry is the fact that this physical level, on which we are living now, is a portion only of the world-system and probably the least interesting. Who is going to do Wortvoll's job thoroughly? Perhaps only a very high mystic could undertake it. Perhaps such bold philosophy is not for the ordinary terrene student at all, who must rest content with such side-lights as these dialogues and the like provide.

We have been considering imaginals that increase and multiply, interpenetrate with invasive qualities, further and thwart one another in the external world; we have seen that others may dwell in our minds and not beyond. We shall have to allow also for imaginals which are seats of centres of conscurring able to function as souls, *i.e.* as dominating or guiding factors in the behaviour of what we call living bodies."

W. "First catch your soul and then trace it to its source in a soul-imaginal. When I see reason to believe in one, I shall be quite ready to locate its source as you desire. At present I incline to hold that 'soul' begins and ends with the history of a 'living body'. Still I should be rather pleased to find that I am wrong."

A. "We have contended — and, as your comments showed, not without force — that physical Nature consists of organisms and aggregates of organisms. The atoms and smaller units of physics are organisms. Whenever a dominant centre of conscurring, irreflective or reflective, controls a group of such organisms, it is working as a typical 'soul'. The 'soul' may be one of the organisms of the group. But it may have a special organism *of its own*, coming to, and appropriating, the group of minor organisms and leaving them when 'de-composition' (in the original meaning of the term) occurs.

The first case is illustrated simply by an atomic group: the proton and its allied electrons. The proton is a centre of conscurring with a body of psychoid spatio-temporal content. It dominates, but as one of the group. The second case is that which is to interest us greatly: that, *e.g.*, of the human soul and its physical body. Need I say that I am at one with Plato in holding that the soul pre-exists to its descent into the body and leaves this prison like a patient recovering from

disease. You will recall what Socrates says before drinking the hemlock."

L. "We have only hints of the truth to guide us. Those who love philosophy and shun pretenders and self-styled seers will find these hints in the works of Plato and Plotinus. The new Imaginism and the *aperçus* of such men and other Western students suffice to guide our steps aright. We avoid making appeal to 'Indian wisdom' which does not furnish the metaphysics required and belongs in this respect largely to the past. And, as you have seen, we cannot travel even with Western idealists such as Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer for more than a portion of our journey. We must make bricks with such handfuls of straw as we can collect.

But consider! Suppose that Plato and Plotinus, greatest illuminatus of the ancients, are fundamentally right in what they assert about the soul. Suppose, Wortvoll, that 'psychology without a soul' is nonsense, that disbelief in a soul that pre-exists to the body and persists is a mistake, must we not say that, in an important respect, the dominant 'best thought' of Europe for many generations has failed? What a revolution awaits the lecturers of our universities! What a change of outlook is open to the millions who have ceased to allow for a future life and are wandering now in the wilderness! What a crash of many political systems and institutions would be inevitable! Who is going to waste time in maintaining much of the tomfoolery that now afflicts the world? The State, sanely ordered, will have to exist for individuals, not individuals for the State."

W. "Once more I say: first catch your soul and we'll see what its outlook may be. Meanwhile perhaps Anderton will tell us on what lines he defends belief in a soul."

A. "Next time we meet perhaps."

W. "And what about the soul-imaginal or imaginals?"

A. "Well, they are not to be likened to Plato's 'Idea' of Man. Plato promotes a concept, stressing what is *common* to all men, to the rank of immutable, single, simple, homogeneous Form, active in no assignable way amid the stir and vicissitudes of this changing world. His Eleatic prejudices prevailed. The imaginal, however, which is not a concept about reality, but

reality itself, accepts change and enters actually into the time-process. It comprises also from the outset souls having *different* contents :

Concordes animae nunc et dum nocte premuntur

centres of irreflective consciring whose emergence into creative evolution occurs late in world-history."

L. "These are what Plotinus calls Ideas of individuals, 'ideal forms' of individuals. Their 'instances' will be found only in their successive lives."

A. "Don't be too sure. The great Bradley thought that 'several bodies might be organs to an unknown soul'. But let that pass.

Soul-imaginals, differentiated at the outset into centres of irreflective consciring, the Plotinic 'Ideas of individuals', 'Transcendental Subjects', as some neo-Kantians would call them, each with its distinct zone of influence, are not simple in themselves and belong also to a complex hierarchy within Divine Imagining."

W. "You are silent about sub-human souls of this sort?"

A. "I shall require notice of that question, as they say in the House of Commons. We are only on the fringe of our topic. For the present I have said enough about imaginals to enable us to carry on. I will now turn your thought to causation; we must have some working idea of what this term ought to mean. We must also understand the process named the Imaginal Dynamic, the veritable *élan vital* that rules the world. I have no time to repeat all that is written in *Z.D.* and must ask you, Wortvoll, to consult that work for further information.(39) It is my business now to summarise its results. Having done this we can talk more profitably about creative evolution and form a tolerable notion of how our world of pain and conflict came to pass."

S. "Writers like Mill shelve the issue as to *how* events come to pass and inevitably also the wider problem as to *how* the drive of the world-process is secured. William James called cause 'an altar to an unknown god, an empty pedestal marking the place of a hoped-for statue'. Popularly, of course, the word 'cause' is used as a mere counter in pointing out a

certain 'antecedent' or 'antecedents' of practical importance; a counter never changed for the cash of adequate thought. Imaginism not only gives a clear meaning to 'cause', but at the same time solves the problems of freedom and chance. It supplies the 'statue' wanted by James."

W. "Nothing like enterprise! As to Mill, well I don't serve under his flag. He disliked the idea of *productive* causation and saw in a causal event what is 'invariably and unconditionally' consequent on certain 'antecedents'. The two adverbs suggest that the event was 'produced' after all. Mill writes about surface-phenomena; you are trying, not without success, to get behind and under them. . . . Anderton, you hold the floor."

A. "The results I cite are substantially those reached by *World as Imagination* (1916) and *Divine Imagining* (1921), but a clearer and more thorough account is that of *Z.D.* (1931). I shall submit them, Wortvoll, after mention of a statement about causation made by the thinker you referred to — Mill. I am assuming here that time-sequence is not mere appearance to finite sentients, as subjective idealists have urged, but a feature also of the independent external world. For us imaginists time-sequence is the form or manner in which additive creation takes place.

Let Mill's definition be considered. Cause means for him 'assemblage of phenomena, which occurring, some other phenomenon invariably commences, or has its origin'. He won't go below the surface-phenomena. As metaphysicians we must. Why then does the 'other' phenomenon commence? Why do events happen at all? As we have seen, there are no compelling 'laws' and assuredly no intellectualist 'principle of causation' at work.(40) The events happen in virtue of a perpetual miracle; they are parts of a system upheld and in process of renewal within Divine Imagining. And there is no blind Fate or Orlog that prolongs their succession when nothing is being achieved; the limits of time-sequence are the limits set by Divine Imagining. Events happen 'not merely because other events have preceded them but because they are steps in the movement of the world towards perfection and beauty, because they are phases of Divine Imagining in Its balanced

wholeness . . . the causal dynamic is no master — it is only the manner in which imagination presses to its goal, the slow making and perfecting of the world-romance which began and will have its end; an “end” at once the close of a time-process and the crown of a purpose fulfilled’.(41) We have swept mechanistic thought from our path; let us push our advantage home. Causation is a ‘*teleologic transition* marking incessant violations and restorations, in general and in detail, of the harmony of the changing whole or world-system under survey.’”(42)

W. “You have appalling aspects of life to fit into your divine causal dynamic, but I am sure that you won’t dodge the difficulties.”

A. “The dark side of life — yes. Be patient. Leslie was a pessimist till he met us at Zermatt. If we can’t solve problems of that kind, our philosophy is not worth your time and trouble. I continue.

What ‘takes place’ implies what ‘makes place’; nothing merely goes on without support in the depths. Changes, again, are in finite ‘steps’, not, as some mathematicians might think, in infinitely graded transitions without ‘next’ terms. The spatial and temporal aspects of content are finite, seeing that the content itself is finite. Imagination ‘*semper facit saltum*’ from one discrete pulse of content to another. Change goes ‘dropwise’, as James put it.”

S. “The quantum theory in physics is an incidental confirmation of this view.”

A. “There are two sorts of causal events emergent from this changing; that in which conservation and that in which additive creation is most prominent. For this reason Mill contrasted events due to ‘composition of causes’ with those exemplifying ‘heteropathic laws’.(43) This is ‘one of the fundamental distinctions in Nature’, so find room for it, as we do, in philosophy. In the second sort the transformation of factors in the event is never complete; conservative features persist. There is conservation in respect of weight even in the process of chemical transformation of factors into water. And there is a leaven of novelty amid the conservation noted in the ‘composition of causes’. Observe that additive creation is

always limited by the factors on which it is superinduced. A silk purse cannot be made out of a sow's ear. In this way the purely capricious and fantastic are avoided, save in the realm of our private fancy ! No creative magic can evolve Homer out of a matchbox or the moon out of green cheese. Additive creation varies a theme already in being.

Without contraries, it has been said, there is no progress. All cases of causation involve useful conflict of this sort. They imply many agents and the interpenetration which we have already discussed.(44) During this interpenetration there is conflict. Consider Mill's two sorts of causation once more. There obtain, urges Mill, 'two modes of conflict, or mutual interference' of the causal agents. In the first conflict is *solved* in more or less conservative fashion ; in the second the solution may be transformative, entailing marked novelty. Causation of either sort closes with an *imaginal solution of conflict*, whether the conflict takes place in Nature, in finite centres or in both of these quarters at once. You will concede, Wortvoll, that the phrase 'imaginal solution' is justified ; that it is not a mere juxtaposition of words."

W. "If the conflict and the solution take place in an imaginal world, the phrase is both justified and apposite. What amuses me is the way in which Mill is being made use of in the onslaught on his own empiricism. But tell me : whence comes the solution ?"

A. "It is the gift of consciring ; additive creation. A writer, whose works you know well, Lossky, says much the same thing : namely, that in causation we are aware of some 'energy' being expended 'which produces or actively creates a new event' .(45) There is no 'energy' in Nature or ourselves which is not a symbol for consciring. We imaginists are no longer crying in the wilderness, as in 1921 and 1916 ; our *vis creatrix* is found to be at work in every case of causation we know of. Why is its working not detected as a rule ? Well, I said a good deal in a former talk about irreflective and reflective consciring. Our human reflective consciring is poor ; it lights a very limited region well, that of the conscita or contents to which we are said to 'attend'. It lights itself also so as to be the whole in which the contents show, and is revealed further



in feeling.(46) But it shines dimly in its own light and very much of its working lies 'below the Threshold'. Man is only beginning to be conscious. What wonder that philosophers overlook this obscure portion of their being! What wonder that they overlook the veiled consciring which acts in Nature!"

W. "Interpenetration and conflict of agents, harmonising imaginal solution with novelty — these are the outstanding features of causation in Nature and finite centres of consciring such as ours. I follow and am interested. Of course during interpenetration the behaviour of the agents — their 'laws', as the saying goes — is modified, and to this extent there must be conflict with harmonisation issuing in the event. The mutual interference may be slight or violent. But about the novelty?"

A. "The harmonising solution in the cases of 'heteropathic' causation may have two striking aspects. It may furnish an *occasion* for a *waiting* imaginal or even particular object to embody itself in the event. Secondly, it may contrive the synthesis in a manner that copies no 'antecedent', is new to the cosmos, *ex nihilo fit*, and consequently must be called additively creative. In the cases of 'composition of causes' the event of course shows conservation dominant and prompts inquiry less notably. Most events are of this type.

'Law'? The first formation of water illustrated a creative leap; there arose by repetition a habit of Nature enabling us to talk of a 'law'. Conservation is illustrated in the habit. But bear in mind that the novelty 'water' and afterwards the habit of Nature are not random occurrences but the work of consciring that is divine. Note how conservation and additive creation are allied.

Another illustration. I am in a pitch-dark cellar, take a match from a matchbox and strike a light. What has happened? The *occasion* has been furnished for the manifestation of the light-imaginal which was not there before. We are discussing a concrete, mind-like external world, rich with qualities. Light is with the complex periodic processes which we call 'vibrations' in a crude, mechanistic way. It does not commence its existence in nervous systems.

Another and important illustration. Is the babe-soul part of the complicated event known as the formation of its physical

body. Certainly not. An occasion has been furnished for the manifestation of a waiting soul, which in respect of its content-side is a particular object. There will be much additive creation as regards the synthesis of the two objects. But fundamentally a chemical synthesis and this birth-synthesis are not very unlike."

W. "Well, well. But why does the human soul need a physical body? This is one of the things you will have to deal with later. I won't say more now."

L. "Events, born of causation, become sometimes very stable objects; the moon, a diamond, the *Iliad* and *Hamlet*. What is done may be done completely and permanently, even on this planet, if rain, wind, weather and men don't corrupt. A perfect poem like *Arethusa*, once written, may endure for ever among the treasures harvested by Divine Imagining. Meanwhile these things remain factors in causal change."

S. "These relatively stable events serve to remind us of what Anderton said just now: there is nothing in the causal dynamic which suggests the unending. What is suggested is progress toward some far-off stabilisation or equilibrium when making is to culminate in the made; in the Divine Event."

W. "A rest-phase only, so it was said. But could your Divine Imagining rest in a perfect event for ever? The Perficent Power takes joy in the novel as well."

A. "Any questions — we are digressing."

W. "The whole cause, urges Bradley, must take in the universe, if it is to be considered complete. What say you?"

A. "Why then are not all effects exactly alike? The reply to Bradley is that, though all causes fully stated include the world-system and Divine Imagining, no two of them do so in the same sense. The important interpenetration varies in each case of causation. Thus an atom penetrates the world-system, but its short-range influence is very different from what it does afar. An *H* atom may trouble Sirius, but it troubles a near, combining *O* atom much more strongly and differently. We must not speak of penetration of all objects by all others but of all being invaded by much else. The very distant penetrating objects may be almost negligible. We have to allow sometimes for almost closed fields of causation. Is a radio-

active object in London influenced by a sneeze in Peru or my admiration of a picture in New York? Thus penetration-contents differing, conflict and imaginal solution differ as well."

W. "Answer decisive. We have enjoyed some highly suggestive statements about causation; more than sufficient to prepare one for what is coming. Is there anything else of importance to mention to-night? It's getting late. I want to find my pillow and dream of flying."

L. "Say a few words about the Imaginal Dynamic, Anderton, and we'll all start dreaming. Very soon we shall be able to talk about evolution and the process which led up to the appearance of the soul in this sublunary world."

A. "A few words then, and not more than one illustration. Wortvoll knows where to look for fuller information.(47) I shall close with a few other indispensable words on freedom and chance. I want the road clear for our business to-morrow. Then to bed.

I take leave awhile of causation with a final caution. Be careful in reading books on 'evolution', 'development', etc., not to be fooled by the word *derive*. Deriving the complex from the absurdly simple, the higher from the crudely lower, is an expedient of men whose first philosophy, *i.e.* metaphysics, is defective. Music has been derived from the love-cries of monkeys. The drive of all human activity, including that of contemplative thought, has been found in a few shallow instincts, *i.e.* species-habits, invariably of much lower rank than what they are supposed to explain. Love-cries and instincts comprise no promise or potentiality whatever; they are just what their rude level of action reveals them to be, phases of the urge of consciring in the depths. The ascent, which evolutionists discuss, would be impossible without the waiting imaginals and additive creation. Metaphysics must be such as to include these.

Interpenetration, conflict and harmonising solution underlie all particular cases of causation. Let us turn from such cases and bethink ourselves of the greater changes in Nature, of the drama of human history, of world-evolution itself. We prefer now to speak of the Imaginal Dynamic. This is the veritable drive of the world-process. Hegel sought to describe

such a power, his Dialectic. This, in his conceptual rationalism, shows as the 'labour of the *Notion*'; the very movement of the *Notion* itself. It is held to underlie weather changes as well as events connected with the minds of men. 'Wherever there is movement, wherever there is life, wherever anything is carried into effect, there dialectic is at work.' I mention this, since some inquirers seem to regard the term 'dialectic' as denoting something operative only within the minds of men, when studying logic, philosophy and so forth. Hegel's movement of the *Notion* is world-embracing. It is said to display logical necessity, working through contradiction and the overcoming of contradiction with an inevitableness beyond cavil.

Imaginism rejects cosmic logic and accordingly the dialectic.(48) It rejects also belief in rigorous necessity, logical or other, ruling the world-dynamic. The new intrudes, replacing the old. But various innovations may be possible when the harmonising agents are human minds. There is no one inevitably realised pattern or plan in history. As Fisher observes in the Preface to his *History of Europe* there is only one safe rule for the historian: 'that he should recognise in the development of human destinies the play of the contingent and of the unforeseen'. Exactly.

The imaginal dynamic works only within creative evolution; in that field of additive change which lies between the Metaphysical Fall and the reattainment by the world-system of peace, of the *ἐνέργεια ἀκινήσιας*. It has to do with successions in which steps of change are taken, with time sprouting into novelty. The archetypal state of the world-system and its later halt in relative perfection have no place for the dynamic.(49)

An illustration of this Imaginal Dynamic: 'the Minoan culture was penetrated by, and in conflict with, nomads from the north. The result was a creative harmonisation; there was evolved a stock of "magnificent mongrels, to clarify and harmonise this wealth of *incongruous* gifts", as Professor Myres tells us. Much was conserved, but the creative synthesis was imposed on the antecedent conditions, not derived from them.'(50) The novelty *fit ex nihilo*, like Hamlet from Shakespeare's fancy. It adds a facet to reality. It is not elicited

from antecedents, but posited in response to them. You can find further illustrations easily for yourselves.

I pass on to make some preliminary remarks respecting freedom and chance. Stark will not expect me to deal with the physico-mathematical side of this problem, which has won recently much attention in science and which you can consider in his company later. What I shall do is to stress the metaphysical case against a rigorously strict determinism of the old type. Understand that, Wortvoll, and you will understand also happenings in the dark aspects of the world which no optimist, or even meliorist, has been able to confront hitherto without misgiving. What say you, Leslie ? ”

L. “ I was for long an atheistic idealist, a believer in the philosophy of the Unconscious. I could not account otherwise for the dark side of life ; I had the outlook of Hardy and Leopardi. Wortvoll will find that even the worst deeds of a real chance will surprise him no longer.”

A. “ I urged before that a scheme of deterministic ‘ law ’ cannot be thrust on the manifested world. ‘ Laws ’ are fictions of man’s fancy, though approximately stable habits of Nature and of our private minds enable us to use them for prediction. Winds don’t *obey* Buy Ballot’s ‘ law ’ ( ‘ in the N. Hemisphere if an observer faces wind, the pressure will be lower on his right hand ’ ) ; the ‘ law ’ is a generalisation made by man for his use and is verified awhile by the conservative side of Nature. Its verification next month is highly probable, in a thousand million years very much less so. It may be possible to measure the probability and assign it a number.

The manifested world tolerates awhile the scheme of deterministic ‘ law ’. Its habits long-drawn-out lend themselves to our inductive ventures.

Such a scheme cannot be thrust on the supreme Divine Imagining ; the Power which sustains and creates additively without dependence on anything beyond Itself. We have to take note of unconditioned freedom which, as first without forerunner, lies at the roots of Being. The world-systems and all else dance on the jets of this Fontal Imagining. To cast at it a net of man-made ‘ laws ’ would be wasting time.

Our business is with conditioned freedom as it appears

in the manifested world ; in the causal sequences which show in the flowing of time. A queer place, you may say, Wortvoll, in which to look for it ! Classical philosophy opposes causation to freedom. Yes, but this way lies error. My comment, put tersely, is this. There is no pure freedom as there is no pure chance. An event is determined by its conditions. And, being thus determined, it illustrates freedom ! Occasionally such freedom is obtrusively real.

Consciring works in the petty sequence as it works on the cosmic scale. Whenever an imaginal solution occurs, there is the *new* and the additive creation implied. The case for freedom is the case for recognition of this novelty. We hear much about the 'conditions' of an event, but note that among these 'conditions' is the creative consciring. The imaginal solution, as I said before, does not proceed from the other conditions, but is posited in response to them, a response which is the 'gift of consciring' to the contents of the world. Thus the old Antinomy of causation and freedom has vanished."

W. "A contention of vital significance. But, if there is freedom in the ordinary physical causal sequence, what of the alleged freedom in human volition ?"

A. "Among the minor centres on the lower rungs of the ladder of causation ; *e.g.* disturbances in a gas, additive creation has little scope. In ordinary human volition scope for it is very much greater and often accordingly obtrusive. This is why, despite all the determinists, the plain man believes that he is free. He 'feels free'. 'Feels' here means that he is aware vaguely that he is *making* reality. In the case of volition, in which motives are weighed thoroughly, he 'feels still more free'. Shall he go off to the High Alps or do some reading in the south of France ? The so-called contending motives are creations *ad hoc*, not to be discussed as if they are entities in their own right. They are themselves events illustrating freedom and belong to the centre of consciring, improvised structures of fancy that serve to guide its action. A further free effort marks the decision when the centre identifies itself with one line of action, *creating* to that extent the man's personality. We shall return to this topic."

S. "These structures of fancy, created *ad hoc*, are built of

stuff supplied mainly by memory ; a conservative aspect of private imagining."

A. "Assuredly. And improvement or degradation of character depends largely on how this building is controlled. A structure in the glow of 'attention', *i.e.* focal consciring, is built apace ; and what psychologists call the 'mental disposition' underlying it gains force as well. The discipline of attention is of the first importance.

I turn to chance. Chance is a feature of additive causation both on the so-called inorganic and higher levels of Nature ; and it would be hard to point to the frontier between it and free human life in cases wherein action, not orientated definitely and with width of purpose, is being pursued. We have to allow for the initiatives, 'gifts of consciring', present in even the lowest minor centres, for the conflicts and relative separateness of these centres, and for the narrowness of the fields of action which evoke a creative response. Molecular, atomic and sub-atomic strife entails a certain, if controlled, anarchy. There is instability within those 'uniformities of co-existence and sequence' in which Mill and other logicians rejoice. Statistical tend to replace cast-iron 'laws'. The imaginist, turning to physics, is not surprised when Eddington speaks out. He is inclined to say : I told you so ! 'All the indications are that strict causality has dropped out everywhere.'(51) But in the case of astronomical regularities central control is not imperilled by chance-happenings. The anarchy menaces a world-system as negligibly as a row in a bar menaces the British Empire.

On somewhat higher levels the initiatives are more formidable ; additive creation innovating still for narrow fields of action. An example. Monstrous variations (protected but not produced by Natural Selection) arise in the evolution of animal species, displaying an inventiveness that is wonderful but damnable. Only the well-being of a species is furthered in this kind of ruthless, creative response. A Schopenhauer or Leopardi condemns the entire evolutionary process in which such happenings occur, and what are we to say ? We urge that we are contemplating instances of *imagining that has run amok*. In portions of our world-system there is miscreation, of value only to sentient of the baser sorts ; and this nightmare

is prolonged far beyond the confines of animal life. We are reminded of Blake's 'screaming shapes', of the hosts martyred in the orgies of politics and popular religions, as a sequel to dreams fantastically absurd, products of fancy such as fires the insane.

And now I have done. To bed, and may we all sleep well."

W. "Causation includes freedom — imagining may run amok — these are statements full of promise. Thanks to all three of you ; I am quite curious to see how this Imaginism is going to pilot us through the reefs around the riddle of the soul."

#### NOTES BY BASIL ANDERTON

(1) Earl Russell in *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 9. In this way, as Professor J. S. Mackenzie held, "there would seem to be ample scope for every conceivable variety of conditions, all affording scope for creative activity and the realisation of beauty". Exactly. And, if each system is constructed out of different sets of imaginings, the scope for variety is limitless.

(2) *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, p. 140.

(3) "We need not be troubled by Kant's Antinomies in discussing space and time. Space-time refers us to certain relations. And relations . . . are manners of compresence, of appearing together of contents, of 'terms' to conscribing. These terms are indispensable: no terms related as co-existent, etc., no space-time. I take it then that the space-time of a system is finite because the contents related in these ways exist only in finite quantities. Thus space cannot be greater than the contents, said to fill it, allow; cannot be infinitely divisible because there are minimal bits of content which cannot be divided. Similarly the time-flux of this world-system had a beginning with changing content and, again, is not infinitely divisible, showing discrete 'steps of change', not a mathematical continuity in which there are no 'next' terms. *The contents decide; we need not discuss abstract forms.* And the contents are what they are because the world-system is organised purposively on a finite scale throughout."—*Z.D.* p. 314.

(4) Cf. *Z.D.* p. 320.

(5) On this false simplicity, cf. *Z.D.* pp. 310-312.

(6) Professor F. C. S. Schiller stressed this Aristotelian *ἐνέργεια* very ably in his suggestive *Riddles of the Sphinx*.

(7) *Nature of the Physical World*, p. 84.

(8) The upper limit to the age of the physical world is set by Jeans at some 200 million million years.

(9) Cf. *Divine Imagining*, chap. vi., "Creation and the Causal Dynamic", Douglas Fawcett, 1921.

(10) Cf. *Z.D.* pp. 495-496.

(11) *ἀεὶ ὃν καὶ οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ἀπολλύμενον*. On beauty, as defined from the human point of view, cf. *Z.D.* pp. 270-275.

(12) *Divine Imagining*, pp. 169-170.

(13) *Z.D.* p. 326.



- (14) *Analysis of Matter*, p. 402.
- (15) *Process and Reality*, p. 109.
- (16) *Analysis of Matter*, p. 380. Cf. also J. S. Mackenzie, *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, p. 418.
- (17) Cf. *Z.D.* pp. 328-329.
- (18) Cf. *Z.D.* 322-325.
- (19) Ueberweg, *History of Philosophy* (Engl. trans.), vol. ii. p. 355.
- (20) *Concept of Nature*, p. 146.
- (21) Douglas Fawcett in *Divine Imagining*, p. 21.
- (22) *The World and the Individual* (2nd series), p. 197.
- (23) In *World as Imagination* (1916) and *Divine Imagining* (1921). The protest, though an insistent one, was born out of time and hardly noticed.
- (24) *Divine Imagining*, pp. 117-118.
- (25) Cf. *Z.D.* p. 353.
- (26) *Divine Imagining*, pp. 172-177. Also *Z.D.* pp. 356-372.
- (27) The Professor might have had in mind a statement of Matthew of Aquasparta, who held that a "plurality of forms" manifested in Man; the "form of mixture", the "form of complexion" and the "intellectual form" are mentioned among these! Cf. *St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century*, by Anton Charles Pegis, Ph.D., pp. 53-54.
- (28) *World as Will and Idea* (Haldane and Kemp's trans.), vol. i. p. 303.
- (29) "Universality lies in the expression of a system by each and all of its parts suitably to the place or function of each. A system so expressed or organised is a universal, and the nexus between its parts, though none is primarily similar to or a repetition of any other, is a universal nexus or law."—Bosanquet, *Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 120.
- (30) Wallace, *Logic of Hegel*, pp. 41-42.
- (31) "We must remember that it is only one particular interpretation of the scientific theory . . . that the vibrations in some sense produce the colour. . . . The particles of all objects that are really red may vibrate with a certain frequency, and the sole function of this may be that it is a factor in causing us to become aware of the redness that is always present in the object."—Professor Broad in *Mind*, April 1920, p. 234.
- (32) *Z.D.* p. 368.
- (33) *Ibid.* p. 274.
- (34) On beauty, cf. *Z.D.* pp. 270-276. And on feeling, cf. Chapter VI of this book, pp. 95-98.
- (35) *Must Philosophers Disagree?* p. 250.
- (36) Leslie refers, no doubt, to the statement in the *Origin of Species* (6th edit.), p. 8, which regards the "nature of the organism" as of the first importance in explaining variations; the other conditions are perhaps of no more importance than the nature of the spark when combustibles are set on fire. Leslie has read much since our days with West at Zermatt.
- (37) *Body and Mind*, p. 377.
- (38) As Professor T. H. Huxley put it (I have lost the reference), flowers tell us much: "Those who run may read in them uniformity of type, amidst endless diversity of plan, with complex multiplicity of detail. As a musician might say, every natural group of flowering plants is a sort of visible fugue, wandering about a central theme which is never forsaken, however it may, momentarily, cease to be apparent."

Similarly the structure of all mammals, however outwardly dissimilar, illustrates thus saying in striking fashion.

Imaginals support and help to conserve the stable aspects of creative evolution.

(39) Cf. *Z.D.* 378-410.

(40) Mackenzie, *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, pp. 361-362, writes of the principle of causation whose "apparent demands" are that events should follow antecedents and lead to other events. This principle is an invention of men who write books.

(41) *Divine Imagining*, p. 110.

(42) *Ibid.* p. 141.

(43) Cf. *Z.D.* pp. 388-390.

(44) Cf. Chapter VIII. pp.128-129.

(45) *Intuitive Basis of Knowledge* (Eng. trans.), p. 23.

(46) Chapter VI. p. 96.

(47) *Z.D.* pp. 397-402.

(48) *Ibid.* pp. 399-400.

(49) *Ibid.* p. 401.

(50) *Ibid.* p. 398.

(51) *Nature of the Physical World*, p. 332.

## CHAPTER IX

### CREATIVE EVOLUTION

"Organisms unlike our own, arrangements pervading and absorbing the whole extent of Nature, may well exist. And as to the modes of perception which are possible with these organisms we can lay down no limit." — BRADLEY.

"For when Urizen shrunk away  
From eternal, he sat on a rock,  
Barren ; a rock which he himself  
From redounding fancies had petrified."

BLAKE.

"An intuitive imagination enjoys that mode of understanding reality for which mystics crave. It 'stands under' things ; a reasoned system 'stands for' them." — DOUGLAS FAWCETT.

"So to-day I am to hear about the origin and development of the world-system", said Wortvoll, "up to the time when physical man was evolved." We were sitting on the turf of our snug nook on the mountainside, while a mile or so behind us the others were plodding in earnest conversation through the pines. It was about two o'clock ; a blue sky and a mild north wind made glad our hearts in this temple of Nature.

A. "I don't want you to suppose that Imaginism is compelled to furnish this history. We have no call to try to solve all the riddles which may be submitted to us. Still there is no harm in suggesting how easily such an account, vastly improved as it will be in the future, can be made to cohere with what physicists, astronomers, geologists, biologists and others teach us. We shall supply the canvas on which the artist of the future is to paint a complete picture. A mere sketch will serve our purpose to-day. Having considered the appearance of physical man in the time-process, we shall pass at once to the discussion of the problem of the soul. The metaphysics, indispensable to any attempt to solve it, has been understood. It is the frame in which our canvas is made secure."

W. "No departures from science when science is the only witness worth listening to. No statements, credited to 'occultists', about planetary chains, fantastic prehistoric races and the like. I want no vagaries of private fancy that has — to borrow your phrase — 'run amok'."

A. "Have no fear; we shall be thrusting no such inventions on the world's history. You would like to know what we believe about the origin of species? Quite so. Well, we consider that modern evolutionists are quite right in describing this portion of the tree of life as they do. The historical succession of species is surely, in the main, what they hold it to be. Our comments will bear, not on the fact but the factors of evolution. You follow me? Good. I have now to ask you to bear the two following statements carefully in mind. Both have been made before; I repeat them in case they have been forgotten. They are essential to an understanding of what I have to say.

The first statement warns you that a sketch of evolution deals mainly with the physical level, though this level, in Bradley's words, is probably only a 'small part' of the reality. This part is what is sometimes called mistakenly by physicists and astronomers 'the universe'. For the former the physical criterion of objectivity, urges Planck, is this: whatever can be *measured* exists. The trouble is that we finite human percipients are not acquainted directly with all sorts of objects and are consequently not in a position to subject them to measure! The physical world, however, the space-radius of which is measured in light-years, is of vast extent. In explaining it we shall be forced to transcend it and to say something about the unperceived levels implied. We have to supplement our diet of direct information as best we can.

The second statement warns you that this physical level and the unseen levels connected with it belong only to this particular world-system in which our lots are cast. There may exist infinitely many such systems insulated, at any rate during early stages of their development, from one another. These declare the variety native to Divine Imagining. We must rest content with discussing the development of one of these systems — our own."

W. "Obviously. The story of the adventures of another system, if it exists, would not perhaps be comprehensible. If a different set of primary imaginings had been used to construct it, neither our language nor our minds could be made to work. Enough said."

A. "Ah! there they come; we'll plunge *in medias res* at once. We were up much too late last night. No more midnight talks for me."

\* \* \* \* \*

A. "Matter and energy being mere instrumental concepts, to discuss *primaeval* evolution in terms of materialism or energetics would be absurd. Matter and energy are not to appear till, thousands of millions of years later, civilised man, still offensively simian, begins to *think*. In a remote future these makeshifts, having served their purpose, will disappear. I take it that this is sun-clear."

Wortvoll nodded. "Get along — we have heard that before."

A. "With rejection of such thought goes belief in Cosmic Days and Nights. World-systems come and go; Divine Imagining, that is to say Eternal Day, remains. When I say 'remains' I mean that It has contents that endure, that attest Its activity, conservative and additive. As the maker of time-relations, It cannot be said properly to be in time as a somewhat that endures. Duration, simultaneity and succession are alike aspects of time."

L. "Such Days and Nights belong to the thought of creatures who live in solar systems. Eastern mythology."

W. "I suppose, Leslie, you would prefer a mythology of your own, annexing the world-system in the interests of poetry."

L. "Well, why not? We have got rid of the abstract scientific scheme and to that extent have broken down the Platonic barrier which parts philosophy from poetry. Whitehead aids and abets us. He is in quest of an organised whole 'from which the organic unities of electrons, protons, molecules and living bodies can emerge' — a whole still displayed in that continuity of events happening here and throughout the starry heavens. He wants Nature to be considered as the 'locus of

organisms in process of development'. We provide all that he asks for in the drama we are discussing to-day. 'All the world's a stage, and the play and the players alike originate in the imagining of God. . . . At the outset there is unbroken unity ; the discrete agents requisite for fecund division and conflict are unborn. It is practicable to suggest quite clearly how all the later storm and stress came, and still comes, to pass.' I am reading an extract from *Z.D.*" (1)

W. "Have your way but take care that you don't annex more than you can assimilate. I don't find this world saturated with the divine or the poetic, but await enlightenment. Perhaps Anderton will take up his burden and help me."

### THE INITIAL SITUATION

A. "The phrase Initial Situation denotes the first stage of the existence of our world-system as upheld conservatively (*ἐνέργεια ἀκνησίας*) within Divine Imagining. Constructed out of a limited number of primary imaginals, finite throughout, a complex of qualities, quantities and relations which is distinctive, this system declares in its own special way the glory of the Fundamental Power. It must not be regarded vaguely as 'thought'. Thought, we saw, is dependent on contents which it does not make, tends to abstractness, excludes will, feeling and sense-stuff, is *about* reality other than itself. The Initial Situation — the *primaeval* imaginal field — which includes so very much, is not thought about reality, but reality. It cannot be conceived on Eleatic-Platonic lines ; it is neither simple nor ungenerable ; on the contrary, it is very complex and it began. In *World as Imagination* (1916) stress was laid on the facts symbolised as the 'degradation of energy' ; these were held to be strongly suggestive of a beginning and end.(2) To-day leading physicists and astronomers find the case for belief in a beginning conclusive,(3) while the vanishing of 'mass' into 'radiation' shows that the physical level at any rate, with its gross tangible objects, is doomed. Plotinus thought that the phenomenal order had no beginning and will have no end. But to-day men of science aid the imaginist in contending that he was wrong."

S. "When you say 'end', you mean that this additively creative phase of our world-system has a time-limit? A world-system, once called into being, may have many rest-phases and phases of evolutionary change."

A. "Quite so. And each rest-phase would open with the very gradual disappearance of the system's lower levels, *e.g.* the physical level of which I was speaking just now. Nothing persists or 'perseveres in its being' save what concurring supports. Evolution moves towards its day of doom."

W. "This primaeval imaginal field, in which there is no additive change, could be called one of equilibrium?"

A. "If mechanical symbolism makes appeal to you — yes. A stable or equilibrated whole, when undisturbed from without, tends in Spinozist language to 'persevere in its being'. Disturb it and changes ensue which tend to close in equilibration once more. But the stable state of the primaeval field is described better as that of psychical harmony, there being no trace of conflict within the limits of the whole. With the coming of internal conflict begins what we called the Meta-physical Fall, the birth of additively creative evolution."

W. "You call this primaeval field perfect?"

A. "Yes. As I said before, only finite things can be perfect; poems, symphonies, statues, characters, world-systems. Divine Imagining is not 'complete and finished', like the old Absolute, is perficient, not perfect. But the primaeval field, while perfect which means 'thoroughly made', is so only after its kind.

The imaginals, contributing contents to the nascent system, body it forth according to plan. The qualities, quantities and relations manifest what a Greek might have called the 'divinity of measure'; the harmonious unity-in-variety attains beauty such as could enthral even Plato.(4) The divine activity unimpeded produces at a stroke and without effort the most perfect whole *imaginable*.

This 'divinity of measure' expresses an immanent design. It is essential to the static harmony. And it is to control very largely the future of the creative process, come what striking improvisations there may. There are bounds set to achievement in the case of any one world-romance: bounds

set by its creation lasting only a finite time and bounds due to the limited content-conditions present at its birth. Our 'principle of movement' . . . is not a magician able to construct novelties out of a void. It improvises, like Shakespeare among ourselves, on a basis of given conditions which impose genuine, though elastic, conditions on creative power." (5)

S. "These chosen imaginals, which furnish the stuff of the system, may remind you, Wortvoll, of Mill's original natural agents 'independent of causation', the compresence of these agents being 'among merely casual concurrences'."

L. "If the system had an origin, we must get back at long last to existents independent of causation. For causation in this system begins and its so-called 'laws' are secondary, depending on how the 'original natural agents' behave."

W. "I'm sure that Anderton won't allow that these existents are, as Mill urges, 'casually related'; chance is not the father of all things. Of course causal regularities have no place in the *primaeva* system; they imply change, succession. We have been told that at first the system is upheld conservatively, immune from change, as Being rather than Becoming."

A. "When Mill discussed the existence and quantities of the 'original natural agents' independent of causation, he was not pushing research as far back as we do. He was still considering *distinct agents*. Imaginism asks you to think of a stage when there were no distinct agents at all.

The primary imaginals, supplying the stuff of this world-system, supply it in measures expressive of plan; the plan which is realised in the history of the system. They are eternal objects, inexhaustible sources of contents, independent of the causation which they render possible. The kinds of content they furnish and the quantities of these made use of must not be regarded as 'casually related'. Relations, as manners of compresence to divine conscurring, express plan. Now this plan takes shape at first in a stable imaginal field; in the Initial Situation immune from change. There are no additive causal successions; the system merely endures within God. I am considering, not the first, second, etc., rest-phase but the original appearance of the system. We have to surmise how this stable whole of Being is disturbed, generates distinct



agents and passes into Becoming, into creative evolution."

W. "You call this whole perfect. But, if it is perfect, why is it subjected to change?"

A. "I said perfect after its kind. Take note now that it is only perfect *as a poem or picture might be for you or me*. It is 'thoroughly made', completely realising plan. But it remains just a whole *of content*; that which exists only for Divine Imagining and not for itself. Is a new kind of perfection, of 'thorough making' which realises another plan, possible? *Yes, if the whole is to exist also for itself*. This perfection is realised by way of creative evolution in the Divine Event."

W. "You spoke of God as not perfect but perficient, and you spoke well. What of God regarded as infinite?"

A. "I don't refer to a static Absolute 'always in its own sphere' and thus unlimited. I incline with Plotinus and Proclus to think of the Fundamental Power as having infinite capacity of becoming, as inexhaustibly productive."

W. "You won't dogmatise. Well, our intellectual needs are not pressing in this quarter. Who can do more than talk? What, however, of space and time in the nascent world-system? We can't ignore that riddle."

A. "Absolute space and time were long ago abolished by philosophy, only recently by physicists who announced their conversion with the air of men making a discovery. Ignoring these 'metaphysical monstrosities' (Whitehead), we have to consider spatio-temporal *relations*. Modern relativity-physics studies these relations with measuring chiefly in view; metaphysics in order to understand what fundamentally the relations mean. The problems raised are dealt with in *Z.D.* at some length.(6) Respecting relativity, I agree with Professor Hobson that the discussion is 'purely internal to Natural Science' and will not affect radically the relations of science with general thought.(7) Remaining therefore within metaphysics, I will tell you quite briefly how Imaginism answers your question. You will see my point, Stark. I want to pass quickly to the talks dealing with the soul."

S. "Wortvoll has *Z.D.* in his room. Yes, don't linger too long over this issue. But may I intervene with a caution?

You will be referring to *cosmic* time. Now certain writers

on physics have expressed disbelief in this alleged universal, cosmic time-order. And, if account is taken only of finite 'observers' (or the bodies occupying positions where they might be), cosmic time can be disintegrated quite plausibly into particular time-systems which conflict. This is one of the aberrations of relativity-physics when it runs amok. But take account also of divine consciring and the foundations of a time-order, common to all 'observers' and their objects, are laid. There is provided a concrete, but very complex, time-order in which the inevitable discords are harmonised. If two events are simultaneous for me and another 'observer', who is at rest relatively to me, but are successive for you, that is due to our different locations in this order." (8)

W. "That is good common sense; of course all depends on whether one accepts such a Power as Divine Imagining or not. The atheist's cosmic time will be disintegrated. You imaginists confront a complicated time-order, but then, as Anderton has said often, the world is not simple but complex. After all, it was not evolved with a view to fools understanding it easily."

L. (laughing). "We hear too much of these very finite 'observers' and too little of the ocean in which they are drops."

A. "I continue. *Mundus non est factus in tempore sed cum tempore*. The nascent world-system has a time-order proper to itself; its contents are thus related, *i.e.* compresent in this manner, in Divine Consciring. Two different contents, conscired as I am now aware of yon blue and of warmth, constitute simultaneity; the perseverance of these two in their being exemplifies duration. Duration can be conscired without contents that change.(9) Take note that consciring, not an intellectualist's 'Form', underlies these aspects of time.

Succession implies change and there is no change, perhaps, occurring within this system which nevertheless *endures* and is therefore not timeless. The different portions of it exist also *simultaneously*. Remember always that I am speaking of the system on its first appearance after construction before it has been launched into creative evolution and before even distinct agents have arisen within it. A system in its rest-phase after a phase of evolution would be different, aglow with centres of

consciring and with all phases of time complete. A consummation of this kind is very far distant."

W. "You have to discuss spatio-temporal relations, but this statement contains nothing about space."

A. "The spatial (not 'space' which suggests an entity existing in its own right) appears to be among the early achievements of creative evolution. Relations of *co-existence* supervene on relations of *simultaneity* under stress of the imaginal dynamic; the drive that impels the world, that forces it to realise plan. We shall notice this great step of change in passing." (10)

L. "This is one of the suggestions that imaginists are free to accept or reject as they like. If the spatial were as long established as the temporal, Anderton would be making a mistake and that is all. Similarly, if this entire account of evolution were faulty, belief in Divine Imagining is not sapped. We folk here are only so many experimenters, feeling our way about the cosmos."

W. "Oh! I allow for that. As for the spatial, it's of no great concern to me whether God imagined the spatial along with the temporal or only after the world-system had been changing for some unknown stretch of time. On the other hand, I should like to hear something more about time-sequence, the Past and the Future. The first-named has always worried the philosophers."

A. "Time-sequence, as I said before, is the 'Form of additive creation', the *manner* in which addition of novelty to the world-system occurs. Believers in the Absolute, 'complete, perfect, finished', are mute before the riddle of time-sequence and its implied change, not so we. Divine Imagining is both conservative and additively creative; It fulfils Itself in part through that time-sequence wherein novelty supervenes. I have nothing to add to that basic contention. Time-sequence is not the illusion that Bradley declared it to be; it expresses a feature of ultimate reality.

Having said this, I can answer the rest of your question. The Present is the region in which reality is being made. Our human 'specious presents' cover only a few seconds of time-span, yet what appears in them may condense very long histories. What are indivisible events for us, *e.g.* a patch of



MATTERHORN SEEN OVER AGAINST THE BREITHORN ON A DULL AUTUMN AFTERNOON.  
TO THE LEFT IN BACKGROUND, MONTE ROSA (15,200 FT.)



red, may for other sentients be 'distinguished so minutely as to furnish contents as rich as those which, from our point of view, occupy aeons of the world's history', observes Royce.(11) Perception divides only to the extent that our practical needs render useful. Similarly there may exist sentients for whom the events dealt with in a *History of Europe* are condensed into a few contents hardly worth attention. Nevertheless in all such 'specious presents' reality is being 'evolved', that is made. The Past (that into which our changing experiences and events in Nature *pass*) is the region of made or frozen reality, existing as part of the conservative content of Divine Imagining. The Future is partially made reality to be modified: 'the future, *in so far, at any rate as the work of indefinitely many sentients, super-human, human and sub-human is concerned*, is reality which is not made and is not yet being made'.(12) Yet coming events cast their shadows before; there is divine creation in the total imaginal field or world-system that comes to the experience of the finite centres belonging to it. A strictly determined world-system, nevertheless, is nonsense, a fiction dear only to those who make calculations. Causation itself includes freedom; the imaginal dynamic teems with free initiatives. Divine Imagining responds to every novel problem with a novel solution."

L. "The Past in Divine Imagining is not a pale, anaemic makeshift, like our memory conditioned as it is by brain; it is actuality, so far at least as content is concerned. Perhaps that is what Blake meant when he wrote: 'the ruins of time build mansions in Eternity'."

W. "Who looks to poets for a clear statement? On your own showing the Past is not outside time but endures. It is still temporal, though it does not change. Indeed everything maintained in your Divine Imagining must be temporal; even the basic imaginals are everlasting, which is not the same thing as to be above time. But never mind that. Tell me what you mean by saying that the Past is actual in respect of content."

L. "Suppose that in a former life you were tortured in Spain. You don't live through the experience and feel the pain now. But the history of the drama is conserved as it occurred in the Past — conserved within Divine Imagining. It persists,

however, only as content present to divine consciring, not as content along with which you are suffering. You have stepped out of this slice of reality and are helping to make another. Do you follow me? Good. In the book *Divine Imagining* reference was made to the Jews who were crucified after Titus took Jerusalem. The Past with the crosses persists. But it does not include suffering Jews. Only content is upheld by the *ἐνέργεια ἀκωρησίας*. 'The planet of that date lived through the collective living of . . . hosts upon hosts of sentients of all grades. We may compare the hosts to coral workers in an area of upheaval. These creatures are born, build and die; and ever as they die a greater and greater block of "made" reef is thrust upwards. Millions and millions perish, but other millions work on to the slow growth of the reef that needs them all. The main mass of the reef ceases to harbour workers after it is *made*; but where there is new rock in the *making*, there also are new live workers and all is astir.' (13) This simile may prove helpful."

W. "I don't want help; I welcome an interesting suggestion. But is it supposed that the entire Past is maintained in this way? Just reflect!"

S. "There is perhaps only a conservation of values. And even the entire history of a world-system may not be worth conserving for aeons. We have no means of solving such problems. But we can say this. The intolerably foul, which cannot be expelled from the universe of Bradley, raises no difficulty for imaginists. No longer conscired, it is destroyed utterly. Divine Imagining is not like Bradley's Absolute which has to provide some sort of home for all its 'appearances'. De-consciring reduces 'appearance' to zero reality. Professor Broad holds that 'once an event has occurred, it exists eternally', (14) but he has not, so far as I know, suggested the desirability of a purge. Yet the purge is available; no event once 'made' maintains itself."

W. "Very good, friends Leslie and Stark. I have no criticism to offer. But I would like to make sure that I understand how God, 'sustaining' and 'kindling' this world-system, includes time-content."

L. "Bravo! agnostic. *L'appétit vient en mangeant*, but

how are we to satisfy your hunger ? Can we enjoy the outlook which commands centre, radii and circumference at once ? ”

S. “ Perhaps we can think not unhelpfully in symbols. Divine Imagining includes Past and Present in Its *direct* consciring ; as reality that is ‘ made ’ and reality that is ‘ being made ’. The Future is there too as initially ‘ made ’ reality, shaped as it is imagined, to be modified and rendered fully determinate by sextillions of finite centres. To imagine on the level of Divine Imagining is to make or create. Were there no finite centres, nothing save the divine consciring would act.

A world-system is like a cloud forming in a clear, blue sky ; every stage and aspect of it are temporal. It begins, it endures, it has features that are simultaneous and successive. All content is similarly temporal. Lossky regards Mozart’s grasp of a composition — ‘ a survey of everything at once ’ — as of a supertemporal whole, but that is misleading.(15) The whole surveyed comprises simultaneous and successive aspects, it is not an instantaneous object but endures. It had a date of origin and it may quite conceivably cease to exist.”

L. “ The Future for God is rather forereality than foreknowledge. It appears in the divine time-span which, lit by fully reflective consciring, must be stupendously different from our human ‘ specious presents ’. In the eternal day of Divine Imagining the distinctions, Past, Present and Future, lose their hard outlines ; at the same time they are not abolished.”

W. “ What of the Future totally unimagined even by God ? ”

L. “ It is nothing ; a *flatus vocis*. No contents, no relations called temporal, no time. You don’t want to revive belief in a time-entity ? ”

W. “ Good for you ; I don’t.”

S. “ You spoke, Leslie, of ‘ forereality ’, an excellent term. It is this which men have had in mind when talking of the decrees of Destiny, Orlog or Fate. *Foreknowledge* belongs to our merely human outlook. Nevertheless discussion of it would lead us to consider an old and interesting problem : is there a way of making foreknowledge consistent with belief in ‘ freedom of the will ’ ? It seems to me that Imaginism furnishes the solution. Consider — ”

A. “ I don’t want to break in and miss this *aperçu*, but



time, friends, won't wait even for philosophers. Bide a while, Stark, until we are considering the human soul."

W. "Avanti! And tell me how the Metaphysical Fall comes to pass. I have found your account of the Initial Situation eminently suggestive. Our world-system is afloat on, and upheld by, the ocean of Divine Imagining. But it is a craft on board of which nothing is happening, and it has not even a crew. How is the great change in its destiny contrived?"

A. "The world-system is perfect after its kind, but it exists only as an object among objects within Divine Imagining. It is to be transformed into something else realising another kind of perfection, that of a system, aglow with centres of conspiring, which at long last will exist *for itself*. *Why* does this creative evolution go on? Imagining, which *is* creating, fulfils itself thus. There is no deliberation which is a mark of ignorance and weakness in finite centres such as ours. *How* does it take place? Some not too intolerably abstract account can be suggested. Is it worth while? the pessimists will ask. Well, life on this planet in 1939 seems a sorry business. But what matter the sorrows of a small planet, a dust-speck in the abysses of space? The answer will be found in the consummation — in the Divine Event.

Let me read to you a passage about this 'system of content', this object among objects, from the book *Divine Imagining*: 'Let us now liken it to a beautiful poem, whose parts some gifted mortal imagines as present simultaneously, much as Mozart used to hear musical compositions in their undivided completeness. Let us suppose, further, that the poem comprises numerous characters. . . . These characters are present to the poet, but they are not for that more than imagined contents; they are things of which he is conscious, but which are not conscious of him. However clearly he is aware of an Undine, it does not follow that the Undine, imaginatively created, is aware of her creator. She remains, in this sense, content: present only to his conspiring. All the characters in this poem remain, of course, docile creatures of the poet, wholly under his control. The poem, moreover, though it comprises successions, endures as a whole, just as it was imagined at first. Even so endures the poem . . . within

Divine Imagining. Its different aspects are contents subordinate to their whole ; are not more or less independent *agents* which may be mutually opposed. Divine Imagining enjoys a splendour which is utterly under Its control. Creative time-succession, with its multiple agents or sentient, is unborn.”(16)

L. “ The imaginals interrelated in this object are not simple, but pregnant with variety which will appear in due season. Like Plotinus and Proclus, we don’t forget the ‘ many ’ ; we don’t want to lack the materials wherewith to construct the actual world.”

S. “ You will accept more readily what is coming, Wortvoll, if you bear two things in mind : that Nature is the ‘ locus of *organisms* in process of development ’ (Whitehead), and that these organisms, so very numerous in the domain explored by physics and at first mere objects, become seats of conscurring, that is to say *distinct agents* as well. Eddington notes the ‘ atomicity of matter and the more general atomicity that underlies all quantum phenomena ’ ; it is the presence of these distinct agents that is indicated. As soon as they arise, the disruption of the *primaeval* world-whole begins. How do they arise ? You will hear. You will find portions of our former talk about conscurring and ‘ Thresholds ’ of service.”

A. “ Thanks, Stark ; the birth of these minor sentient agents might be called by pessimists ‘ the fundamental evil ’, initiating, as it does, strife on the cosmic scale. Harmony or ‘ equilibrium ’ has been lost and will be restored fully only with the Divine Event. What occurs for the philosopher ? Just the preludial phase of creative evolution, which ought not to be condemned because some of its early stages, taken separately, are more evil than good. Discussing this development, I have the physical level of this world-system in the foreground of attention. How could it be otherwise ? I am not a high mystic enjoying genuine, supernormal perceptions, nor a charlatan hawking other-world-lore which no one can check. Even on this restricted physical level I live ‘ blinded by my eyes ’. And yet not altogether in the dark. I am forced by the imaginal dynamic to transcend my very limited, direct experience and, in so doing, I learn something about the cosmos and my place in it.

The birth of Creative Evolution! Therein Divine Imagining, God Perficient never Perfect, shapes novelty not attainable save through a world-process and finite individuals.

"Whence the Creative Appulse? Bergson has suggested that the natural order is due to 'detension' which implies a 'diminution of positive reality' comparable to defective will. *E.g.* a man is reading a poem. There is relaxation of attention, the poem loses its wholeness and dissolves into loose particulars. When cosmic consciousness shows a 'negative direction of relaxation' there arises spatial diversity along with 'the admirable order that mathematics finds there'. This view was criticised in *World as Imagination* (17) when a constructive suggestion was made, substantially that which I am to defend."

L. "Must we suppose that 'cosmic consciousness' goes 'slack' just when a great adventure begins?"

A. "Assuredly not. An increase, not a 'diminution', of reality is indicated."

S. "We are concerned with a rhythm implicating the 'Radiance beyond Reason'—not with thought. Even we mortals awake to recommence our daily adventures in virtue, not of thought but 'energy', as the physiologists say, livening the cortex. That is symbolism of course; it refers us to consciring and the 'Threshold'. Irreflective consciring becomes reflective; on awakening we are conscious agents once more."

A. "There's the clue. And now for the adventure:

Divine consciring, which conserves the Initial Situation, is also the 'activité agissante' which is to disturb it, violating the restful equilibrium. The degree of the consciring is not fixed. It is such that the many different contents of the system, which is complex and richly qualitative, interpenetrate, mingle in one another's being, without conflict. Suppose that this sustaining activity—consciring—is increased. At once all the contents of the system exist more intensely, and particular regions of them much more intensely, thereby realising plan. No Bergsonian 'diminution of positive reality'; reinforcement of it! A charcoal fire, burning almost invisibly, has been livened by forced draught and, in very numerous spots, glows white. The intensities in particular regions increase until a

new stage of reality supervenes. The regions are no longer merely different aspects of a whole of content. They are regions also of sentients, 'mentoids', 'psychoids'; of very numerous finite centres of consciring, of *distinct agents* at work in the hitherto unified system. These are the 'primitive natural agents', the very remote ancestors of those mentioned by Mill, the sources of that general 'atomicity' in the external world of which Eddington, using the symbolism of science, writes. A partial abdication has taken place. Divine consciring, though dominant in the background, has also sunk itself in the new finite centres which, in their insulated particularity, now share the control of the world-order. God active will be aided or opposed by other activities whose local initiatives comprise chance; nay, in all grades of the sentients that will emerge later free imagining is to run amok. A large-scale shaping of novelty is assured. A cosmic adventure has begun."

W. "Most intriguing. But are these distinct agents creative novelties in the full meaning of the phrase?"

A. "Consciring of course is not new, and it is the same in all its instances; the differences between the agents lie in the contents which they conscire, and these in a system with complex penetrations can never be exactly alike. What is new is consciring in insulated, separate centres. Each centre conscires, irreflectively on this low level, just that bit of the world-contents proper to it, and the bit is fragmentary indeed. This bit is its body. We suppose that the primaeval imaginal field (the Initial Situation) was mapped out into such bits even when it was controlled throughout by divine consciring.(18) With the great abdication distinct agents arise in these bits. There is a strength of the parent activity beyond which they begin to act as existents in their own right."

W. "How are these agents insulated so that one does not melt into another?"

A. "Perhaps by contents in which the strength of the parent activity is relatively low and which are, therefore, insentient. Such insentient contents bound the two or more 'persons' sometimes found in alliance with the same human brain. When there is 'psychasthenia' (which means defective consciring), frontiers exist where normally there are none and

dissociation results. I don't seek a vote of confidence in proffering this suggestion; take it or leave it. We are not here to solve all the riddles submitted to us."

L. "What separates my waking life from yours? What separates my 'specious present' from the vastly richer tracts of content buried in my soul? Low-strength consciring. The continuity of my waking life would have a much greater range, if this low-strength consciring became intense."

S. "I accept the suggestion which the illustrations cited render most plausible. I have to urge, further, that we must allow definitely for two 'thresholds' or creative steps in the dawn of finite consciring. The first 'threshold' is that at which the distinct agent begins; consciring is irreflective. The second is that at which reflective consciring begins. An electron conscires a proton irreflectively; a man the sun reflectively or, as we say ordinarily, he is 'conscious' of seeing it.

The consciring that lights content on the level of the primitive natural agents is dominantly conservative. Also, though it waxes and wanes, it abides. This truth is illustrated in the symbolism of physics; 'it seems astonishing . . . that an atom in such a state [of so-called lowest "energy"] should not be able to yield up its energy still further, but, so far as our experience goes, it cannot. And this property, little though we understand it, is, in the last resort, responsible for keeping the universe [physical level of system] in being. If no restriction of this kind intervened, the whole material energy of the universe would disappear in the form of radiation in a few thousand-millionth parts of a second. . . . By prohibiting any emission of radiation except by complete quanta and by prohibiting any emission at all when there are no quanta available for dissipation, the quantum theory succeeds in keeping the universe in existence as a going concern' — I am reading a passage from Jeans' *The Universe around Us*. You can interpret the symbolism readily, not forgetting that 'physical level of this one world-system' and 'universe' are *not* the same thing!"

W. "You three certainly give me much to think about. I notice that the 'organisation' and 'chance' aspects of evolu-

tion, stressed by Eddington, are stressed also by you, who have travelled by a different route of thought."

L. "Imaginists hold that perfect organisation obtained in the *primaeval* field; disorganisation, the chance or 'random' element, appears in the *Becoming*, in the process of Creative Evolution. Nature for Blake is the 'disorganised immortal'. If we go back far enough, writes Eddington, we reach a point when organisation was perfect with the random element absent; organisation which seems to express plan. Our metaphysics shows why this is so, but it does, or will do, more. It discusses the *descent* into evolution; it prepares us to believe in the inevitable *ascent* closing in the Divine Event."

W. "I have two more questions to put. The primitive natural agents have been referred to as 'mentoids' and 'psychoids' and quite properly. They are mind-like, not minds; centres of irreflective conscurring of very rudimentary kinds. Yet they are genuine psychical factors, expressing themselves in the mass in such ways as the world-plan requires. Their bodies are the bits of content that they light. But these bodies belong also to Nature, I suppose."

S. "Yes; and, were the 'mentoids' to cease to exist, the bodies would remain as bits of Nature, if still upheld by divine conscurring. You see, therefore, that idealism and realism have no permanent quarrel."

W. "Thanks. My last question concerns God. It will be difficult for you to say how much of the world-system is controlled by the primitive natural agents and other finite centres that appear after them and how much by God."

S. "It is — for us. But it must be supposed that these finite centres themselves realise, in the main, the world-plan, though of course they are not aware of it. The riot of molecules in a gas seems anarchic, and yet we can predict what the gas will do. Consider further that these centres are not self-contained Leibnitzian monads, but have windows open to the winds that blow through the system, not all of which is occupied by them. Divine Imagining is sovereign in the background; the wider imaginal dynamic overrules any possible anarchy."

W. "But you have to allow for chance, for the imagining

that runs amok, for miscreation that may be monstrous."

S. "Such as made our friend, Leslie, a pessimist in the old days — yes. You will accept that dark record as the price of creative evolution. But let Anderton continue. You will follow him easily now."

A. "According to one form of materialism, *association* of bits of 'resisting extension' called atoms, etc., is the prelude to evolution. Such existents, we say, are fictions. What happens within the primitive imaginal field is a partial *dissociation* or loosening of elements in a whole. I say 'partial', since the original continuity, as shown by interpenetration, is by no means fully destroyed. Dissociation takes place similarly in the early history of the human organism, which divides into cells.(19) It occurs also in the early history of our souls after birth. What I am going to say shows how the original dissociation, issuing in spatio-temporal Nature, came to pass.

The imaginal field comprises sextillions on sextillions of petty regions lit by the lowest natural agents. Additive creation, which presupposes the time-succession proper to the system, is to begin. For the 'divinity of measure', securing the primaeval harmony or equilibrium, has been lost. The contents, present to the specially livened natural agents, are livened too; and the character of their interpenetration is altered. *No longer is there interpenetration without conflict.* Each content, being conscired more intensely, overflows the more insistently into content beyond itself, can assert itself also destructively against much that is invaded. From being merely *different* it becomes *opposed, incompatible*. We are reminded of the saying of Heracleitus, 'strife is the father of all things', a saying which is being verified on the cosmic scale. Hegel urged that contradiction 'moves the world' but, properly speaking, *contradiction* is only a phase of conflict, that of statements. We are concerned with conflict or strife in the widest sense of the term.

Conflict is not a principle of fecundity; it provides, nevertheless, a field for harmonising innovation, such as we discussed when dealing with the Imaginal Dynamic; the veritable 'universal and irresistible power' which Hegel sought to find in Dialectic.(20) Innovation, the mark of additive

creation, comes with the 'imaginal solution', complicated, it may be, by the descent of fresh reality into the time-process. Interpenetration, conflict, imaginal solution: these are the three aspects of the Imaginal Dynamic, the 'principle of movement' which rules the manifested world. 'Given a situation of inner discords, transformation is the resource which serves to reduce the discords, as much as is possible, to harmony. But this reduction, again, produces a new situation which becomes in its turn the seat of inner discords, which tend to increase, whereupon is created a fresh transformation equally provisional. *The world-process is thus forced along the path of imaginal or creative evolution.*'(21) A one-way time-process is also enforced.(22) Along with realisation of the world-plan will go much that is futile, hideous, even sheerly bad. For there are free local initiatives due to the finite centres (or even the finite imaginals showing in them); inevitably and widely imagining is to run amok. At the outset of evolution and for very long after these minor centres or agents are under effective central control. It is in the domain of biology that the local initiatives begin to flout offensively the divine.

Nature is the home of a vast society of societies made up of the 'natural agents'. We get to know of these agents first through their bodies amid which we live, move and have our terrestrial being and which penetrate us, whence our sense-presentations. 'Biology is the study of the larger organisms; whereas physics is the study of the smaller organisms', observes Whitehead.(23) Electrons, positrons, neutrons, protons, are examples of the smaller organisms; iron and ice consist of such organisms, though not organisms themselves. The lowest organisms, which are also centres of consciring, further and thwart one another's being, but are not minds as we understand the term. Any one of them may perish, if its consciring loses that 'degree of strength' which lifts it above the 'threshold' as an agent. Unlike us, it can die out of reality. There are no 'selves' on such a level; indeed the evolution of fully continuous 'selves' does not take place below the level of Man.

Quantity in the domain of contents is a function of consciring. A positive increase of reality has been decreed. The overflowing, interpenetrating contents of the system, thrust



on one another, bring unrest. How easily this situation can be illustrated. 'A toothache, as it becomes sharper, influences my whole conscious present; a rising emotion spreads itself into my gestures, physical action and beyond. The emotions of sullen men stream forth at last into the French Revolution. Taine held that in the sphere of thinking every idea tends to grow into an illusion or hallucination, and each is kept from doing so *by collision with opposite ones*, and thus "something like sanity is preserved by an equilibrium or balance between many lunacies". In the sequel of the primitive struggle, which we observe in Nature to-day, everything is seen to press on something else which limits it. Even the nations themselves continue the pressure one against another, often becoming *in-compatible* at a certain point of space and time; an *impasse* of discords met all too frequently by a "solution" enforced by war.' (24) It will be no trouble for you, Wortvoll, to call to mind instances of unrest due to penetration. Pessimists have found such unrest odious, but it is essential to the world-plan, and perhaps the world-plan is worth the conflicts which it entails. Unrest and creative novelty are allies.

But even in this turmoil conservation obtains. There arise new, but stable, connexions of content amid those changes which we call 'causal'. The seeming fatality of Nature grew out of originally free action repeated (Ravaisson); and what is now habit will continue till a new direction of cosmic activity is required. The world-system, moving towards the Divine Event, exercises a pressure on every subordinate system within it. The mills of God grind slowly, but they grind the alleged uniformities of causation exceedingly small. We have said enough about the two sorts of causation, also about freedom and chance. There is no case for belief in 'universal and necessary' connexion. Los is always at war with Urizen."

W. "I suppose the wave-movements of science symbolise for you invasive contents, with movements somewhat like familiar ones in water and air."

A. "We said our say about 'waves' long ago. Royce, considering what is symbolised, writes of a tendency to 'mutual assimilation' on the part of the regions of Nature involved. (25) But, of course, before we can speak of wave-movements, we

must have *spatio-temporal* Nature in being. Motion presupposes the spatial.

Space, or rather the spatial, is not mere appearance to finite percipients, as Kant would have us believe. It may have characterised the *primaeval* imaginal field. Or it may have been evolved creatively as one of the early products of the Imaginal Dynamic ; a view which I find to be worth attention. As dissociation went on and the conflicts of the interpenetrating contents became more intense, a harmonising novelty was called for. A great additively creative stroke supervened. Divine Imagining decreed the spatial which solved the problem in part. I say 'in part' since the conflicts essential to evolution continued. They were conflicts which could be used to further realisation of the world-plan.

Thus the spatial may be a creative modification of simultaneity and the transition is discussed in *Z.D.*, which Wortvoll can consult.(26) With the spatial comes room (*Raum*) for spreadoutness, co-existence and movement. Relations of 'attraction' and 'repulsion', of psychical character and prompting change of place, become very important and increase the variety of the world-order. The struggle takes on new forms. Consider the complex, amazing relations of the units and societies whose doings are investigated and predicted by physics and chemistry. Every great conflict furnishes occasions for new creative steps and descent of fresh imaginings into the time-process.

The higher imaginings manifest only when conditions favouring their ingression are complete, so that the Metaphysical Fall is inevitably long-drawn-out."

W. "When you speak of 'Fall', you seem to have in mind this physical level, existence in which for us has been called a disease ?"

A. "The world-system, as I observed before, includes different levels, only one of which, my dear Wortvoll, has your official permission to exist ! The more important of the levels are probably the 'unseen worlds' which few self-respecting men of science care to discuss to-day. All these belong to the time-process. But the word 'Fall' applies well to the cases of high existents passing into a domain like this physical one ; a

domain full of the madness, futilities, uglinesses and pains which pessimists stress. Yes ; Socrates held that in dying he was recovering from the disease of earth-life. That attitude expressed his belief that this physical level offers little of value to the fallen soul."

L. "But that little is necessary in some way for the development of a centre of reflective consiring. If not, why is the alleged disease contracted ?"

W. "Good for you, Leslie. But perhaps the soul does not 'descend' at all. Perhaps it originates in the body and has to take what it gets."

A. "About that later. Meanwhile we are clear as to why we are talking with this physical level so much in view. We follow a precedent of value to all philosophers who are not high mystics but have the limited experience of ordinary men. The supplementing of our direct knowledge must be achieved with great caution. The physical level was the last to be evolved and is even now, as regards its tangible masses, in process of vanishing. But we are well immured in our prison-house and must not pretend to be able to know everything that goes on in the main world-system. Enough for us must be sober thinking ; radical empiricism is the only wear and furnishes happily the clues required.

It is a far cry from the genesis of the natural agents and the basic dissociation to condensation of the primaeval nebula and minor nebulae of our physicists and astronomers, but the route, though a long one, has been indicated. The evolution of so-called inorganic Nature, and incidentally of this solar system, occurs late in the story of the cosmic romance. Short-lived Peter Bell, a day-fly amid long-lived geological formations, does not know that :

The hills are shadows, and they flow  
From form to form, and nothing stands ;  
They melt like mists, the solid lands,  
Like clouds they shape themselves and go.

but the man of wide outlook and culture welcomes this flowing as the revelation of Divine Imagining Itself. Realising what the pageant means, he returns to his studies in science like a giant refreshed."

L. "Yet we don't perceive in its fullness the actual Nature within Divine Imagining; all detail indeed is refused to us, unless it has value in guiding our actions. That is why, as a poet wrote, we are 'blinded by our eyes'."

S. "That is so, as consideration of the periodic processes called 'waves' makes clear. The frog is worse off still; his visual world is one of black and white; practical needs call for nothing more. Motions, which we perceive so often as continuous, consist of steps of rest and change of place. Anderton cited Royce's remark: what for us are indivisible events may be as rich in contents as those occupying, from our point of view, aeons of the world's history. The man calculating in terms of sextillions of protons, electrons, etc., must sometimes turn to his familiar sense-world mildly surprised. Everything there seems abbreviated and condensed. If, like us, he holds that protons, electrons, etc., symbolise centres of consciring and that the external world is packed with qualities, he will be surprised even more. But such a man will find that Imaginism is easily understood."

L. "Imaginists, however, can only *think*; they don't claim to perceive more of natural happenings than other people. Let me read you, Wortvoll, a few lines from *Z.D.* 'You want, perhaps, to construct an adequate metaphysics of physics and chemistry. Not *being* a "natural agent", you will not sound all the qualitative depths concerned, but you can credit the agent with relations and places in structures, and for the rest you are metaphysicians and can judge its character by what, as penetrating your perceptions, it seems to *do*. You will avoid the false simplifications of science which reduce the agent to a ghost. You will recall that the qualitative richness of Nature is poorly sampled by the meagre sense-contents which steal, as through cracks in a vault, into your tomb-like body. Some of the ancients called this body a tomb — and rightly.' " (27)

W. "You observe a prudent reticence. But it would be easy to interpret the symbolism of the text-books on the lines of your 'interpenetration' and 'additive causation'. I suggest as an example the view of chemical composition as due to shared electrons. I am entirely with you in holding that the familiar concepts of electrons, etc., are mere makeshifts of use

only to calculators, and not always, as Eddington points out, to them. Leave the full interpretation to specialists. Suppose now that we turn awhile to biology, the domain of Whitehead's 'larger organisms', and see in what respects the current outlook on evolution may have to be modified."

L. (with a wink at Stark *sotto voce*). "The Herr Professor is taking the talk pretty seriously."

A. "The *primaeva* imaginal field, as I urged, comprised innumerable organisms allied with centres of consceiring, perhaps always irreflective. Not minds, but mentoids, light these tiny bodies. The organisms of biology, even the hypothetical 'biococci', are much larger and differ from them in outstanding ways; in respect of assimilation, growth, repair, reproduction and so forth. A new creative step, with features special to itself, has been achieved. Don't take refuge in a 'life-force' in discussing its origin; 'force' is a term useful to writers on mechanics, but too vague and uninformative for philosophy. Don't indulge in the very fashionable but unpardonable sin of 'deriving' the higher from the lower, with intent, *e.g.*, to squeeze a complex planet out of stellar gas or dust, the inner lives of poets, philosophers, mathematicians, out of a few crude instincts, music out of the love-cries of monkeys and the like. May I read you an amusing passage: 'Our wishes and hopes, disappointments and sufferings, have their source in instincts which are comparable to the light instincts of the heliotropic animals. The need of the struggle for food, the sexual instinct with its poetry and its chain of consequences, the maternal instincts with the felicity and the suffering caused by them, the instinct of workmanship and some other instincts, are the roots from which our inner life develops. For some of these instincts the chemical basis is at least sufficiently indicated to arouse the hope that their analysis, from the mechanistic point of view, is only a question of time.' (28) Thus Loeb. The fundamental error in this 'derivation' is not far to seek. What say you, Wortvoll?"

W. "According to you the idea of causation, guiding Loeb and others, is faulty. The biologist's organism *continues* certain physico-chemical actions observed in Nature, but much is being modified. You spoke of additive causation and the

descent of imaginals. Nothing is thrust into existence merely by 'antecedent' contents in a causal chain. A *new* event is created, and sometimes this event is an 'occasion' which allows a fresh factor to enter the effect. I am referring now only to the life of the organism; if we take into account also what you would call soul-life, the case against Loeb is shattering. Was *Hamlet* in the 'instinct of workmanship'? Have I followed your line of thought accurately?"

L. "Yes, but what do you think of it?"

W. "Well; it seems to me well worth checking and that for the present is my business. Don't be in a hurry."

S. "I might mention that Loeb makes a further mistake. He has taken over physico-chemical phenomena in Nature as if they were what the mechanistic school believes them to be. The phrase 'inorganic Nature', we saw, is misleading."

A. "Well, I can pass on. Organic Nature illustrates once more the interplay of conservation and additive creation, with variations subjected to Natural Selection. Variations, according to Professor Arthur Thomson, often look like *experiments* on the part of germ-cells; (29) important ones may also be traced to imaginals, sometimes perhaps even to super-human powers, 'gods', active in the differentiation and betterment of species. 'Fortuitous' variations would be utterly helpless before major problems, as Bergson has shown in the case of the evolution of the eye. Natural Selection, unaided by purposive variations, would be almost sterile; its main service is to prevent promising varieties from being crowded out by inferior stock. It can 'select' only what is provided, and the more important variations, mutational and other, favoured by it are due to the imaginals. Interesting in this regard is the opinion of de Vries: 'All lines of the genealogical tree show alternating mutating and constant species. Some lines may be mutating at the present moment; others may momentarily be constant . . . in a complete and systematic enumeration of the real units of Nature, the elementary species and varieties are thus observed to be discontinuous and separated by definite gaps.' Rhythms again of rest-phase and additive creation!"

W. "Aristotle held that all 'forms' are eternal, but your

secondary imaginals at any rate are generated. I should like a statement making your position quite clear."

A. "There are certain basic primary imaginals, *e.g.* Light and Sound, which are manifested in this world-system and perhaps in infinitely many others. There may also be primary imaginals special to this system, constructed out of the basic types *ad hoc*, along with the *primaeval* field in Divine Imagining. During the time-process very many secondary and tertiary, etc., imaginals are evolved creatively out of the primary as well, ranging, as we saw, from active kinds down to otiose concept-universals in the human mind. Some of the last-mentioned resemble nothing outside the mind; the case of the 'flying gallop' of the horse, cited in *Z.D.*, is both interesting and instructive.<sup>(30)</sup> Don't ask me for a list of primary imaginals; I have found the task too difficult. Remember too that our experience of this world-system is very incomplete."

S. "A bird's flight is made possible by feathers and these have been described as 'developments' of reptiles' scales. This statement merely shows what heralded the feather-variation; it does not of course account fully for it, as some evolutionists appear to think. Now does this variation realise something inherent in a primary imaginal, or is it just an adaptation *ad hoc*, a creative modification of the scales improvised during the earth-history of organisms? I put this question as an example of difficulties that may arise."

L. "We don't know whether there exist a primary bird-imaginal and sub-imaginals, rich with germinal variations which are to appear as occasions permit. But surely we ought to shy at positing too many primary imaginals. Let us dispense with the legions of 'eternal forms' which Aristotle, for instance, described in species. The attributes of animal and plant species are those of organisms *adapted throughout to earth*, so why seek sources for such attributes in a remote pre-nebular past? Consider the characters of the half-million species of insects!"

S. "Leslie again to the rescue. Surely Imaginism must account differently for the hosts of species. Primary imaginals, the basic and those constructed only for our world-system, show in the main lines of biological evolution. The essential features are assured thus and belong to the stabilising or con-

servative side of Divine Imagining.(31) The differentiation into the hundreds of thousands of species belongs to creative improvisation during the geological history of this planet. Is not the inventive conscurring always at work? Is there not great scope for inventiveness, for experiment even in the history of the germ-cell?"

W. "Well, that suggestion removes many difficulties. Incidentally it allows us to understand the obscene, cruel, most certainly undivine, character of so many of the variations that emerge in the struggle for existence. Could a God bear this burden of guilt without forfeiting respect? Schopenhauer's blind Will was suggested in part by the horrors of life."

L. "Ah! now you are talking like an imaginist. For what is the truth? It is that imagining tends to 'run amok' in amazing fashion in this field of organic evolution and the finite centres of conscurring allied therewith. The imaginals and their instances become the seats of constructive freedom which, creating in the service of very petty ends, goes straight to its mark, outraging, of course, very often those ideals of conduct men call moral. Given free local initiatives in the struggle for existence and well-being, there result the monstrous developments familiar to us all. The primaeval dissociation has been worsened by orgies of ruthless struggle. However, Wortvoll, you will soon be reading about 'The Riddle of Evil' in *Z.D.*, unpleasantly aware that reality in our quarter is infected with disease. But, if this part of the world-system is septic, are you surprised? Tiamat is sovereign therein and Marduk, saviour of the gods, has not, so far, been able to prevail."

A. "Mephistopheles has different aspects; one shows him, as Goethe knew, to be the friend of God. But, please, friends, don't drift now into a discussion of Pessimism. We can deal with that when something has been done to shed light on the standing of the soul. Pessimism is an emotional attitude of Man; and we are talking now about the origin of species."

W. "Quite so. Tell me then how far down the scale of so-called 'organic' being mischievous innovation is at work."

S. "Professor Schiller thought that 'the various disease germs have all *adopted* their present nefarious mode of life', and held it proved that parasitism on the part of fungi is 'an



acquired habit'.(32) The man of the future will have much greater control over these pests."

W. "Anderton tells us that God is on good terms with the Devil, but let me hint that this friendliness has limits. A great amount of passing evil and pain is unavoidable, is helpful in the evolution of conscious life. Some mild folk have regretted that carnivorous land-animals were evolved. But their prey, left at peace and multiplying to excess, degenerates. Further, 'the predominance of flesh-eaters among amphibians and the earliest reptiles was a consequence of the necessity that sea-plants should be microscopic in order to float the better'.(33) Thus the ancestral land-vertebrates had to be carnivores, and carnivores claw and bite. Pain is a chartered libertine in the world-process. Forgive me for using this homely illustration. Another illustration is available in the emotional history of Man. If evil and pain had been lacking, how could Man have been induced to work? And what would our emotional development be worth to-day? God then finds in the Devil a helper, so far as certain phases of evolution are concerned. It is only in overstressing the Devil's services that we become absurd.

Evil and pain are largely indefensible, thwarting, not helping, evolution. Roosevelt, as traveller, spoke of the 'iron cruelty' of life in the Brazilian forests. Consider that to-day perhaps 75 per cent of the teeming millions of Asia are underfed; that 'throughout Asia and formerly in most European countries in which the labouring classes were not in bondage, there is, or was, no restrainer of population but death' (Mill). Consider what scores of millions in tropical countries have to suffer owing to the hook-worm. Consider that the lunatic's visions of horror, as William James wrote, are all 'drawn from the material of daily fact'.(34) But I won't dwell on all this useless evil and pain; illustrations leap to the eye. The problem for all of us is obvious; is the game of life worth the candle? I myself, as you know, am stirred little now by conventional ideals and have become a worker for the State. The State takes me out of myself; the individual is no longer at the mercy of chance."

L. "Alas! poor Nazi. Is the State worth all this devotion?

Is there no other religious ideal meriting your notice ? You yourself are more important than the State and will outlive it."

W. " Outlive ! "

A. " Now-now. Leave something for our future talks. Tea calls us and I suggest that this discussion, now becoming erratic, should be brought to a close.

We have glanced at creative evolution mainly in the domain of organisms, natural and biological, in the course of examining a background over against which we are to consider a great problem ; that of the human soul. Now Man, in respect of his organism, belongs to the large group of Mammals, which for many millions of years has been throwing off species, explorers of land and water, as if to exhaust all available ways of conducting a great enterprise. Collaborating with us (who are now also navigating the air) are whales, dogs, apes, elephants, tigers, horses, strange Mesozoic creatures and very many other poor relations not acknowledged always with relish.

We are forced apparently to hold that men's physical organisms were ' evolved ' out of an animal ancestry ; the biological and other evidence is such as to leave no room for doubt. But two very important questions remain unanswered :

(1) How was this step made ? The word ' evolved ', we know now, refers us to additively creative construction. Presumably a phase of ' mutations ' had opened, but under what appulse ?

(2) Did something notable occur on the *spiritual* side of the transformation ? Before replying to these questions I deny of course that I possess the gifts of the high mystic or seer. I shall be endeavouring to show that the metaphysical background which we have discussed — a background identical with that of *Z.D.* — enables us to find the answers required. Wortvoll may charge me with flights of fancy. But then all hypotheses of science are flights of fancy till verified. I shall be submitting hypotheses and asking you all to help me to verify them — no more. Adventures of this kind are of service to progressive science and philosophy alike. Wortvoll, I must thank you for your persistent aid in securing such verification as I can offer. Just now you succeeded admirably in standing in my shoes and contemplating evil and pain from my point of

view. The prospect of winning ultimately your support makes my task pleasant."

W. "No sane critic can be insensible to the steady pressure of your reasoning as tested in so many fields. Our glance at imagining that 'runs amok' has proved singularly helpful. No other idealistic hypothesis explains so plausibly the disarray in Nature and History. You will recall that Hegel had to denounce Nature as 'weak', though he had spoken of it on other occasions as 'applied logic'. He held also that 'what was intended by eternal wisdom' is actually accomplished in Nature and the domain of spirit.(35) Such an utterance crumbles in the presence of reality. The God-hypothesis is perhaps sound, but, if this be so, then clearly very much has escaped temporarily at any rate from central control."

L. "Splendid. Look at the Europe and China of 1939!"

A. "We pass next time to discuss the riddle of the soul. But we have done good work and I think that some lazing is desirable. Will you be my guests at Geneva to-morrow? We will lunch at the aerodrome or in the city as caprice prompts. How shall we get there? By air of course and over Mont Blanc."

It was an enthusiastic party that collected its note-books, reference books and rucksacks and made its way over turf and through the pines down to Wengen.

#### NOTES BY BASIL ANDERTON

(1) *Z.D.* p. 306.

(2) Cf. Douglas Fawcett, *World as Imagination*, pp. 423-424, on "Time-limitations and energy": "Worlds, it is suggested, have careers in which a certain fund of mutability can be spent and no more. They strike the mind as moving, slowly but fatally, towards a day of doom. They are, perhaps, all experiments, and there is a tide in their affairs which may or may not lead to fortune, but which has its inevitable turn. Suggestion for deriving these funds of mutability *indefinitely* from prior sub-systems and systems are not satisfactory. The ultimate origin of the 'energies' must be sought, as Bergson himself concludes, in an 'extra-spatial' source."

(3) *Z.D.* pp. 495-497.

(4) On the definition of beauty, cf. Chapter VIII. p. 140.

(5) *World as Imagination*, pp. 445 *et seq.*

(6) *Z.D.* pp. 422-456, 501-504, 525-530.

(7) *Domain of Natural Science*, p. 318.

(8) *Z.D.* pp. 502-504.

- (9) Cf. Reid, *Intellectual Powers*, Essay III, chap. 5.
- (10) On the evolution of the spatial cf. *Z.D.* pp. 525-527.
- (11) *The World and the Individual* (2nd series), pp. 137-138.
- (12) *Divine Imagining*, p. 150.
- (13) *Divine Imagining*, p. 151.
- (14) *The Mind and its Place in Nature*, p. 252.
- (15) *The World as an Organic Whole* (Eng. trans.), p. 83.
- (16) *Divine Imagining*, pp. 188-189.
- (17) *World as Imagination* (1916), pp. 453-458.
- (18) "Psychology may help us to understand what obtains. A 'plurality of presentations to which attention is directed — or on which it is concentrated — thereby tends to become a unity, to be more or less definitely 'synthesised' or 'integrated' as one 'situation' or one complex whole of some sort' (Ward). The term 'attention' refers us primarily to focal human and animal reflective concurring, which is very selective. Divine concurring sustains the whole of the primitive imaginal field. Still, it is open to us to suppose that distinct acts of concurring, 'integrating' plural contents into minor unities, took place within the wider concurring that sustains the field at large. And that is enough for us."—*Z.D.* pp. 509-510.
- (19) Doncaster, *Introduction to the Study of Cytology*, p. 3.
- (20) Chapter VIII. pp. 154-156.
- (21) *World as Imagination*, pp. 463-464.
- (22) "Certain penetrations and conflicts are presupposed by the steps of change in additive creation. Given these and not otherwise, a new phenomenon begins and is added to what is *already* there."—*Z.D.* p. 525.
- (23) *Science and the Modern World*, p. 145.
- (24) *World as Imagination*, p. 466.
- (25) *World and the Individual* (2nd series), p. 220.
- (26) *Z.D.* pp. 525-528.
- (27) *Z.D.* p. 532.
- (28) Loeb cited by Hobson, *The Domain of Natural Science*, p. 367.
- (29) *Contemporary British Philosophy*, vol. II. p. 330.
- (30) *Z.D.* p. 369.
- (31) "These main distinctive structures are necessary to any land-plant that is to grow erect: difference of root and stem, woody skeleton, and upward and downward transport systems. And we find that they had all been developed by the Middle Devonian, allowing large trees to be evolved even in that remote epoch, only a few million years after the first invasion of the land. Then they appear, essential land-plants; and all the subsequent lapse of time has brought only minor variations or improvements in detail."—*Science of Life*, H. G. Wells, Julian Huxley and Wells, p. 428.
- (32) *Logic in Use*, p. 328.
- (33) *Science of Life*, H. G. Wells, Julian Huxley and Wells, p. 512.
- (34) *Hibbert Journal*, July 1910.
- (35) *Philosophy of History* (Sibree's trans.), p. 16.

## CHAPTER X

### THERE IS A SOUL INDEPENDENT OF THE PHYSICAL BODY

"He is dead even in this world who has no belief in another". —  
GOETHE.

"Why, if the Soul can fling the dust aside  
And naked on the Air of Heaven ride;  
Were't not a Shame — were't not a shame for him  
In this clay carcass crippled to abide ?

OMAR KHAYYÁM.

"Ever since I can remember, nothing has occupied my imagination more than death, yea, even in the most licentious season of my life." —  
MONTAIGNE.

"One need not necessarily be violently enamoured of one's own life, or cherish any abject desire for personal continuance, in order to feel that if the chapter of life is definitely closed by death, despair is the end of all its glories. For to assert that death is the end of all beings is to renounce the ideal of happiness . . . to admit that adaptation is impossible and that the end of effort must be failure. And it is to poison the whole of life with this bitter consciousness." — PROFESSOR F. C. S. SCHILLER.

"COME up with me, Anderton ", says Leslie as the car stops before the aerodrome of Berne (Belp-Moos), "I want to complete your initiation into flying. Our course will be very picturesque. We are to see some fine valley scenery on the way to the Rhône country. And after that . . . well, you have had one experience of high mountains that was not without charm."

We cross the enclosure to the tarmac before a big hangar where Leslie's red-lined biplane of silvery wings and fuselage and the red, local, high-wing Leopard monoplane, propellers idling, await us. Leslie's friend, the cheery Swiss expert, who is busy with his craft, leaves it to greet us.

"Weather all right above the Cantons of Berne and Fribourg. There's a thick cloud-ceiling at about 3500 metres above Lake Lemman and Savoy. Mont Blanc must be reached over a sea of cloud after leaving the Rhône valley, if you don't mind that. Fine and warm aloft, splendid for photography

but, of course, we have to put our faith in the engines. No getting down comfortably in Savoy to-day."

L. "No safe blind flying into cloud-blocked valleys, Anderton. But these engines very rarely let one down — I might almost say never. What say you?"

A. "We go" — and, the others assenting, we lose no time, taxi out on to the grass and in three minutes are off the ground and rising above the Belp-berg in the direction of the Stockhorn, a sulky-looking 7000-foot peak forming part of the boundary of the Aar valley south of Thun.

Beyond the Belp-berg I look down on dark copses, neat villages, squares and oblongs of cultivated fields, streaks of white road and the Aar curving towards the dainty lake-side town of Thun. On the Thunersee, two miles away on our left, are a steamer and some small yachts; in the background above the foothills Jungfrau, Eiger, Monch and the other great Oberland peaks stand out clearly against the blue sky. No sign of cloud formation in this quarter, or in that of Lucerne and the Emmenthal, but we have yet to gain altitude ere south-west Switzerland can come fully into view. We are approaching the Stockhorn, soon we see clearly the pines and the path that leads to the summit. We pass over the ridge, leaving the top of the mountain on our right, and are flying now at full throttle with the extra air lever partially forward. Soon after the altimeter is indicating about 8000 feet when Leslie observes:

"Grand going, isn't it? We are now over the Simmenthal and there's the crest of Mont Blanc about sixty-five miles away to the left rising out of a sea of cloud that covers all High Savoy and no doubt a lot more of France. But Lake Lemman in the direction of Geneva seems pretty clear, so we shall get our lunch and talk all right after the raid into Savoy. What a picture!"

There is not much to be seen of Mont Blanc at this distance, but I find the scenery below me superb, gazing down rapturously at the winding Simme, the hamlets and the pine-clad mountains and doing a little mental navigation touching our route to the Rhône valley. Though I know Switzerland well, I discover that, as an air-traveller, I have a great deal to learn; even familiar

mountains and passes take on strange forms, while less impressive landmarks have become very small.

L. "We are over Zweisimmen where the two streams of the Simme meet — to the left is Lenk and the Wildhorn. Ahead is the Saanen-Moser watershed, haunt of skiers in winter . . . we are now above the Sarine valley and on the left are Gstaad, Gsteig and the Oldenhorn . . . now we are over Château d'Œx which you know so well, having the Gumfluh range on our left and about a thousand feet below us."

I glance at the altimeter ; it indicates a height of about 9200 feet. Travelling has begun to seem long-drawn-out ; the great mountains go by with a slowness that is deceptive. On the ground in a motor-car we are accustomed to see objects chasing one another out of our vision.

A. "Where are the others ?"

L. "On our right, just behind. Look down at Château d'Œx and note what visibility is in these parts."

The experience is amazing. I can see quite clearly the Grand Hotel, the swimming-pool, the river, railway and the main road, even particular villas and bits of ground used as rinks in winter. I have read of aviators enjoying marvellous downlooks in Switzerland but the reality beggars my fancy. And ahead of us all is wondrously clear save where the cloud-pall hangs over High Savoy, perhaps some fifteen miles away.

A. "What a glorious medley of minor mountains ! Have you ever wandered about here low down exploring ?"

L. "Often — on windless days one can take liberties, skimming over ridges, nosing between mountains and dropping deep down into valleys. During Foehn weather this would be suicide ; the down-blasts then are vicious and of course there are nasty eddies. In suitable weather the game is fascinating ; the risk of course is absence of landing places. In Alpine flying one's best ally is the first-class ground-engineer ; the engine must be well looked after and must not fail. Engine failure, clouds and fog are the only things that trouble the man who knows his job. But take a turn at flying ; watch me. I've trimmed her to run level for the while, and now I take my feet off the rudder bar and leave you in control of the 'stick'. Steer towards the Dent du Midi over the pass ahead ; you won't







SEA OF CLOUDS IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF MONT BLANC

need the rudder. There, you've got her."

At the outset I think that she has "got me", for the yawing and pitching are not encouraging, but my first lesson has borne some fruit. In this pleasant craft the Y-handled "stick" is placed between the airmen who, sitting side by side, can chat without shouting. Confidence is attained rapidly. Occasionally a touch of Leslie's forefinger rights a marked blunder of over-correction, as I try to keep the Dent du Midi in front of the nose.

L. "Sit at ease; don't stiffen your muscles. A fingertip does this kind of work. Remember this — there is very little in ordinary flying high up. Most air touring is sitting behind an engine while one enjoys scenery, the newspaper or map. The 'boosting' of short and long distance heroes and heroines has been overdone badly. After guideless mountaineering one finds air-touring quite an unexacting sport."

A. "Well, you ought to know. At present I think I should feel safer on the rocks and glaciers. Besides one has to take-off and land; and mishaps seem not infrequent."

L. "The landing is harder by far than the take-off, but less risky. Still, given pluck, it ought to be learnt by the worst middle-aged pupil."

A. "Who are the real aces in the game?"

L. "The war-pilots, the test-pilots, the instructors and the liner pilots who fly regularly in fair weather or foul. The rest are, like me, merely decorative. Hallo! we shall be climbing again. Up with the nose a trifle; we must get that cloud below us."

The altimeter needle is at 10,500 feet and "The Good Companion" level with the teeth of the mountain toward which I am steering. As we pass over Aigle and the Rhône valley I pull back the "stick" cautiously. Up goes the nose and air-speed drops slowly from 110 to 60 m.p.h.

L. "Enough — don't let air-speed fall below 60. If it does, dip the nose a trifle. She's on full throttle and climbing well. Capital piloting too. Nose raised smoothly . . . at 11,500 feet or so we shall be above the cloud-pall. Now watch me; I can trim the machine so that it shall fly at the angle giving 60 m.p.h. without troubling you for more 'stick'-work. A tab on the

elevator does the trick." He pulls back a short lever on the left side of the cabin above his head, "Now you can take your finger off the 'stick'. I trim the rudder by using this sliding arrangement in front of me. The machine is now flying itself, so make ready the camera or enjoy the outlook. Really the pilot's life in a light aeroplane can be quite a happy one."

A. "Suppose she spun."

L. "She can't, while she keeps her flying speed. But you want to know how spins are righted? On this type of biplane by ruddering the craft in the opposite direction to that of the spin and then pushing 'stick' about a third of its course forward. You make use of the 'opposite rudder' of the textbooks. As soon as the spin stops, the rudder is centralised, a straight dive follows and one gets out of that exactly as you gained height just now. Begin your studies of spin with throttle closed and at first don't make more than a turn or two in your corkscrew flight."

Conversation ceases, for we are now soaring high over the Dent du Midi. At 13,000 feet Leslie takes over the craft and I am using a camera, the sliding side-window giving me a view unmarred by wires or struts. Veering to the left and still climbing, we see Mont Blanc as an island washed by a sea of clouds, through which break here and there the tops of aiguilles. This sea is troubled by irregular waves with towering crests and deep troughs, through occasional holes in which I get glimpses of valleys and minor mountains. As we approach the giant, these holes disappear. The cloud-sea extends south and south-west beyond the range of vision. Geneva and Lake Lemman, though very near it and hazy, can be located, nevertheless, without difficulty. We are now at 15,000 feet and I have to confess that I feel a certain discomfort in breathing.

L. "We shan't be long now. And, look! those fellows are showing us the way." On our right the Leopard is forging ahead, crossing the Mer de Glace, we have to infer, for the ice-river is invisible under the clouds that overlie the minor aiguilles and all below. Leopard leads the way over the emergent aiguilles du Plan and Midi to our goal, circling round the summit of Mont Blanc, while we follow rejoicing. What we reach is, like so many other human "successes", disappointing. Nothing

here comparable with the savage grandeur of the Matterhorn ; just a dome of snow fashioned in one quarter into the semblance of an animal's head with a small crevasse as its eye. Even at this height (15,780) we see no end to the sea of cloud southward. We are in the realm of the Valkyries with only a few peaks and the distant Juras to remind us that solid earth has not vanished. I place Lake Lemman now in a mere gap filled with mist.

I am not sorry when we make an end of circling and turn north-west towards Lake Lemman. The rare air reminds me that I am getting old. Down goes the nose and "The Good Companion" begins to glide, though ever and anon Leslie opens the throttle to keep the engine reasonably warm. Cooling is rapid during such descents ; and floating towards Geneva with the engine gummed up and out of action is not in the programme. Across the cloud-awning that hides the Savoy Alps we reach Eaux Vives, settling down comfortably a few minutes later on the big aerodrome of Cointrin. The machines housed, we leave by car for our hotel, interest divided between thoughts of a good lunch and the dialogue that is to follow.

\* \* \* \* \*

It is not yet two o'clock. Stark, Wortvoll and I are lounging in long chairs on the balcony of the private room where we have just lunched. On the further side of the Rhône the fog is vanishing and the sea of clouds breaking up into scattered, thinned-out cumulus. Our homing flight in the evening will be all that aviators could desire. Leslie is busy downstairs on the telephone ; our Swiss friend, who takes no joy in philosophy as expressed in a technical foreign language, is off to the "movies". The familiar armament of books, note-books and manuscripts tells of the coming war of words. But for the moment only an informal chat is in progress.

W. (glancing at a paper). "The greatest merit perhaps of the imaginist hypothesis is that it can be applied to all domains of fact, whereas its rivals find certain quarters of reality most embarrassing. Your suggestion that this lower world suffers from imagining that has 'run amok' pleases me, I must avow, mightily. I recall what Mill wrote : namely that natural phenomena are so replete with events 'worthy of abhorrence'

that, if anyone were to shape his actions similarly, he would be 'universally seen and acknowledged to be the wickedest of men'. This indictment of the world is fatal to popular Theism; in philosophy Hegelians, mumbling abstract logic in the classroom, have no means of replying to it at all. On the other hand, a world in which imagining 'runs amok', which in all quarters displays the work of freedom and chance, is sure to teem with miscreations, sometimes fantastic. How could it be otherwise?"

S. "Leslie, who was a pessimist before he joined us at Zermatt, found this enigma of miscreations too difficult as Schopenhauer had before him. . . . But here he is. Leslie, friend Wortvoll thinks that we alone provide an explanation of why this lower world is so bad."

W. "Not so fast. Only on the supposition that the said world has a spiritual source which is not unconscious, but enjoys full reflective conspiring. Anything might erupt from an unconscious world-principle, even the utterly damnable; all happenings are indifferent to the unconscious which lies below purpose."

L. (settling down in his chair between W. and A.). "Of course, of course. The whole difficulty is to show how the monstrous phenomena of this underworld erupt within, and yet not from, Divine Imagining; and this we are able to do. But there remains a further task."

W. "Expound, Sir Oracle."

L. "We know that sayings such as pain is 'the angel of God' ignore too much. Undeniably there are useful pains; there exist also pains which are sheerly evil. Mill's indictment of the world-process, as impossibly the work of an omnipotent, all-holy god, directs our attention to the evils which theologians prefer not to see. Now Imaginism makes clear to us how these aspects of the process which we label 'sheerly evil' arise and persist. But so far it has not answered a question which Wortvoll has surely in mind. Suppose that evolution is a cosmic adventure, at present largely or mainly evil. Is this adventure worth while for us who are talking here? We can fight bravely, we can fight well, but to fight sanely we ought to believe that our efforts will not close in failure, utter and

irremediable. We ought to be able to reply satisfactorily to Kant's question 'For what may I hope?' Otherwise it seems to me that Schopenhauer reasons well. The adventure, in so far as it concerns us and others sufficiently superior to the apes, were best brought to an end."

W. "And the answer to Kant's question calls for a solution, such as you deign to welcome, of the riddle of the human soul?"

L. "I want the truth of course but this truth must be such as I can approve of; otherwise enlightenment will but show me that Schopenhauer was right. If, for instance, I was convinced that death ends my career, I should certainly decide that this earth-life, taken as a whole, is not worth living."

S. "Remember that in an imaginal universe the later stage of the cosmic adventure will be the best *imaginable*. That reflection will give Leslie pause. The riddle of the soul can be solved by us only in theory. It will be solved by Divine Imagining in the domain of fact. The outlook therefore for us in the domain of fact is encouraging."

W. "Well, thanks to Leslie we are up against this soul question at last. We cannot do better than ask Anderton to make the opening statement, riddling it, if we can, with our criticisms. I am told that he had some private discussions with your philosopher in chief, West."

A. "A few only. Understand that I lay claim to no knowledge save what is suggested by the philosophical background which we have discussed. Credit me with occasional guesses and speculative talk, but expect no *ex cathedra* statements made by the mystic you name. I am speaking not to illuminati but to cultivated men of the world who, apart from their studies of 'Psychical Research', have no acquaintance with supernatural facts."

W. "We must feel our way very cautiously of course, but I am not one of those who are opposed to adventures of thought. All hypotheses even in science are born of fancy; some turn out to be false and some true. Some again may be true, though mortals like us are not in a position to verify them completely. So don't hesitate to dream dreams in your alluring way; the probability is that many will be true, even though you cannot point to the reality which is symbolised. You hold, I suppose,

like Leslie, that optimism, or shall we say meliorism, triumphs or falls according to what we believe about the standing and prospects of the soul."

A. "There are die-hard optimists who say that they ask no more than what this brief earth-life allots them. They play as a rule pleasant parts in the drama. Perhaps, too, they like to believe that what they work for here and now is worth winning. Watch their lives closely and judge. I am certainly of Leslie's way of thinking. If evolution on this planet signifies nothing, if all the sufferings of mankind are to close in the unconscious, I am forced to regard the long-drawn-out process as utterly damnable, nay absurd. I see nothing ahead worth effort, merely complications of petty 'progress' which are to end in — nothing. Nor is this world of futile 'progress' to be bettered radically. It can never be changed into a paradise. Our bodies declare its character. Are they not, as the outspoken Bishop Andrews of Winchester averred, 'not only base and vile but filthy and unclean'? There dawns for many advanced folk a stage in which the Platonic 'disease' of earth-life is felt. At this stage they become critical of their lot, meliorists or pessimists as the presence or absence of philosophical consolation decrees."

W. "But, allowing that you are right, how did the soul become entangled with this underworld at all? How and why did it contract the 'disease' of earth-life? Plato and Plotinus suppose it to 'descend'. On what initiative?"

A. "You will hear later. Meanwhile let me say something about this soul. You will notice that I am referring only to the souls of men. According to Proclus animal souls are differentiated 'under ideas of species only' or, as we should say, they have no roots of *their own* in the dominant imaginal concerned. As regards human souls, there can be no talk of an enduring personality until 'self', which is an acquisition and not a gift present at birth, has been evolved. In the case of certain animals connected closely with men a nascent 'self' seems to appear, but we have to deny to animals in general the single, continuous personality which we mean when we say 'myself'.(1) Such a unity presupposes ideal construction from the 'now'; construction of a grade which does not occur below the human

level. I need hardly say at this stage that you must not confuse the centre of consciring (Bradley called this regrettably, we saw, the 'centre of feeling') with the self. A centre of irreflective consciring, for instance, does not comprise a self; that which calls itself 'I'. A centre of reflective consciring, in which life is solely perceptual, is also devoid of a self. A centre of reflective consciring on the human level comprises a self which has to be acquired; in abnormal cases of psychasthenia many rival selves can be acquired. And in dreamless sleep and death a human self can cease for the while to exist. But the centre of consciring, which now lacks its reflective phase, subsists."

W. "Yes, I follow you fully and have no criticism to offer. By all means keep the discussion limited, as far as is practicable, to the problem of the souls of men. Neither you nor I have the knowledge required for discussing fully the vicissitudes of psychic activity in animals, plants and so-called inorganic Nature. This activity belongs to levels different from ours; selves are not evolved even in animals and below them are centres of consciring which must have very limited contents, of a character not open to our inspection and not to be imitated in our fancy."

S. "In the case of the minor centres which are related so as to form the cortex of our brains, this statement seems to be incorrect. Certain of the actual contents of the brain, hence of minor centres, are present to you, *e.g.* in the phenomena of sound, toothache and light. And to this extent you can be said to know directly that their contents resemble your own."

L. "And there is a likelihood that Nature, actuated by these minor centres, influences you sometimes otherwise than through any of the familiar pathways of sense. We have heard much of telepathy as obtaining between one human centre of consciring and another. Something of the kind seems to obtain directly at times between Nature and ourselves."

W. "Stark scores perhaps a hit, but how is Leslie's guess to be verified? It sounds to me like mere poetic fancy. But to continue: Even allowing for Stark's correction, we know precious little about these sub-human centres and their contents and less still of their imaginings and the ingressions of these into



one another and this underworld. So leave the matter so. You are better equipped to deal with the riddle of the souls of men."

S. "But without power to tell the full story of the imaginals and sub-imaginals which are sources of these souls. Anderton includes them among the primary imaginals of this world-system, regards them as constructed *ad hoc*.(2) But constructed out of what? The 'many', which (a Proclus would say) were *immanent in them*, may all have had histories of amazing sorts of which we know nothing whatever."

L. "We can't travel into the 'Back of Beyond', posing as high mystics when in fact we are very ignorant. For the purposes of this inquiry we must take these constructed primary imaginals as we seem to find them; they were constructed along with the rest of the nascent world-system and only a fragment of this world-system is interesting us now."

A. "Quite so. And now to business."

Friend Wortvoll's attitude towards the soul-issue is that of an agnostic; he is uncertain whether our fate is bound up with that of the physical body or not. He asks us to furnish the evidence, failing which categorical statement would be immoral. Of course we here are rid of the prejudice that those who believe in an enduring soul are necessarily 'spiritual', while those who do not are of the baser 'materialistic' sort. Materialism, as we saw, is simply a faulty metaphysical hypothesis about reality. Incidentally there is nothing to prevent materialists from believing in a future (or even prenatal) life; some indeed have put trust in an 'ethereal' body, made of a finer grade of matter, of which consciousness is a 'function' and of which it continues to be a 'function' after physical death. The Comtean positivist Professor d'Assier in *Humanité Posthume* expressed belief in an ethereal ghost that survives the gross body but dies out gradually and ingloriously in its turn! And, if one reads the literature of spiritism, popular Christianity, Judaism and other faiths, materialism is found to be asserted or implied very frequently. Even the theosophists of the close of the last century began by believing 'in matter alone',(3) before they tapped Indian thought and found a saner faith. But they were very interested in souls. On the other hand, idealists, *i.e.* those who believe that ultimate reality is

akin to what we confront in ourselves, often deny that the soul endures. 'Before us there is certainly only nothingness', observes Schopenhauer(4), and believers in immortality will find no friends in Hegel, Bradley and Bosanquet. It is not idealism, but the type of idealism, that matters. From Imaginism the student gains a sure and certain hope of continuance and, what is by no means the same thing, immortality."

L. "Yes, but not an immortality such as some of the crude old religions promised. The limited person as we know him is hardly worth continuance, let alone immortality. He must be educated so as to understand what the true flowering of our being exacts. For the grandeur of the immortal crowns a very long career of wise living."

S. "The earlier civilised peoples had a very poor programme to offer to the 'continuer'. Survival among the Assyro-Babylonians meant life in the lower world or *arallû* and was certainly not worth having. The victim 'menait une existence misérable, se traînant dans l'obscurité et dans la poussière, n'ayant pour subsistance que les banquets funèbres offerts par les vivants sur sa sépulture'.(5) There is nothing 'spiritual' in *this* cult of survival! The royal cemetery at Ur suggests the creed of a noisome and vicious ape. The old Jews displayed an almost equally grim poverty of fancy, while the later Pharisaic belief in resurrection of the body excites to-day, not unjustifiably, mirth.(6) Even Achilles, interviewed in Hades, finds existence as a shade odious, but, enjoying, as he did, *otium cum dignitate*, he was better off than the ploughmen and others who sweat in Egyptian fields beyond the grave. The modes of killing time in Valhalla prompt criticism, though the elect are among its boarders. One hardly cares to ask what awaits the servitor and peasant.

Primitive peoples are devoid of philosophical insight because they are intent only on the incidents of the workaday world and lack leisure. A Plato appears only as occasion allows. The older beliefs about survival are no more 'spiritual' than Vedic prayers to secure cows."

W. "These fancies remind me of those of many modern spiritists who believe in a lasting duplication of our terrene existence beyond the grave, in shops, streets, meat, milk,

cigars, whisky and soda, and what not. Really, if this present underworld is to be duplicated, I must apply to the President of the Immortals for leave of absence. A prolongation of ugly living does not suit me at all."

L. (laughing). "Are you sure that you will not be conscripted by a Nazi President or clubbed in a concentration camp? What a glorious revolt of the individual! My congratulations. But seriously even these strange spiritistic tales may have their significance. We live in an imaginal universe; there may be dreams after death; there may be realms which the joint fancies of 'dead men' construct, private worlds which Plato and you would despise. I daresay that Anderton will be saying something about these — in Divine Imagining are many mansions. Even the most barbaric men need their gardens, where they can find the flowers they love. In the intervals of rest-phase between his births poor Naboth may enjoy his vineyard. He will find it."

W. "Blows the wind that way? More hints of an expansionist programme? By the way, Anderton, do you get anything of value out of Psychical Research? You told us that you are not stressing it in this talk; do you intend to ignore it altogether?"

A. "In view of the many disputes about the alleged facts I have to be cautious; I prefer, as far as possible, to speak with only our philosophical background in view. But, as you wish to hear my opinion about Psychical Research, you shall have it. It is that of the mystic C. C. Massey: 'We may — I think, do — discover survival, but that for me means only a ghostly and memorial prolongation of the earthly life. . . . I want the expansion of life, not a continuance of its present contracted mode.' And again: 'All so-called spiritualistic communications fail to prove, for me, of themselves (though I accept them evidentially for what they are worth) *another* life. They signify for me only an insomnia in a larger cycle of individual existence, in which two states, activity (with *contraction*) and rest (with *expansion*) alternate.' (7) The rhythm of additive creation and rest-phase once more! Maeterlinck comments on the 'miserable phantoms to whom death has revealed nothing, and who have nothing to tell us of their life

beyond the tomb, a pale reflection of their previous existence'.(8) I too have had experience of Psychological Research and am well aware of the poverty, incoherence and banality of messages purporting to come from a better world'; but actually, I think, from the irreflective consiring of the medium, sometimes perhaps from the vague dreaming of dead men, wraiths of mist-like instability whose rest is being disturbed. It is something to know that such levels exist, for otherwise the intellectual profit is *nil*. Telepathically the more gifted of us may draw inspiration from much higher levels, but in these cases the relations are direct and the help is due to initiative that we cannot command. In all such cases the tree must be judged by its fruits. And the fruits of most ordinary mediumistic 'communications' are poor indeed.

As regards some much-discussed phenomena, I agree with Professor Richet: 'La cryptesthésie [which includes telepathy], la télékinésie, l'ectoplasme, la prémonition, me paraissent à présent établies sur des bases de granit, c'est-à-dire sur plusieurs centaines d'observations précises, comme aussi sur plusieurs centaines d'expériences rigoureuses'.(9) I need not go beyond this answer at present."

W. "Thanks; I see. You are to exploit your philosophical background which is certainly wide enough, but when details are needed you may sometimes draw on Psychological Research, possibly even on private experiences of your own. Quite a promising plan of campaign. Meanwhile you will be under fire from us three."

A. "It was instructive to recall how crude were the ideas about the future life current in the older civilisations. And we find that at first the thinkers, as well as plain men, had very much to learn. Not only hewers of wood but the early Greek philosophers held that the soul is a mode of matter, though more subtle than the stuff of which physical bodies are made. 'Matter', being a mere instrumental concept,(10) let me say that they regarded the soul as a spatio-temporal object among other objects like rocks, clouds and trees. This view, reducing soul to a body or assemblage of bodies, was to please the less competent thinkers for centuries and persists, of course, in dark corners of spiritism and popular religion."

L. "What about modern philosophical materialism which makes spatio-temporal objects supreme?"

A. "It does not regard soul as a separate body; what it does is to reduce soul to a function of the physical body. If it allowed for a second body, of which also soul could be the function, it would not be inconsistent with belief in survival. The second body might last a long time after death. Recall my reference to Professor d'Assier's book.

To continue — the older Greek philosophers erred in two ways: (1) they ignored mental contents, feeling, fancy, volition, reason, etc., and (2) consciring. *They were obsessed by external perceptions*, or rather by those aspects of them which we call extension and resistance. In our technical language their consciring was insufficiently reflective. This inevitable failure culminates in the absurd, in the Democritan atom. Meanwhile compensatory reaction is being heralded. 'Immaterialism' finds expression at last in the genius of Plato. The pendulum swings in the opposite direction. The spatio-temporal object, the sensible world, is regarded now *de haut en bas*; its high significance is overlooked. The soul, one, self-active, substantial, simple, immortal, home of the 'divine principle' of Reason, is lifted above bodies, physical or subtle. But, while the older Greeks were dominated by aspects of external perception, Plato was *too intent on those phases of mental content which are called concepts*, with the results that we have discussed elsewhere. The clash of the schools of thought, called into being, illustrates most notably the work of the Imaginal Dynamic. Were it not for the mistakes and 'solutions' characterising this clash, we should be unable to deal with the riddle of the soul to-day.

Aristotle, that famous pupil of Plato, rescues soul from body otherwise.(11) Soul is the first entelechy of . . ."

W. "Excuse me, Anderton, but can't we dispense with further raids on the history of philosophy? You have made it clear how the Greeks became soul-conscious, and surely that suffices for present purposes. Of course there were alternations of success and error, the latter never without value. Aristotle, by the way, is certainly no ally of yours. He is not an evolutionist, believing that all 'Forms' are ungenerated and that this world is eternal, while individual immortality is hardly in

his programme. He exalts the active Reason, not your Radiance beyond Reason ; imagination for him belongs only to the domain of the lowly ' sensitive soul '. He made many blunders for which the nascent science of his day was responsible. Jump the centuries and pass at once to modern thought. I have questions to ask, *e.g.* : What prompts you to moot an enduring independent soul at all ? Can you give a definition of the term ' soul ' ? What is the source of souls ? Why in the case of Man has the soul a physical body and in what manner is it related to this body ? Has it other bodies ? What is its place and general history in the cosmic scheme ? Answer these in any order you like, but time is precious. I need solutions of problems, not an account of attempts to find them."

L. " You need patience too ; why must Anderton goose-step to order ? I like all these side-lights on our problems. These tentative efforts of the past show us how the mind of the race actually goes to work. Truth is not erupted suddenly out of a drawing-room."

A. " But time flies in a drawing-room or outside it, so I accept friend Wortvoll's ruling. We have a flight ahead of us.

Why do I express belief in an enduring soul ? Psychological Research, as we know it, is unable to verify this hypothesis. To survive physical death for a century or more, possibly as one of d'Assier's fading phantoms, is not to endure in Platonic fashion ! But am I without empirical support for the belief ? It may be that experience, such as is wanted, is available. Professor Lutoslawski, writing in *Mind*,<sup>(12)</sup> affirms that he is aware not only that he is immortal, but that he pre-existed to his present earthly career. These certainties are not conclusions from any line of argument. They are direct intuitions like those of a patch of green or a noise. Respecting pre-existence he writes : ' I know that I have existed before this life, either on earth as man, or elsewhere in similar conditions. This knowledge is for me not less evident than any mathematical axiom, and needs no proof. It is the foundation for many other convictions, and the explanation of many difficulties. . . . I reached this certainty later than the certainty of immortality, but since I reached it, more than thirty years ago, I have never lost it for a single moment. And so far as I know the number

of those who share this certainty is rapidly growing on earth. All the great Polish poets and thinkers during the nineteenth century had it.' Wortvoll, you will find this claim of psychological interest at any rate. Is the believer in immortality and pre-existence to be considered a radical empiricist? Is his alleged experience above criticism?"

W. "The claim has been made also in India. Well, I admit freely that we can no longer derive the entire contents of mind from Locke's sense-mediated impressions and ideas. There is often a vague knowledge, also an illumination in the best thinking, not so simply explained. But we have to allow also for additively creative human fancy, of which you yourself have spoken at length. What if Lutoslawski's alleged certainties are the work of this improvising fancy? You will observe that the certainty respecting pre-existence came late in his life, as if it were a slow development. That it should endure, after once being welcomed, is not remarkable at all. You have only to look around and you will find believers in the herd-creeds in India, Europe and elsewhere, upholding the most strange inventions of fancy at all costs."

S. "I am unable to believe that anyone can be aware directly that he is immortal. For knowledge of that implies surely that he is aware of the future in which the immortality holds good. But the remote future, we saw, unlike the past, is not existent nor even in process of being made."(13)

L. "Spinoza also stressed experience. When he called 'us' eternal (*Sentimus experimurque nos aeternos esse*), he had in mind, I suppose, the fundamental conscurring, which underlies all being and which, as the maker of time, is not itself subject to time. Alas! this term eternal is ambiguous.(14) It may mean that which is above time. It may also mean immortal or everlasting, *i.e.* lasting throughout all time. When the soul is called eternal, this second meaning is usually in the mind of the speaker; he is saying that the soul, while subject to time, does not perish in it. The soul 'lasts' or endures for 'ever'. This ambiguity may lead easily to confused thinking."

A. "I am avoiding the use of that term when undefined. I wish now to say that I agree with Stark that immortality or everlastingness cannot be intuited, in so far as the future is

*unmade*. But the future, which is *in the making* within Divine Imagining and which is coming towards us and other sentient to be modified, might perhaps be intuited vaguely, yet with 'subjective certainty'. Private fancy, as Wortvoll very properly remarked, *may* deceive and I won't dogmatise. But as regards pre-existence I am not in doubt. The Past, remember, exists integrally for divine consiring,<sup>(15)</sup> and fragmentarily no doubt for the finite irreflective consiring of the human soul. In consiring vaguely their remote pasts, as so many claim to do, men may intuit pre-existence empirically. In this case the soul can be credited with at least two waking lives and the interval between them; after which transition to the topic of the plurality of lives is made easy."

W. "Why do some enjoy this privilege and not others?"

L. "Why did Plato enjoy better insights into reality than his cobbler? Favourites, my dear Wortvoll, seem to rule the world; don't you Nazis believe in an aristocracy of the fit? You do. Then allow that one man may enjoy a more fully reflective consiring than another. By the way, Anderton, your remark about finite consiring suggests the basic solution of the riddle of memory. Is it not so? Such consiring conserves on the great scale irreflectively."

A. "The riddle is more complicated than you may suspect. It involves the complication of bodies. . . . No, not now. Bide a wee."

S. "Anderton may be right about pre-existence. But he can't stress this 'subjective certainty' to-day, because Wortvoll sees in it only the play of private fancy. So let us get back to hypothesis."

W. "By all means. I note with satisfaction that Anderton is not comfortable about an intuition of immortality. The future cannot be intuited if it does not exist. As regards pre-existence I admire Anderton's initiative. It would be very convenient to establish the soul as a pilgrim *and therewith the plurality of lives offhand*. But I have no intuition to help me and am justified in suspecting that Anderton's is bred by fancy. I may be wrong, but I prefer working hypotheses to the dreams of seers."

A. "So be it. I continue in the manner preferred."



This hypothetical soul has, I contend, two main aspects. It is a centre of consciring, reflective and irreflective. It is also, in respect of its contents, a 'thing' maintaining a certain continuity and sameness among other objects in the cosmos. It is changeful, but the changes occur normally at different rates, some very slowly. Thus the soul is no bare centre of consciring, but has contents which either are, or penetrate, the body which it lights. These contents, temporal in part, are largely spatio-temporal. In the Augustinian dualism, which influenced Descartes, the soul was held not to have extension; an error due to considering consciring and not contents. Actually sense-contents (the 'sensations' of the old psychology) are all more or less spatial, though this immediately given character shows much more obviously in some than in others.(16) Again, all my fancy-images of the Matterhorn are spatial. The truth of this statement is verified by observation of the images. The colours of sky, snow and rock that bound one another, are *co-existent*, *i.e.* spatial.(17) Space is a manner in which diversity can be related, not an entity. In my blindfold chess playing I *move pieces across the squares* of a board that *occupies* part of a space-field and note *how far away* is the hostile Queen from my King snugly ensconced *behind* his pawns. These relations constitute space, though not the kind of space that concerns the climber or surveyor. Even emotions, in addition to time-determinations, have spatial aspects.(18) I am talking now of some very 'private' contents, as men call them, of the soul. But this soul itself is supposed very often to be *seen* as in a glass darkly. The souls of the ghost-seer, the phantoms of the séance-room and Psychical Research, the angels, etc., of religion, even the Augoeides of the mystic, refer us to bodies, to objects of perception having place, shape and size in the spatio-temporal order."

S. "Cosmic space is a mode or manner of being related within Divine Imagining; and, once created, evolved if you prefer the word, the spatial invades all existents in the world-system. The point is that Descartes' contention is erroneous; the soul is extended and comprises extended contents, often very 'private' ones like the visions of fancy. Anderton tells how we are to accept this truth. A time-honoured point of

view must be left behind us pilgrims of thought."

W. "Some writers credit the soul with many bodies or 'vehicles', about which I shall expect you, Anderton, to be saying something later. Meanwhile I would like light on your words 'either are, or penetrate, the body'. What precisely is meant?"

A. "On a very high level, such as I shall indicate in considering the source of souls, the contents of the soul may be the *same* as its body. On lower levels these contents will be associated closely with other contents which are penetrated intimately only for the while and for certain purposes. Thus on this terrene level the physical body, which is a temporary portion of the soul, is penetrated intimately in the region of the cerebral cortex and its adjuncts. But this body's contents are associated very loosely with the rest of the soul; they are not built into the enduring structure and are dispensed with at physical death. If you look on a dead body, ready to accept intimations of what has happened, if for once in a while you trust your intuitions, you may be aware vaguely that only the carcass of the under-soul is there."

L. "Very well put, Anderton. A Gnostic writer, if I mistake not, has called the highest body the 'robe of glory'. Incidentally, I note, you complete the reaction against the Augustinian dualism; you don't contrast the physical body with the soul, you make it a sort of *temporary prolongation of it*. Wortvoll, on the contrary, inclines to make consciring, in some manner not easily grasped, the function of the physical body; the only soul-body, he thinks, which exists."

W. "No; I have not seen my way clearly through the riddle and suspend judgment. Anderton's suggestions are most interesting and give me pause; they cohere, too, well with the rest of his philosophy. Let me mention, however, now a basic difficulty of mine with which I expect him to deal.

In the old days it was easy to urge against materialists of various schools that conscious life could not *be*, or be *caused by*, physical changes in the brain. For the said changes were by hypothesis without promise or potentiality, and conscious life had to be conjured out of the void. Your inquiry into causation renders such conjuring absurd. A more respectable theory,

that of the so-called 'parallelism of neurosis and psychosis' won't avail, for what is 'neurosis' in itself? A 'material' world, of which neurosis is part, is not, as we saw, to be taken seriously; 'matter', save as a convenient instrumental concept, has no standing. This sort of speculation is doomed.

Far more formidable opponents confront you among the many idealists — men holding that the external world is psychical or mind-like in character — who favour psychology 'without a soul'. For, if neurosis is already mind-like in itself, may it not be declaring its character frankly and overtly in conscious life? May not each of us be simply a differentiation of the already existing psychical structure of Nature? At any rate this suggestion brings Nature very close to conscious life; the two are not, as for materialism, separated by an abyss. Nature passes, say such idealists, into conscious individuals by the route of brains; and the individuals repass into Nature at death. There is my main difficulty."

S. "You can't derive reflective or irreflective consciring from content, whether such content resembles that of your private experience or not. Nor, if our previous contentions were sound, can you suppose that a psychical structure of Nature exists without the support of Divine Consciring, not to mention the innumerable minor centres of consciring of which we have spoken. The consciring, which lights the human soul, is a rill, following up which we reach the universal consciring."

W. "The case for Divine Consciring is very strong, perhaps conclusive. No, I am not suggesting that, in Bosanquet's words, 'the *connexion* of contents' is the same thing as the 'unity of consciousness', that is to say, of reflective consciring.(19) For what Power, unmentioned by Bosanquet, *connects*, conserves and creates additively in the finite centres and in Nature? No; I am suggesting what the more thorough idealists may urge: namely that Nature, 'sustained' from below and 'kindled' from above as your Shelley puts it, can pass directly into a new mode of existence, in explaining which the hypothesis of a soul is superfluous. The seat of the transformation is the nervous system of the organism concerned, the psychical character of which finds expression in the new individual. Observe that ancestral organisms have bequeathed very much

to this individual, legatee of that immemorial past of bodies of which evolutionists tell us.' "

L. " But the individual has often wealth of his own which no ingenuity can show to have been bequeathed to him. Inevitably there is a very important conservative aspect in the ancestry of the body which is continued in birth ; such heredity works in will and thought as well as in a man's muscles and arteries, but this factor can be overstressed. And in seeking for other factors we have to allow for the coming of the soul itself."

S. " Let us consider this coming in the light of our talk about causation. We saw that causation is of two sorts, conservative and additively creative ( ' heteropathic ' as Mill calls it). In ' heteropathic ' causation the event, *e.g.* in the case of human birth, is unlike its conditions in many ways. A ' waiting ' agent completes the conditions ; whereupon an ' imaginal solution ' transforms the conflict. A novel reality is added to the cosmos.

In the case of human birth ' heteropathic ' causation generates a decidedly novel event — the dawn of a personality. Is it not suggested that the ' waiting ' factor, the soul, profiting by an occasion, has become ' ingredient ', as Whitehead might say, in the causal series ? Why try to ' derive ', in the vicious way we condemned, the higher *entirely* from the lower ? "

L. " Good for you, Stark." Wortvoll nodded but did not reply ; apparently the soul-hypothesis seemed to him not unworthy of notice. Once more it became clear that the soul-problem involves the *crux* of causation and cannot be discussed save against a background of general philosophy.

A. " Yes, birth is an imaginal solution, exemplifying the second sort of causation. And the ' waiting ' factor or agent is often so strongly individuated as to set its unmistakeable mark on the novel event. Is it supposed that, while ' deriving ' the higher from the lower, we can make ' fortuitous variations ' account for all puzzling features of the event ? The prospect is not inviting.

The soul is not only a spatio-temporal object but a centre of conscurring which controls, and co-operates with, the contents of the allied physical body. It interpenetrates intimately

portions of this body, certain cerebral regions being literally annexed and occupied by it for the while. In this way the physical body becomes a temporary part of the soul, which has to confront all the vicissitudes entailed by annexation. But the predominant partner maintains its pride of place.(20) It behaves as an agent in its own right, not as a psychic exhalation rising out of, and wholly controlled by, the physical body. It has adopted, and ministers to, this body but can also lead *its own life*, which is very different from that proper to the organism. This is a point of capital importance and cannot be overstressed. Don't overlook it just to save a theory! *Quod agit existit*, and this action of the soul reveals it as an independent existent making use of an organism which merely limits it and which is called by Platonists its prison. Thus Man as philosopher soars altogether above the level of his body, making of even the 'impressions' and 'ideas' of empiricist psychology substitute-facts by using which he discusses the universe. The undersoul or physical body has inevitably a very limited range of 'response' to its 'environment'. Experiments such as Pavloff's regarding 'conditioned reflexes' concern the Platonic prison; have no bearing on the riddle of the activity which issues in Newton's *Principia* or Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Yet they have been used by simple-minded folk in arguments directed against belief in an independent soul.

There are books about 'analysis' of the mind which favour psychology without a soul. But remember that 'analysis' presupposes attention and attention is a name for focal reflective conscurring. This conscurring *selects* aspects of what is primarily a continuum of content, and there ensue statements about these. There is no magic which reduces the soul to rags and tatters; the soul's work is implied throughout. Take note, further, that, were the soul in fact the poor thing which the analyst believes it to be, the book about it could not be written. A series of loose thought-contents, actuated by the brain, could not make itself its own object and fulfil so high a purpose *of its own*. The physical body, even if of psychical character throughout, is active on a low level of 'response' and must not be held to generate wisdom miraculously

out of neural events within its brain ! That way surely lies folly.

Of course Man intellectual, artistic, etc., offers innumerable examples of souls living lives *of their own*, lives which could not be dictated merely by activities such as co-operate with them from the side of the physical body. Amuse yourselves by studying such examples. But realise what these examples imply.

At this stage I need say no more about the relations of this independent soul to its Platonic 'prison' or physical body. That task lies ahead."

L. "We have made good progress and no mistake. Don't you agree, Wortvoll ?"

W. "Anderton certainly drives the spear-head home. But a query. There is a mass of evidence showing how the physical body influences and at times even wrecks and suppresses the other part of the soul. Are you prepared to welcome all that ?"

A. "Why not ? When the independent soul penetrates, and annexes the brain of, a physical body, it confronts both the thwarting and the furthering events which occur in that body. When Germany annexes Austria, it must accept happenings in Vienna as incidents within itself. That is sun-clear. On the other hand, don't speak of the other part of the soul as wrecked or suppressed. Is the sun wrecked or suppressed when you cannot see it on account of fog ? The brain portion of the soul may be in dire turmoil as in cases of delirium tremens, madness or the taking of drugs. These woes of the undersoul are primarily local, whatever their repercussions elsewhere may be. We may be sure that they do not penetrate to the depths."

L. "And so the arrows of popular scepticism have no heads. There is an independent soul and the undersoul influences it exactly as might be expected."

W. "But we have a long way to go before this independent soul satisfies the critic. Its origin and history, its bodies, its 'descent' into a physical body, its flowering into personality and its ultimate destiny raise issues on which Anderton may be expected to shed light. He has succeeded in interesting me vastly."

L. "Do you allow now, agnostic, that there exists an independent soul?"

W. "I think that Anderton has shown that even a psychical or mind-like Nature cannot become Leslie merely by way of transformation of a brain. I am not an epiphenomenon, but live obviously *my own* life. There is somewhat else than this body involved. Coming talks will show me perhaps what it is."

A. "What have you to tell us, Stark? You are always so well placed between extremes."

S. "Nothing save that your preliminary insights seem to me convincing. Your private talks with West have borne fruit. . . . But ought we not to think about getting back. The flight to Berne and the drive to Interlaken will take time. And we are booked for another talk to-night."

\* \* \* \* \*

"The Good Companion" rose off Cointrin aerodrome into a sky now almost free of cloud, crossing Lake Lemman and following the shore-line from near Thonon to St. Gingolph, the water-side frontier village, in the shadow under the Savoy mountains. At this point we crossed the lake again, looked down on Montreux and Caux to pass over the Jaman ridge on the way to Fribourg. How often since I have recalled that wonderful trip in the cool, late afternoon. No tentative navigation as in misty England at a height of from 1500 to 2000 feet, but the normal Swiss visibility with scores of miles of country in view, no need to use the compass and opportunity to fly at any level, at 15,000 feet if desired. We flew in fact fairly low, sated awhile with our soarings in Savoy. From picturesque Fribourg to the hills bounding the Aar valley we looked down on rolling green uplands and snug homesteads. Then with throttle closed "The Good Companion" glided across the Belpberg and floated into the Berne aerodrome. A flight of unforgettable charm had become one of the pale shades of memory.

#### NOTES BY BASIL ANDERTON

(1) "... Where conscious life is mainly perceptual, the several trains of an activity are relatively isolated and disconnected with each other. They do not unite to form a continuous system, such as is implied in the conception of a person. We must deny personality to animals. They are in the main

creatures of impulse. The word impulse is properly applied to any conative tendency, so far as it operates by its own isolated intensity, apart from its relation to a general system of motives."—Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, p. 388.

(2) Cf. Chapter VIII. pp. 147-148.

(3) This creed was once called "transcendental materialism" by one of its defenders, A. P. Sinnett. Cf. also Chapter II. p. 13.

(4) *World as Will and Idea* (Haldane and Kemp's trans.), p. 531.

(5) Dr. Contenau, *Civilisation d'Assur et de Babylone*, p. 91.

(6) Rénan points out that the old Jews had no idea of the contrast of soul and body; still less of metaphysics. He cites the later Pharisaic doctrine of resurrection of the body. "The righteous will live again to participate in the Messianic kingdom. They will live again in the flesh, confronting a world of which they will be kings and judges; they will behold the triumph of their ideas and the humiliation of their foes." Very poor stuff, confirming H. G. Wells' view that we hear too much of Palestine in the history of religion.

(7) *In Thoughts of a Modern Mystic*, edited by W. F. Barrett, F.R.S.

(8) *The Great Secret*, pp. 109-110.

(9) *Traité de métapsychique*, p. 760.

(10) Cf. Chapter II. pp. 12-16.

(11) ἡ ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ζῶν ἐχοντος δυνάμει runs the famous definition that made history.

(12) "A Theory of Personality", *Mind*, January 1922.

(13) Cf. Chapter IX. pp. 171, 173.

(14) F. C. S. Schiller gives five meanings, one in the list the exact opposite of another, *Formal Logic*, chap. xxi. § 7.

(15) Cf. Chapter IX. pp. 170-173.

(16) "Every sensation is in part spatial in character; a distinct locality, determined by the element irritated, being its invariable accompaniment. Since generally a plurality of elements enters into play, *voluminousness* would also have to be ascribed to sensations. . . . This conception is, in fact, almost universally accepted for optical, tactual and organic sensations. Many years ago I myself characterised the relationship of tones of different pitch as spatial or rather as analogous to spatial; and I believe that the casual remark of Hering, that deep tones occupy a greater volume than high tones, is quite apposite." And so on.—Mach in *Space and Geometry* (Open Court), pp. 13-15. See also *Z.D.* pp. 451-453.

(17) Cf. *Z.D.* pp. 525-531 on the evolution of space and on space-time generally, pp. 422-456.

(18) *Z.D.* p. 454.

(19) *Life and Finite Individuality*, p. 191.

(20) Professor McDougall writes: "It may be that the soul . . . is but the chief of a hierarchy of similar beings and that this one alone, owing to the favourable position it occupies . . . is able to actualize in any full measure its capacities for conscious activity; and it may be that, if the subordinated beings exercise in any degree their psychic capacities, the chief soul is able, by a direct or telepathic action, to utilise and in some measure control their activities." — *Body and Mind*, p. 366. Cf. also "Æ" in *Candle of Vision*, p. 46: "Our brain is full of living creatures as our body is thronged with tiny cells. . . . I know that my brain is a court where many living creatures throng and I am never alone in it."



## CHAPTER XI

### BACK TO PLATO AND PLOTINUS

"Man has no Body distinct from his Soul, for that called Body is a portion of Soul discerned by the five Senses, the chief inlets of Soul in this age." — BLAKE.

"Only a part of us is imprisoned in the body, as if one stood with his feet in water, the rest of his body out of it." — PLOTINUS.

"Every man is a being of two worlds . . . it will be proved, I know not where or when, that the human soul also in this life is indissolubly connected with all immaterial natures of the world of spirits, that it alternately influences and is influenced by that world of which however it is not aware while still man and so long as all goes well." — KANT, *In Dreams of a Ghost-seer*.

"It will be during life that we drink the bitter cup of Lethe ; it will be with our brain that we are enabled to forget." — Professor F. C. S. SCHILLER.

"There is reason to suppose that our normal consciousness represents no more than a slice of our whole being." — F. W. H. MYERS.

As I heard later, Stark and Leslie in the leading car had been enjoying the outlook as they sped from village to village along the road north of the lake of Thun. Meanwhile Wortvoll had been sitting in silence on my left looking serious and slightly troubled, his hands joined with fingers infected, it would seem, with their master's unrest. Could it be that the evidence in favour of Imaginism was beginning to tell ; that his prized aloofness as an agnostic was menaced ? The beauty of the lakeside failed to stir him. As we were crossing the Aar into Interlaken, he turned towards me and said :

"A strong point that of yours about the soul living, at least to a considerable extent, *its own* life, not merely a crudely adaptive life in the service of the organism. This soul, you were urging, supplies the revelation of its existence in its acts, intellectual, artistic, religious and indeed, one might add, moral.(1) On this showing soul cannot have been erupted from below, not even out of a brain which idealists declare to be psychoid or mind-like itself. For the level of activity at which the brain

works is too low. The problem is to account for what is done in connexion with this bit of organic Nature. And what is done or can be done is utterly beyond mere cerebral 'response to stimuli'; adaptive adjustment to the surroundings in which we live."

A. "You have followed my thought exactly. You allow now that 'somewhat' acts other than the physical body. *Quod agit, existit*, is it not so? Your philosopher Kant held a like opinion, but inferred what you would be unwilling at present to believe. Let me cite his words from my notebook. 'Man's faculties, desires and natural gifts reach far beyond earthly use — they are out of all proportion to our terrestrial needs; and as we find from the analogy of Nature that means and ends are always proportioned, we must only conclude that hereafter there will be a sphere in which these faculties and desires will have full scope.'(2) Yes; in considering the 'somewhat' we may travel far."

W. "The 'somewhat' is like a peak barely glimpsed at first but later descried more and more fully through the mist. We have *found* (not guessed) that it is relatively independent of the physical body, a point of the first importance. We must allow, too, that it seems to work as an individuated agent and that it reveals itself in its acts as a *spiritual power*; we are not considering a 'thing-in-itself' respecting which we can say nothing save that it exists. We have now to make our knowledge of it more adequate. And to-night I shall be expecting suggestions of value. I want to learn in what such souls as yours and mine are rooted; what is the fundamental part played by the physical body, the radical meaning of birth and death, the standing of the 'me'; how the soul annexing a physical body influences and is influenced by it. The way then may lie open to other discussions of great importance. Quite an interesting outlook! Having won already my belief in the relatively independent soul, you can help me towards a better comprehension of it. I am critical but glad to yield to superior force."

A. "Be patient of guesses and speculations which our present position in the cosmos prevents us from verifying completely. Remember that our fancy is akin to the Power in the

depths and that its best inventions may often pave the way to truth. All the great hypotheses of science were born of fancy and many of them remain incompletely verified."

W. "But fancy may run amok and then . . . doubters like myself are useful. By the way, I note that you don't make use of the time-honoured arguments in favour of the soul, those stressing its alleged simplicity, incorruptibility and the like."

A. "They are no better than the theological arguments meant to support belief in God and demolished by Kant. For example, the soul is not simple but very complex. And, even were it simple, it might lose intensity and fade out of the level of reflective consciring; its mere persistence, because simple, would be valueless to us mystics who have conscious immortality as our goal. This kind of talk wastes time. I mention it and I pass on.

You accept the soul-hypothesis because, intellectually speaking, you cannot do without it. You have also verified this hypothesis, but very incompletely. Your 'take-off' in this inquiry, to use the language of aviators, is less satisfactory than mine. As I said before, I enjoy a strong intuition of pre-existence; believe on empirical lines in at least three life-adventures of my enduring soul. I am driven accordingly to consider very seriously the additional hypothesis of the Plurality of Lives, striving to discover what is fundamental in this interesting aspect of the cosmos. This new enterprise of thought will be the prelude of others."

W. "Yes; the 'take-off' is easy for you. On the other hand, I too may benefit from your experiments in ideas. It may be that your intuition of pre-existence is sound; that your 'take-off' is altogether superior to mine. I can always assume that it is and profit by the trains of thought to which it leads. Even thought has its holidays with games as interesting as any sport. . . . But hallo! here we are at Lauterbrunnen. What a wonderful outing it has been — I can't thank you in terms of what I feel."

Philosophy perhaps, as well as sport, was taming the erstwhile combative Professor let loose on us by Leslie.

\* \* \* \* \*

We are lounging on our long chairs on the balcony after

dinner. Leslie has been trying to convince Stark that air-piloting is a good sport for retired men of sixty and seventy years of age. He insists that the strain is minimal, provided that nerves, heart and arteries are beyond reproach. Navigation, not flying, is the difficulty before the tourist. Even aerobatics can be mastered in the seventies. After the risks of guideless mountaineering, aviation, which is sufficiently adventurous to be interesting, brings to the veteran his well-earned repose. "What say you, Anderton?" he concludes.

A. "I'm afraid that my qualifications don't permit me to express an opinion. . . . And now friends, we really ought to be making a start. Stark, do you mind 'taking-off'? As was agreed, we might begin by discussing the sources of the souls of men. Correlated topics will present themselves in due course."

S. "By all means, though what I have to say will not be news for you and Leslie. I shall be interpreting *Z.D.*, the essentials of which Wortvoll himself has now mastered. Indeed the Herr Professor is now able to exploit Imaginism as well as I. Both of us, however, will be glad to profit by any fresh teaching for which Anderton is indebted to West, treating such statements, of course, as hypotheses and guesses serving to energise thought."

W. "I have had enough to do in understanding Imaginism in its cosmic aspect; the exploiting of it in connexion with the soul-problem is your business. So get going. Note at the outset that I accept Anderton's contention that we *find* the soul to be in some way independent of the physical organism. I am asking you to body forth this admission of mine as best you can. The soul-agent is a genuinely real one. What can we say about its position in the cosmic structure, what about its history and prospects?"

S. "So be it. But you may like texts to precede the sermon. My first step then is to read you a few quotations which bear on our quest; quotations interesting every mystic who is aglow with the greater hope and of high importance also to the philosopher."

He reads slowly the five passages cited at the outset of this chapter and pauses awhile, but even Wortvoll has nothing

to say. So with electric torch in his lap and fumbling among note-books, the Professor continues as follows :

What is the source of our souls, those agents of which we are aware now so obscurely and imperfectly in their relations with physical bodies ? Well, as Anderton said, the problem has two main aspects ; according as the soul is regarded as a centre of *consciring*, reflective and irreflective, or as a body or complex of bodies, one of the *conscita* which the worlds of objects comprise, a 'thing' maintaining a certain sameness and continuity amid other temporal and spatio-temporal contents of the cosmos. Let us consider these two main aspects in turn."

L. "We have to consider spirit as well as overbodies ! Yet the soul was once spoken of as if it were merely a thing of external perception on the same footing as stones and trees. Most of the words for soul, writes Max Müller, denote at first the merely tangible wind or the breath issuing from the mouth,(3) but even this crude stage of thought must have been reached very slowly. Early Greek philosophy itself regarded souls only as bodies. The soul as centre of *consciring* is ignored by very many inquirers to-day as of old. Yet from the finite centres, considered in this regard, we pass so naturally to the universal *consciring*."

W. "Well ; I agree that this aspect commands notice. On, friend Stark, on."

S. "Schopenhauer wrote that 'my true inner essence exists in every living being as immediately as it reveals itself to me in my own self-knowledge' ; Fichte that 'all individuals are included in the one great unity of pure spirit'. For us Divine *Consciring* is neither one nor many, but above number. We contend, however, that the rills of finite *consciring*, when explored sufficiently far, are found to be effluents from the Fundamental Power ; the superpersonal 'radiance beyond reason'. Still, to proclaim this truth will not solve all the problems which confront us to-day. Thus their *identity* in respect of the Fundamental Power does not help us to explain their *differences* which show in world-history ; in the contents or *conscita* which mark off each from the rest. Finite centres on the various levels may differ by the breadth of being. Consideration then

of the source of souls brings us once more to discuss the Imaginals, whose contents furnish the bones, flesh and blood of the world-systems."

L. "Souls viewed as centres of consciring are not Leibnitzian monads or Herbartian reals; they are just the many-aspect of the one-many universal consciring asserting itself. In this sense even we finites can 'feel and experience' that we are 'eternal,' as Spinoza averred. To 'feel' (sentire) is used by translators in default of the appropriate 'conscire'.<sup>(4)</sup> We are established in Power above time. But now Stark asks us to consider how we become clothed during a time-process, when some world-system is running its course. For the garments worn are astonishingly different, as one expects them to be in an imaginal universe."

S. "The differentiated centre of consciring, as known in a time-process, had a beginning, like the world-system in which it appears. As regards the cosmic rest-phases and phases of additive creation in which individuals arise, centres display on the great scale a rhythm noticeable even in our workaday terrene life. 'Psychical life consists in the main of a continuous alternation of predominantly receptive and predominantly reactive consciousness',<sup>(5)</sup> urges Ward."

W. "No objections raised. But we have heard of these rhythms before, so get along. I recall by the way that, in substituting Imaginals for the Ideas of Plato and others, you avoid a conceptual rationalism of 'forms'."

S. "To avoid unclear thought—'Form' means for us, not a Platonic or mediaeval abstraction, but *manner of existing*. And, as you heard at some length, Imaginals are very different from anything that might seem to anticipate them in Greek philosophy. I will now meet your wish and try to 'get on'. But perhaps you would prefer . . ."

W. (sobered at once). "I'm all attention."

S. "We have urged that directly or indirectly by way of evolution all the Kinds (species) appearing in the history of Nature and conscious life sprang from primary Imaginals, animated by the universal consciring. Man's remote origin is indicated by this statement. The roots of human sentients—who must be classable among very many psychical sub-

species (6) — are traced back to the beginnings of our world-system ; to an Imaginal, with perhaps sub-imaginals, constructed aeons before the Metaphysical Fall. This Imaginal is a different source from that which Plato called an Idea and which even the *Parmenides* and Aristotle assail ; it belonged, however, to that Platonic harmonious state which pre-existed to a world of change and conflict, when souls were to be entombed in physical bodies :

Concordes animae nunc et dum nocte premuntur.

Wortvoll may be startled at my suggestion, but, after all, it is one that is understood offhand by any student who has discussed the Imaginals. We four here are among instances of the Imaginal under survey. Even Bradley among modern philosophers has told us that 'several bodies might be organs to a higher unknown soul'. But whatever else they do, physical bodies function only on their native level — they cannot enable us to reveal for critics the splendour of the 'higher unknown soul'. Plotinus calls the physical body the 'river of Lethe', and he may well be right. We four, swimming in that river, are aware only of its dark waters and the reign of Night. Is my meaning clear ? Cannot I say with the Orphics, 'I am a child of earth and of starry heaven but my race is of heaven alone' ? And yet I am unable to supply the empiricist with the full verifying experience for which he asks."

W. "You can say so and your meaning is sun-clear. As to the Imaginals — we have discussed them, used them to account for the evolution of Nature, and we can use them once more as now. You don't try to explore the 'Back of Beyond' ; you accept them as constructs sustained in Divine Imagining at the birth of this world-system of ours. So far, so good. I want to see what you can get out of them. So I defer criticism until the hypothesis, which has many good features, has done its best. Of course I can't expect you to verify it fully as you would an assertion about sound or light ; if we are swimming in the waters of Lethe, we must put up with the pale speculative concepts of mere thought."

L. "Wortvoll might have found one criticism timely. Whence arise the *many* instances of Imaginals ? Plato's Idea is

unitary and changeless, subsists aloof from the sensible world and is useless therefore for explanatory metaphysics. Plotinus and Proclus put a manifold into some of the Ideas. Plotinus indeed held that every human individual has his own 'ideal form' established in 'universal mind', is not merely an instance of a single form common to all its instances. Our teacher West also held that the Plotinic 'ideal forms' symbolise a plurality immanent in the Imaginal at the outset. What Kant calls the Transcendental Subject was in some manner individuated even within the 'Heavenly Man'. Let us modify the hypothesis accordingly. 'Twere useless for the pod to burst unless many seeds within it await release.' (7)

S. "Well said. And permit me to express my surprise, Leslie, at your astonishing progress in philosophy since those hours enjoyed at Zermatt. . . . Ah! you say West made the subject so interesting that toil passed into delight. Quite so. But the pupil was worthy of the master."

W. "Leslie reasons well; suggestion provisionally adopted. But we are referring to the 'Heavenly Man', not to imaginals whose instances, *e.g.*, are centres of animal life. We are ignoring for the present problems respecting very much in Nature and animal life. . . . Yes, Anderton limited the discussion and wisely."

L. "Take note that the individuated 'ideal form', though some writers might call it a particular, could have its own instances in *successive lives*; episodes in its passage from irreflective to full reflective consciring. In this rôle the individual oversoul is literally *φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλητήs*, and we cannot consider it further without discussing the plurality of lives!"

W. "But *cui bono* the whole business?"

S. "Carry on, Anderton; we need a commanding point of view."

A. "I begin by stressing very insistently the importance of that major portion of the soul which is hidden from us. Some old Greeks recognised it. An opinion credited to Heracleitus, but perhaps of Orphic origin, was that 'while we live our souls are dead and buried in us; but when we die, our souls are restored to life'. Familiar sayings 'the body is a tomb' or 'prison' illustrate the same belief. Notice too that, while



Heracles speaks to Odysseus in the dark realm of Hades, peopled by 'senseless dead, the phantoms of men outworn', the higher Heracles, who is married to Hebe, is in the hall of Zeus at the banquet of the immortals. This higher Heracles could be taken as symbolising the overbody or Augoeides said to be present to the perceptions of certain mystics and reaching through them even the by-ways of popular thought. But we must not outrun our knowledge of such mystics which is very slight.

In modern thought the higher part of the soul has been discussed by many writers. A lower part also, interesting psychologists of the so-called 'Unconscious' and intimately allied with ongoings in the brain, has been studied with great care. I need only mention the names of a few prominent thinkers. The monad, according to Leibnitz, has a very small portion of its contents lit by reflective consciring. Kant's Transcendental Subject, alleged basic condition of the possibility of experience, has become for some an individuated superior part of us comparable with the superior part described by Plotinus when he deals (*Ennead* vi.) with the 'amphibian life' of the soul. Thus Carl du Prel, in his philosophy of mysticism, argues towards belief in such a superior part or oversoul, stressing manifestations of it in dreams, clairvoyance, prevision and so forth, but unfortunately asserting its materiality 'if only in the sense of a fourth aggregate condition'. I need only mention this lapse and pass on. Novalis too is to the fore, urging that our first duty is to seek for 'our transcendental ego' which normal terrene experience does not reveal. Fechner tells us, in a way that recalls some old Greek thought, that 'man is a stranger to his own mind, in which he gropes in the dark, trusting to his syllogisms to guide him, and often forgetting the best of his treasures which happen to lie out of his way concealed by the darkness which covers the regions of the human spirit.' After death . . . 'a new day will break upon his spirit; the centre of the inner man will kindle into a sun which sheds its radiance over all his spiritual stores'.(8) Death, which lights so much with reflective consciring, cannot, however, be expected to bring supreme experience to the plain man — to each pilgrim only the heights which he is able to

climb. The mere shedding of a body leaves godhead very remote ! Professor J. S. Mackenzie accepts 'a succession of beings, all belonging somehow to a more comprehensive individuality that persists and develops through them. That individuality, however, would no doubt have to be supposed as itself a fragment of a still larger whole' in which it is to flower consciously, when mature. The 'beings' of course are the different and often perhaps very unlike 'persons' of the successive lives. A human soul shows promise of great, nay, almost unlimited development. F. W. H. Myers urges in *Phantasms of the Living* that normal consciousness reveals little of our being. 'We all know that there exist subconscious and unconscious operations of many kinds. . . . Well, besides the subconscious and unconscious operations, I believe that super-conscious operations are also going on within us ; operations, that is to say, which transcend the limitations of ordinary faculties of cognition, and which yet remain — not below the threshold — but rather above the upper horizon of consciousness, and illumine our normal experience only in transient and cloudy gleams.' Dr. F. C. S. Schiller argues for a 'Transcendental Ego' which 'holds together the Becoming of the phenomenal selves', for an individuated upper part of the soul such as Mackenzie described. 'The phenomenal self would then be that portion of the Transcendental Ego which is at any time actual (exists *ἐνεργεία*) or consciously experienced. It will form but a feeble and partial excerpt of the Ego.' Thus writes the author of *Riddles of the Sphinx*. I need not draw further on the philosophers who think in this way. But a word on terminology will be of use.

The phrase 'Transcendental Ego' is open to criticism. A centre of consciring, which is irreflective, does not 'bend back' on itself, is not an Ego. That soul, which is not 'consciously experienced', to use Schiller's words, has yet to evolve the opposition of self (ego) and not-self. A 'Transcendental finite Ego' did not exist at the beginning of our world-system. Centres of finite consciring only were active and were to be seats of 'phenomenal selves', to use Schiller's words again, far later during the world-process. Reflective consciring is presupposed by this development. Wortvoll asked us just now :

*cui bono* this development ? The answer is that all centres of consciring such as ours are passing from the stage of irreflective to that of full reflective consciring, in which alone their hidden wealth will become manifest. We enjoy and we suffer and become very slowly gods. All the while the world-system as a whole is being transformed as well, preparing for the coming of these gods. But I must not anticipate what I have to say in a later talk."

W. "All's well with the world ?"

L. "No, but all will be. The best *imaginable* world may be good enough even for Schopenhauer and you ! Meanwhile learn to be patient and wait till Divine Imagining 'hath made the pile complete'."

W. "Thus speaks Zarathrustra who, a year ago, I am told, was a pessimist and after aeons of waiting may become one again. How little, my friend, you really know. What if the world-process presents a problem too difficult even for Divine Imagining ?"

S. "The difficulty is measured by the length of the time-process and it lies in our power probably to increase that length. . . . But tell me, Anderton, apropos of terminology — would you object to the often used phrase 'Higher Self' ?"

A. "Assuredly, if nothing but the phenomenal self, as Schiller calls it, is 'consciously experienced'. If there is no other self in a centre of consciring, don't use words which suggest that there is."

W. "I don't like Myers' term 'superconscious'. You can't be more than conscious ; to conscire reflectively and fully must on your lines be exhaustive of what there is to be aware of. Why then 'super' ?"

A. "Quite so. The term is misleading. I propose now to say a few words respecting that lower buried part of the soul which interests the psycho-analysts.

There is nothing novel, of course, in the theory that psychical contents can belong to the 'Unconscious', can exist without being *conscired reflectively* by the soul interested. Some of these may continue happenings begun originally in the open, but anon repressed and buried ; some again may continue actions set up by ancestral souls and inherited by way





NEAR THE CREST OF MONT BLANC (15,780 FT)

of the chromosomes. All are related intimately to ongoings in the central nervous system. In the case of dissociation from the main content-mass of the mind, such contents, working anarchically, can be mischievous. Complexes, resembling secondary intrusive personalities, are formed within the centre of consciring. Conflict results. The 'running amok', characterising phases of an imaginal world-system, is exemplified once more.

Our interest here is not in therapeutics, but in terms. We substitute for the psycho-analysts' realm of the 'Unconscious', which suggests strongly absence of all psychical process, that of 'irreflective consciring' in the lower part of the soul; the physical body having been annexed and made a temporary province of that soul. Recall that, sunk in irreflective consciring, most of your past earth-life is always lost to view. When you hear a bell ring, how much of your long past, how much of your prized perceptual, intellectual and emotional personality is left to you? Your reflective consciring is of a field whittled down to an amazing degree. It is no more than a star twinkling against black night.

A warning. When making an inventory of contents hidden in the so-called 'Unconscious', in the lower realm of the soul, never forget that contents may reach you from the higher regions as well."

L. "From the 'Builder of the Tabernacle' maybe, Builder who has so many subordinate psychical agents in his service :

Many a House of Life

Hath held me — seeking ever him who wrought

These prisons of the senses, sorrow-fraught ;

Sore was my ceaseless strife ! (9)

My great hope is to waken him fully in due season, lose myself at long last in his radiant consciring. . . . And now, Anderton, tell us something more about the bodies which the Builder constructs or, to be accurate, helps to construct."

A. "Descriptions of the soul such as 'that which feels, wills and knows', 'sum of enduring capacities for thoughts, feelings and efforts of determinate kinds' (MacDougall) and the like are familiar to us. They tend to overstress certain

aspects of our present consciring. They supply no illuminative aid to philosophy. Other descriptions, of savages as well as of cultivated folk, treat soul as a subtle body or a set of bodies, two, three, four, five or more, the seats of its different powers. These overstress the aspect in which soul may be regarded as a spatio-temporal object, part of the existing order of change, division and conflict. The student, conversant with Imaginism, is forced of course to think more adequately. He will begin by considering soul as a centre of finite consciring, irreflective and reflective; a study during which the cosmic consciring will also exact notice. Nothing truly explanatory can reward him till this work is done. Anon he has to discover, if practicable, what bodies this finite consciring — the light that lighteth all bodies that exist in the world — serves to light. If not himself a mystic of exalted outlook he will be unable to make observations such as those to which empirical science can point. He will have to rely on his *aperçus* and those of enlightened men 'with an eye', on alleged supernormal experiences of others, on inference that sometimes resembles guessing. He builds in a realm that may be formed largely by his lower fancy. Nevertheless his soul too has its 'higher part' and occasionally may let drop the pearls of truth. In the end he may have something to say, furnishing clues that inquirers may grasp to profit."

L. "I yield to none in my respect for empirical science, but I am against its practice of disposing of *all* unverifiable philosophical statements as output of 'private fancy'. For even 'private fancy' may sometimes draw nutrition from the higher part of the soul. This part does not respond to the lower minds of most folk, but may it not do so ever and anon in the case of the inquirer whose competence and devotion force it to awake?"

S. "The hypotheses of science, we saw, are all sired by fancy. And those of great men of science, like Faraday, resembled at times gifts of intuition, of the higher part of the soul, rather than achievements rewarding effort. Please continue, Anderton."

W. "Don't enlarge further on what religions say of the bodies. These herd-creeds at their best improve public morality

and brighten the plain man's existence with hope. But they invent too lavishly in the interests of the faithful ; the play of fancy lacks control." (10)

L. " Indian religions suggest often that fancy is running amok ; yet they are rich also in suggestions about the bodies. Others, which lack the refining influence of the great Indian mystics and thinkers, shamble often into folly. A conspicuously foolish belief is that in the resurrection of the physical body. We ought to receive suggestions from dogma very critically, but, after all, some of these clues may prove of value."

A. " By all means, Wortvoll. But, not wishing to waste time, I shall not draw heavily even on philosophy. I shall be pointing only to a few beacons that seem to shed light on our path.

Here is one of these beacons of the first importance. Leibnitz, the monadologist, for whom, as an idealist, all phases of the world-system are mind-like in character, consisting of a hierarchy of monads, is of course greatly interested in the human monad. He contends that this monad is never without a body ; *this latter expressing, and being conditioned by, the monad's own activity*. There are no quite bodiless monads. My monad, which is now intimately related to the complex group of subordinate monads called the physical body, is freed from this at death, but retains an invisible body inseparable from it, which is kept in being from instant to instant by its acts. Lossky writes similarly : ' The body which is immediately conditioned by the activity of the soul cannot possibly be taken away from it. Death means the separation of the soul not from its immediate body but from the bodies of the other substances which during its lifetime were particularly closely connected with it.' (11)

W. " But your centres of consciring are not monads, so why do you stress this view ? "

A. " A centre of consciring is a centre of that activity, conservative and additively creative, expressed in the worlds. All phases of reality dance on the jets of consciring. The human soul, the higher part of which is now sunk in irreflective consciring, behaves just as Leibnitz' suggestion contends. It sustains and creates additively its highest body or *upadhi*, as a



Hindu thinker would call it. Its lower bodies, unlike this immediately conditioned body, are subject to innumerable other influences as well. On the physical level, as we note, these influences are so forceful that the very co-operation with them of a permanent soul is often denied. The lower causal sequences seem to dull minds all that need be taken into account."

W. "You refer to lower bodies — how many ?"

A. "I am not a high mystic and cannot therefore speak with authority. Only a 'radical empiricist', who enjoys direct conscurring of what he describes, can have the last word. I don't write books about the fauna and flora of Borneo unless I have visited it; I cannot explore unseen levels of being on demand when I am unable in fact to visit them at all. I can say something of a general character about the highest level of our being, but that is because the topic can be grasped not too feebly by mere thought. The bodies below this level need, not to be merely thought about but, to be *perceived*."

S. "The theosophists, drawing on Indian lore, talked of, I believe, six or seven bodies."

W. "Talked of . . . but what did they know ? You can talk all day of Wodan and Thor, but they won't be on your visitors' list for that."

L. "Well, there is practical wisdom in the saying of a modern writer; 'when the body which thou now hast falls away, another body shall be prepared underneath'.(12) How many levels lie between this body and the highest body ? Wait and see ! Let us stick to general philosophy and not dogmatise about what is to be perceived until we perceive it."

A. "Perhaps our friend West will throw light one day on topics of this kind. Meanwhile let me suggest a course of action that promises well. Study the better portion of the literature of psychical research, spiritism, occultism, mysticism and the like; study also such windfalls as the special experiences of friends may bring you. I do all this myself; further, I add that I have not been without psychical adventures of remarkable sorts. . . . No; I don't discuss these even in a gathering like ours. I am sufficiently vain not to wish to be thought crazy and will leave the matter so."

S. "I have profited by the course prescribed by Anderton and my provisional attitude is this. I consider that the three bodies — the physical, the subtle and the permanent Augoeides or radiant body that travels from terrene birth to birth — of Orphic theology provide a working-solution sufficient for the facts. There may exist other bodies but I am aware of no facts which compel me to think so. I believe in three bodies and am as agnostic as Wortvöll about the rest."

W. "Avowedly a provisional attitude and not a bad one ; it can be modified as facts dictate. By the way I note that so able a thinker as the late Professor J. S. Mackenzie inclined to believe in your subtle — or is it 'fluidic', 'ethereal' or 'astral' ? — body. He suggested that perhaps 'conscious life is not primarily or essentially connected with the brain, or with any other visible part of the bodily organism, but rather with some more subtle mode of existence, which can be detached from the physical organism without serious loss, and can still retain a large part of what is essential to the personality of the individual'.(13) Fechner held a like view and so did many other able thinkers. Such super-physical organisms, they say, are objects of perception on their own levels of the spatio-temporal cosmos. And now a truce to disputations as to how many such bodies exist, for I am certain that we don't know and can't at present find out. . . . Anderton, however, has made one assertion of capital importance, seems indeed to have found out something indispensable for the continuance of this talk. He has argued very plausibly that the centre of individual human consciring has a 'highest body' which expresses *its own* conservative and additively creative acts, *is therefore inseparable from it and cannot be brought to nought*. This 'highest body' is what Leibnitz intuited vaguely and discussed in his Monadology, a context not acceptable to-day. Anderton rejects the Monadology, which does not work, but he is forced to take account of the body which the monad is said to sustain. Now the centres are not self-contained monads ; whence then they and their highest bodies ? I have other questions to put, if Anderton finds an answer to this."

A. "Belief in self-contained monads breaks down before the evidence for interpenetration and the artificiality of that

philosopher's dodge, 'pre-established harmony'. And, further, nothing tempts us to posit either egos or monads as present at the birth of this world-system. The old Buddhists were right in disbelieving in permanent egos of any kind. It was once difficult, withal, to justify their contention before the tribunal of thought. It is so no longer. The centres of finite consciring proceed out of the cosmic consciring. Their 'highest bodies', which determine their individual differences, are formed at first *for* them and sustained subsequently *by* them, as I urged just now. Out of a phase of both conservation and additive creation arise those many so-called 'Ideal Forms' of individuals in which Plotinus believed. The clues to this solution are to be found in *Z.D.*(14) and in our recent talks about Imaginals and the creative evolution of the world-system. All is explicable without resort to monads or egos. I repeat :

The nascent world-system exists harmoniously at the outset within God, that is to say the superpersonal Divine Imagining, and is conscired there as a poem, perfect *after its kind*, might be contemplated by a poet. The system, constructed out of variously related imaginals, comprises no centres of finite consciring ; it is a system of mere content, a 'conscitum' in our technical language of which Divine Imagining is aware, but which is not in any aspect aware of itself. Its different aspects are subordinate to their whole ; are not seats of minor *agents* whose initiatives might be opposed. Divine Imagining sustains every phase of Its construct ; and the construct, docile as the human artist's poem, shows no tendency to escape from central control. The splendour of a cosmos has been achieved and endures stably. As in the case of a completed masterpiece of human painting or music, nothing new is imagined into being, nor could it be so imagined without marring the balance and beauty of the work.

But this whole, perfect after its kind, is not the only whole of beauty which is possible, *i.e.* imaginable by the Fundamental Power. And cosmic rest-phases have to give place to phases of additive creation with consummations in novel divine events. A transformation, which needs the birth of innumerable minor agents or centres of finite consciring, has to occur. Among these agents, drawing their contents from

such regions of their Imaginals as they light, appear the souls of men, the 'Ideal Forms' of individuals as conceived by Plotinus."

W. (after fumbling with a rather tattered collection of notes). "Ah! I recall parts of this account which I had not thought of just now in connexion with the souls of men. Let me read my notes and save your time. Have I got the statements in our talk and *Z.D.*(15) summarised aright?"

(Reading) "Divine Consciring sustains the imaginal field which is to be the nascent world-system. Within the wider consciring that sustains the field at large are minor acts of consciring expressed in minor and minimal regions of content integrated in special ways. Still the interpenetration of all the regions attests their intimate union as aspects of a harmonious whole. There is indeed *nothing active* save Divine Consciring and central control without conflict is thus assured.

The intensity of the creative consciring heightens — in the birth of the world-order there is 'no diminution of positive reality', as Bergson suggests. With this heightening the already mapped-out regions, which are to be seats of the earlier-dawning minor agents or centres, are conscired with special intensities. Thereby these regions become more than mere aspects of a *unitary* divine system. They are lit, occupied, by *distinct* agents who exist *for themselves*, separated by their very emergence as units from Divine Consciring and from one another. Nevertheless they are effluents having the same source, possessing too, to the extent which their limited content permits, the freedom native to that source. Hence no fully determined world-order is possible and what is to follow will be full of adventures and tragedy.

Heightened intensity in the mapped-out regions lifts psychical activity therein above what, using Herbart and Fechner's term, you call the first 'Threshold'; the regions becoming seats of finite consciring, at the outset irreflective. The 'Threshold' of reflective consciring, of what is popularly known as 'conscious life', marks an intensity still further increased. This level of intensity will not be reached by all the finite centres, in fact is to be attained by very few of the uncountable sextillions evolved. The lowly constituents, for

instance, of inorganic (so-called) Nature, such as we discuss in symbols 'electrons', 'positrons', 'atoms', 'molecules', etc., are no more aware of themselves than we are in dreamless sleep. Yet they operate as units — of irreflective conscurring."

S. "I found very interesting the words of Jeans cited before (16) to the effect that the lowly constituents of Nature — units having relatively simple content — cannot lose their 'energy' beyond a certain minimum. Quantum theory indicates the restriction. But for this restriction 'the whole material energy of the universe [better is 'world-system'] would disappear in the form of radiation in a few thousand-millionth parts of a second'. The Sustaining Fundamental Power, is ever active in the background. In the foreground It continues and negates Itself in the same process. Its conscurring supplies the rills welling up in the finite centres; nevertheless these rills have now careers *of their own* and may show initiatives hostile to the plan embodied in the cosmos. Conservation concurs with an additive creation fraught with strange possibilities born of freedom and chance."

W. "Yes; you do well to stress that restriction. But don't let us stray from the topic of chief interest; viz. the standing of the centres which are to become human and like souls. These have two 'Thresholds' to pass, but win through apparently only at a late stage of the world-process after aeons of stellar, geologic and biologic evolution have built them homes of flesh. Well, Anderton, have I grasped the elements of your solution fairly well?"

A. "Quite well, but don't suppose, because human souls appear late in places like this earth, that they have no prior adventures at all. They may 'descend' through various levels, being clothed in appropriate new bodies the while."

W. "They may and a Plato, I suppose, would incline to welcome such a view. But we don't know. . . . I will now put some further questions."

A. "By all means."

W. "I gather that pre-destination counts for something. For you say that the different centres are born with different contents at the outset, contents made not *by*, but *for*, them. The distinct finite centre arises after a content-region has been

formed and the first 'Threshold' passed. It is not then the sole author of its being. It maintains and alters a filling allotted to it. What it is at any given time will be partly due to remote antecedents over which it had no control."

A. "Inevitably so. The distinct centre, when originated, has already different contents from other members of its Imaginal and sub-imaginals. And these contents constitute what we have called its 'highest body'. Allied with this body, the centre is the permanent soul, *φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλητῆς*, the Augoeides of some old mystics. The topic is one of commanding importance and henceforth, maybe, we shall be talking of little else. . . . Yes, you are right. In virtue of its filling, a filling which it received and did not make, each soul, while relatively free, has a character which was thrust on it."

L. "Its 'Karma', as a Hindu might say regretfully, is to this extent not of its own making!"

W. "'Twere futile to inquire what the original contents were?"

A. "We men are aware directly of a very small section of the soul, hidden from us, as for the most part it is, in the night of irreflective consciring. The contents are not at any rate those of a 'thinker'; on that level there is no call for the substitute-facts, dodges and trains of abstract ideas used in the intellectual life. These contents, penetrating, and penetrated by, the other contents of the divine system, comprised much besides provision for the world-line of individual history to be traced. Let us leave the matter so for the while."

L. "Of course when we speak of the 'highest body' we have in view nothing resembling the physical body, a terrene object of no great beauty, a prison from which many mystics wish to be freed. No; we are referring to the permanent part of the soul in so far as it can be an object of external perception. The use of the term Augoeides can only be justified in this way. And there is another weighty consideration to be borne in mind. The centre of consciring, once originated, maintains the 'highest body', which is *inseparable*, as we saw, from its activity. It does not, withal, maintain it restricted to some particular spatio-temporal form; we must not limit possibility by drawing

overmuch on our petty experience as dwellers on earth. Protean variations must be allowed for.

The physical body is a *separable* part of the total soul ; a bit of the earth which has been annexed only for the while. Physical death terminates the relation. But even during terrene life the relation is not fully intimate. Thus the permanent soul taps the psychical life of the physical body only at certain regions of the brain. Thus the trees, stocks and stones which I perceive suggest what Schopenhauer called a 'cerebral phantasmagoria', while even my thought, feeling and will depend largely on what cerebral changes dictate. Under normal conditions most of the 'lowest body' does not invade the oversoul in strength as do changes in the cortex when I see a dog or think."

W. "Sage reflections, but let me ask what is the basic use of this lowest and physical body. And why does the soul quit the harmonious state, of which Plato writes, to descend into a 'prison'? What is gained by this dangerous and often exceedingly unpleasant adventure? We need an explanation at present only indicated in part."

A. "You shall have it."

W. "I want also to learn what you think about the theory of the 'tabula rasa' and kindred views adopted by empirical psychologists. The permanent soul, you say, possesses a vast wealth of content. Why then does it seem to Locke and his evolutionist successors to be built up gradually out of sense-data and combinations of the ideal residues or echoes of these? The fortune of a beggar is traced by some to coppers slowly collected and turned into shillings and pounds. Has the beggar a large independent capital as well?"

L. "Perhaps he has, but, suffering like the Platonic soul from loss of memory, can't get at it."

W. "Well countered. What is a group-soul?"

L. "A popular term for certain sub-imaginals discussed in connexion with men and animals. Imaginal is a term of indefinitely wider scope."

W. "Well, I have shot my bolts. Anderton, what about that riddle of birth which I mentioned just now. You have stated a theory about the permanent soul — use it."

A. "I'm off to sink, I hope, into a phase of irreflective con-  
sciring, to wit dreamless sleep. What say you, Stark?"

S. "I'm for bed too. So good night, all."

L. "What a day we have lived through! And really this  
jury, at first divided against itself, seems likely to reach agree-  
ment, at any rate as regards the major issues discussed."

# NOTES BY BASIL ANDERTON

(1) Even the Victorian agnostic, T. H. Huxley, urged in *Evolution and Ethics* that "the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less on running away from it, but on combating it." This initiative, opposed to the process, derives presumably from the side of the human souls in revolt. Mere by-products of the brain, which belongs to the process, could have no revolutionary initiatives to impose. 'Somewhats', superior to the process, are adding a novel contribution to reality.

(2) Cited from Mahaffy's well-known work on the *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 276.

(3) The words "became gradually divested of their material and visible attributes till they were brought to mean the vital breath or something stirring or striving within us, something of which breath was the visible sign, and when this breath of life also had been discovered as something accidental, something that comes and goes, then what remained — that which was not breath or anima, but of which anima as living breath formed only an attribute, was singled out and signed by its own name, whether *psyche* or *thymos* or soul or âme, all having meant originally breathing or commotion".—Max Muller, *Last Essays* (2nd series), p. 360.

(4) "Feel." The term is used, we saw, in this misleading way by Bradley, Whitehead and other writers.

(5) Ward, *Psychological Principles*, p. 243 On Rhythms, cf. also Chapter VIII. pp. 127-128.

(6) The mere ability of *terrene* biological groups to interbreed freely, showing thus that they belong to one species, is of interest only to students of zoology and botany. The speaker has in view groups having distinctive psychical characteristics common to their members.

(7) Cf. *Z.D.* p. 523.

(8) Fechner, *On Life After Death*, p. 77.

(9) From Sir Edwin Arnold's *Light of Asia*.

(10) Cf. Chapter VII. pp. 106-108 on the "oases" of religion.

(11) Lossky, *The World as an Organic Whole*, pp. 110-111.

(12) Edward Carpenter in *Towards Democracy*.

✓ (13) *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, p. 393.

(14) *Z.D.*, cf. more especially p. 482 and chap. xx. on "The Birth of Creative Evolution", pp. 508-515.

(15) *Z.D.* chap. xx. Cf. also Chapter IX p. 165 *et seq.* Cf. also pp. 147-148 of this work on "Creative Evolution."

(16) Cf. also *Z.D.* pp. 522-523.



## CHAPTER XII

### BIRTH AND DEATH

“Concordes animae nunc et dum nocte premuntur  
Heu quantum inter se bellum si lumina vitae  
Attigerint, quantas acies stragemque ciebunt.”  
VIRGIL.

ONCE more three of us are sitting in the green hollow on the slope of the mountain, chatting occasionally, reading or gazing lazily across the Trümleten ravine at the Jungfrau. Stark is to join us shortly. We have brought our thermos flasks and all else essential to the ritual of tea. The now inevitable note-books are on the grass beside us ; the talks have become too technical and allusive for the resources of memory, however good.

L. “It seems a pity to be wasting this fine afternoon when we might have been flying — just look at that delightful hole in the clouds above the Silberhorn. We must really explore the Oberland thoroughly one day and get some cloud-pictures.”

W. “Appetite comes by not eating. You will enjoy to-morrow’s flight all the more for this rest. Besides the talk is going to be interesting ; we are to discuss ‘Birth and Death’. To-morrow the Great Adventure ought to make a strong appeal to you.”

L. “What adventure ?”

A. “Wait and see. What I have to say is based on a private chat with West, but connects admirably with our attitude towards the imaginings. It concerns the coming of Man into existence on this planet ; a coming not explicable of course only from the side of the physical body.”

W. “You will be steering clear of pseudo-occult mythology, ‘esoteric Buddhism’, planetary chains, Atlanteans, Lemurians and the like. Otherwise I should be for Leslie’s suggestion and prefer a flight.”

A. “Nothing will be said that the most radical empiricist

among geologists, biologists, archaeologists, and philosophers can label mere private fancy. I welcome only the verified statements of modern science and interpret them in accordance with imaginist metaphysics. The said statements lend themselves exactly to my way of thinking."

L. "Provocative language from so careful a student as Anderton, who is to build, I gather, on a foundation laid by West. . . . This birth-topic interests me too. In the old days I was a pessimist and used to consider birth a grim business. I was sorry for those who come into this world and could rejoice at death, cure of the disease of earth-life, as Socrates called it. Even now I consider this disease tolerable only because it may be the prelude to something better. Some of the Greeks, of this way of thinking, likened the physical body to a tomb (*σῶμα σῆμα*) and regarded those buried in it during terrene existence as practically dead. Were these critics wrong? If the soul, said to trail 'clouds of glory', descends into bodies described by a famous Christian bishop as 'base and vile', 'filthy and unclean', the adventure lacks charm. And the unfortunate soul, immersed in foulness, is supposed to lose its primitive wisdom as well."

A. "But the earth-life is not merely a disease, the body is not merely a tomb and the garments of flesh have their uses. It will be made clear later why the soul must have a physical organism which, even in a world wherein so many agents run amok, could not be radically different from what it is."

W. "I have read Leslie's grim poem 'The Cheat' (1) and surmise that the old pessimist is not quite dead. . . . Still it seems reasonable to ask why an alleged radiant soul had to take this plunge earthward and become blind as it falls. Perhaps things go wrong sometimes on the great scale. We have been told that imagining can run amok. And we know that monstrous maladjustments inflict misery on our stock. Variation of the front to back diameter of the pelvis has caused the death of millions of mothers and children. The mothers could not bear children, yet they conceived! No sane purpose finds fulfilment in this aspect of the world. How far then may this corruption of being extend? God's in His Heaven, says the poet, but seems inert."

A. "The running amok, which is the price paid for the local initiatives that mark creative evolution, is formidable indeed. It mars all the lower levels of the world-system in which, as Schleiermacher urged, there is 'more of the spontaneous activity of the finite individual essences' than of the 'activity of God'. Miscreations cannot be denied places in the spatio-temporal order. . . . Ah! there's Stark; we had best settle down to business at once."

\* \* \* \* \*

A. "Well; Stark, what do you make of the birth-problem after our talks with West recorded in *Z.D.* and recent conversations?"

S. "I gather that there are very many psychical or 'mental species' of men and like finite beings, either equal in rank or superior to us, who help to people the cosmos. I place the roots of these phenomenal beings in imaginals and sub-imaginals (meaning in this context group-souls). Doubtless there are wheels within wheels of complication far too difficult for mortal man to explore. Mentioning then only the sub-imaginals of Man, I hold that they comprise, at the very outset of this world-system, individuated agents, the permanent souls of you, me and the rest now gathering experience on this earth in travail. I hold also that these souls existed once in Plato's harmonious state, but not that they enjoyed contemplation of Platonic 'Ideas', gaunt concepts these which belong merely to the sphere of intellect. The fare of the higher soul is not concepts, but concrete imagining. Further, these permanent souls were not, in popular language, 'conscious'. *Nocte premuntur*. Theirs was irreflective consciring below the 'Threshold', on passing which an agent awakes. Merely to have conscita or contents is not to be aware of them as such. These souls indeed resemble the patients of whom modern psychopathologists write, patients who perceive but do not notice that they perceive, who can see and hear but know not that they do so. 'C'est la connaissance seule des malades qui ne voit pas et n'entend pas.' "(2)

L. "The patient, suffering from psychasthenia, reverts in part to the irreflective consciring out of which his personality was born."

S. "Exactly. You may recall our sub-atomic natural agents ; also Lossky's lowly 'creative substances' which have the contents of other 'substances' before them — 'in view' — and react accordingly. Yet they don't 'know' what they do.(3) All of us men too can tell of perceptions which were not noticed when they took place but were *remembered*, withal, later. All of us always have most of our psychical wealth hidden below the 'Threshold', lost entirely for the while to the surface mind. If Wortvoll desires more light to be shed on this topic, Chapter X of *Z.D.*, 'On the Levels of Consciring', will prove helpful."

W. "I accept this statement. Well ; we confront now the individuated agents or permanent souls, very rich, maybe, in content but of that low strength or intensity of psychical life which we call irreflective consciring. And now the descent has to be dealt with."

L. "Through many stages and levels of being with lower bodies, perhaps, formed and shed very often. But one dominant purpose is in process of being realised. There is a passage from irreflective to full reflective consciring on the part of the soul, nay of the entire world-system in whose history the soul attains self-knowledge. We are to pass beyond 'personality' into a Divine Event, for which both consciring and conscita have no secrets, a consummation indefinitely remote, but all-illuminating rest-phase after a cosmic imaginal romance has been made complete."

S. "The soul has no key wherewith to unlock the gate of its own treasure-house. It must seek this during the descent and later. Anderton, at this point I am feeling not fully competent and will ask you accordingly to carry on. I shall be more appreciated in the rôle of commentator and critic."

W. "Anderton, you are to set sail now towards the solution of the riddles of birth and the standing of the physical body. When dealing with the latter, you can answer this question : why does consciousness — or, shall I say, reflective consciring ? — vanish instantly when a current flows betwixt head and leg of a victim in the electric chair ? Why does reflective consciring seem to lie so utterly at the mercy of brain ? I could put many questions of a like sort, but this one,

I think, will require an answer applicable to all."

S. "You heard before that, if a soul annexes a physical body, it takes over all the happenings, helpful and harmful, occurring in that body. To this extent and in virtue of its own act soul is at the mercy of what is annexed thus temporarily. But even so we do well not to overstress the part played by the brain. The results of Psychical Research enforce caution. And, as a physiological psychologist warns us, 'considerable portions of the cortical substance may be extirpated or lost by disease without the destruction or appreciable disturbance of any motor, sensory, or more purely intellectual functions. To such an astonishing extent is this true as to throw temporary doubt not only over the whole theory of the localization of cerebral function, but even over the statement that the cerebral cortex, as a whole, is the *only* material substance of mental operations.' (4) Thus writes Professor Ladd." He closed his note-book with a snap and smiled faintly.

L. "You have done well to mention Psychical Research; it compels us to call in question assumptions tolerated too long. It may be that Professor Mackenzie is right after all in suggesting that my 'conscious life' is not primarily connected with brain 'but rather with some more subtle mode of existence' detachable from the physical organism, one of the higher invisible bodies of which we have been talking." (5)

W. "It would be futile to try to show that brain-changes are essential to every initiative arising within the soul; there is influence 'from above' as well as influence 'from below'. I concede this point readily. And I will even allow that Mackenzie's contention is arguable. I recall that the cranial capacity of Leibnitz was surprisingly low. But anyhow you won't deny that the relations of the permanent soul and brain are very intimate. Well, I want to have the fundamental *raison d'être* of this intimacy brought to light."

A. "And quite rightly."

L. "Stark said that the *primaeval* soul has no key to its own treasure-house. You will be pointing out how one is found. Why not tell us the story of a soul, beginning with its origin within an imaginal and continuing into its appearance as a 'prisoner' on earth? We only want to hear about

essentials. Don't hesitate to repeat and emphasise previously made important statements when necessary. Wortvoll won't object to their being driven home."

W. "Yes, and dwell at length on that portion of its story which we can follow, as psychologists and philosophers, here and now. When the terrene adventure is being discussed and understood, there will be an easy transition to the topic of the Plurality of Lives, and the interesting problems which are raised by it."

A. "A way of stating my views, suggestions and guesses that promises well. But don't yawn when at Leslie's bidding I repeat and accent statements which concern the fundamentals of imaginist thought.

I commence, or recommence, then with an account of the standing of this soul in the divine imaginal field. This field was originally one of *mere content*; a conscitum constructed as home of a nascent world-system. It existed *not 'for itself' but for Divine Imagining*, just as a poem exists for a poet who has created it, possesses it and controls its being throughout. The poet, as we say, is aware of the poem, but the poem is not aware of itself or the poet! But this divine imaginal field is to be lit by finite centres of consciring who will exist not only for God *but also 'for themselves'*. At first the regions, in which these centres will arise, are only tracts of content, some more or less simple, some complex, all under the central divine control. As God imagines them to be, so they are. Among these regions is that of the imaginal which is to be the seat of the permanent human souls and among the souls will be the one whose story interests you.

An influx of 'energy' into this content-system takes place on the great scale; a symbolical description of the heightening of divine consciring. There is achieved a step of change which is veritably creative. The imaginal just mentioned is conscired more intensely until that degree of strength which constitutes a 'Threshold', to borrow Fechnerian terminology, is passed. Beyond this 'Threshold' a tract of content, once only conscired, becomes one of consciring, at first irreflective, and a finite centre or agent is born. The content of this agent is that in connexion with which it was created. The content ever

aglow for Divine Imagining has now become aglow for itself. Let me cite the illustration of the human poet once more. Suppose that the creator of a drama found his work escaping from his control, *his* characters of fancy developing into actual individuals *existing in their own right*, he would be confronting a creation such as I have in mind."

L. "The vast 'societies' of natural agents of whom Royce writes and who sustain inorganic Nature, do not seem to get beyond irreflective consciring. The populations of the animal levels attain through their higher members reflective consciring, but even they do not evolve satisfactory 'selves'. Yet these lower levels interest me greatly."

A. "Of course; but we have agreed, being ill-informed, to ignore them. Perhaps West will come to our rescue one day. Keep to the topic of my human soul; there is no evidence that any human wanderer, *φυγὰς θεόθεν*, reaches his level after descent through animal and lower depths."

W. "This soul is necessarily differentiated from others?"

A. "I suppose so. Each soul has its special relations within the imaginal, to which correspond special modifications of the features which are common to it and the other souls. *It exemplifies the imaginal in its unique way.* It is predestined to develop along a particular world-line, to which we referred before. But in a time-process of additive creation its activity is leavened by freedom as well."

L. "Its 'categorical imperative' will be along this world-line and may differ therefore from the 'imperatives' of other souls. This suggests what for my part I believe in, namely that there is no one way of morality; that there exists for every soul its own way of living best."

W. "What bounds the soul-region? Why does not your agent in region A fuse with the agents in regions B and C?"

A. "The regions, maybe, are bounded by content which has *not* been conscired above 'Threshold' strength and remains accordingly under the central control of Divine Imagining, ever active and ultimate support in the background. Is there any illumining fact in familiar experience that bears on this issue? I think so. Several secondary persons may be allied with the same brain, separated by frontiers below 'Threshold' strength.

Yet they need not for that lack mutual penetration of their content in particular ways.

In the soul-imaginal there is also mutual penetration, so far as content is concerned. But, were the frontiers raised above 'Threshold' strength, the centres of consciring would fuse into one centre. Such a fusion has been recorded in connexion with rival selves allied with a human brain. It is incredible only for those who regard souls as windowless monads, as impenetrable 'Egos' closed to all invasion from without. Belief in such insulated, substantial 'Egos' is wrecked by the facts of Psychological Research."

S. "Within its region the individuated centre of consciring now maintains that conservation once secured by Divine Imagining?"

A. "Yes; and this region becomes thereby the 'highest body' of the soul which we discussed before. It is upheld henceforth by the centre as expression of its own activity and cannot therefore be destroyed. The centre and its body constitute together the enduring soul, that which will enable the phenomenal individual to become divine. It is what Novalis dreamed of, and misconceived, in his cult of the 'Transcendental Ego'; what Leibnitz sought to reach with his belief in the monad and its inseparably allied organism."

W. "A plausible suggestion which will haunt even the sceptical hearer. But tell me: do you regard the 'treasure-house' of this soul, before it has begun its alleged wanderings, as a place of great wealth? Some might urge that most of the wealth was acquired during the wanderings."

A. "At the outset it penetrates, and is penetrated by, the other souls in its imaginal, probably to some extent by the entire nascent world-system. You will recall the high level of which Plotinus spoke, whereon each centre 'contains all within itself' and intuites at the same time 'all in every other' centre. The soul may comprise very much in its irreflective consciring — how much it is impossible for our deliberative intelligence to indicate. The experiences of mystics are very far to seek. The Augoeides is not the home of gaunt categories or discursive understanding, a mere realm of shades, rather a palace from whose windows a cosmos is descried. That is my personal



view, or perhaps you will call it prejudice.

On the other hand, some may regard the soul as having an almost empty treasure-house, into which only its later wanderings can bring the rich content required. I allow, of course, that the time-process of additive creation must increase its wealth vastly, but conservation of an original treasure is maintained, I hold, all the while. Conservation and additive creation are confluent in its story."

W. "A glance at that story will be timely. And, when favoured with that, we shall enjoy your treatment of an old controversy, that touching the *tabula rasa*. Empirical psychologists have urged that the phenomenal or surface mind draws all its content from data supplied through the physical body. Sensible impressions and their ideal residues, variously combined, fill what is at first a void. Evolutionist thought, stressing inheritance of ancestral experience, has sought to support this belief. I need not accept or reject it. But I ought to point out what a strange difficulty has been invented for you. If the surface mind is supplied solely in this way, what of the content said to be lodged in the 'treasure-house' of the permanent soul? Is it so much idle wealth like the gold stored to-day in the bank-vaults of the United States? And is consciring a mere 'neutral light'?"

A. "This 'difficulty' is born of false hypothesis. It will be countered as I proceed. And now to the story of our typical individual soul.

In its original state this soul is open, as I said, to penetrations from other parts of the world-system, but the invading content implies no conflict. The fires of being are of low intensity, just dully red. The appulse of heightened consciring, source of evolution, waxes strong. Under forced draught the fires glow white. The content of this soul and all the other agents or centres of consciring is sustained more intensely. Each content tends to overflow into regions beyond its own and to assert itself against other contents occupying their places in the divine imaginal field. Once merely different, it becomes incompatible with, opposed to, that which, conserved in the invaded centres, resists. Thus penetration is now the occasion of conflict, and this strife, existing on the cosmic scale, renders

possible the Imaginal Dynamic; the power at work in the transformations of an evolving world.(6) Conflicts give place to harmonising solutions, and these again to renewed conflicts. Not the Hegelian Dialectic, but this Dynamic, is overlord of Nature, the gods and men.

A plunge into conflict — in all causation within the time-process there is conflict of agents with solutions more or less conservative and others transformative (7) — is imposed on the soul. Hitherto it has been conserved stably at that low degree of strength of consciring which we term irreflective. It was unable unaided to rise above this level. But its degree of consciring has been made more intense, while penetration from outside its region has brought discord. Henceforth it will be subjected by the Imaginal Dynamic to alternating phases of creative adventure and rest-phases. *The 'wearisome wheel', as Eastern mystics have called it, of births and deaths is turning. Soul 'descends,' in Platonic language, from level to level, wearing ever new lower bodies and shedding them when the rest-phases recur.* Always and everywhere is rhythm exemplified alike on the cosmic scale and in an electron's career. I am unable of course to describe the soul's doings on all these levels; you must glean such lore as you can from the sources mentioned before. But I shall be expected to say something about its adventures on this planet, which, it would seem, is the lowest level reached in the descent."

W. "What is the fundamental use of these bodies and, above all, of the physical body which, I notice, so many religious folk denounce as 'unclean' and 'vile'?"

A. "When discussing the 'highest body' I suggested that it renders individuation possible. The divine consciring is the same for all the regions allied with which finite centres are to arise. These finite centres will differ in respect of their contents; they will also be insulated one from another. We have said enough about the contents; and we saw further how the insulation is secured.(8) This insulation prevents the soul from fusing with other centres of consciring, preserves it as one among many. It is compatible, nevertheless, with lavish penetration of content inflowing from the world-system. This influx is of the first importance. Thus we four here, for instance, only

perceive one another's bodies, the grass and the Alps in virtue of the penetration of our brains by external Nature. And we four only began to conspire reflectively on this terrene level after such penetration, supplying sense-content, had awakened our souls. Our souls, devoid of 'sensations', would have remained sunk in irreflective conspiring. But, whereas on the highest level penetration takes place on the great scale, it is very limited on earth. This limitation is not arbitrary but forwards plan."

S. "Sense-content — I shy at the word 'sensations' which means for many *unit*-elements, mere figments of psychology — is the port of entry from a mind-like external world. In sense-content we sample the actual characters of aspects of that world. Plato held that sense-content is only a means of awakening a soul, already full of knowledge, that uses the physical body. The *primaeval* soul, however, was full of reality rather than knowledge 'about' it; not a 'thinker', as was said before. Sense-content, again, ought not to be regarded, as by Plato, *de haut en bas*. It is a limited spiritual revelation of a spiritual cosmos. Plato, withal, voices a great truth. The pre-existing soul is awakened by the physical body and then uses it."

A. "The soul, whose history we are considering, has had many such awakenings in the past and as many deaths. Let us reflect on one of its awakenings on earth. What we find in the first place is this: failing penetration from its body and the external world, it does not awake at all. Its content will never have that degree of strength which secures the passing of Fechner's 'Threshold'. Accordingly there will be for it no reflective conspiring, no 'conscious life' as most folk would prefer to say. Thus the basic use of the physical body is to secure to the soul reflective conspiring on this terrene level. How is this done? Well, the permanent soul annexes the physical body, which is built up largely without its aid, and makes it temporarily a part of itself, penetrating most intimately the brain. Now the brain is a portion of the mind-like external world akin in character to that which has annexed it. There is no abyss between annexer and brain which needs bridging; the 'mystery' of the relation, about which so much con-

troversy has raged, has vanished. The physical body has become a prolongation of the permanent soul, a sort of feeler, of one tissue with itself, which this soul has thrust into our terrene world.

Cortex-processes, allied thus intimately with the permanent soul, express the consciring of natural agents such as are discussed in the symbolism of physics, chemistry and biochemistry. This consciring belongs no more to insulated agents ; it shows now within the unified region of the permanent soul whose own consciring reinforces it. The degree of strength needed for the 'Threshold' is attained ; reflective consciring, perceptual and other, ensues."

W. "Do I catch your meaning ? The natural agents, subatomic, atomic, etc., insulated from one another, are active below the 'Threshold', but, grasped collectively within the permanent soul, they furnish the intensity required. Meanwhile the soul contributes to the strength of the synthesis. It is not merely passive ; it responds to, reacts on, the penetration. And later it will react again, interpreting with the aid of memory what is before it."

A. "Well said. There is much soul-activity, even in perception, that lies below the 'Threshold'. Even the content of what are called 'sensations' is hardly a mere *datum*, unaltered stuff thrust on us from without. It may involve also creativity. In the coming of a patch of colour there is more than the surface-fact suggests."

L. "You emphasise the penetration of brain-process by the soul. Which of the bodies owned by soul is most in evidence ? Perhaps Professor Mackenzie's subtle body." (9)

A. "I can't say. Treat the physical body as a prolongation of the permanent soul — that is the point of most importance. If you want to better this attitude, produce your evidence."

L. "You spoke just now of limitation. Physical stimuli awaken the soul which reacts, but the soul's powers on this earth seem certainly poor. During the 'descent' a great proprietor has become a pauper."

A. "The primaeval soul owned much but, after all, it was not aware of its great possessions. The perfect individual who is to emerge from it is still in the making ; the vast majority

of persons who people this globe are unfit to enjoy more powers than they exercise now. The brain enables us to live consciously on this earth level, but it also 'damps' consciousness, urged Professor Schiller, enabling us to forget. In *Riddles of the Sphinx* the physical body is regarded as a device for 'inhibiting consciousness, for preventing the full powers of the Ego from being prematurely actualised'. Schiller was referring here to the 'Transcendental Ego', whereas we prefer, for reasons already given in full, to speak of the permanent soul. But his case for 'damping' holds good. The body is part of a constraining system in which, drinking the cup of Lethe, we are protected to a great extent from ourselves. We and our societies are still in the depths in which imagining runs amok. Consider Europe and Asia in 1939! Happily our malevolence is blunted by defective knowledge and control of Nature."

S. "Our typical soul has now come into touch with the earth level. Are we to suppose that the pressure in this direction is very strong?"

A. "Yes. No doubt there is a 'divinity of measure', as Hegel calls it, which is illustrated in the quantities finding expression in the cosmos; excess and defect are righted in the long run. But in respect of births on earth, the drift has nearly always been towards excess, and the righting of this has entailed great suffering, not however without its compensations. Thus the struggle for existence and pleasant living was made acute and Man was compelled to tread the hard way of progress:

Man's efforts lightly flag and seek too low a level (10)

observes God to Mephistopheles in *Faust*. Man's fecundity, at least among the less intelligent stocks, was secured by the drive of instinct. Through instinct, again, works a force of which philosophy so far has failed to take account.(11) We are to glance at a topic of great metaphysical interest, understanding of which will further the solution of many riddles.

Struggle exists in the cosmos at large and in all parts of it, among sub-atomic natural agents, even among the mental contents whose reciprocal tension prompts us, as Professor Dewey urges, to think. All students are familiar with Darwin's illustrations of its working in the plant and animal kingdoms;

some have discussed it freely in connexion with Man. We are going further; we are to apply the concept of struggle to a domain not usually held to be associated with it, are to stress the struggle for manifestation of souls, needing physical bodies whereby they can conspire reflectively on earth. It is this struggle in the background which supports instinct, supplying the swarming hosts, fit and unfit; which brings to pass the tragedy mentioned by Mill, that of great populations 'with no restrainer but death'. Death, and often in grim, degrading forms! Yet despite famines, malnutrition, wars, harrying mischief of all kinds, and last, but not least, the miserably poor routine-lives in store for most of us, there is no likelihood of revolt on the grand scale, such as Schopenhauer desired. Friend Leslie here used to regard ours as a 'mad world'. Since he saw in creation the work of the Unconscious and denied that the martyrdom of Man brought any adequate return, I could greet his opinion quite warmly. He had been disillusioned by life as he seemed to see it. But now even this martyrdom of Man is found by him to be both unavoidable and worth enduring."

L. "That is so, and this light shed on the birth-problem helps me yet more. This pressure must needs exist, has a purpose — is an aspect of the cosmic plan, of the creative realisation of the divine world-system. Let me add a rider. Beyond the individuals to be developed in this Gehenna of struggle are discerned no doubt the Imaginals furthering, limiting and checking one another's expansion in the spatio-temporal domain. May I read a passage from *Z.D.* bearing on populations and control of them: '... the repression of excessive numbers means that certain imaginals are limited and checked by other imaginals whose joint manifestations constitute the "environment". When the "divinity of measure" is violated and any constituent of the world — from CO<sub>2</sub> to men — appears in excess, conditions supervene, tending to repress it. Otherwise there would be nothing to prevent codfish from filling the Atlantic or negroes from occupying all the continents. What you name "the means of subsistence", "climate", human and animal "rivals" and so forth all alike exemplify groups of imaginals which, by limiting one another and other

imaginals, secure the *proportions* most favourable to the world-plan. The seemingly banal pressure of populations against the "means of subsistence", as noted by Malthus and others, is the outward and visible sign of a balancing process effected through struggle.' (12) Once more we recognise that old Heracleitus was right; 'war is the father of all things'. And we have got back to a war of Imaginals."

S. "And these Imaginals, with their combinations and proportions, were constructed by Divine Imagining for creative evolution. So we can take joy in meliorism: God's above the storms of the Becoming; all's well . . . Wortvoll, what do you think of the notion of soul-struggle thus sprung on you?"

W. 'Anderton exploits well the Imaginals. Yet so far I can't detect a flaw in his speculative ventures. It may be that I accepted too much when these imaginals were first mooted.'

L. "No, no; you were very cautious. But anyhow you accepted provisionally our main contentions to see what they might lead to. Continue to criticise; we like it. I foresee that this *aperçu* about soul-struggle is going to be useful later. Help us to make it so."

W. "This extension of the notion of struggle to souls is novel and startling. But I have admitted that belief in an agent, independent of the physical body, is sound. Don't forget that. Since such agents exist, they may enter possibly into a conflict such as Anderton posits. Births may not be secured easily. Souls competing within a group and groups warring against groups — these concepts make one stop to think. But, even if I allow for such a struggle, all that is diabolic in overpopulation and its sequel has not been accounted for."

A. "Don't overlook, what I referred to before, those local initiatives which mark the riot of agents getting free of central control and running amok. I can't say more. Who can?"

W. "A just retort. And now, Anderton, having brought your descending soul within range of earth, consider that it is successful in the struggle for birth. It's about to be born on the physical level. Tell us more about the process."

A. "Just the essentials of philosophical interest; we have no time for excursions into psychology."

W. "Unless you see fit to point out in what respects empirical psychologists, contemptuous of metaphysics, have gone astray. Philosophy ought certainly to have something to say about that."

A. "Suggestion adopted. I continue.

The seat of the soul in the physical body has been supposed to be in the pineal gland, the arteries, upper brain and various other places. In so far as the annexing soul has a body or bodies, it may be said to have its seat in the entire physical body enveloped or invaded by these. In so far as it is regarded as a centre of consciring, its seat is best described as those portions of the nervous system with which it is allied closely. Physiological psychology tends to connect it most intimately with certain processes in the cortex which in fact, after the annexation, belong to it temporarily as part of its own psychical life.

Processes in this quarter supply stuff for the sense-content thrust on the soul by the infant's brain. It was once the custom to speak of 'sensations', derived from intra or extra-organic sources, as just *data*, i.e. 'given'. Writers who believed in the soul subjected them to its 'forms'. Other writers credited them with leaving behind ideal residues which combined themselves, or were combined by the brain, into mind without positing a soul at all. Associable 'sensations' and 'ideas' promised to simplify so much! This was an aspect of that false simplicity, already exposed,(13) which set up materialism in philosophy and associationism in psychology, ignoring reality to the end of making terse statements. In philosophy these statements, lightening the burden of thought, won a respect sapped with difficulty; in psychology they were never useful."

S. "Never. The units were figments and the 'laws' of their association unverifiable. Associationism dates from Locke and leaves us wondering how, on its lines, Locke's creed was thought out and put into words! The work of a centre of consciring, Locke's, living its own purposive life, was overlooked. This creed was silent too about the creativity present in the mind. And, when later 'mental chemistry' had to be invoked by Mill, its sterility became obvious."



W. "What do you offer in its place?"

S. "We rescue you from a monster and you ask for a handsome present as well. As Anderton observed, we are not talking psychology. We get rid of course of the unitary 'sensations' and 'ideas', and we refer you to conservation and additive creation within a continuum, to aspects of which you attend. These 'sensations' and 'ideas' are among such aspects, not things existing in their own right, out of which one can juggle verbally what they don't possess. Generalise about the happenings within the continuum and substitute sound psychological theory for bad. . . . But Anderton is telling us of the history of a soul."

A. "Perception implies penetration; sense-content, visual and auditory in particular, may be an actual messenger from the external world. But this traveller changes his appearance very considerably as he leaves Nature, enters the brain and is received by the reacting soul. Thus my body is said to comprise  $10^{27}$  atoms (=societies of minor natural agents), but how much of this amazingly rich object do you perceive? A few beggarly colours, sounds, etc., are all you conspire of an indefinitely complicated fragment of the external world. Look at yon patch of green. It seems a quiet, stably simple content and yet, were you able to record all the events allied with it in your brain and in Nature, you would need a geologic aeon in which to do the work. The practical needs of your living are met by the little of reality which you perceive; the construct, green patch, is made in the laboratory of your soul, of which the annexed brain forms now a part.

Made thus the green is interpretable, by imaginal supplementation, as the green grass of this mountain, and is then perceived with its full meaning. It has been interpreted, not as a datum, but as a *construct*. It stands out of a continuum such as James and Martineau stressed; a continuum from which only attention severs for itself the related parts. This continuum in our perception conveys to us that of Nature, which Whitehead regards as the 'continuity of events'.<sup>(14)</sup> Such continuity, again, which is sufficiently 'loose' to give agents a free swing, presupposes the universal conspiring. Democritan dreams, which build up reality out of detached 'elements',

deceive only those who take abstractions too seriously."

*L.* "Lafcadio Hearn wrote that 'even in the most common of our sensations' there are enigmas insoluble on conventional psychological lines. Anderton has said that sensations are constructs, not data. Constructs are before us now — yes. But this is not all. Clinging to them may be the scent of ancestral pasts, nay, of our own pasts in the Plurality of Lives. Save me from academic thinkers with eyes only for their theories. Watch for those subtle intimations, dear to mystics and poets, which reach us on the crests of the waves of sense."

*W.* "Oh! in this way, Leslie, you can smuggle all sorts of mystical lore past the Customs. What check have we got on the intimations? . . . But, Anderton, in respect of the constructs, you don't reject, I suppose, the rule that qualitative differences in sense-content, *e.g.* colour, sound and smell, depend on the excitation of specific corresponding parts of the central nervous system and its adjuncts?"

*A.* "Certainly not as regards ordinary sensory experience, though there are alleged facts in the annals of Psychical Research that must give us pause. The 'law of specific energy of the nerves' refers us to a rule, and it may be that exceptions to it occur. In ordinary sensory experience the soul reacts on what is supplied by its annexed lowest body and normally as the 'law' states."

*W.* "If the primaeval soul was rich in content, it comprised, doubtless, very many of the constituents of the world-system. In this case sensible qualities did not appear to it for the first time on the lower levels of being which include this earth. What it perceives is not entirely novel, as it would be to a soul conceived on Platonic lines and acquainted in the harmonious state only with bare 'Forms'."

*S.* "In a world of additive creation and conflict such as this, very much will be novel to the soul, but not that qualitative sensible variety which Plato despised. Sense-content also is a spiritual fact; fact = 'that which has been *made*' within an imaginal cosmos. Such content was among its possessions before the wheel of births began to turn, but, mark you, for its irreflective low-intensity conscurring, not as part of a Platonic, contemplative paradise to be 'enjoyed'

consciously. And when the soul perceives sense-content here and now, it reacts as the possessor of like content, not as a conceptual ghost trying to fill a mere void in its being."

L. "Surely in the building of its knowledge *ici-bas*, there is a Platonic 'recovery' for its reflective consciring of what it possessed irreflectively before. Indeed the main importance of life to us seems to be that it leads — so slowly — to the unlocking of the soul's 'treasure-house' of which we spoke. The soul is to attain full reflective consciring of itself on its way to God, its home."

S. "Enriched by the novelties which it confronts while unlocking the 'treasure-house'."

W. "Help to unlock it, Anderton."

A. "An interesting digression. I continue. Creative synthesis then is present in mere sense-patches, but also in the perceptual field at large. Is this surprising if, as Wundt held too, we live in a world of 'spiritual energy' (= consciring)? And, according to Höffding as cited by Tudor Jones, this creative work 'finds expression in every sense-perception and most clearly in the apprehension of space, which springs from the mutual reaction of perceptual, tactual and motor experience, and in the timbre of sounds, which is produced by the mingling of overtones and undertones. It was first discovered in the higher phases of psychical life, in the rise of imagery, concepts and ideas. But the peculiarity presents itself in the most elementary psychical processes, as well as in the highest. In this respect also it bears witness to the continuity of the soul-life.' (15) One cannot expect a *tabula rasa* to work and there is work to be done! Most of this work is done below the 'Threshold' and consequently escapes notice. Indeed it was only by pointing out what is done more overtly in the surface-field of private fancy that West induced us three to consider Imaginism and the creative syntheses of which it treats.

Experience (reflective consciring and its conscita) acquaints us with a continuum or unbroken whole of content, not with unit-sensations and loose ideas such as associationists invent. Once you have allowed for this continuum within the soul, you can posit, as Kant did, 'productive imagining' to do the creative work just mentioned. Modern Imaginism indeed is a

development based on the suggestion made by Kant. ' . . . It is to productive imagination that the generation of unified experience is primarily due. In it something of the fruitful and inexhaustible character of noumenal reality is traceable . . . to its noumenal character we may also trace its capacity of combining those facts of sense and understanding, which in the realm of appearance remain persistently opposed. Imagination differs from the understanding chiefly in that it is at once more comprehensive and also more truly creative.' (16) Kant moots also the question whether this imagination is the ' fundamental power ' . (17) Fichte uses it as the pre-empirical activity that produces objects. Of course we are for this power. Call it conscurring or imagining, according to that side of reality (consciring-conscita) which you desire to stress."

S. " *Gestalt* thought with its perceptual images is also a protest against adding and combining mythical units. It tends to treat objects as wholes rather than sums of separate ' things '. Such ' things ' are carved out of the sense-continuum by ' analysis ', i.e. attention. The world of sense-imagery, which is the perceptual world, has its objects created, urged Professor Wildon Carr (18), not put together as associationists hold. The objects, again, are not made by ~~thinking~~ in the logical meaning of the term. ' There is . . . an activity logically prior to thinking and its condition, an activity of imagining which gives us the perceptual world.' This imagining, the ' principle of life ' itself, is expressed in the sense-images. In exploiting Kant's suggestion, Professor Carr followed the example set by Professor J. S. Mackenzie and Douglas Fawcett, (19) from which modern Imaginism took its rise. Belief in the sense-continuum goes back to Martineau and earlier."

W. " Kant's *aperçu*, which failed to dominate his general thought, was the best gift he had for philosophy. In other respects he blundered, often badly — his categories, for instance, became the thinkers' burden."

L. " This sense-imagery, lit with emotion, ' expresses ' further the individual's special selective outlook. *Quot homines, tot mundi*. It may express too an outlook favoured in a former life or lives. Sense-continua, approximately alike, may be dissociated by different souls into largely different worlds.

Interests decide. So-called 'congenital dispositions' count for much."

W. "Your fancy needs a bridle; one thing at a time. . . . More, Anderton, about the story of your typical soul. We have dealt with its sensory constructs and perceptions as it begins to work in alliance with the physical body. It has been victor in the struggle for birth, annexing one of the organisms for which the invaders compete. What of the sequel?"

A. "What do you say about a truce while we have tea? I close for the while by welcoming Leslie's remark. The phrase 'congenital dispositions' (dispositions is a word liked by psychologists, committing them to no definite explanation) may cover much, even the effects on present consiring of interests and actions that helped to fill our former lives. For heredity works not only through the chromosomes of the germ-plasm, but also through conservations within the wandering soul itself. . . . Ah! I interest you. No, not now. A slice of that alluring cake, Stark. Thanks."

\* \* \* \* \*

A. "Perception presupposes penetration. Our typical soul, using its annexed brain, is penetrated, reacts, supplements with interpretative content the constructs, and comes to perceive, at first very confusedly and crudely. At the outset it seemed helpless indeed. The sense-continuum was an invasive, enveloping surprise, sense-stuff all but indiscriminated, organic sensation, touch, colour, sound, feeling, intimately blent, time and space lacking clear outline and measure, self and not-self as yet unevolved. Consiring was of a meaningless, changeful neutrum in which, however, there was no *thing* to change. But slowly the continuum was probed and forced to yield objects. It was dissociated; things, qualities, relations, quantities, pleasures and pains were attended to and stood out in detached aloofness against a background.

Philosophy can say that the stuff or filling of the objects is of one tissue with the substance of the external world, which enters the soul not without modifications and heavy losses. Grass is green, whether we perceive it to be such or not, but we enjoy an astonishingly meagre knowledge of what is thus named. For in truth we are 'blinded by our eyes' and other

senses. Fullness of knowledge is not for dwellers on earth ; the adjustments of practical life exact precision, it is clear, not omniscience. Grass exists actually in the brain as well as on this mountain, though it is present in a very incomplete way, borne into it on the wings of light or troubling it slightly through sound, gravity or touch. Just so an electron in the grass is also present in distant stars, in any spot, however remote, to which its causal range can be said to extend. Such interpenetration of content dates from the *primaeval* world-continuum, sustained by God, and renders possible the perceptions of the soul about to be born. The grass, too, not only penetrates the brain, but it does so as an alien, limiting and intrusive presence which this brain and annexing soul did not create. There is supplied the foundation on which belief in an *external* world will come to stand.

We can regard this soul as now launched and being made ready in a harbour before going to sea. It has even been said — take care of the percept and the concept (and with it thought, the thought which is examined by logic) will take care of itself. Certainly, in the absence of percepts, concepts will not be formed. But the concept or substitute-fact, which represents realities when we are thinking *about* them, demands further creative power. Concepts are not mere copies of percepts but constructs which fulfil purpose. They serve the purposes of our souls living *their own* lives. Thus 'God', 'electron', 'energy', 'mass' are constructs which stand for realities for the purposes of practical or theoretic thinking. Do you shy at the phrase 'substitute-fact'? Reflect. Is my concept of the State the State itself? Are the concepts with which men represent God in their philosophies and creeds God Himself? No; the concept is a substitute-fact and is often created, *i.e.* imagined, amiss. Notice creation of a useful sort in physics. The physicist uses concepts of a highly imaginative type and 'is nowadays scrupulously careful to guard these from contamination by conceptions borrowed from the other world'; the familiar one of workaday life, observes Eddington.(20)

I ought to add a few more words about thought. Conceptual thought, the higher field of reasoning, deals with relations and is a makeshift evolved in the service of finite sentient ;

its goal being truth which is only 'about' reality, lacking the grip and fulness of direct consciring. Even so its triumphs cannot possibly be explained on associationist lines or indeed on any lines that presuppose an originally empty soul. Creativity pervades this field; imagining shows, as we saw, even in the syllogism. Let me cite Professor Ribot's words once more: 'Underneath all the reasoning, inductions, deductions, calculations, demonstrations, methods and logical apparatus of every sort, there is something animating them that is not understood, that is the work of that complex operation the constructive imagination'. And the soul, imagining thus, makes and relates concepts, *living its own life*, not that of a puppet dominated by the body. The concepts further its purposes.

Consider how the so-called impressions and ideas are used. A thinker wishes to be 'spectator of all time and all existence'. He seeks to grasp in thought the universe, but, this being impossible, he has to *use* concepts, made out of quite poor stuff, to represent it, has to make a system of substitute-facts stand for reality at large. His soul was never empty. He tries to *recover* for his conscious thought something which exists already in the background of this soul. And the marvel is that, using such meagre content as is available, he achieves a result which even critics admire.

So far, so good. Enough has been said. I am not here to talk logic and psychology to the boring of experts who have nothing to learn. I am considering the metaphysics of birth and, having finished this task, shall be passing to another topic also of metaphysical interest. Before doing so I ought to deal with any difficulties raised by what has just been said. Will you oblige me by asking questions respecting these?"

W. "All the phases of my psychical life derive from the 'fundamental power' of the soul, called consciring or imagining according as we stress one or other of its main aspects? I follow this statement easily enough."

A. "These phases arise by way of creative evolution which throws off the novel as required. Hence the word 'derive' is of doubtful value. Thus much novelty is improvised in the development of reasoning, which at first, as is obvious in the case of practical inference, owes everything to fancy. But I

need not go over this ground again.(21) Don't forget Stark's saying, ' we have to use reason for what it is worth ' ; it misses perfection, is a make-shift, not the mark of an immortal."

W. " Agreeable feeling, such as our surface-minds comprise, colours free and furthered consciring ; disagreeable marks obstruction and conflict in what psychologists call ' neuro-psychical ' processes ? "

A. " Yes ; we have dealt with that issue too. In respect of the higher emotions and sentiments, feeling due to the permanent soul counts for far more than that from the annexed physical body. By the way if you were liberated awhile from this body and were able to attain certain levels, you would learn unforgettably what feeling can be. We live a stale, flat life for the most part on this planet. Read what famous mystics have said."

W. " You speak as one having authority. Have you ever . . . ? "

A. (stiffly). " I'm not in the witness-box. . . . Any further questions ? "

W. " I prefer first-hand evidence when I can get it ; so many of the mystics belong to the herd-creeds and dream as faith dictates. . . . No matter. And now solve this little difficulty. The grass, you said, was borne into the brain on the wings of light. True ; but what of the happenings in the receptive ganglia. The permanent soul reacts on what they transmit. But in reacting thus why does it perceive only light and not the physiological processes in the ganglia as well ? "

A. " The soul reacts as portion of a planned world-system. As to the co-operating physiological processes we can suggest this. The entire processes are not on the level of intensity required ; only the message from the external world is of such intensity that it can be raised above the ' Threshold ' and so made content for reflective perceptual consciring. The nerve-processes canalise favoured ingressions from the external world and thus make possible the adjustments of practical life. ' Ganglionic hesitancy ', ' ganglionic friction ', etc., which one reads of in works on physiological psychology, mark the making of the level of intensity required. Invasive content, waning in intensity, soon falls too far below the ' Threshold ' and cannot be raised above it by the permanent soul. Power is limited."



L. "Sense-content comes largely from the internal organs of the body."

A. "The canalisation is assured in this domain as well, but, as practical life exacts, the affective tone of the content dominates all else."

W. "The sense-world is objectivated without the aid of 'forms' and 'categories'?"

A. "I don't need them; hence *hypotheses non fingo*. Touching space and time consult the pages of *Z.D.* (22) These relations are imported along with the sense-content in the 'messages' from an already spatio-temporal world. These relations, conspired crudely at the outset, are elaborated as the text-books of psychology describe. Incidentally all so-called 'sensations' are spatial, but the relations show more clearly in some than in the rest.(23)

Categories, Kant's 'judging concepts'? They are not wanted. The mythical manifold, derived from 'things-in-themselves', is not 'unified' in space and time 'forms' and 'judged' into objectivity. The actual sense-contents declare their own character as 'messages', as intrusive tentacles thrust forth by something not the conspiring soul. All further elaboration of externality is achieved on this basis.

The category of Causation comes off badly. It concerns time-successions. Since for Kant time is mere appearance for finite percipients, there are for him no time-successions in an independent, external world. The category is used by the 'Transcendental Judgment', and with that its significance ends.

The truly important matter, after all, is to discover the character of the causal dynamic as embodied in the actual time-successions in the world-system; of which the external natural order is a part. For time, as we saw, is not unreal appearance but native to Divine Imagining Itself."

S. "It is no hard task to conceive the permanent soul as underlying the surface, terrene man, always supposing that one realises that evolution or development is creative. Sense-content, feeling, conation, have been dealt with sufficiently during these talks and elsewhere. Judgment is fundamentally discrimination (implying of course conspiring) very often allied with assimilation. Reasoning presents no difficulties and we

have said enough about it for the uses of metaphysics. Private fancy, *i.e.* imagining in the narrow acceptance of the term, need not delay us. It illustrates well the additively creative aspect of the soul. I am not comfortable, however, about the problem of Memory, clearly a conservative aspect of the soul. Perhaps Anderton will say something respecting Memory and soul-conservation generally."

A. "This is a topic which calls for more expert knowledge than I possess. Nevertheless I will feel my way cautiously towards an attempt to meet the difficulty.

In the first place I remind you of what we said about Divine Consciring, that It is both conservative and additively creative and that *inter alia* It conserves the entire pasts of this and innumerable other world-systems. It conserves these as fully concrete 'made reality' sustained exactly as it came to exist. That which has *passed* into this realm of conservation is the great *Past*, at once Memory and Actual Existence.(24) Always being added to, this Past, which had no beginning, gives place in the direction of the future to the restless seas of change.

We must suppose that the consciring of the finite soul conserves similarly, only on its finite scale.<sup>c</sup> But what is behind the memory which Man exercises in earth-life? This memory is a makeshift, valuable for the adjustments of practical life, but dim, fallible, ill supplied with details and conditioned obviously by the processes of physical body and brain. What more can we say about it? While I am making up my mind, I should be glad to profit by suggestions, so will ask someone else to carry on. Perhaps Stark will oblige."

S. "In discussing conservation in connexion with the surface mind, we are driven to consider those 'dispositions' to which Leslie referred some while ago. Whatever these may be, they are most important; in fact, as Bosanquet put it, if we lay a mind on the dissecting table, we find it consists mostly of 'a fabric of organised dispositions, each disposition corresponding to a unique point of view or special angle from which it plays a part in some human function'.(25) We are not aware directly of this fabric. We infer the 'traces' or 'dispositions' from the effects which they have on our

conscious life. Some psychologists call them 'mental' or 'psychical', but there are many who dissent. Imaginism, which regards all reality as of psychical character, will regard the fabric as located somehow in one or more of the bodies of the soul. The fabric ejects into conscious life the contents which may be required when there is perception to be interpreted, books to be written, recollections to be built up and so forth. But I am not clear as to how all these contents are maintained in being, actual or potential."

L. "The fabric has been called a 'structure' by Macdougall, and a relatively conservative one too. We are invited to consider how it grows, how it influences conscious life and is influenced by it.(26) The surface man is always altering it and so altering, though slowly, the background of his waking life. Observe that there is something very stable about the fabric or structure, call it what you will. I look at an old letter and memories, buried perhaps for twenty years, ride up in battalions. Well, Wortvoll?"

But the Professor shook his head.

W. "I can't add a word usefully. Let Anderton intervene."

A. "Thanks, friends, for clearing the track. But we are not out of the jungle yet, so some of my work may prove of use.

You made mention of a more or less conservative fabric or structure, of which we have no direct knowledge, but which is said to constitute most of the mind. This structure, psychical and sustained by irreflective consciring, supplies a lavish flow of content indispensable to our living. How is this service secured?

I reminded you just now that Divine Consciring sustains the Past, the actually existent Past. All finite centres of consciring sustain pasts in the same manner. I say — consciring. Nothing is explicable unless this fundamental power is borne in mind. A 'structure' of content includes only such content as belongs to it at any given instant. It is itself sustained and cannot produce or reproduce content of any kind whatever. Don't refer to it as a store-house of innumerable contents or as a factory for making them. And beware of the term 'potential', used by Stark. A 'potential' chick does not exist

— only the egg. When the causal conditions have been made complete, the chick exists and not before. There is no limbo in which 'potential' existents abide.

Consider the full significance of these truths. The 'structure' is sustained by finite irreflective consciring. But not all the contents related to it are sustained in the specious present. On the contrary, most of these exist *in the past*, in that past which was referred to as made reality. If we locate (as I think we must) the 'structure' partly in the brain, partly in another body of the soul, we must not populate it with too numerous contents at any given moment. By far the greater portion of the related contents exists *beyond the specious present*. It has been made, persists aloof from the Becoming in which reality is being made."

W. "What then influences our conscious lives?"

A. "The consciring active in the *present* 'structure' which is modified and re-modified continually. Let me take the most difficult case; that of Memory.

The Memory enigma is stateable thus. Suppose that I hear a melody in 1939 which recalls an event that happened in 1900. This past is reconstructed from the 'now' with contents that are new; the 'structure' is modified so as to eject these new contents into my conscious life. The scene I remember in 1939 is not resurrected and transported out of the past into the present with contents numerically the same as in 1900. It is *re-membered*! How then does the memory mediate the past; how does the past intrude into the present at all?"

W. "Some, like Bradley, fall back on 'universals'."

L. "Perhaps the past penetrates the present and is known in and through it as the external world is known in and through sense-content?"

A. "Leslie's suggestion is interesting. Are we to say that the present is penetrated by the past in the case of my Intuition of Pre-existence?"

W. "We ought not to forget that there is a disease of memory in which new experiences are falsely familiar. Memory becomes a cheat."

S. "I would not overstress the abnormal in this discussion. When a 'structure' is located in the brain, an irruption of

physical origin may wreck it. The brain exists on the level where natural agents run amok."

L. "We ought not to forget something else; namely that we have a direct perception of a segment of the past in every specious present. . . . And now have we said enough to mediate a solution?"

A. "I'll close tentatively thus: there arises a change in the 'structure'. The scene of 1900 is *re-constructed* in 1939 with *new* content by consciring *which sustains the actual past*. But this consciring is conditioned as to expression. Nothing perfect, nothing immune from defect or destruction, occurs on the level of the brain. (The level of the permanent soul is not involved.) It is possible, as Leslie says, that the scene in the past penetrates the memory and is thus present in and through it, but, if so, we shall have to allow that the content is *not* wholly new!

A further consideration seems to me of great importance, in so far as the 'structure' is supposed to feed Memory. When I remember the scene of 1900, I do so in terms of new content, penetrated possibly by old. But what of the side of consciring? Perhaps the *original act of consciring* is repeated and constitutes thus the so-called 'inexplicable tie' between what I knew once and now know again. In this case the reconstructed 1939 scene may differ considerably from that of 1900 (and most of our memory-constructs are very poor), but the old will nevertheless be recognised in the new. Consciring is adequate to the call for sameness."

L. "We often remember vaguely and badly — I recall that I flew my aeroplane yesterday, but have no accurate mental picture of the fact. Still I am sure that *I* flew it; Anderton has hit the mark."

W. "I like this theory that consciring supplies new contents modelled on the actual past; there is so much to be supplied which cannot be stored in the specious present. . . . Well, we have heard about Memory; what of Expectation?"

A. "Creative fancy dominates obviously. But no difficult problem is presented. Work it out for yourself later and let us get on."

S. "Do you believe that 'loose' images are used in our thinking?"

A. "I don't hold that dissociation of the continuum results in them normally. All the alleged images I examine have outlines defined against a background of other content. Recall a face, a winter scene; it stands out of a background, is unstable and tends to melt into this background. In the case of very strong consciring the image tends to annex and include more and more fresh territory, until it becomes only a small portion of a larger field. Frankly the 'loose' image of popular writing seems to me to be isolated only by attention."

L. "What about dissociation in the case of secondary personalities?"

A. "Ah! that is not a normal happening. Two or more sub-centres of consciring exist, very closely related, with frontiers formed by content below the 'Threshold' degree of intensity."

W. "Determinism has no place in imagist psychology?"

A. "Determinism is a convenient assumption of science which aspires to predict infallibly. Statistical laws, based on the uniformity of averages, favour this hope; nevertheless I hold with Eddington that 'there is no strict causal behaviour anywhere'. (27) Actual causation includes freedom and chance, as I urged before. This truth bears most impressively on the discussion of the Plurality of Lives which lies ahead of us. 'Inflexible laws of causation' are out of date."

W. "We need hardly dwell on the topic of the evolution of self and not-self?"

A. "No; this would entail too long an excursion into psychology, into domains familiar to us already. But I will make some observations which seem helpful.

In indicating the history of this soul that has won a body in the struggle for birth, I was not concerned with narrative such as is recorded in a biography. I was dealing with the process that awaits souls in general and had no interest in what particular souls, A, B and C, may have to confront. My remarks on personality will concern likewise what is common to all normal souls, whatever their very many differences may be.

The Buddhists and William James are justified in

rejecting belief in a substantial ego. The stable reality connected with our typical individual was described only as the 'permanent part of the soul', which is certainly immune from destruction during the evolution of a world-system. It is a centre of consciring, at first irreflective, which, like the monad of Leibnitz, has a 'highest' body expressing it and sustained inseparably by it. But it had a beginning and is not closed to penetration from beyond its domain; has 'windows' which a monad has not. Such a centre at the outset is neither an ego nor supports one. To describe it as a 'higher self' would be misleading. The egos or selves are to be evolved on lower levels after the 'descent', as I call it in Platonic language, has begun. On this lowly terrene level self is constructed along with not-self as perceived in the external world and is completed by intercourse with other selves. 'The altruistic instincts', wrote Ward, 'lead on to sociality and this begets personality; but such creative synthesis is not reversible.'

It is important to note how unstable such selves can be. A change in mere organic sensations may be disastrous. And those selves that are normal are always selective. A great personality of wide ideals and interests exists through choice; not all the content welling up in the centre is welcome. Reflective consciring identifies itself only with content that is of value or promises well."

*L.* "Reflective consciring is essential."

*A.* "Of course. Reflective consciring lights my social, sporting, business, philosophical and other selves as also the wider one which embraces these minor ones. But don't fail to understand that the most rich and full terrene self is of quite provisional worth. And dismiss the frequently used phrase 'unconscious self' as nonsense."

*W.* "You seem to be preparing me to face some new adventure of thought."

*A.* "Well — yes. For we are to discuss soon issues connected with the topic of the Plurality of Lives. Clear ideas about self will be required. We are now ready to tolerate the truths that, as the Buddhists and Proclus urged long ago, the same self does not pass from life to life (28) and that the centre of consciring may comprise two or more selves in one birth-

history. Birth-histories are means by which the permanent soul attains reflective consciring and opens its treasure-house."

W. "Will the soul enjoy this house for ever? What in fine is the guarantee that it will be immortal?"

A. "I shall be dealing with this problem when I come to consider 'Outlooks'. . . . And now I think we ought to be getting back to the hotel. To-night after dinner we will follow our typical soul into the valley of the shadow of death. We have not attempted to consider a biography; only salient features of its birth-history offer riddles to metaphysics. Its passage into death may be discussed similarly without entering into details. It is only the fundamental meaning of this episode that compels us to reflect."

\* \* \* \* \*

### DEATH

" . . . Surely death acquires a new and deeper significance when we regard it no longer as a single and unexplained break in an unending life, but as part of the continually recurring rhythm of progress — as inevitable, as natural, and as benevolent as sleep. We have only left youth behind us, as at noon we have left the sunrise. They will both come back, and they do not grow old."—Professor ELLIS McTAGGART (29).

"Science tells us", says Wortvoll, as we settle into our long chairs after dinner, "that earth-life cannot dispense with death. Thus deaths, the price of its life, are always taking place within the physical body and the final death of the entire organism is both inevitable and, biologically speaking, useful. Death is the guardian angel of terrestrial multi-cellular species. Overcrowding is stopped, the claim of the unfit to breed denied, newcomers with variations good for species encouraged. Meanwhile the ageless, enduring Germ-Plasm sheds successive bodies much as your permanent soul sheds successive selves. The biologist has no quarrel with Death till his own turn comes and he is invited to take part in the *Danse Macabre*."

L. "But why should he protest even then? Is not this earth-life squalid, petty, unprofitable and permeated with pain? In the Middle Ages when most folk led mean lives, sages sought



for an Elixir Vitae which was to warn off Death for ages. *Cui bono*? Were they sceptics at heart, wishing to postpone their departure for Heaven? Or were they slaves of instinct, clinging to a painful lot because they must? For my part I am with the Orphics and Plato who in the *Gorgias* thinks life in this body is life in a tomb."

W. "Oh! come now, you don't do so badly after all, you spoilt child of Fortune. You don't shy at sport anyhow."

L. "Instincts drive us to action, bringing with them both pleasure and pain. I don't deny that portions of earth-life are very pleasant, but on the whole unrest and pain seem to prevail. Consider the sacred books of most of the religions; they record the groans of a world in travail. These groans are too loud to ignore and I cannot set against them the occasional hours of merriment which I enjoy. As for Death, why here is a promising new adventure indeed! Pluto may seem sinister, but Persephone at his side is smiling and a garland from the field of Enna decks her brow. I am to expand into a higher reach of the soul. Why should I shrink from greatness?"

S. "I must say, Leslie, that for an ex-pessimist you are liberal in your praises of the future. But with all respect for Persephone I will suggest that there are dangers ahead. 'Dire illusions await Man in the regions beyond the grave'.<sup>(30)</sup> The Tibetan *Book of the Dead* and like works may well scare the traveller. Those who 'run amok' too ruthlessly in this prison-house may have a rude awakening. One need not be a fool to blench before the possibilities within an imaginal world."

L. "I suppose that such evidence as we possess shows that the man who dies takes up his psychical life, high or low, on the other side more or less where Atropos cuts it short here. He will have to face the storms which he has called into being. But I was thinking, not of Grand Inquisitors, sadists, gangsters and world-conquerors, but of the normal individual for whom the wind has no sting."

W. "Well, these guesses may be true or not and I'll leave the matter so. The main contention before us is that death is the shedding of the lower part of the soul. I am recalling the statement that the physical body was annexed by our typical soul."

A. "That is so. And, support from the old body having

ceased, the residual, superior soul is sunk at first in irreflective consciring. Conscious life will recommence slowly in connexion with a new level of being, possibly with a private world born of fancy. Fechner, considering this change from the point of view of the soul, would call it one of 'attention'; another complex of objects has risen above the 'Threshold' and holds interest."

S. "Attention is focal consciring and always illustrates rhythm. Even in earth-life 'it is impossible to keep attention on a perfectly steady stretch with respect to its object. Waves of consciousness in connexion with these fluctuations of attention rise and fall.' (31) There are thus alternating phases within reflective consciring itself, tendencies towards rest and *vis viva*. There are also alternating phases in which reflectivity and irreflectivity take part. Death's fundamental meaning cannot be far to seek."

A. "Death illustrates a conservative feature in the history of the soul, simply a habit which is based on rhythm. The soul tends to return to that stage in its history when it was a region of *mere content*; (32) existing not for itself but for God. 'Tends', since at worst now it conscires irreflectively. It was the brain of the old body that enabled the soul to raise content above the 'Threshold'. Losing this ally, the soul is once again overborne temporarily by night."

S. "You have the answer in so far as it concerns death. But these alternating phases of reflective and irreflective consciring are used also, I take it, so as to secure the development of souls. These periods of *vis viva*, with rests and the cup of Lethe, seem from our human point of view indispensable. A soul at our stage of development, confronted perpetually with memories of often hideous lives, would be in evil case. Oblivion, which buries the past for the while, facilitates progress."

L. "Death itself must come to an end."

A. "Surely. When reflective consciring lights the 'highest body', death becomes impossible. But that consummation lies very far ahead. . . . Well, I have explained to Wortvoll our attitude towards death, and I am now about to retire and have an interview with death's sister, sleep. As we are flying to-morrow, I should advise you three to do the same."

## NOTES BY BASIL ANDERTON

- (1) *Z.D.* pp. 14-15.
- (2) Jung, *L'Inconscient* (Payot, Paris), p. 19.
- (3) Lossky, *The World as an Organic Whole*, pp. 111-112.
- (4) Professor Ladd, *Elements of Physiological Psychology*, p. 264 ff.
- (5) Chapter XI. p. 235.
- (6) Cf. *Z.D.* pp. 399-402.
- (7) Cf. *Z.D.* pp. 389-393.
- (8) Chapter XII. p. 248.
- (9) Chapter XI. p. 235.
- (10) A. G. Latham's Translation.
- (11) The first writer, according to Prof. F. C. S. Schiller, who applied the concept of struggle to the problem of births was Douglas Fawcett in *Riddle of the Universe* (1893), a book now superseded, withdrawn and long out of print.
- (12) *Z.D.* pp. 472-473.
- (13) Cf. Chapter II. "Towards Rediscovery of a Lost World".
- (14) *Principles of Natural Knowledge*, p. 25. Cf. also Appendix on "Continuity", *Divine Imagining*, pp. 239-242.
- (15) Hoffding, *Modern Philosophers*, p. 14.
- (16) Professor Norman Kemp Smith in *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 265.
- (17) *Ibid.* p. 474.
- (18) "Imagining and Reasoning", *Philosophy*, April 1931, p. 199.
- (19) Cf. *World as Imagination* (1916) and *Divine Imagining* (1921).
- (20) Eddington, *Nature of the Physical World*, Introduction, p. xv.
- (21) Chapter IV. pp. 49-51.
- (22) *Z.D.* pp. 422-456.
- (23) *Ibid.* pp. 451-453.
- (24) *Ibid.* pp. 444-448.
- (25) *Philosophical Theory of the State*, p. 174.
- (26) *Body and Mind*, p. 165.
- (27) *Nature of the Physical World*, p. 309.
- (28) Proclus is "quite clear that the composite individual, Socrates or Plato . . . has only one mortal life and at the end of it disappears. This, however, is to be distinguished from the soul of which it is a temporary embodiment". Cf. Whittaker in his book on the Neoplatonists, p. 255.
- (29) *Human Immortality and Pre-existence*, p. 119.
- (30) Sri Krishna Prem in his fascinating *The Yoga of the Bhagavat Gita*, p. 76.
- (31) Professor Ladd, *Elements of Physiological Psychology*, p. 542.
- (32) Chapter XII. p. 247.



MATTERHORN AFTER HEAVY FALL OF SNOW



## CHAPTER XIII

### THE GREAT ADVENTURE

TEN thousand feet above the eastern end of the Thunersee we are looking down on Interlaken and beyond it on the blue-green lake of Brienz. On our right, dominating the valleys of Grindelwald and Lauterbrunnen, the great mountains of the Oberland stand out against a sapphire sky. Far down on our left and a little behind is the hill-resort of St. Beatenberg, very picturesque on its shelf of green near the pines. It is still early, about nine o'clock, and the outlook at this stage of our flight to Innsbruck is distinctly good. There have been no "bumps" save above the shorelines where land and water meet; care-free travelling high up is our privilege. Leslie, having trimmed the elevators, has taken his hands off the "stick", and controls the craft only with his feet, gently pressing the rudder-bar. This is hardly a procedure to be recommended to the novice, but is convenient when conditions conspire to please us as to-day. He has been studying a map which he folds up and places on the shelf behind us.

L. "I fancy you will find this trip interesting. We shall see some of the finest scenery in Switzerland and the Tyrol; the surroundings of Innsbruck are said to be superb. And we shall come back over the Rhine and Glarus."

A. "What about the navigation? Well, the other craft can lead when wanted."

L. "It's an easy job, like that of most fine-day flights in these parts. The landmarks are so many and so obvious. No, I told our Swiss friend that we were to lead and set the course — I want to make sure of going over as many mountains as possible."

A. "Is the Leopard near us?"

He looked back out of the open window, the deflector protecting which secures him from a blast otherwise intolerable.

"About two hundred yards behind. And now we'll pay the

valley of Grindelwald a visit." Leslie does not trouble to touch the "stick", but, gently coaxed by the rudder, "The Good Companion" veers slowly to the right and crosses that view-point so justly beloved by tourists, the Schynige Platte. I can see ahead of us below the Männlichen the village of Wengen whence we had motored two hours ago. . . . But the craft is veering again up and over the Lütschen valley towards Grindelwald. Seen from the height at which we are travelling, freed thus from the ugliness marring a holiday haunt, the village on its green slope, into which two glaciers thrust their snouts, takes on the charm which stirred Ruskin. Finsteraarhorn, Schreckhorn and Wetterhorn hold me glowing with a mountaineer's delight, as the craft floats above and past the Great Scheidegg towards Meiringen in that part of the Aar valley called the Haslithal. Higher and higher we fly; I have now in view a multitude of peaks and five lakes, those of Thun and Brienz and three half veiled by mist, those of Lungern, Sarnen and Lucerne, which are glimpsed beyond the Brünig Pass. Visibility? I can make out the line of the Juras, Mont Blanc in Savoy, the Black Forest in Germany and the Valaisan Alps beyond the now fully disclosed snow-wilderness of the Oberland.

L. "We are near the 14,000 feet level; after another 1000 feet we shall cease to climb and just enjoy the visibility which, you will admit, is marvellous. People at home don't know really what the charm of flying can be. Take the 'stick' and play with it. . . . No, those wobbles and dips don't matter. Nothing matters at this height, save that, in the cases of a straight stall or spin, recovery would take longer than usual."

A. "The popular idea that the airman is always a martyr to strain seems to me, I must say, quite ridiculous. And when, as now, navigation is easy, I can agree with you in blessing the game as suitable for retired men and elders generally. But the sport has its bad times."

L. "If there were no risks at all, should we be quite so enthralled by it? *Tout lasse*, but the leaven of adventure prolongs its charm. . . . And now I must consult the map again; there is a prohibited area over which we must not fly.

I shall be going round it so as to cross the Rhine, or rather Vorderrhein, on our way to the Rheinwaldhorn and Splügen Pass. I'm making this trip as impressive as I can."

A. "The more I see of it the better I like it."

We are high above a complex mass of peaks among which is the Titlis, and enjoy a full view of misty Lucerne, its strangely shaped lake and the Zugersee ere passing across the Reuss river. Next we leave a big mountain, the Tödi, on our left.

L. "The Vorderrhein and ahead of us the Rheinwaldhorn!"

Thence we follow the Hinterrhein, skirting the Splügen Pass, profiting by a close view of the geography of the Italo-Swiss frontier and turning soon east in the direction of the Engadine. We cross that truncated valley over St. Moritz and fly a mountain course on the right side of the Inn towards Austria. These Rhaetic Alps display an amazing variety of peaks and glaciers to which neither Leslie nor I can give names. On and on we go, getting fine downlooks on lateral passes and occasionally the valley of the Inn, and marvelling always at the seemingly interminable succession of mountains. An air-liner was once lost among these, and no trace of it was ever found. We are now, I see, at a height of over 15,000 feet. And I find myself not quite so comfortable as I could have wished.

A. "Aren't we unnecessarily high, Leslie?"

L. "We're nearly at Innsbruck. A short-cut completes the pilgrimage. We leave the Inn awhile far on our left and rejoin it in Austria or, as we must now call it, Germany."

The Leopard is now abreast of us on the left, and the two planes begin to descend in a wide spiral.

L. "Look! the Brenner Pass."

A low pine-fringed gap on our right, not 5000 feet high, carrying a railway without a tunnel, is very clearly in view. It unites the valley of the Inn, which we are nearing again at the end of its loop, with that of the Adige in Italy. I have a splendid outlook down the upper part of the grand trench that leads to Bolzano and Trento; way of the march of armies in the past, way perhaps of the march of Germans one day into



the Italian plains when the present fashions of politics shall have changed. And now, propeller idling, we are on the glide. Still at about 10,000 feet, we cross the Sill towards Innsbruck, set among superb mountains on the right bank of the Inn, two of whose bridges are sighted quite easily even from our height. I can trace the Sill to where it disappears in the Inn, and with the aid of the map make out the main railway station, the Museum and University, but little else. . . . "The Good Companion" glides across the University and the Inn, spiralling back over the river till the city, now only 3000 feet below, is spread out in detail before us. We are crossing Museum Strasse; then we make for the north-east towards the mouth of the Sill.

*L.* "We can now get down to the aerodrome comfortably, having lost enough height to approach it at our ease and turn in as is convenient. I don't suppose the Customs will bother us much."

"The Good Companion" floats at 60 m.p.h. round the Reichenau aerodrome and, choosing her time well, makes a "fluff" landing. Two minutes later the Leopard joins her on the turf. The two professors and our Swiss friend, the pilot, are enraptured with the adventure. Men in uniform, looking severely official, approach.

*L.* "I suggest that we take in petrol and oil, have our lunch here and our talk afterwards. It's not worth while exploring this place in the short time at our disposal. And, if these chaps know that we are staying on the ground and off again shortly, they won't bother."

*S.* "Wortvoll and I have been here before and don't want to leave the ground."

*A.* "I'm much more interested in the scenery and our chat than in Maximilian's monument and the rest. Yes, I'm for Leslie's suggestion."

\* \* \* \* \*

#### THE GREAT ADVENTURE

Lunch has been dealt with — efficiently! We are sitting on cushions close by "The Good Companion", against a wheel of which Wortvoll is leaning. A liner has just come in and

taken-off. It is time for the discussion to open. So thinks Leslie :

“ Well, Anderton, we are all attention. We are to hear something from you about one of the Great Adventures of the permanent soul, descending from its *primaeval*, harmonious state into levels of change and conflict. It falls, like Lucifer, whom Milton likens to the sun, when showing through the horizontal, misty air ‘ shorn of his beams ’. At the dawn of the world-system it had a range such as that of Traherne’s Spirit :

It Acts not from a Centre to  
 Its Object as remote,  
 But present is, when it doth view,  
 Being with the Being it doth note.  
     Whatever it doth do,  
 It doth not by another Engine work,  
 But by it self ; which in the Act doth lurk.  
 Its Essence is Transformd into a true  
     And perfect Act.  
     And so Exact  
 Hath God appeard in this Mysterious Fact,  
     That ’tis all Ey, all Act, all Sight,  
     And what it pleas can be,  
     Not only see,  
 Or do ; for tis more Voluble than Light :  
     Which can put on ten thousand Forms,  
     Being clothd with what it self adorns.

And now, ill served by its eyes and other senses, it has lost even the memory of its past.”

S. “ Yes, but those original powers persist, though not for the passing personality of earth. The soul, sunk almost wholly in irreflective conscurring, conceals indefinitely more than it reveals. True, but at long last it will enjoy its treasure with full awareness and with its world-line of novel adventure present as well.”

W. “ I don’t wish to belittle this treasure, but we are to talk now about the world-line. I don’t expect to be told much, since my instructors, I fear, are not furnished too lavishly with evidence. But, as an ‘ earth-personality ’, I must bear in mind my short-comings — and theirs. I don’t require to see without

eyes ; I don't bank on miraculous vision on their part. So (like Plato, I believe) you need say nothing touching the various levels reached by the soul on its way to earth. I am interested, withal, intensely in what you will have to say about the manner in which its first plunge earthward came to pass."

*S.* "Quite so. And we can approach this topic in a fairly confident mood. We have mooted already several relevant suggestions respecting birth and death ; have learnt something about imaginals and sub-imaginals ; have considered the illuminating concept of the Struggle for Manifestation or Birth. And, after all, here are we, four actual existents whose vicissitudes are certainly not fiction, but have to be accounted for somehow."

*L.* "But perhaps Wortvoll holds with some nihilists that 'we know nothing and are nothing' ; in which case 'nothing' had better climb into the planes and take flight nowhere."

*W.* "Nonsense. Only I want something more convincing than the verbiage of poets, for instance."

*S.* "I think, Anderton, that your intervention would be timely. We shall not be here so very long."

*A.* "The 'descent' of the permanent souls is a stage in the fulfilment of the plan discussed before ; that of the passage of these individuated agents, superficially ill-favoured and often bad but at bottom divine, from irreflective to completely reflective consciring. This drive for fuller reality turns the wheel of their lives in the time-process, enforcing incidentally the Struggle for Manifestation or Birth on the various levels. This pressure is felt at last on the terrene level. Are there facts, known to Science, suggesting that an irruption of such evolving souls has taken place ? Let us see."

*W.* "One moment. . . . Am I to regard this statement as an indispensable part of imaginist philosophy or just as a venture of your own ?"

*A.* "As a supposal of mine prompted by a remark of West's. Stark and Leslie have never heard of it. Take or leave it, as you prefer. Treat it as my private attempt to deal with a difficulty which confronts Science to-day. Another imaginist may find a better solution ; but I must admit that I don't think he will."

W. "Now we know where we are — continue, please."

A. "You will recall my observations respecting imaginals in general.(1) No primary imaginals in the background, no creative evolution, no construction even of what men call inorganic Nature. These are great conservative, stabilising factors, but in the additively creative time-process give rise to very many secondary imaginals; to novel variations innumerable enriching the world. Among such primary imaginals is that (or those) whose members play parts in the history of mankind. The history, in so far as it takes place on this planet, is one of souls allied with physical bodies. In this quarter stability in complexity (2) and an astonishing novelty are illustrated lavishly among the secondary imaginals and sub-imaginals concerned. I cannot dwell now on these aspects of conservation and additive creation. I am to ask: when was ingression into these physical bodies first achieved?"

L. "Are we considering a *predestined* event or an *experiment*, expressing the free initiative of the permanent souls or their imaginals?"

A. "Ask me something easier! Though much hangs on the answer, I cannot give it. Some may descry in the ingression an experiment and a disastrous one, more particularly those who describe history, like Winwood Read, as the Martyrdom of Man."

L. "A bad experiment, say I. Honestly is this planet a place for anything higher than animals? Is not life here fundamentally squalid and base? Man, driven by instinct, prolongs his stay on earth, but would he not do well to cease breeding and quit it?"

S. "Some of us seem to profit by our experiences here. I incline to regard the 'descent' to this level as predestined, that is to say as part of the original and beneficent world-plan."

W. "Disputes among the masters of wisdom! And of course Leslie, as the half-converted pessimist, enjoys his grouse. But, if our 'descent' here was a bad experiment, why do the souls continue to pour in?"

L. "Initiatives, once taken, may bind. Those who 'reptilise', as Blake would say, on earth may be in control."

A. "As you like it. I continue."

If all the souls belong to one primary imaginal, then the bodies of men on the earth are the physical body of this imaginal. But, if there were different primary imaginals, the statement must be amended accordingly. Modify it at need. But take note that the hierarchy of sub-imaginals or group-souls must be very complex and important. When did these group-souls become allied with physical bodies ?

Science perhaps will help us to reach a decision. Science, *i.e.* that brave company of workers who organise the departments of knowledge, has sought to acquaint us with the principles of organic life. It has favoured the view that the fauna and flora of this planet had its ancestry in relatively simple and undifferentiated organisms which inhabited the tepid primaeval seas. And, inheriting belief in a 'material' external world and having at its disposal vast stretches of time, it had adopted a creed of biologic evolution which ignored plan. It dreamt of a mechanistic system supplied with 'fortuitous' variations of which Natural Selection eliminated the bad, allowing those useful in life's struggle to persist. Such hypothesis was better than biblical dogma, but it breaks down before philosophical research. As we have seen, there is no material order, save in the minds of its inventors, men.(3) And 'fortuitous' variations, happening without plan, are expected to generate too much. For, after all, Natural Selection only eliminates ; is dependent on variations which it does not make but which are supplied to it. There is no magic in mere struggle. Aeons of it will achieve no advance, if the indispensable variations do not occur. Nay, if no 'useful' new variations are forthcoming, while the 'useful' old variations disappear, retrogression sets in apace. *Stabilising* factors therefore are needed. But factors that *initiate novelty* are even more important from our present point of view. You have both these in the imaginals."

S. "Controversy to-day ought to concern the factors of organic evolution, taking for granted the statement that evolution, which is creative, has occurred and is continuing still. 'Fortuitous' variations, said to happen without plan, are too often asked to solve problems. Recall Bergson's admirable strictures on the mechanistic explanation of the evolution

of the eye. No one would stomach such stuff, were it not that a theory has to be saved !

Variations, which fulfil no important plan, occur lavishly on the lower levels of Nature. Have we not made it clear that natural agents can run amok and that chance has an actual field in the external world ? Happenings originated on this low level must be allowed for freely. They are ' fortuitous ' in the original meaning of the term. But they contribute little or nothing towards solving the problems of the higher ' adaptive ' evolution which is interesting us now. Creative imagining *ad hoc* is required."

L. " Basic variations ' in definite directions ', such as Bergson notes, could not be the work of planless chance. They would imply the guidance of controlling imaginings ? "

S. " Quite so."

W. " No controlling imaginings, no organic evolution. No ' descent ' of the imaginal or imaginings, in which men's souls are rooted, no evolution of human organisms. I must congratulate Anderton on his strategy and tactics, for I am aware of what is coming. He will be using the imaginings to lift organisms on to the human level."

L. " And why not ? There is no other agency discoverable ; you have dethroned the Semitic personal god and you don't believe yet in those minor gods of which some mystics have spoken. Have you any tolerable alternative solution to submit to us ? "

W. " It's not my business to imagine solutions, but to criticise those on offer. . . . By the way, Anderton, I gather that you steer clear of popular Hindu and even Platonic mythology ; you are stopping the ' descent ' of the permanent souls at the higher mammalian level ; you don't want them to plunge into the depths of ' metempsychosis ', into quarters sacred to crocodiles, cats, rats and flies."

A. " No, no ; consign all such talk to the limbo of nonsense. There is an aspect of predestination, we agreed, in the world-line of the permanent soul. The soul is to unlock a treasure-house. What would it profit by a ' descent ' into those ' depths ' ? It is no more drawn thither than an oxygen atom is drawn to argon. However questions of this sort are best

deferred until we come to consider the plurality of lives."

S. "Variations are often discussed as of two sorts: those which are built up slowly out of a succession of slight changes and those called mutations which appear suddenly. If a number of important mutations occurred among members of an animal species and these continued to breed freely and transmit the new features to their descendants, a Natural Kind, as it has been called, might be evolved rapidly. Now 'mental' or 'psychical' kinds or species are allowed for in our thinking. An imaginal, which is such a kind, could conceivably transform a mere physical kind sufficiently well-developed to serve its purpose. The mutations would be congenital, expressing modifications of the germ-plasm."

A. "Thanks, Stark; you have made my task easy. I am of opinion that the Natural Kind, Man, was evolved thus on this planet, from an ape-like stock in the late Miocene or early Pliocene period, and at first much more rapidly than the old school of evolutionists would have thought possible. But creative evolution shows the alternating rest-phases and phases of fruitful change which we mentioned before; even the geological record and the history of the origin of physical species help to illustrate this truth. Mankind began in a revolutionary and relatively quick manner. It was to live also through very long periods of stagnation when the centuries seemed altogether without promise. But when old urges had spent themselves and interludes of torpor come to pass, fresh urges matured in their season not to be denied."

W. "An interesting hypothesis congruent with your general philosophical attitude. You don't of course spoil it by mentioning the quarter in which this alleged transformation took place. In his *History of Creation* Haeckel suggested that the original home of Man may have been a continent lying now under the waves of the Indian Ocean. How conveniently remote from the critics!"

L. "Most conveniently. For Darwinian evolutionists are sometimes embarrassed when they look backward. Primitive men are not sufficiently primitive! The much discussed Neanderthals, those very 'simian' brutes, are not supposed by all to have been among our ancestors. Other early and

genuine claimants to that honour had skulls comparable with those of modern Britishers or indeed with that of Leibnitz. The Darwinian will always find that skull problem difficult to solve. There seems to have been provision for developments which were not needed by the earlier men."

W. "Does your theory of Man's origin require a long stretch of time?"

A. "I won't spoil it by mentioning figures (Leslie laughs) but, considered in terms of geological history, the period required may have been quite short."

W. "You understand that, while I find this theory very interesting, I am not in a position to accept or reject it offhand."

A. "Think it over and let me have your opinion later. As I said before, this is not a hypothesis which Imaginism imposes on its students. You may be able to discover a better."

L. "I don't think so, but honest scepticism always bears good fruit. . . . In my eyes this hypothesis is too good not to be true. It is of one tissue with the rest of Imaginism and it serves to connect the soul-*aperçus* of Plato, Plotinus and Proclus with modern thought. Stark differs from me in holding that the 'descent' to this earth was predestined. He might well urge that the evolution of the mammals was predestined as well and with this 'descent' in view. . . . Ah! so that's his belief. Well, he may be right. But there's much about the 'descent' which suggests that it was an experiment on the part of the imaginals or group-souls. We live here in a world good enough, as I said, for animals, but hardly for intelligent men."

W. "More of your old pessimism."

L. "All the great religions, more particularly the Hindu, Buddhist and Christian, warn their votaries that earth-life is not worth living for its own sake. *Vanitas vanitatum, omnia vanitas*. Compensations are to be sought — elsewhere. You will remind me that this is a world 'in travail' and therefore full of pains, but consider carefully the list of pains and tell me how many are of value and for what? The worst of them have taught men how to dream of hells. Has an experiment failed? Having appropriated ape-like mammalian organisms, were the group-souls unable to remould either them or the



environment in an adequate way? The domain of Man, according to a saying attributed to Gautama Buddha, is, in the eyes of the gods, just a cess-pit.(4)

There have always been undercurrents of disillusionment, of dissatisfaction with the conditions under which men live. Are the group-souls to be blamed? Some of the Alexandrians were ashamed even of their bodies. These digestive tubes, with their parasitic brains and dull senses, are defective in respect both of construction and design.(5) Bishop Andrews has called them 'filthy and unclean', and the phrase 'vile body' is familiar to anyone who goes to church. And what does Montaigne write? 'In truth, when I imagine man quite naked, yea, even in that sex that seems to have the greater share of beauty, his blemishes, his natural limitations, his imperfections, I find that we have more reason than any other animal to cover ourselves.'(6) Well, souls that inform bodies made primarily for the beasts will have dark thoughts at times. Something from their veiled depths disturbs them, makes them suspect, even amid scenes of gaiety, that all is not well. Those who feel this most strongly become free mystics or, if not of high intelligence, monks, ascetics, saints of a herd-creed and the like."

W. "There are evidently two extremes of taste to be reckoned with. On the one hand we have folk like the ancient Greeks, who were enthusiastic about human bodies; on the other hard-boiled critics like Carlyle, who called Man a forked radish 'with head fantastically carved'. A nudist looks and is ridiculous; the vast majority of us civilised peoples is too ugly to foot it unclothed. I must really range myself on the side of Montaigne and Carlyle. But I find the bodies of beasts on the whole pleasing and in keeping with the levels to which they belong.

Anderton tells us of the 'descent' of imaginals or group-souls into certain animal bodies, enforcing their development on novel lines with 'mutations' created *ad hoc*. If this occurred — and I may come to think so — no complete success has been attained. Man is still imperfectly adapted to the erect position, for instance. And Professor Hooton assures us that there has not been a single improvement in Man's ana-

tomical status during the last 25,000 years 'as revealed by the skeleton. The brain has not increased its size . . . the spine has not improved its curves ; the pelvis, with its weak sacro-iliac joint and its wide-open aperture, is still the same unsatisfactory mechanical compromise. The bones of the lower extremity in civilised city-dwellers have indeed become somewhat more massive and better adapted for supporting the body weight in standing and walking over level surfaces, and the feet are perhaps a little larger and stronger, but oftener broken down and misshapen. On the other hand, our reviewer of skeletal evolution would find certain clear evidence of anatomical degeneration.' (7) Elsewhere, after referring to the 'repeated patching and reconstruction of a more or less pliable and long-suffering organism' and stressing the defects entailed, he observes : 'In making a new machine out of an old one, plenty of obsolete spare parts have been left to rattle around inside. There are no few evidences of ungifted, amateur tinkering.' (8)

L. "Amateur tinkering ! And in my childhood we were taught that God was our Maker and made us in His own image ! Verily we live and learn. What we have here of course are defects and failures incidental to the conflict of the imaginals. The imaginals, in which men are rooted, find that the lower imaginals resist their control and in part successfully. Hence some of the miscreations which the books of honest men of science describe. Will the higher imaginals win the final battles ? A complete triumph is very far to seek."

S. "Evidently the power to control and transform the bodies is limited ; in our technical language conservation cannot be dominated sufficiently by additive-creation. This failure is very frequent. Much is conserved that has no value and is even noxious. Our own habits and the habits of Nature (= 'laws') furnish illustrations in plenty. Inheritance of insanity shows how faulty is this lower world in which we live."

L. "Conservation entails very grave risks for the souls that 'descend'. The simian organisms annexed impose on them instincts and urges from which one day they will shrink in disgust. It has been said that, if an honest man looks into his surface-mind, he will find there 'the germs and possibilities'

of all sorts of evil doing.(9) Most of these derive from the heredity imposed by our physical ancestry. Due in part to this heredity is the sexual instinct. If the human stock is worth preservation, the instinct has its use, though its aberrations have generated evils without number. Quite justifiably Shelley called it 'life's great cheat' and large numbers of religious folk, holding that it is unclean, starve it out. Virgin-worship is a phase of this revolt; world-saviours in the East and West are said to have had virgin mothers. Man is victim of the Great Experiment, but he will not allow the highest persons created by his fancy to be defiled as well."

A. "Leslie, once a pessimist, retains his contempt for the vanities of this passing show. A poet, influenced by philosophy, he seeks the beautiful; and ideals of beauty are realised, as we know, very imperfectly on earth. Outside a few forms of sport and art, he finds little on our level that brings joy to his soul. And we abide here, he decides, as sufferers from an experiment which has failed. Our main business ought to be to escape from a domain which has nothing stably satisfactory to offer us. He is a modern Schopenhauer whom the imaginist philosophy cheers with visions of a glorious future.

Was the 'descent' to the earth-level an experiment? Or was it a planned stage, a predestined episode, in the programme of creative evolution? I could not answer a short while ago. I incline now to think that Stark was right. And I believe that, if Leslie neglects awhile the beautiful and studies other values, he will reconsider his view. After all imaginings, sunk in irreflective consciring, can hardly be said to choose freely; they 'descend' whither an appulse not their own directs. It is the divine consciring once more that is at work. At work even on this terrene level where so many centres, freed from central control, have run amok. There is required a complete philosophy of history, not merely a cult of the sublime and beautiful, before we are in a position to estimate aright the worth of the Great Adventure."

Ah! there is our friendly Swiss pilot hurrying across the tarmac, followed by an official of his acquaintance and a mechanic. He tells us that we ought to be off; there is fog awaiting us in and above the Rhine valley and over the mountains round

Glarus and the Wallensee. We lose no time in getting into the machines. In five minutes we have taken-off, circled round the aerodrome to gain height and are now crossing the city over Museum Strasse on our way up the valley of the Inn. We are returning to Switzerland and by a route of which I know next to nothing.

We rise steadily as we follow the river — no fog or cloud in this quarter anyhow — passing over Landeck at about 12,000 feet, still climbing; the Leopard keeping its distance behind. Then we leave the valley. . . . Crossing the Arlberg and Bludenz we see that masses of cloud have hidden the lake of Constance and the Rhine, overlying also all the country between Zurich and the river. The Säntis mountain is not to be seen, but the top of the Glärnisch shows through mists like an island. Having avoided a prohibited area, we cross this island to have excellent glimpses of Lucerne and its lake through “holes”. The top of Pilatus is clear, and the country beyond in the direction of Berne offers no difficulties to craft seeking to land.

L. “Innsbruck may seem to you to have broken up our chat with a false alarm. But it’s well to be careful.”

A. “Do you get much of cloud and fog in central Switzerland?”

L. “Much more than in the Valais betwixt Martigny and Brigue which is an ideal airman’s country. But the amateur, who is free to arrange his outings, has very little trouble except in winter. At the worst there is almost always a big ‘hole’ over Berne through which he can get down to the plain of the Aar. . . . Nice green uplands these, don’t you think? Yes, we’re over the Emmenthal. . . . There’s Langnau, and not many miles beyond it the Aar valley. I’m sorry to be going to ground, but a good distance separates us from Wengen and dinner.”

#### NOTES BY BASIL ANDERTON

(1) Cf. Chapter VIII. pp. 136-148. Also *Z.D.* pp. 356-371.

(2) “Is it possible that the phrase ‘the soul of a race’ is something more than a metaphor? That all this wonderful stability in complexity, combined with gradual change through the ages . . . is in reality the attribute of an enduring psychic existent of which the lives of individual organisms are but successive manifestations.”—Professor McDougall in *Body and Mind*, p. 377.

Similarly Schopenhauer urges that every organism reveals its Idea (here = imaginal) but not completely, as power is lost in controlling the lower Ideas (=imaginals) associated with it. Conservation is stressed by these writers, but, as we saw, that is not enough.

(3) Cf. Chapter II, "Towards Rediscovery of a Lost World".

(4) *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Part II, p. 355. Translated by T. W. Rhys Davids and C. A. F. Rhys Davids.

(5) Cf. Professor Hooton in *Apes, Men and Morons*.

(6) *Essays of Montaigne*, vol. i. p. 478 (Oxford Univ. Press).

(7) *Apes, Men and Morons*, p. 291.

(8) *Ibid.* p. 243.

(9) Dr. Stanley Hall in *Adolescence*, vol. ii. p. 68.



TOP OF THE OBERGABELHORN. IN THE BACKGROUND THE MATTERHORN  
ALL BUT HIDDEN IN CLOUD



## CHAPTER XIV

### THE PLURALITY OF LIVES

"Where is Ardiaeus the Great ?"

PLATO, *Republic*.

"Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting :  
The soul that rises with us, our life's star,  
Hath had elsewhere its setting,  
And cometh from afar."

WORDSWORTH.

"The parents possess an indefinite number of potentialities that may possibly be inherited, and these, again, may be commingled in an indefinite number of ways. But the character actually inherited is a *definite* combination of these potential qualities, and what determines the way in which it is actually combined ?" — F. C. S. SCHILLER, *Riddles of the Sphinx*.

"'Heir and inheritance' is a quite superficial legal analogy. . . . What is inherited is not individuality or character but the tendency to develop certain ancestral characteristics, in a word a particular *Anlage* as the Germans say." — WARD, *Psychological Principles*.

"In the present state of our knowledge of the subject, heredity only helps us to account for a comparatively few among the hosts of peculiarities which go to make up the basis of an individual character." — SULLY, *Outlines of Psychology*.

"So we are to discuss the Plurality of Lives this afternoon", says Wortvoll to Stark as they climb through the pines, notebooks and paraphernalia for tea in their rucksacks, towards our nook above the Trümleten ravine.

S. "Yes: and without concerning ourselves with the corrupt forms of that belief current in the East and West. We don't want to waste time on 'metempsychosis' for instance."

W. "Meaning the view that human souls can descend to animal levels ?"

S. "Yes. Popular Hinduism, which contains much superstition and nonsense, makes souls on our level descend into the bodies of worms, spiders, snakes, chameleons, etc., into levels whereon a continuous, unified personality does not exist.(1)



Savages, devoid of our respect for evidence, hold similar views. Nay, even the Pythagoreans and Plato mooted fancies of this sort.”(2)

W. “It is difficult to be sure at times whether Plato is offering us one of his ‘myths’ or teaching philosophy. But of course we can’t waste words on a view which makes life absurd. My respect for Divine Imagining could not survive the proof that It plans mad worlds.”

S. “So you approve of the case stated in defence of our belief in Divine Imagining?”

W. “The hypothesis, as Schiller urged, is at any rate ‘all-embracing’, and no other hypothesis ever stated attains this level. It haunts one, reaffirming itself always when impugned. If it holds good, I expect to find that the main structure of the world, despite the ‘running amok’, is fundamentally sound. The notion that a Newton may animate a future fly or maggot clashes with this deduction.”

S. “I wish also to enter a protest against the use of the term ‘reincarnation’. This term suggests that an already existing person or self is robed anew in garments of flesh. Schopenhauer prefers accordingly the term ‘palingenesis’.(3) He finds in the successive births ‘life-dreams’ of an individual will, fresh conscious selves grown in connexion with new bodies and brains. ‘Even empirical grounds’, he thinks, ‘support a palingenesis of this kind.’(4) For my part I consider that the expression ‘plurality of lives’, duly interpreted, meets all our needs.”

W. “Schopenhauer’s ‘individual will’ is what you call better the finite centre of conspiring allied with the permanent soul. Primarily irreflective, this centre generates what Schopenhauer terms ‘life-dreams’ or ‘knowing beings’ — i.e. selves lit with reflective conspiring — during the succession of births. Each self or ego is impermanent, arises and perishes; nothing being said about that “made” Past which we discussed on this alp.(5) Thus at this stage of the career of my soul there is no permanent self or ego. “So the Buddha was perhaps right after all.”

S. “Very well put, if you will allow me to say so. As to Schopenhauer’s insistence on ‘will’, let me add this. ‘Will’ is simply his way of attacking Hegel’s apotheosis of ‘reason’.

He meant in a vague way not mere volition or even 'conation' — to mention an approved and wider modern term — but consciring. His universal cosmic WILL, operating with the IDEAS, is a first attempt to substitute for the Hegelian REASON what we call DIVINE IMAGINING."

W. "I see that, but don't waste breath on Hegel."

S. "Yes: Buddha was right, but could not make many people understand what he meant. He could teach them philosophy, but could not supply them with brains. . . . By the way, we must credit Plotinus and Proclus with the same insight, in so far as concerns the passing self or ego. After one mortal life a Plato vanishes, though the soul in the background persists.(6) But this vanishing is presumably slow, occurring only at the close of a long career after physical death. 'Plato' for the soul is an incident or experiment; a new personality resembling, but superior to, 'Plato' is to be made in connexion with a new body. Any given personality, however great we consider it on earth, is a poor thing against the cosmic background and must not be prized beyond its worth. Anderton is sure to stress this point."

W. "If Kant had believed in the plurality of lives, he would have been forced to fall into line with Proclus. The same statement holds good of Leibnitz, Herbart and many other philosophers. My own position becomes increasingly clear. I regard the hypothesis of Divine Imagining as the best I know, as possibly, nay, probably true. As I said, it haunts me, insists on itself; and all things seem to insist on it as well. I accept provisionally therewith consciring, irreflective and reflective. I have recognised the soul as an agent potentially independent of the physical body, and note further its share in building the personal man. Birth and death are more or less understood. But this retrospect and prospect of the plurality of lives! How are we to travel far in the darkness of mere thinking?"

L. (who has been catching us up). "Be of good cheer! What said Paul of Tarsus? 'We know in part and we prophesy in part.' And our knowledge has been bettered astonishingly by the centuries."

\* \* \* \* \*

All four of us are lounging in our favourite nook; note-

books and a volume or two are lying on the grass. Straggling portions of an avalanche, sliding from a snowfield high up on the Jungfrau, lose speed and stop, adding to the chaos at the source of the Trümmelbach. The precipices of the Eiger and the little Scheidegg are hidden in cloud. On our right across the Lauterbrunnen valley shows Mürren. In this scene one seems to enjoy, as in a glass darkly, glimpses of Divine Imagining.

A. "Stark tells me, Wortvoll, that you have grasped our contention, which is that of Proclus and Schopenhauer, most sympathetically. 'Plato' does not pass from birth to birth. Whatever you style us, we are not 'reincarnationists'. In our opinion the permanent soul does not incarnate itself at all, merely growing a new person, self or ego in alliance with the brain of an annexed physical body. You agree that this must be so, at the very outset of our talk about the plurality of lives?"

W. "I say that, if the belief in this plurality is worth criticism, it must be stated in your manner and no other. The successor of 'Plato' may resemble his forerunner pretty closely or, again, he may not. For, on the lines of this belief as you hold it, the soul has to realise different powers and emotional moods at different times. Further, the surroundings and physical body of any given life are of capital importance and cannot be duplicated."

L. "The days of the year are often very different from one another, yet all can belong to one experience. The permanent soul, however, must needs attain reflective conscurring before all its changeful personalities or selves are present to it as a series. Death will retain its sting till this conscurring matures."

W. "Yes; at present then you have to admit that the surface-man prolongs a past, the vastly greater part of which is lost to him. Indeed most of his experiences, even in one earth life, vanish in like fashion. What a poor thing is the memory of this surface-man! Strange that, remembering so little of his life, a man should pretend to recall prior lives in human and even animal bodies. . . . Yet, if a creed draws strength from the numbers who accept it, palingenesis stands well."

A. "Religious systems such as Hinduism and Buddhism teach it as a fundamental truth, and the number of their adherents is very great. Indeed so prevalent is the belief that Schopenhauer, its most famous advocate in Europe, held that it has a better claim to be called an 'Idea of the Reason' than any one of the three philosophical concepts exalted by Kant. Even in the West it has been welcomed by many mystics, poets, philosophers and men of letters. Thus, as stated already (7), Professor Lutoslawski is intuitively certain that his soul pre-existed to its present life as a man or 'in similar conditions', adding that 'all the great Polish poets and thinkers during the nineteenth century' enjoyed this intuition. The French 're-incarnationist' school and the modern theosophists, at first materialists,(8) later drawing inspiration from Indian thought, did much to popularise the topic. Unfortunately the dominant religion of Europe has on the whole been hostile. Its attitude has been that of Paul — one death and then the judgment. Paul's views may not interest Wortvoll, but they have shut the eyes of many to truth."

W. "Never mind how many men believe or disbelieve in the plurality of lives. Stick to the case for the belief as made out by competent minds. What is the opinion of an Indian ryot, a Zulu or docker worth? Most men need all their wits just to earn their daily bread."

L. "But what if Lutoslawski is right? The belief has then an empirical basis. And even the acute Schopenhauer holds that 'empirical grounds' can be indicated. Anderton will be stating his case soon. In doing so he will, I hope, take account of the struggle of which he has spoken in connexion with birth."

S. "We can't think adequately without recognising it. We note struggle in whatever corner of the changeful world we look for it; indeed in every causal sequence there is conflict of agents and a 'solution', conservative or additively creative.(9) Thus Weismann applied the notion of struggle and natural selection to the sphere of the germ-plasm. There is not only a struggle between the organs, tissues and cells of a physical body, but one between the constituents of the cells, ordinary and reproductive. There is good reason to suppose further that struggle obtains in the regions of the 'molecules',

'atoms', etc., of which cells are built; natural agents of a psychical character being symbolised by these concepts. Physics is the study of the smaller organisms, observes Whitehead.(10) Pending fertilisation of a mammalian ovum there is struggle between hundreds of spermatozoa in their drive towards the cell, as Professors Thomson and Geddes have maintained. The struggle among larger organisms and groups of organisms and between the contents of their minds requires no mention. Struggle obtains also in all the violations and restorations of equilibrium that characterise so-called inorganic Nature. It must obtain also, I urge, in the drive of souls towards the annexation of physical bodies."

L. "Are there any empirical grounds for this belief, which seems certainly to be suggested to us by a study of Nature?"

S. "Well, you can't look for many, since before birth you can't verify perceptually what souls are doing on levels unseen. The range of your outlook is very limited. Population-problems seem closely connected with the drive, so reflect on them well. Meanwhile consider the following suggestion. So eminent an authority as Professor McDougall has mooted the possibility that struggle may exist even after birth, 'that more than one psychic being may be associated with one bodily organism. It may be that the soul that thinks in each of us is but the chief of a hierarchy of similar beings, and that this one alone . . . is able to actualize in any full measure its capacities for conscious activity; and it may be that, if the subordinated beings exercise in any degree their psychic capacities, the chief soul is able, by a direct or telepathic action, to utilize and in some measure control their activities.'(11) Cases of simultaneously conscious persons, allied with one physical body, may lend themselves to such an explanation. A struggle that existed prior to birth may continue after it! One is reminded of 'Sally' in the famous Beauchamp case. 'Sally' seemed to be a somewhat childish person, but her memory recalled early incidents of Miss Beauchamp's life. There was a persistent conflict between her and the nominal owner of the physical body."

W. "A split-off secondary personality; a case of psychasthenia, I suppose; defective consoling, as you would put it,

is indicated. The tide ebbs and separate pools are formed in the sand."

L. "You say so, but after all you don't know. So very distinct, robust and aggressive a person as 'Sally' is certainly not psychasthenic. On the other hand psychasthenia may have opened the door that let her in! A fort occupied by a weak force can be taken by storm."

S. "Shall we be rude, turn our backs on 'Sally' and listen to what Anderton has to say?"

A. "I begin by reminding you of what I urged before.(12) I enjoy first and foremost an intuition: my soul has pre-existed in another life somewhat resembling the one being lived now. And this advantage enables me to speak confidently. A soul that has survived at least three stages of being, a former life, an interval and part of this present life, may quite well survive a dozen or a million stages more. The plurality of lives for me is partly fact and partly inferred. Of course I have a great deal to learn about it."

W. "The alleged intuition is perhaps private fancy as I objected before."

L. "A man with eyes, Wortvoll, can see, even when the blind say there is no light. Consider this. You admit that the soul is potentially independent of the physical body. It has a short life in this relation, but it survives physical death. What does it do? Sink for ever into irreflective consciring? Not in a cosmos in which rests and bursts of creative change alternate. On this physical level or another, in connexion with a new body, it will attain reflective consciring once more. Three stages, therefore, in its career are inevitable, and more will follow. There will be forthcoming a succession of births, deaths and the intervals between them. So whether you build on an intuition or not, you will find yourself confronting the plurality of lives. Infer it by all means, if you so desire, but let those who possess an intuition enjoy it."

W. "Not so fast. A merely haphazard series of lives cannot profit the soul; some planned development will be essential in your philosophy. Births and deaths ought to be incidents in a world-line of progress. Does a soul resemble a cork bobbing up and down aimlessly in a rough sea?"

A. "Leslie is right ; the soul cannot sink, save for a while, into irreflective consciring. Alternating phases of rest and fruitful change rule the world. The soul cooling to a dull red will glow white hot again in due season, unclosing into fuller reality in the act. The plurality of its lives is assured. But of course this development must take place according to plan, must be congruent with the wider design immanent in the world-system. We have discussed that system while the cosmic metaphysics of Imaginism was being explained. I had contended strongly, you will recall Wortvoll, that we required a cosmic outlook before we could confront satisfactorily the problem of the soul. Well, the system is available. Its value is now obvious."

L. "A plurality of lives of some sort is inevitable. We all have to admit that. So far, so good. But Divine Imagining shapes our ends in harmony with plan of cosmic scope. We are justified accordingly in saying further that any account of the succession of births and deaths will, nay must, reveal high purpose."

A. "That's right. If we bear this truth in mind, we shall go far. Even human *imagining* — whence spring our theories — may mirror much that is being achieved by Divine *Imagining*."

W. "And thus the agnostic is to be silenced ! I'll wait and see. . . . But now, having heard your opening statement, let me shift my ground awhile. During our walk from the hotel Stark reminded me that Schopenhauer found there were 'empirical grounds' for believing in a former life or lives. I am not referring to vague intuitions such as you and Lutoslawski discuss, but to definite things and events in this present life on which *inferences* are based. Thus some child or young person, unlike the rest of a family, excels in the domain of music, of mathematics, or of poetry. This variation, writers infer, has its source in doings in a former life. Is the inference, which cannot be verified by us, tolerable ? Again, a man, gassed in war, and a climber in the Alps suffer long and badly from their adventures. Some folk infer that the Furies, angered in former lives, are at their throats. What did these souls do that they should be plagued thus ? Illustrations of this sort

of inference are to be found in all popular literature on the plurality of lives. What is your attitude towards this kind of argument, on which the case for palingenesis is often made to stand ? ”

A. “ I am a friend of intuition and hold that there are ‘ definite things and events ’ — to cite your words — in my present life providing occasions when such intuition seems to flood the soul. I am aware of direct experience rather than inference. But you mention inferences. Let me say at once that, considered by themselves, some few seem to me provocative, but not wholly convincing, many weak, some logically indefensible and some even absurd. Inferences claiming respect are those which find current ‘ heredity ’ theories defective and derive much in a personality from antecedents referred to former lives. Absurd are those which credit human souls with descents to, and returns from, the bodies of maggots and flies. Were I not armed with a system of thought serving to check, modify and incorporate minor inferences, were I not in enjoyment of the intuition of pre-existence, my belief in the plurality of lives could not attain certainty. This hypothesis would remain, what F. C. S. Schiller in his later years considered it to be, probably true, but would lose a great part of its influence on my practical life.”

L. “ I listen to an opera ; my outlook is widened vaguely and strangely :

Something is, or seems,  
That touches me with mystic gleams,  
Like glimpses of forgotten dreams —  
Of something felt, like something here ;  
Of something done, I know not where ;  
Such as no language may declare.

I am gazing on a grand stretch of mountains ; there wells up content which appears as a veiled messenger from a mysterious past. But what past ? That is not clearly indicated.”

S. “ Perhaps your own past in this life ; perhaps the past of former lives ; perhaps, as Herbert Spencer would say, the past of your ancestors’ experiences. Indeed, you will recall that some modern psychologists have made much of a ‘ race-



unconscious' which can extrude content into your life. How would this be handed down to you? Along with the 'psychoplasm' of the physical body."

W. "Anyhow it would be risky to infer categorically that you are stirred by echoes from your own soul's prenatal past."

S. "And ordinarily at any rate the case for alleged definite memories of the soul's prenatal lives is weaker still. 'Body', observes Plotinus, 'is the true river of Lethe', and inevitably so. The brain, allied with memory, is an instrument that works in the service of the present life, as physiological psychology shows. The success of a new-born child, I must add, depends largely on the suppression, rather than emergence, of memories of past lives. Memories may be harmful. Even the career of a butterfly would be marred, were memories of its larval past thrust on it. Adjustments to its surroundings would be spoilt."

W. "The brain, made in a woman's womb, restricts the range of memory; the 'dispositions' allied with it are limited beyond question. The plain man can have no hope of leaping over this barrier, save in the direction of the ancestry of his physical body. Vain persons, of no present importance, often claim to have played great parts in history, the rôles of hewers of wood and drawers of water being less in demand. Such alleged definite memories are surely aberrations of fancy. The content of ordinary memory, which is constructed from the 'now', is that of conservative fancy. But refer inventive fancy to a date in the past and illusion results too easily."

L. "Fantastic claims, I know, have been made; at one time there were three applicants for the rôle of Mary Queen of Scots. Ignoring these aberrations of fancy, we might say this. The physical body is indeed a river of Lethe. But the higher bodies of the soul may sometimes further remembering of the prenatal past. For, after all, the past is conserved.(13) A high mystic may achieve what is impossible for the plain man."

W. "Produce the said mystic and we shall be able to make progress. What is evident at present is that for ordinary folk the argument from memories is without promise. Not even Leslie would listen to the evidence of a tinker, tailor or society woman without misgivings."

L. "No; there you're right. But what do you think of Professor McTaggart's point? 'Two people who have seen but little of each other are often drawn together by a force which is equal to that which is generated in other cases by years of mutual trust and mutual assistance.' (14) No definite memories are alleged; neither of the two may be interested in pre-existence. Later on, however, the fact that they were drawn together may suggest to them that their souls renewed an old tie."

W. "That's arguable no doubt. But very little things may bring people together, *e.g.* when the sexual instinct is aflame or adventure calls. And now let me ask you a question. Many years ago I was a witness of an extraordinary mutual devotion on the part of a horse and a sheep. Separated they pined. Do you suppose that the 'force' drawing them together expressed a close relation in previous lives?" He grinned maliciously.

L. "A solitary sheep wants protection and a horse company. Habits are formed. Why look deeper?"

W. "Why look deeper in the other case when attractive persons are concerned? Anyhow McTaggart's contention, taken by itself, is simply a guess. Some other explanation may be better. But, if you believe in palingenesis already, you will be inclined to agree with him."

S. "But, Wortvoll, we three believe already in palingenesis; we are justified accordingly in holding that McTaggart is perhaps or probably right. May I add that your own attitude seems now to resemble ours? So be prepared to interpret facts accordingly."

Malebranche, glancing at a book written by Descartes, is intensely excited. His philosophical career begins. Kant's 'heredity' won't enable us to account for him. Again, a boy, taking up a copy of Louis Figuier's *Day after Death*, becomes forthwith a metaphysician and believer in the plurality of lives. He is a metaphysician still at the age of seventy-three. In such cases interests, developed in former lives, are rekindled often suddenly. At least I incline to interpret the facts in this way."

L. "One might find it difficult to derive Shakespeare from 'nature and nurture' without drawing heavily on the

experiences of a soul rich with prior lives. Genius, according to Weismann, reveals itself spontaneously and suddenly, not as result of slowly acquired ancestral prowess culminating in individual greatness. And the descendants of a genius are seldom or never remarkable folk. In this domain are many striking facts to be interpreted by Wortvoll. If he ignores palingenesis, his task will not be easy. Let me read to you what William James wrote on Great Men and their environment : ' the causes of production of great men lie in a sphere wholly inaccessible to the social philosopher. He must simply accept geniuses as data, just as Darwin accepts his spontaneous variations. For him, as for Darwin, the only problem is, these data being given, how does the environment affect them and how do they affect the environment ? ' Herbert Spencer urged that the conditions which made the community also made the innovating great man. ' Before he can make his society, his society must make him.' But a reasonable view of causation shatters this belief. No man is made solely by his antecedent social conditions ! And further, if our belief in palingenesis is justified, the great man may come ' from afar ' into the community which he is to mould."

S. " May I give Wortvoll some more facts to interpret ? It was not a mathematician who begot Gauss, a musician Handel, a painter Titian ; and Weismann says that the forbears of these geniuses had no special talents.(15) And mathematical, musical and artistic powers, when inheritable, may be at their best at the *beginning or middle* of a series of individuals. The Victorian agnostic, Professor Huxley, wrote : ' There are Pascals and Mozarts, Newtons and Raffaells, in whom the innate faculty for science or art seems to need but a touch to spring into full vigour ', and again, ' The child that is impelled to draw as soon as it can hold a pencil ; the Mozart who breaks into music and inspired music as early ; the boy Bidder who worked out the most complicated sums without learning his arithmetic ; the boy Pascal who evolved Euclid out of his own consciousness : all these may be said to have been impelled by instinct, as much as are the beaver and the bee. And the man of genius is distinct in kind from the man of cleverness, by reason of the working in him of strong innate tendencies which

cultivation may improve, but which it can no more create than horticulture can make thistles bear figs.' (16) But this famous man ought not to have confused such 'innate tendencies' with instincts. Instincts are actions *common* to all members of a species. 'Innate tendencies', of the sorts mentioned, appear only in rare individuals. And, unlike instincts, they may handicap their possessor in the struggle for existence. How often the man of 'innate tendencies', philosophical, scientific, artistic, suffers in the battle of life !

One more witness, Professor Ward, insists that ' . . . there are scores of instances of genius without any such evidence of heredity that anybody may recall ; *e.g.* mentioning names as they occur, Shakespeare, Newton, Cromwell, Napoleon, Wellington, Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant, Beethoven, J. M. W. Turner'. (17) Perhaps Wortvoll would like to put in a word at this stage."

W. " Your suggestion is that these 'innate tendencies' have remote sources in past lives of the souls concerned. You don't trouble about the mentality of Peter Bell, but about that of a few remarkable people. You offer me an explanation of certain notable variations special to these favoured individuals.

But can I be sure that there is no alternative explanation available ? Let me see. Anderton has told me in his persuasive way that additive creation exists in all regions of the world-system ordered by Divine Imagining. He has spoken also of the sort of imaginals called group-souls in which we men are rooted. He has stated that these imaginals can give rise directly to variations in living bodies. I reply then to Leslie and Stark in the form of a question.

Why cannot these imaginals furnish the variations under survey *directly* through their members ? There seems no need to introduce the complication of 'past lives'."

Leslie, unprepared with a retort, looks questioningly at Stark who looks at Anderton. Wortvoll has scored a hit.

A. " The imaginals do furnish such variations through their members. But the members, whatever may be their world-lines, have to be prepared for their work. Even physical variations may require a series of generations in which to mature. And most certainly the making of a genius-philosopher or great poet is not to be completed in one life. Wortvoll must not

regard the geniuses as so many guns into which shells are thrust from behind. These souls are strong with powers that they have made *their own*. And maybe they have grown thus strong during a long stretch of lives."

W. (not too amiably). "Maybe?"

A. "I told you that I do not reach certainty in arguments such as these. My method of research is simple enough. First I attain hypotheses and generalisations of adequate width by way both of induction and intuition. Then I verify them whenever I can. But I don't talk overmuch when observations are lacking. In this case to be silent is to be wise."

L. "Well; you have got us out of a mess this time. . . . And now a suggestion. We have been referring a good deal to heredity; shall we look into this matter a little more closely?"

A. "By all means. And let me begin by saying what a student of the plurality of lives has to accept. At least two sorts of heredity are involved: that due to the ancestry of the physical body and that due to the past of the soul that annexes and uses that body. Two streams of influences, like the Ganges and the Jumna, are confluent. We must know something about both of these rivers when discussing the manner in which the greater river comes to exist.

Let us consider first heredity, in so far as it is imposed from the side of the physical body. It involves, of course, many ancestral bodies. Derived thence is the so-called 'psychoplasm' to be differentiated and supplied to the soul. But we need not adopt this term. We have learnt already that the physical body is of psychoid or mind-like character. Having annexed it the soul is penetrated by certain contents of the brain; by contents fundamentally akin to its own. 'Mind and body' are not separated by the breadth of being, but interact intimately. (18) There is no aspect of the interaction which offers more than a problem in psychics."

L. "Quite so. Wortvoll will recall that Professor Ward in *Heredity and Memory* has already discussed physical heredity in terms of memory, contending that the 'building up' of the embryo illustrates just — habit! For us of course this 'building up' is a process in the imaginal structure of Nature. Conservation plays a very important part (the so-called laws

of Nature are habits), but novelty emerges as well."

W. "Yes; I know of Ward's view, which is shared by eminent German writers. Your view is an obvious deduction from imaginist first principles. It is probably true. But you will agree that a good many riddles must be solved before physical heredity, however explained, can be harmonised with belief in palingenesis."

A. "I am with you. There are riddles respecting physical heredity and riddles also respecting environment. So I am asking you three to call to mind such difficulties as you find to be grave. Stark, may I ask you to set the ball rolling?"

S. "Leslie and I would prefer to listen to Wortvoll's questions; a critical and invaluable scepticism is needed. But first I will say a few words, anticipating perhaps some of our friend's observations.

Let me deal once and for all with the contention that Mendelism has shown us the way in which heredity-problems are to be solved. Heredity is said to be due to physical unit-factors or 'genes', of which hundreds, possibly thousands, may exist in one chromosome of a cell. Mendelism, with its interesting experiments, presupposes the reality of the 'genes'; carriers of heredity which are relatively independent, variable things, lending themselves to combinations and even the formulas dear to science. This theory may prove of great practical value to breeders of animals and plants, but does not take us far into the depths. It will not aid us to-day. In the first place it has not been tested successfully in the case of man.<sup>(19)</sup> The complications of the complete man are too great. In the second place the 'gene', entering metaphysics, would become a psychical complex; its 'variations' and 'combinations' would have to be rethought on lines familiar to you. This 'unit-factor', like Nature to which it belongs, is misdescribed by mechanists who try to simplify reality by ignoring its fullness.

The complexity ascribed to the germ-plasm is formidable. Don't forget that, looking backward for only twelve generations, you find that 4096 germ-plasms have met in your career. If, further, you allow for the instinctive impulses, the 'racial unconscious' and other extras in which modern writers take

delight, you will be sure that germ-plasm, as popularly conceived, comprises much ! If you hold also that the building up of the embryo illustrates habit, you will have to reconsider what we said about memory.(20) The 'specious present' may not comprise all the factors at work."

A. "Anyhow there is provided a host of possibilities for a new personality developed in connexion with the physical body. The nature of the soul will determine what use is made of this lower 'psychoplasm', what phases of it are appropriated, what combinations of them are to figure in the new self. It secures thus its continuity with the self of the last life lived in union with a physical body. Its constituent contents further, and are furthered by, like features of the 'psychoplasm' native to the body. There obtains thus a *selective* activity, at first below the Threshold of reflective consciring, preventing too abrupt transitions in the history of the soul ; too violent a passage through the plurality of lives. Owing to this soul-selection, *interests* of a past earth-life are rekindled in the next. And in this conservative way heredity carried by the soul and heredity carried by the gross body co-operate. One word more. This co-operation presupposes of course a fresh sensory experience, failing which the new concrete person could not exist."

W. "Excellently put, Anderton. You speak of a conservative heredity, uniting the forces of soul and physical body in the orientation of a new earth-life. Soul-selection shapes the personality ; the all-important interests, perceptual, emotional, intellectual, etc., are revived. So far, so good. This exceedingly important riddle of continuity is read. But the topic of conservation in this domain raises further problems.

Conservation such as you stress seems to be purposive, fulfils plan. It has other aspects. Not infrequently it is futile and may be sheerly noxious. 'Brachydactyly', night-blindness, congenital cataract, deafness are perpetuated with mischievous results. We learn that the insane diathesis is inherited 'with at least as great an intensity as any physical or mental character in man'.(21) Nothing could be sillier in a world than arrangements which make insanity inheritable. Even one case of insanity is a blot on a world where, as you

say, souls are being evolved. Does not inherited insanity suggest that the world itself is infected with disease ? ”

L. “ Who is the pessimist now ? . . . But I have to add that you supply the solution of your problem. Conservation, whether in the sphere of heredity or not, is often bad, just as is additive creation. Finite agents ‘ run amok ’ in a domain of chance. There’s the clue. Heredity works in part amiss. But so does almost every other phase of this sublunary world. You suggest that this world is infected with disease — it is. We don’t shy at your gibe ; we welcome it.”

A. “ Shelley thought so too and quite rightly, but our world fortunately is not the universe. I reply to Wortvoll’s criticism, like Leslie, by accepting it. The facts cited illustrate the extent of the ‘ running amok ’.

There are two relevant considerations worth emphasis. The first is that the struggle of souls for manifestation or birth is severe. To be ‘ born ’ is a victory over rivals. These souls are rising from a level of weak reality — of irreflective con-sciring — to one where living is intense. They cannot find a way save by annexing physical bodies, the brains of which, as I sought to show (22), enable them to attain reflective con-sciring, *i.e.* what is usually described as ‘ conscious life ’. To annex such a body is thus a great success ; a triumph on a path that must be taken. The second consideration is that human souls are not at first strong ; in many respects they are at the mercy of the annexed bodies and have to accept what is imposed by these. Ages hence they will grow strong and perhaps become masters of these tabernacles of flesh.”

W. “ At the mercy of the bodies — yes. A chick, escaping from its shell, is furnished liberally with instincts by its body. It pecks accurately at everything it notices. The human being also, which matures slowly, is provided with instincts rooted in its physical body, and these, so think many, constitute the driving power in its career. There is for you, I know, a physical heredity and a heredity carried by the soul. But the evidence for the former leaps to the eye ; whereas that for the latter has to be sought for and, in the opinion of very many sceptics, does not exist.”

L. “ Don’t forget that the physical bodies you speak of



belong collectively to imaginals and were evolved under pressure from these. The imaginal may show in many instances, simultaneous and successive. Does it matter whether the higher or the lower levels of an imaginal provide the instincts useful to its members ? ”

*S.* “ Instincts are imposed. They are habits of the imaginal common to its members. Untoward developments also — miscreations — can be imposed on individuals. Experiments with the embryos of frogs produce startling results ; alterations in the internal secretions of mammalian bodies may wreak havoc. A babe would become a monster, were certain changes in its internal chemistry provoked. But all such incidents and accidents belong to surface phenomena and will occur often in these earth-jungles of evil and chance. The mishaps which are so numerous before birth, as well as after, warn us of the character of the world in which we live.”

*W.* “ One must allow for that, if Imaginism is to be taken seriously. Central control of the world-order is far to seek ; much works amiss. No ; I don’t expect to find that all’s perfect in the arrangements for birth. Wherever there are finite agents, much can go at any rate temporarily wrong. . . . And now I have a further question to put. We hear much of ‘ inherited characters ’. Are these brought over by souls from prior lives ? Or do they come partly by this route and partly by way of physical heredity from ancestral organisms ? ”

*L.* “ By both routes I should say. If the soul, of which Plato was a manifestation, annexed another physical body, the new personality would certainly resemble Plato in the matter of conduct. But the body would contribute heavily to the make-up of the new man, not always helpfully and even arbitrarily. The new man would be at a level at which he is ruled largely by the physical body. He may be a victim of ‘ glands ’ or suffer from futile congenital disease. His emotions may be altered by visceral sensations thrust on him by ancestral ‘ psychoplasm ’. The features of his character will not be wholly of his soul’s making, as crude ‘ reincarnationist ’ theories proclaim ; no duplicate of the prior man will be in evidence. A soul annexing a female body after a male one will suffer a

change of character largely dictated by the physical organism. Even a novel terrene habitation will impose modifications on character. It is known that the environments of many human stocks influence very considerably their psycho-physical qualities."

A. "There is a leaven of sheer adventure and luck in the history of the individual. Much 'runs amok'; disorganisation and chance are widespread. Don't believe in a pre-established harmony which permits souls to be developed always satisfactorily. The struggle for birth is acute; and the successful soul may have thrust on it novel features, not due to any hypothetical 'karma' of its own.

We shall be discussing shortly the dynamic which shapes chance in ways furthering the world-plan. Meanwhile, in respect of the birth struggle, let me say this. Influences modifying and afflicting man unfavourably 'from below' tend to weaken; will be dominated more and more by the contents of the evolving souls. The human race of the future will enjoy a measure of power adequate to its terrestrial needs. The soul, allied with a physical body, will tend to be a veritably predominant partner. It uses this body to profit even now, but the extent of its control is obviously too limited."

S. "The all-important matter is, what we mentioned before, the *world-line*, predestined at the dawn of the cosmos, along which the soul will travel. The soul's 'character' in any one birth includes many surface phenomena without basis in a prenatal life or lives, coming to pass and vanishing arbitrarily, having no lasting importance for its ulterior development. Unless this is understood clearly, the case for palingenesis must embarrass its advocates."

W. "Consider the characters of animals. Breeds of dogs, cats, rats, anthropoid apes, horses, etc., have markedly different characters. Who would explain all these by reference to prenatal lives?"

S. "Quite so. Let me read you a suggestive passage from Darwin's *Origin of Species*: 'A cross with a bull-dog has affected for many generations the courage and obstinacy of greyhounds; and a cross with a greyhound has given to a whole family of shepherd dogs a tendency to hunt hares'.(23)

Such features of greyhounds and shepherd dogs are *gifts* from mere physical heredity. Consider a species of wasp. Two well-known observers, the Peckhams, tell us : ' In this species as in every one that we have studied, we have found a most interesting variation among the different individuals, not only in methods, but in character and intellect ' .(24) Among ants and bees feeding determines character. Such character differences are normal to members of species and varieties, are surface phenomena like many of the traits of men."

A. " We agreed not to moot the problems of these lower levels during our talks, so I will say only this. Stark is surely right — the *world-line* is the all-important matter for the human soul. There are no such predestined world-lines for agents on lower levels, no development even of continuous and unified selves. Surface phenomena rule there in lives of impulse. The agents have no roots of their own, but belong to the imaginals or group-souls that are being evolved."

L. " What about population ? "

A. " There is a ceaseless pressure of souls towards birth, but many are worsted and delayed in the conflict ; the fittest for the terrestrial conditions ruling succeed. The ideal state of population shows a Hegelian ' divinity of measure ' without excess or defect of numbers, such as furthers reasonable living. But the swings of the pendulum to one or other side of this ideal point are often grave. The numbers too, tolerated by circumstances, vary from time to time ; at present the earth is supposed capable of harbouring 2,500,000,000 men. When the full occupation takes place — if ever it does — I shall not care to contemplate it, whatever position I may fill. I shall be glad, so far as I am concerned, when my soul no longer needs to be associated with a physical body."

L. " And I. Convinced mystics almost all feel in this way ; the ' hounds of heaven ' bay them on to worthier haunts. But, respecting population, we are not in a position to solve all our problems."

A. " The academic psychologist, *e.g.* McDougall, explains the drive behind population as due to instinct, reproductive and parental, that stirs us earth-dwellers ; he observes nothing of the pressure ' from above ' and makes no mention of it.

Occasionally, however, the pressure can be detected; thus Schopenhauer avers that a love-match may be due to the need of an individual 'will-to-live' for an organism to be provided by a special couple. The attraction of one lover for the other, which seems often to the onlooker comical, indicates the power at work. There are many alleged cases of such a pressure 'from above' in connexion with wars, plagues, group-births of notable folk, etc., which you must examine yourself. Be sure that other factors are active besides instincts based on our physical bodies."

S. "In the old days we heard much of instinct and the tendency of population to outrun the means of subsistence; a tendency which could be rendered less formidable for the while by science, at least in fortunate parts of the continents. But nowadays the voice of the teacher of birth control is heard everywhere, though no one need be anxious at present as regards the earth's supplies of food."

A. "Well; a prudent man recalls Mill's already cited remark that there was once no restrainer of population but death 'throughout Asia and formerly in most European countries in which the labouring classes were not in bondage'. He is not eager to imitate the lemming or springbok, one of whose hordes is said to have been 'fifteen miles wide and a hundred and forty miles long'.<sup>(25)</sup> He wishes, not merely to exist, but to exist comfortably. It is now the decree, not of Nature, but of many visitors to Earth that population shall be within reasonable bounds."

S. "McDougall, referring to the falling birth-rate in the West, suggested that the reproductive and parental instincts might be weakening.<sup>(26)</sup> It may be said much more plausibly that the sexual instinct persists strongly, though interest in offspring has weakened very much."

W. "And it is just that correction which draws attention to the social risk entailed. What Schopenhauer called the 'will-to-live' of a community is enfeebled. When this failure is pronounced, the hour of its ordeal is at hand. It will have lost physical power and the manner of the hero. Is this inevitable? It may be, as Brocchi urged, that all species have a limited earth-life like a man and, further, that nations bear the

seeds of death in their original constitutions. But I don't know."

*L.* "I should not feel unduly perturbed over the decline and fall of any association, even one of the national sort. But a word about this 'will-to-live'. If the instincts, promoting population, weaken, surely that may indicate that the pressure 'from above', to which reference was made, is weakening too? Our moods may well respond to influences beyond ourselves. A greater power may be shaping our ends after all! Are we not of one tissue with the legions of souls behind the veil?"

*W.* "We shall gain nothing by going further into this riddle of population. Its hinterland is cut off from explorers.

I am adding a few, and perhaps, unwelcome words. Whether you are in favour of the growth of population or not, give the sentimentalists short shrift. Whatever you do, don't let the unfit get seriously in the way of the fit; that is the unpardonable crime which brings ruin. Don't let the army of achievement be sacrificed to stragglers best left to die beside the roads. A bad body is a worse prison."

*L.* "Well said. Population fitness is the great boon we can confer on the souls who are to visit earth in the future. A radical purge of this planet is needed, and I wish that a plague could take the responsibility off our hands."

*A.* "Well; what about tea?"

\* \* \* \* \*

Tea having become a pleasing memory, with a tendency to induce sleep, we are roused by Wortvoll sitting up gravely amid his books.

*W.* "These births on low levels, I gather, are parted by intervals, sometimes of considerable length. The struggle of souls for rebirth is conditioned by fluctuations of population and, apart from that, the soul just liberated from a body may tend to enter awhile a phase of rest. I deduce this from what you stated about the alternating phases so general in the cosmos."

*L.* "Yes; one has to take account of what C. C. Massey used to stress; of a 'larger cycle of individual existence in which two states activity (with contraction) and rest (with

expansion) alternate'. Death for the normal individual is full of promise. I say normal."

*W.* "You suppose that, the 'rest' being over, the soul *must* manifest again on Earth?"

*L.* "Not at all. The higher souls, let us hope, will not drink again at this not too pleasant well. But how many souls have weighed earth-life finally in the balance and found it wanting? How many have made the decisive progress which allows this prison-house to be left behind? Almost all souls who have died will complete their rest only to return. Why to Earth? Because the continuity of their creative evolution must be preserved. Their psychical growth will follow lines already traced; and is it probable that such lines are available elsewhere? No physical body, annexed in some hypothetical new planetary home, would have the structure which a soul such as man's requires. Man's soul co-operates now with a physical body that has been organised through long geological periods and shaped closely to its temporary needs. This body is here and now indispensable. There is no duplicate to be found, for the conditions under which it was evolved cannot be matched exactly in other regions of space-time. Yes; during some early stages of our creative development we must remain assuredly children of Earth."

*A.* "At rebirth a soul penetrates once more a physical body which, itself a psychical complex, renders possible, as already urged (27), reflective consciring. At the close of its last 'rest-phase' the soul was sunk in irreflective consciring and could not emerge thence unaided. When it emerges and slowly develops self and not-self, the new earth-life may be said to begin."

*W.* "Very interesting; I get a clear idea of the part played by the physical body in rousing the soul from the 'death' that follows the 'rest-phase'. I note, on your lines, that the soul of the dead man has a long rest of expansion at the end of which the intensity of its consciring wanes; there results once more 'death' and the soul wakes up again as a babe-consciousness. I find no difficulty in supposing that earth lives and deaths may take place until they are no longer required — no longer serve to enrich the soul. The contention is a plausible one,

congruent with imaginist philosophy. I won't say more about it now. But have you anything to add touching physical death, the early stages of the hereafter and the full expansive 'rest-phase' ? "

A. " You will recall my statement about what takes place at physical death.(28) A body, which was by annexation part of the soul, is lost ; and therewith cease those special changes in the brain which enabled the soul to lift certain portions of its content above the ' Threshold '. The soul lacks power now to shine in its own light ; it exists still as a part of the world-system, but without knowing that it exists. It will re-awake. Of what sort of a world will it become aware ?

In this circle we do not cite our own experiences, occasionally most enlightening, so my answer must be on familiar lines. Take my advice, as already given, and make your own thorough examination of the alleged facts accumulated by Psychical Research. Your difficulties will be great ; bad witnesses abound ; fools and liars as well, and at best only glimpses of truth will be your reward. But the darkness which invests this topic fulfils purpose ; it is not well that these secrets should be penetrated too easily by plain men who have duties to perform in the market-place and are well catered for by the popular creeds. If the world's business is to be transacted keenly and efficiently, workaday interests rather than ours must occupy the foreground of the plain man's attention. We, however, have our place in the social structure and are to make the most of it. And, if we pursue our researches patiently, we shall not be sent empty away.

A useful clue is the following : Discussing *Problems of the Future Life* on the basis of data obtained through sensitives, Professor W. H. Hyslop made a suggestion, which is very probably true. The soul, which conserves its 'dispositions' (in the psychologist's sense of the term), is not without memory. ' But for the retention of memory we should lose our sense of personal identity, and hence for a time after death this memory is concentrated on the earthly experiences until adjustment to new conditions can be made. The subliminal functions act to produce apparent reality, and then when the subject of them gets into contact with a psychic, the communication of these

images or pictures conveys the idea that you are dealing with a *quasi*-material world'. The 'dreaming spirit' confronts pictures of the past or is marooned in a world of constructive fancy; a prelude to its passage on to a novel and higher level of psychical life."

S. "The *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* mentions 'the place of dreams' (29) in respect of the interval between births. But, needless to say, we are not to limit the powers of expanding souls merely to subjective dreaming. The outlooks on the world-system in the cases of truly great individuals are doubtless superb. The cult of knowledge, for instance, must flower then almost in the glory of a god."

L. "The 'earth-bound' babblers of spiritism, the Raymonds handling 'spiritual cigars' and all the rest are understood at once, if allowance is made for the preliminary subjective, and sometimes perhaps shared, dreaming. Ask yourself, friend Wortvoll, whether these private imaginal worlds, eddies only within the great flood of the imaginal world-system, could be dispensed with. I trow not. But of course they will present strange puzzles to the naïve spiritist and man of science, not yet aware that imagining is the substance of the suns."

W. "I'm not a Demiurgus, but I'll allow that I can't conceive what adaptations better than these could be invented. . . . Meanwhile I'm beginning to take this imaginal system of yours too seriously for complete comfort. Oh! I'm not in cynical vein this time. Consider. You have been telling me how events unfold for the normal individual. The angel of death may come to him in very questionable shape, but is beneficent. But what of those individuals who sow small and large regions of the Earth with sorrow and ruin? The preliminary dreams and the sequel are fraught surely with hideous possibilities. It seems to me that Imaginism cannot reject altogether the popular belief, Eastern and Western, in hells."

A. "'Ardiaeus the Great' passes to his place. To each the world, which he has called into being. And, not entering the witness-box, I must leave the matter so."

W. "And what of the full tide of the expansion in which the 'rest-phase' culminates?"

S. "Of what use to discuss it? We can state symbolically



that the 'treasure-house' of the well evolved soul is partially revealed; it and its connexions with the world-system being conscired in a splendour of Plotinic extent and depth. Souls however, like stars, differ in glory. Most human souls are very undeveloped and will not go far, even after death, on the way towards full reflective consciring. Yet even the experience of these escapes the net of words; concerns reality which transcends utterly the limitations of content familiar to us.

I know a man fully trained in the history of philosophy, a critical student of modern thought, who enjoyed on one occasion during earth-life experience such as high levels of the 'rest-phase' include. He could speak as one having authority. But, amazing as was the glimpse, it faded in large part and swiftly from his cerebrally-based memory. He retains still the recollection of its meaning and of the words torn from him as the experience — the term 'vision' is misleading — faded away."

*L.* "In that higher experience might appear as fact very many of the earth-lives concerning which we bandy inferences down here, reaching out sceptically to conclusions of doubtful worth. Even the predestined world-line of the soul might be revealed, while great moral effects would flow from contemplation of its vicissitudes and relations with pilgrims like itself."

*S.* "My friend insisted further on the glowing fullness and variety of the life of feeling enjoyed. He learnt what significance to attach to the term 'ecstasy', as Plotinus also had been able to do. He found out the secret of living well, if only for a little while. By contrast his normal emotional and sensational life was to seem flat and dreary. The experience had that 'tang' of reality with which sunshine would flood a crypt."

*W.* "He had to accept it, even if he could not explain it. Quite so, and such experiences, which are among the 'hardest' of facts, give even the radical empiricist pause. He must find a setting for them; and, his resources being sometimes limited, the task may prove hard. Ordinary workaday fancy is not in question; a revelation of vividly perceptual, emotional character confronts us."

*L.* "An honest sceptic come to judgment! Wortvoll, you will be one of the mystics yet. The mystic indeed is only a

radical empiricist with a wider outlook than is enjoyed by his kith and kin respected by science."

*W.* "I can't kick at the facts, whatever else I do. And now, also because I'm a lover of fact, I don't want to dwell further on this topic of the interval and 'rest-phase'. Words are not experience; and we have guessed and made phrases sufficiently for our present needs. We see sometimes as in a glass darkly, but the rest of the time we are merely reasoning with certitude often far to seek. Enough!"

*L.* "Yes; enough of words when only concrete intuitive experience can be of worth. But I have a metaphysical question to put which Anderton may find timely."

*A.* "Say on."

*L.* "What is the core of sameness in the permanent soul that passes from birth to birth generating novel 'composite individuals', as Proclus would say, in the process?"

*A.* "A question not to be answered in a few words. Let me refer you first to the history of this soul."

A world-system such as ours has its own space-time. Far back in the night of this time my permanent soul existed in 'solid singleness' within the imaginal upheld by Divine Imagining. The manner in which the step of creative change, statuting this soul, came to pass has been discussed. This soul has initial contents and perhaps a predestined world-line different from those allotted to other souls. Since at first it is sunk in irreflective consciring, it cannot be said to display the sameness of a self. Self is to be evolved only after reflective consciring has dawned.

The Platonic 'descent' takes place; the soul begins to conscire reflectively by the aid of physical•bodies. Short-span self and not-self are evolved. Then there is added the long-span continuous self made possible by memory. (I who have a toothache swam the river yesterday and broke my leg twenty years ago.) Too sudden or too radical changes of content may wreck this personal identity, which is never of course 'bare ego'. Thus far we consider surface•phenomena which belong to ordinary psychology.

In its higher reaches the soul may shine in a more revealing light. The 'dispositional' background is superior and

allied with a corresponding body. I live nearer that root-consciring which sustains always and integrally as 'made reality' the soul's entire past. Thus I tend toward *consciring* of wider and wider grasp, finding therein the 'inexplicable tie' of which I am in search. This deeper *consciring* has found expression in all my lives; it includes them and their transitions as readily as in my lower being I greet and synthesise the different days of the year."

*L.* "The permanent soul then has a core of sameness in both its aspects; it is stable as a discrete centre of *consciring*, it is stable also in respect of a most important part of its contents. It might almost be called *articulus stantis vel cadentis philosophiae*, has all the advantages for thought of a monad without the disadvantages. Don't you agree, Wortvoll?"

*W.* "It has the disadvantage now of making us late for dinner. Come along, come along—these refinements of controversy are disastrous."

#### NOTES BY BASIL ANDERTON

- (1) Cf. *Ordinances of Manu*, pp. 373-377 (Sacred Books of the East).
- (2) In the *Phædo* Socrates suggests that evil souls of the gluttonous, wanton, etc., may be clothed in the forms of asses, wolves, hawks and kites; that even those who observe "temperance and justice", "produced from habit and exercise, without philosophy and reflection", may migrate into bees, wasps and ants. The prejudice of the intellectual could go no further.
- (3) Cf. *The World as Will and Idea* (Haldane and Kemp's trans.), vol. iii. p. 300.
- (4) *Ibid.* p. 301.
- (5) Cf. Chapter IX. pp. 171-172.
- (6) T. Whittaker, *The Neo-Platonists* (2nd edit.), p. 255.
- (7) Cf. Chapter X. p. 209.
- (8) Cf. Chapter II. p. 13.
- (9) Cf. Chapter VIII. p. 151.
- (10) *Science and the Modern World*, p. 145.
- (11) *Body and Mind*, p. 366.
- (12) Cf. Chapter X. p. 211.
- (13) Cf. Chapter IX. pp. 171-172.
- (14) *Human Immortality and Pre-existence*, p. 87.
- (15) *Heredity*, Essays (Eng. trans.), pp. 91-93.
- (16) *Hume*, pp. 113 and 208.
- (17) *Psychological Principles*, Note, p. 450.
- (18) Cf. Chapter X. p. 217.
- (19) Cf. Professor Hooton in *Apes, Men, and Morons*, p. 62. The application is "confined, for the most part, to the inheritance of a few diseases,

malformations and anomalies. Even in these cases the data are usually not conclusive, and the positive affirmations of hopeful geneticists have to be bolstered up with a certain amount of faith."

(20) Cf. Chapter XII. pp. 269-270.

(21) Cf. Professor Doncaster, *Heredity*, pp. 103 and 105-106.

(22) Cf. Chapter XII. pp. 252-253.

(23) *Origin of Species* (6th edit.), p. 210.

(24) *Wasps Social and Solitary*, p. 22.

(25) *Science of Life*, H. G. Wells and Julian Huxley, p. 598.

(26) *Social Psychology* (20th edit.), p. 234.

(27) Cf. Chapter XII. pp. 252-253.

(28) Cf. Chapter XII. p. 275

(29) Gough, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p. 180.

## CHAPTER XV

### THE POWER THAT TURNS THE WHEEL

"There is somewhat that resembles the ebb and flow of the sea, day and night, man and woman, in a single needle of the pine, in a kernel of corn, in each individual of every animal tribe. The reaction, so grand in the elements, is repeated within these small boundaries. For example, in the animal kingdom the physiologist has observed that no creatures are favourites, but a certain compensation balances every gift and every defect. . . . The theory of the mechanic forces is another example. What we gain in power is lost in time ; and the converse. The periodic or compensating errors of the planets are another instance. The influences of climate and soil in political history are another. The cold climate invigorates. The barren soil does not breed fevers, crocodiles, tigers or scorpions. The same dualism underlies the nature and condition of man. Every excess causes a defect ; every defect an excess."—EMERSON.

"There is a great deal in the universe, I am sure, beyond mere morality ; and I have yet to learn that, even in the moral world, the highest law is justice." — BRADLEY.

"Où est la balance humaine qui pèserait comme il le faut les récompenses et les peines ?" — BERGSON.

"In the moment of the tragic catastrophe the conviction becomes more distinct to us than ever that life is a bad dream from which we have to awake." — SCHOPENHAUER.

"There are true and loyal head-hunters and there are men who piously and conscientiously practise cruel rites, or commit murder from righteous conviction." — JUNG.

WORTVOLL and I, having left Wengen at six o'clock in the morning, are sitting now on a log looking across the misty Lauterbrunnen valley at the Staubbach. After breakfast we are to leave by car for Berne, companions in another air adventure, the last which our visitor's brief holiday can include. One further talk to-morrow morning and the Oberland Dialogues will have become a memory. A pleasant one ? Well ; I could wish for no better comrades than Leslie and Stark. Wortvoll's manner, dictatorial and sometimes rude, has left something to be desired. But, after all, he is the honest man who allows no difficulties to be dodged and who



SOUTH PRECIPICES OF THE MATTERHORN , TO THE LEFT IN BACKGROUND IS THE DENT BLANCHE .



is ready also to change his beliefs when logic is on our side. He is a man whose opinion carries weight in his University and elsewhere, so I am profiting by this stroll to drive home some of the contentions which have been holding our interest of late. During these last two talks he will be lured into, what for an agnostic are, new and strange fields of thought. Let him travel as well prepared for the journey as possible.

A. "So you have found these dialogues of real value ; have made progress in cosmic metaphysics ; have come to believe also in a soul which manifests at any rate in a few lives, and possibly in many more. In your open mind Imaginism is rising dimly like an exhalation ; it will take very definite and complete form in the days to come."

W. "I'm not so sure. What am I compared with a mystic like you ? A man benighted in a narrow canyon, with the roar of unseen waters deafening him, darkness fraught with danger on all sides and just a glimpse far aloft of a strip of sky set with stars."

A. "But the canyon will be seen clearly in the morning and you are not staying there all your life. Meanwhile the adventure is not without charm."

W. "Imaginism for me is too much an affair of inferences ; I am always going over the grounds for my few beliefs to be sure that I hold them rightly. Your reasonings survive criticism but bring me no peace."

A. "There's a discontent said to be divine. And, as long as we wander in the depths of the canyon benighted, we shall be dissatisfied with what we perceive. Our present position in the cosmos is a lowly one and we 'stop to think', not because thought provides a final resting-place, but to resolve passing mental conflicts, which must inevitably be followed by others. Finite life in us is in travail, the goal of its efforts very remote indeed. . . . But what have you to say of our last talk, how has a night's reflection modified your attitude towards palingenesis, towards belief in the plurality of lives ?"

W. "You dealt with this hypothesis much as Plato, Plotinus and Proclus, aided by the philosophy of Imaginism, would have dealt with it. You ignored another form of it, that which derives our souls, not from imaginings present in the 'harmonious state' of the primaeval divine world-system, but



from the lowest depths of what was in fact evolved later — what we call the external world of Nature. Thus writers have depicted electrons, atoms, etc., arising in these depths and being developed through interminable palingenetic adventures from the crudest psychical beginnings up to godhead. An ant or prawn, which ranks high in the hierarchy, would be an angel or Buddha in the making! An Eastern popular dream of this kind seems to have influenced even Professor Schiller's *Riddles of the Sphinx*."

A. "This is, what you have called it, a dream. It believes in a general evolution of souls 'from below'. What of the witness of number? Human souls are relatively very rare. But it has been estimated that  $10^{27}$  atoms are built into your physical body. The chances of promotion in the hierarchy seem poor.

We condemned before a tendency to 'derive' higher existents from lower. The lower cannot provide what the higher are found to possess; the conjurer's hat can yield bits of lining, but not rabbits.

Allow freely for non-competing strata of souls. And in the case of the stratum of relatively very rare human souls, remember this. \* Below that level unified, continuous selves do not exist. Even the gap between man and beast, such as they are now, is not to be bridged."

W. "Non-competing strata, that's the phrase! Why this Democritan zeal in deriving higher from lower or lowest? Are the world's possessions to be drawn from the void? Yes; so far I'm with you. . . . I'll pass now to another topic. You urge that the soul has a plurality of lives on earth and other levels. Is the soul bound to this Ixion's wheel for ever, or, having shattered the wheel, will it find at last peace?"

A. "The wheel turns not aimlessly, but in a cosmos of plan. It turns too at times delightfully; it turns also bringing curses, shrieks and boredom. To what profit?"

The soul has to unlock the 'treasure-house' of which I spoke,(1) has to achieve very gradually reflective conscurring of what it is in itself, to have before it clearly the full wealth which it possessed, but irreflectively, at creation's dawn. This wealth is to remain for aeons below the 'Threshold', like the

'obscure' perceptions of the Leibnitzian monad. The soul contains in the *primaeval* 'harmonious state' even more than Plato ascribed to it, but subconsciously as some of our modern writers might say. As it 'descends', using bodies, it begins to conspire reflectively. Henceforth its life of *conservation* is enriched by *additive creation*; the unrest of the time-process is being endured on Ixion's wheel. Its vicissitudes, efforts, torments swell its power. It passes from the dull red glow of irreflectivity towards the white radiance of full reflective conspiring which in a remote future will light its most inward depths. And, of course, in this process of quickening it ingests content which is *novelty* both for it and for the world-system at large. Indeed only through finite experients is Divine Imagining able to harvest novelties such as the annals of human and like history contain. The souls presuppose God, but God would have an insufficiently adequate filling without the souls. On the divine level to imagine is to create; the imaginal act is fact. Innumerable free minor agents, including our souls, are called into being; centres of creativity which diversify all that is. A leaven of spontaneity permeates the entire world-system constructed by God. The Fundamental Power has created creators; and the richest possible variety for the cosmos — and here and there for chaos! — is secured."

W. "I see. The severity of certain phases of its struggle is a positive asset of the soul. It gives scope to 'élan vital', furthers development. That may be so. But what about a possible final peace? Is there an isle of the blest in the ocean of the infinite? And can you be sure that the soul, once freed from the wheel, will be immortal?"

A. "Don't interpret peace as a tired athlete or peasant would; as a period of rest during which nothing or very little is done. Conservation dominates in the rest-phases of the deeper soul-life, but conservation, as Descartes reminded us, is also creation. A rest-phase, more particularly a cosmic one, conserves long stretches of history, and is the consummation of these. Plato's 'spectator of all time and all existence' would be active in the Divine Event. The 'peace' is only that in which great changes, such as characterise additive creation, are not being produced.

There are no tired sentient save on the lower levels of Nature where bodies having nervous structures exist. Consciring, free or furthered, has as its feeling-aspect joy ; a statement of which the case against pessimism will make use. This is what the poet-mystic Blake meant when he said 'energy is eternal delight'. It is only folk, with overtaxed physical bodies, who turn to a metaphysics that promises them eternal and even dreamless sleep. Eternal activity is the outlook in fact.

I will speak about immortality to-morrow when we discuss 'Outlooks'."

W. "If Blake's view of 'energy', i.e. consciring, is right, optimism in future ages will be lived rather than discussed, while applicants for eternal dreamless sleep will disappear. But enough about the Back of Beyond !

You have given reasons why Ixion's wheel has to turn ; no mere empty 'will-to-live' is concerned. And the souls on the wheel are not suffering in vain. 'God's in His Heaven', you would say after Browning. The wheel turns within the system planned by Divine Imagining Itself."

A. "May I break in with a quotation ? Outside the petty regions where minor agents 'run amok' or stagnate, all causal successions are steps towards that Divine Event mentioned just now. The causal dynamic is no master — it is only the *manner* in which Divine Imagining works for 'the slow making and perfecting of the world-romance which began and will have its end ; an "end" at once the close of a time-process and the crown of a purpose fulfilled'.(2) The turning wheel is part of the manner in which the plan is fulfilled. But continue, please."

W. "Yes ; I recognise that, if your account of causation is sound, this heartening conclusion is not to be impugned. But what about the control of the turning wheel, what about the vicissitudes of the interrelated souls bound to it who enjoy and suffer ? Are there any uniformities of causation in this domain which could be discovered by an adequate science ? Is it possible to generalise an inclusive law with subordinate laws and to point to cases in which these laws are exemplified ? Or must we forego the hope of scientific knowledge and put up

with the vagueness and confusion that mar so much mystical literature dealing with the topic ? ”

A. “ My dear Wortvoll, this brings us to the problem which we are to discuss after landing at Milan to-day, so don't expect me to reply at any length now. I will say something, withal, with intent to be rid of certain obstacles to clear thinking which might trouble us later.

Imaginists do not accept rigid laws of causation, regarding these as only useful inventions, as artistic products of creative human imagining. The time-process of Nature and finite sentient life reveals more or less iterative conservation allied with more or less additive novelty. Thus the ‘ uniformities ’ of science are never quite verifiable ; merely highly convenient formulae whereby we predict events. ‘ There is no strict causal behaviour anywhere ’, urges similarly Eddington, reaching his conclusion by the route of physics and mathematics.(3) If then, Wortvoll, your ideal of ‘ scientific knowledge ’ needs discovery of rigid uniformities of causation, it cannot be realised in this or any other domain. In respect, moreover, of the turning of the wheel we shall acquire at best only rags and tatters of knowledge on this low level of the cosmos. So let ambition be pruned in advance.

Writers dealing with the Plurality of Lives often forget that ‘ laws ’ of causation, whether rigid or not, are generalisations made by men, not forces or entities existing in their own right and controlling the sequences of events. The ‘ laws ’ of the meteorologist do not produce the weather ; they are statements which enable him to predict it. Happenings in the external world are not ‘ governed ’ by compelling ‘ laws ’, but exemplify more or less stable habits of Nature, more or less constant modes of behaviour, which can be anticipated by men who have learnt to observe, generalise and deduce ably. But writers, who draw on Indian lore, are prone to overlook this. They tell of a ‘ Law of Karma ’ which is supposed in some cryptic manner to control events for the souls bound on the wheel. This ‘ Law ’ is not invented by, but presides over, us ! ”

W. “ Appeal seems to be made also to a second meaning of ‘ law ’ : a *command* imposed by a sovereign authority and enforced by penalties at need. Hence the reference to claims

and counterclaims, punitive suffering, retribution, etc., such as this authority might provide for. A very human way of thinking after all."

A. "You suggest that there is often sheer confusion of thought; oscillation between two meanings of a term. At one time law is what compels uniformities of sequence; at another law in the jurist's sense of the term holds attention. It may be so. Those who hypostasise law — law, not of human making, which presides over us — incur this risk. 'Karmic' law of this kind is characterised as inflexible; 'eternal, changeless, invariable, inviolable, law which never can be broken', as a writer, inspired by Indian thought, contends.(4) Henceforth I shall ban this term law which renders more obscure a problem already difficult."

W. "Such words as 'inviolable' and 'broken' suggest the juristic outlook. But this alleged changeless law can be moralised and becomes then the 'law of ethical causation'. An eminent Indian philosopher, Professor Radhakrishnan, regards progress as governed by 'the law of Karma or ethical causation'.(5) But here I have to make a further comment. Ethical causation comprises all sorts of sequences, good and bad. A law guiding these sequences towards good, distributing merited joy and sorrow, gives one pause. What is this power *called* law and how does it work?

Let me add that there is very much in the world-system besides the moral and that no truly 'universal and irresistible power', such as your Imaginal Dynamic, could be identified with the law just mentioned. I gather that for you Divine Imagining is supermoral, *ὑπεράγαθος*, as is 'The One' of Plotinus, and that morality exists only for certain finite experients and their relations. Moral values, again, are subject to change; and this liability would displease the advocate of the 'changeless' and 'inviolable' whose words you quoted. My conclusion is this. I have of course no solution to offer you. But if, as I believe, the supermoral rules the world, the problem must be solved accordingly. I await the light."

A. "There is another point touching which some preliminary observations may prove useful. You may have read books in

which popular writers about Karma assert that man shapes his own destiny, receives, as one of them puts it, 'nothing which he has not earned'. Man, they say, can choose freely; he sows and he reaps the harvest of his deeds. But conscious will only alters a situation that has been *given*; even free acts are conditioned by very much that they do not make. This is why Professor Mackenzie observed that 'from the point of view of the universe' no one perhaps has any responsibility for his choice.(6) Too deterministic an attitude, you may say. Yes, for the initiative of the individual, however conditioned, must count. What remains certain, withal, is this. The individual never sows and reaps alone. Nature, nurture, the world are aiding and abetting."

W. "Professor Royce stresses this dependence of the individual on the world. Remove from it, he wrote, the support of the world and it becomes—nothing! I agree. No need to labour the point."

A. "I have to. The truth is so often overlooked. I have to insist that, whether I am able to choose freely or not, my destiny is made largely or mainly for me, not by me."

W. "On your present level at any rate."

A. "Yes, that's better. Just consider the facts. Souls did not originate themselves; and they were created—evolved if you prefer the term—with the different contents and world-lines that we discussed before. Swept into the conflicts of space-time, they begin to awake to conscious life, having at first only a crude awareness of what they perceive and are. Their different vicissitudes and adaptive responses differentiate them more and more; they are fields also of experiment about which I shall say something anon. In this process the great 'sower' is the world-system. It is creating the minor creators who act according to the characters assigned to them. Recall here that the greater cosmic innovations, in the wash of which the petty agents have to innovate too, are steps of divine, *additive* creation. They are not ejected by mere 'antecedents' in which they were latent; are posited *ad hoc* by the grace of God, by constructive Divine Imagining in the solution of conflicts. But you are sufficiently familiar with what we call the Imaginal Dynamic. From this supreme power proceeds

that background of destiny over against which the minor agents play their parts."

W. "Parts also full of unmerited pleasures and pains. These minor agents seem almost negligible aspects of a plan of cosmic scope. Thus in the conflicts of human and animal evolution pleasures and pains are distributed arbitrarily; something much more important than any hypostasised 'law of ethical causation' directs the storm."

A. "A method of evolution, which includes survival of the fittest, has to inflict 'injustice', unmerited suffering, nay torture, on the great scale. Only a very wicked man, says Mill, could behave as does 'Nature' to its victims. But in fact petty things must be ignored in the interests of great. When sudden geological equilibration takes place, cities are shivered into ruins. The 'sower' does not stay his hand for trifles."

W. "Are ants respected when a garden is being dug up?"

A. "An overriding purpose will not be denied. But often in the 'running amok' of natural agents no sane purpose redeems the welter of evil. Contagious complaints riot among plants and fishes; innumerable birds and land-animals, stricken with disease and defect, perish miserably. Not only children but many birds, fish, horses, insects, crabs, etc., normally endowed with sight, are born blind; failure occurring arbitrarily and serving no useful end at all. In the breed of Dexter-Kerry cattle, we are told, the troubler of heredity, a lethal, dooms a regular percentage of faulty embryos to die. Need I continue?"

W. "No; I have grasped fully your meaning. Creative evolution, like the car of Juggernaut, has and must have its course paved with victims. A 'law of ethical causation', whatever that phrase may mean, merely trifles with the problem which these victims raise. *Ethical causation covers a relatively narrow field.* Over-emphasised, in the context of talk about the plurality of lives, it may rouse mirth. One might ask, as men asked in a Bible story, what 'this man' has done that he should be born blind! But is it certain that the answer would involve his prenatal career? And to stress sanctions for prenatal misdeeds in the case of a blind insect or crab would be unwise. We must avoid a simple-minded,

popular solution. We require one in which all the surface-phenomena shall find a place."

A. "Exactly. And now let us get back to breakfast, for the cars will be waiting at Lauterbrunnen after nine o'clock. It looks as if we should have a nice run to Berne and take-off comfortably for Milan an hour or more before noon. We fly over the Simplon corridor of course."

W. "With a talk to follow at Milan?"

A. "That's the idea; we can stay the night and get back early in the morning at need."

Back we go along the winding path in search of our chocolate and buttered toast. Suddenly what I regard almost as an inspiration flashes on me:

A. "Wortvoll, you will recall my saying that I possess an intuition of pre-existence, but ascribe no decisive force to the popular arguments for belief in the plurality of lives. The intuition supplies certainty. You replied that you had no such intuition. Well, you too will enjoy this intuition one day."

W. "So you are prophet as well as mystic! But why am I to be thus favoured?"

A. "Only quite recently has the intuition replaced for me mere inference. It supervened on study long-drawn-out of the problem of birth. Its coming was of great value but not unearned. It furnishes a foundation of certainty on which philosophy can build sky-scrapers, not all secure against the blasts of debate, to its heart's content. And it is denied to none."

W. "You suggest that, if I think long and earnestly enough, the sun of this intuition will show through the clouds?"

A. "I don't see why you should not be as fortunate as I was. Long continued truth-seeking thought tends to provoke response from the higher part of the soul. There is born direct acquaintance with a fragment of the experience which is desired. And so is won what your moods of doubt refuse."

W. "True; there could be no argument as potent as this intuition. And enjoying it I could find force in many kinds of evidence which, taken by themselves, leave me now interested but unconvinced."

A. "Don't forget, in respect of the intuition, a very important point: the soul's past has not vanished from the



universe but is conserved integrally, as 'made reality', below the 'Threshold' about which we have said so much.(7) My insight does not grow out of deceptive private fancy, as you surmised; *it taps this 'made reality'*, reveals to my surface self more of what its background contains. Reflective conscurring profits by a wider time-span."

W. "Radical empiricism is then possible. Anderton, your last plea for belief in the plurality of lives is your best. But tell me, why do you get only a vague impression of your buried past? Why no definite pictures, sounds, and scenes?"

A. "If I was a high mystic, I might intuite very clearly, but, being what I am, I only glimpse what you refer to quite properly as a 'buried' past. Cerebral 'dispositions', as the psychologists would say, must be allowed for. As Basil Anderton I can intuite clearly no more than what the mediating brain transmits. And this brain began to function only in connexion with my present life."

W. "Not a bad answer at all."

\* \* \* \* \*

We are passing over the plain of Interlaken at about 8000 feet, Leslie piloting as usual on the left seat of "The Good Companion". All parts of this tourist town, now thronged with visitors, are seen very clearly. On our right, almost abreast but some hundreds of yards away, flies the Leopard, having below it the Lütchine on its way to lose itself in the Lake of Brienz.

With a delicious bank we change our course to cross the mountains that separate us from Grindelwald, the Leopard doing the same, while coming somewhat nearer to us. We have gained height as we soar above the chalets scattered in picturesque disorderliness along the green slopes and approach the Wetterhorn to the left of the Upper Glacier. To the south the Finsteraarhorn, king of the Oberland, looks down on a great *firn*, source of the ice-river.

L. "We've got enough height now for what we want to do, so we'll turn again and cross the little Scheidegg"; and, suiting the action to the word, he swings the plane to the right, making for the pass. Soon we have left behind the famous north ridge of the Eiger, also the pass and grim precipices

beyond, and have just below a big hanging glacier broken by two long crevasses. A turn to the left between the Eiger and the Mönch; and another snow-waste opens up. Our course lies across the upper Aletsch Glacier towards the mountain of that name.

Over the Aletschhorn! I am looking down on the great curve of the glacier, the biggest in the Alps, rough with ridges and having beside it, near the Eggishorn, a deep green lake, the Marjelensee, in which are blocks of ice. Ahead are the glorious Valaisan Alps. We follow the line of the glacier for miles till its narrowing snout ends in a stream. Is there anything quite so fascinating as Alpine flying?

L. "There's the Simplon corridor — just a notch in the wall of the Rhône valley — yes, and there's Brigue on the left bank of the river. . . . Hallo!"

Misfiring, recovery, a spell of the normal steadiness, then more misfiring and power falls off noticeably. The nose drops a trifle.

L. "Confound it — we shall have to get down. There are emergency fields at Turtmann and Sierre, but at Sion is an aerodrome. We've lots of height to lose. Interesting for you!"

A. (whose "interest" is tinged with alarm). "The valley bottom near Brigue is not tempting, but there's life in the engine yet. We'll get to port all right."

So the long engine-aided glide down the valley begins, and nearer and nearer we come to the Rhône, as Viège, Raron, Gampel, Turtmann and Loèche are left behind. A flat, clear piece of ground at Turtmann seems worth Leslie's notice — but no, he holds to his decision. Over Sierre we seem uncomfortably low at 3000 feet or so above inhospitable ground. But the engine is by no means without power and at last, passing between the castles of Tourbillon and Valère, we reach Sion and two or three miles further the aerodrome. There follows an easy landing. A few minutes later the Leopard joins us on the turf. Leslie and our Swiss pilot stand in judgment beside the engine. Their sentence is soon known; a ground engineer is summoned and the plane pushed into a hangar. Magneto trouble has been inferred, and such proves to be the case.

L. "Milan's off; we can't get away this morning. Let's

have a taxi, visit Tourbillon castle, lunch there and have a talk after. We might stay the night too at the Hotel de la Poste and have another talk, getting back to Berne early in the morning."

W. "I can spend another night at Wengen, if necessary."

To Sion accordingly by taxi we go, dropping our Swiss friend in the town. We too get out near the Rue du Château, having to face a twenty-minutes walk in the heat up to the ruins, site of the thirteenth-century fastness of a Prince-Bishop. Exploration enjoyed, we open our rucksacks and lunch outside the walls. Before us rises a lower rock bearing Valère castle and church; across the Rhône lowland beyond it the eye travels to the mouth of the Val d'Hérens so rich in associations dear to the mountaineer. A strange place for a dialogue.

S. "So, Herr Professor, you had a talk with Anderton early this morning."

W. "Yes, while you two were lazing in bed. Quite a useful talk too."

S. "About to-day's topic?"

W. "In part only. I was impressed by his latest statement about the manner in which belief in the Plurality of Lives can be reached. The intuition of pre-existence, he thinks, is no privilege, but can be won. However, what he said, though suggestive and well worth attention, is not relevant to the matter in hand. Already I incline to believe in the Ixion's wheel of rebirths. And now I am seeking to learn something about the power that controls the turning of this wheel. Anderton and I exchanged ideas on some aspects of this riddle."

S. "So you have begun to consider that difficult riddle. And with what result?"

W. "We agreed that the supermoral rules the world; that no mere 'law of ethical causation', nor indeed any 'law', can be supposed to dominate the souls bound on the wheel. Neither the generalisations of science nor juristic commands operate outside the domain of finite minds. Moral ideals and taboos are flouted in the annals of evolution. We were of Mill's opinion: anyone who tried to imitate the natural course of things would be 'the wickedest of men'. Put not trust, accordingly, in 'Cosmic Justice'. What then is the power at

work in turning the wheel? Our previous talks have enabled me to anticipate more or less what the answer will be."

L. "Those who wish to believe in 'Cosmic Justice' must believe first not in Divine Imagining, but in a finite, moral God. And they must explain to us how this God can behave like 'the wickedest of men'. Happily no one here is interested in a hypothesis of this kind. We need not suppose, withal, that the only moral powers in the world-system are individuals such as ourselves and our like. There may exist very numerous moral individuals, raised far above any level which we can shape in fancy, who are sufficiently wise, powerful and benevolent to be called gods. Were such gods to manifest themselves to mankind, the popular religions might all become polytheistic. The case for belief in them is strong. Have not individuals been evolved in innumerable world-systems through aeons before the cosmos known to us existed? Well, the gods and indeed the Divine Societies, which transcend individuality,(8) are outcome of this development."

W. "We can't go into this matter now."

S. "But must welcome the remark about justice. Only a finite individual can be moral, and justice is not even the highest peak of moral conduct. Justice has not the standing of a Platonic Idea, eternal and changeless, illuminating the lower world; it was developed creatively during the time-process, changing freely as the interests of finite sentient beings required. There is disagreement even now as to the manner in which it should be conceived. The social organisation, for instance, which, for a conservative upholding 'immutable principles of right', is just, is, for a communist, unjust."

The concept or general idea of justice, a late product of human thought, was heralded by the *practice* of equal sharing, e.g. of meat by hunting savages. Each man's greed is checked by competing desires: distributive justice is adumbrated when the shares are equal; corrective when he who takes too much is hated and attacked. Equal division is the solution harmonising the conflict of wills. A crude phase of savage justice is that of a totem-group. A bison-man has killed an eagle-man. Then the eagle-men will retaliate by killing the first bison-man they happen on, equalising losses, righting a

disturbed balance so as to be 'even with' the opposition. This practice survives among gangsters, though ordinarily the actual aggressor would be selected for 'bumping off'.

The phrase 'equitable conduct' refers us to a word, *aequus*, which means both equal and impartial; and in the division of the meat all have equal shares, which is to say that no one is favoured at the expense of the rest. But it is a far cry from practical primitive sharing and retaliating to the *conception* of justice as discussed by Plato, Aristotle and their successors. Consider Plato's *Republic*. In this work an attempt is made to think out clearly what justice is, or ought to be, when embodied in the social order on the grand scale. Justice (*jus*, *jussum*) meant once, what progressive social organisation was forced to impose, viz.: rules of a governing authority. The State enforces rights and obligations by laws which command and which the man called just obeys, prolonging their spirit into his private conduct as well. Men are social creatures and have to co-operate; the ideally constituted State, furthering this co-operation most efficiently, would be one of justice. Plato furnishes suggestions for the making of this just state, having in view not merely the organisation but the welfare of the individuals who maintain it. But Plato failed to free these individuals sufficiently from the State. He limited their 'rights' to those which the doing of their civic duties entailed."

L. "Your illustration of the meat gives me pause. Let us suppose that one of the hunting savages is a giant of great renown. A larger share of the meat is his portion. It would be bad, were his share only equal to that of a comrade. He would live less effectively for his group and for himself. Equality of treatment won't work. I have exemplified in this simple case the general truth that equalitarian ideals are absurd." (9)

W. "No two men have ever been born equal. When this truth is denied, ask '*equal in respect of what?*' Different men have unequal claims on the goods, services and honours distributed by the social surround."

S. "Ulpian looked to justice to 'give every man his due', but, of course, the difficulty is to discover what this 'due' exactly is. There's the rub! In the ideally just Platonic State,

which is not equalitarian, each citizen is to realise his powers as fully as possible in the service of the commonwealth. Each does what he does best, having been prepared adequately for his task. He has his special rights and obligations, receiving in this organisation that which is 'his due'. But equality is lacking. That which is 'due' to the statesman, poet, thinker, is superior to that which is 'due' to workers in the depths."

L. "Plato dreamt dreams about a small City-State in which a planned home for 'justice' could be built. But, after all, had the dream been realisable, the 'justice' would have been only that which found favour in his sight. It would not have been the last form of this protean thing. The *term* justice alone is stable, giving the false impression that what it stands for is stable too. It is like a rock standing in a stream of change; a stream which has carried much rubbish and evil, and continues to do so even now. Thus the 'justice' of punishment has been fouled with evil. Take thought, for instance, of the semi-barbarous Jew who, in the name of 'justice', wished a man's descendants to suffer for his sins; of men brutalised, starved, broken on the wheel, burnt and tortured in all sorts of ways that 'justice' might be satisfied(10); of Milton seeing eternal 'justice' in a hell where 'torture without end still urges'. Happily *tout passe*, but what is 'justice' even to-day?"

S. "Most States no doubt even now are travesties of what homes of sane, well-intentioned 'justice' ought to be. And the best State, though better than anarchy, is disappointing. While maintaining itself and harmonising, as completely as is practicable, the claims and counter-claims of its members, it is the field of that 'running amok' to which we have referred so often. It has also to enforce *general* laws, which cannot in all cases work equitably. Lacking adequate wisdom its agents, a small minority, impose bad laws as well as good, and even in enforcing the good may blunder badly. Its 'justice' is faulty human achievement, as indispensable, however, as it is open to criticism."

W. "We are off our philosophical course. I have heard quite enough about justice which belongs obviously to the morals of mankind. We agreed that a cosmic version of it is

not required. Anderton, it's your turn to do the talking."

L. "It's too hot here, and we are solving the food-problem for horseflies. Let's descend, phone to the aerodrome and finish this chat at the local hotel or Wengen to-night."

An argument based on horseflies and pushed well home — into one's calves and ankles for choice — is not logical, but decisive. We shoulder our rucksacks and seek refuge in the town. There we learn that "The Good Companion", completely restored to health, is ready to ride the winds. The pilot of the Leopard, who has returned to the aerodrome, suggests it would be a mistake to spend too much time at Sion, as the weather outlook over the Bernese Oberland is not good. He understands that we no longer want to fly to Milan.

L. "Storm clouds seem to be gathering in the north-east over the Gemmi Pass, but we need not return that way. Well, what's our decision to be? . . . Good; then we'll get off as soon as possible."

After a satisfactory try-out of the engine Leslie and I take-off, being the leaders. Height is to be gained before we can begin to pass out of the great trench in which flows the Rhône. As we climb towards Sierre I can see clearly that masses of cumulo-nimbus are being piled up in the direction of the Gemmi Pass and Kandersteg, while even over the mountains north of Sion the air, misty and darkening, seems fraught with mischief. Aeroplanes are seldom struck by lightning, but violent currents are generated by storms above mountains. I am glad when Leslie, having reached the 10,000 feet level opposite the Val d'Anniviers, changes course making once more for Sion over Montana, the sanatoria and ponds of which are seen clearly. Having soon Sion below us, we make a turn to the right crossing the mountains over the Wildhorn. But we are heading into the heart of a breaking storm. On our right all becomes dense black or blackening cloud and in front of us above the Vaudois Alps and the Simme valley is cumulo-nimbus perhaps 2000 feet thick. A brilliant flash to our right, followed by thunder echoed and re-echoed from the rocks, opens the tumult. The machine is thrown about in a zone of violent "bumps", due to currents.

L. "We can dodge this by turning to the west towards

Savoy, but I'm going to fly above it. This is a local disturbance and further on one can almost always profit by a 'hole' over Berne through which to get down, even when conditions are quite bad."

And with open throttle and lifted nose he drives the craft upward through mist. Another flash and long-echoed ear-splitting crash, another and another. I look down into the mirk and wonder.

*L.* "These long-drawn-out peals are reassuring; it's the brief, sharp crack that tells when lightning is near. . . . Rough going, is it not? Just as well that we are strapped tightly to our seats. But now we are nearly above the weather — wonder how the Leopard is doing."

From a height of 16,500 feet the storm becomes a mere spectacle. The mountains of a wide tract of country below us have vanished under a pall of cloud, but for us this pall is now of white wool and the craft, no longer tossed about, is soaring above it in the sunlight. Yes; the storm is a strictly local one. The ranges of Savoy and indeed Mont Blanc itself are to be seen across a misty gap in which lies Lake Lemman. Ahead show more or less clearly the Juras, Lake of Neuchâtel and the Bielersee. The Lakes of Thun and Brienz, on the margin of the storm, are hidden; the summits of the Jungfrau and other high neighbouring peaks rise like small islands out of a white sea.

*L.* "Thor's hammer is striking hard down below in the Simmenthal. But 'The Good Companion' reminds me of the Augoeides shining in its own untroubled light above the gloom and struggles of terrene life."

*A.* "Simile justified; ours is a marvellous experience to which only a poet, like you, could do justice. Unfortunately I find the height rather trying, am giddy with rather a nasty headache. Can we drop a bit?"

*L.* "Take the stick and carry on; get into a glide towards that reach of the Aar which shows beyond Berne. Berne itself is under the weather, but this storm won't last long and we'll go to ground over the city just when we choose. Yes; keep the throttle half open; otherwise the engine may cool too fast and stop. . . . That's the way; you shape like a pilot in the making and no mistake."



About four hundred yards away on our right the Leopard comes into view, travelling fast nose down. As we lose height my head ceases to ache and the giddiness vanishes. Enjoying heartily the rôle of pilot I drop swiftly towards the cloud-valleys and mountains overlying the city of Berne. There is no storm in this quarter. The cumulus is thinning out and at 6000 feet I can glimpse through a "hole" the Federal Palace and Terrace and a bit of the land sloping thence to the Aar. Our journey's end is near.

#### NOTES BY BASIL ANDERTON

- (1) Cf. Chapter XII. p. 249.
- (2) *Divine Imagining*, p. 110.
- (3) *Nature of the Physical World*, p. 309.
- (4) Annie Besant, *A Study in Karma*, p. 3.
- (5) Professor Radhakrishnan, "The Heart of Hinduism" *Hibbert Journal*, 1922.
- (6) *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, p. 308.
- (7) Cf. on this part of "made reality", Chapter XII. pp. 269-270.
- (8) Cf. *Z.D.* pp. 199-201 and Chapter XVII of this work.
- (9) "All Justice is a matter of Proportion and Degree. . . . But Equality is the negative of Proportion as well as Gradation. And therefore, in a world of multiform actual inequalities, Equality is the greatest enemy of Equity. . . . Roman *Aequitas*, like the Greek *Epieikeia*, did not mean forced uniformity, but the restoration of a disturbed balance of established Proportion."—W. M. Thorburn in *Mind*, "What is a Person?"
- (10) *E.g.* "The flesh of Robert Stewart and of a private chamberlain of the King was torn from their bodies with pincers; while, even in the midst of these horrible agonies, they confessed the *justice* of their sentence."—From Sir Walter Scott's *Tales of a Grandfather*.





THE WEISSHORN (14,800 FT.) AS SEEN FROM ABOVE VAL D'ANNIVIERS

## CHAPTER XVI

### THE POWER THAT TURNS THE WHEEL (*continued*)

" . . . To do anything in excess seldom fails to provoke a violent reaction to the opposite extreme, not only in the seasons of the year and in the animal and vegetable kingdoms, but also especially in commonwealths. . . . Thus excessive freedom is unlikely to pass into anything but excessive slavery, in the case of states as well as of individuals." — PLATO, *Republic* (Trans. Davies and Vaughan).

"The old determinists considered that causation excludes freedom and chance. But the imagist view renders causation compatible with freedom and chance; in fact it ascribes to every causal process a creativity which *implies* freedom or chance. . . . Chance is a phase of causation as we understand it." — *Zermatt Dialogues*.

HOURS ago the last straggling clouds of the storm melted into the blue, leaving the air fresher. Once more we are on the balcony at Wengen after dinner, smoking in silence under the cold stars. Probably three of us are thinking of our ride with the Valkyries over the Vaudois and B ernese Alps and wondering whether another such picturesque adventure will ever fall to our lot. Leslie, of course, familiar with alpine flying, is not stirred so profoundly; for him all travel in an aeroplane is a poet's delight and a storm merely an incident of sport. Wortvoll's last evening is bringing him, I surmise, keen regrets. A dull home and University routine will seem burdensome after the free life in the mountains, leisure, philosophy without dull students to instruct and the privileges of an eagle! He will be flown back to the commonplace in "The Good Companion"; euthanasia after a brief career of joy. Stark and I have some weeks more to spend in idling. Leslie, a spoilt child of Fortune, allots himself as many holidays as he desires; he will be with us on his return from Germany and entertains hopes of completing my initiation into the sport he loves.

L. "Is this a trappists' meeting or are we to continue to-day's talk? We have got rid of the obstacles in the way

of clear thinking and might now approach, as near as we can, the solution wanted. The question is : what is the character of the power that turns the wheel of rebirth ? What is the dynamic manifest in the events of the Plurality of Lives ? ”

*W.* “ Judging by the results of our former talks I can guess your answer, at least in part. Make some statement, Anderton, which we can criticise ; you were much too reticent at the castle of Tourbillon.”

*L.* “ Anderton likes intervening at a late stage in a debate. I suggest that Stark shall reintroduce the topic, telling us in his precise, judicial way exactly where we stand. A good many side-issues have been raised which have left me somewhat muddled. Stark is sure to put our question in such a form that Anderton’s answer will be easy to follow.”

*S.* “ Really, Leslie, you flatter me, but I will do my best.

Wortvoll and we have ‘ heard great argument ’ about causation, law, the limited responsibility of the individual, ‘ karma ’, justice and what not. In respect of the turning of the wheel we dislike popular explanations that don’t explain, don’t even embrace all the facts which have to be taken into account. But this is not enough. Can we supply an alternative explanation ? Being what we are we cannot immerse ourselves in the superintellectual reality at work and, if we could, would be unable to transfer our enlightenment to others. But perhaps we can make statements *about* it which have a certain value, shedding at any rate light on the path of practical life, guiding action usefully for those who ‘ stop to think ’.

What then turns the wheel on which human souls are bound during their rebirths ? That is the question. In feeling my way towards an answer, I have always to remember this. The souls are not lodged in an independent realm of their own ; their histories belong to the vast process, conservative and additively creative according to plan, of the world-system. If I like the metaphor of a ‘ wheel ’ of rebirths, I must not forget the innumerable ‘ wheels within wheels ’ which connect it with the cosmos at large. To solve the riddle of the particular ‘ wheel ’ I have to know something about this system in which it is found.

System ! Now let me turn at first to a physical system such as is found in the external world observed, after the manner of most men of science, from the outside. Such a system seems to try to restore, even in the heart of the time-process, the 'harmonious state', that stable or conservative rest-phase which, so Anderton contends, pre-existed to world-evolution. Less daring thinkers assert simply that every physical system tends to attain equilibrium. Suppose that this stable state is disturbed by agencies in its surround. (Here with the aid of an electric torch he consults his notes.) Then, as Professor Stout writes so lucidly, 'there will ensue a series of changes which, in the absence of further interference from without, will terminate in recovered stability. These changes will partly consist in readjustments within the system and partly in readjustments to environing conditions. But whatever share the environment may take in it, the process is self-determining in so far as it follows on loss of balance and is directed towards recovery of balance. . . . So long as the end is not attained, the process goes on spontaneously ; when it is attained, the process ceases. In so far as equilibration involves interaction with environing matter, there is scope for what we have called indirect self-determination. In living bodies equilibrium depends on certain specific processes of this nature. Vital function is perpetually sustained by interaction between organism and environment, and this interaction, so far as the organism takes part in it, is itself the discharge of vital function.'(1) In the life of the organism minor processes are allied in one delicately balanced process, violations of which must not be severe if equilibrium is to be re-attained. The neural accompaniments of human conscurring resemble physical systems in general. 'All parts of the nervous system hold each other in mutual tension, and the passage of an impulse, afferent or efferent, is better represented as a disturbance of equilibrium than as a transmission of energy', (2) urged Broadbent. Similarly William James referred to the nervous system as 'a mass of matter whose parts, constantly kept in states of different tension, are as constantly tending to equalise their states'.(3) The dynamical theorem known as law of the 'equipartition of energy' accents this tendency to

equalisation in the depths wherein sextillions of free small units of mass move and interact."

W. "Halt there, halt! Why this mention of equilibration, balance, energy, mass, adjustment and so on? Are we to recur to mechanistic symbolism at a pinch? Must Imaginism use concepts, based on surface-phenomena, when 'noumena', as a Kantian would say, are its topic?"

S. "These concepts are relevant when I discuss a physical system as perceived from the outside — my present job. I talk physics, but Anderton will be talking metaphysics. I stress certain important features of a physical system. Anderton will stress them too, but in the light of Imaginism which is concerned with more than physical systems and seeks, not mere working concepts, but grasp of ultimate reality. What a significant contrast has been secured for you! Meanwhile let me say this. Mechanistic symbolism is very useful. But pushed too far it breaks down even in the realm of surface-phenomena themselves."

L. "Yes; even there. For the changes, *e.g.* in a living body, restoring equilibrium have to be accounted for; and this on purely mechanistic lines may be difficult, sometimes impracticable. The soul and the imaginist view of causation thrust themselves on thought! Similarly in the case of changes which mark off a new physical species. These suggest often creative invention *ad hoc*.<sup>(4)</sup> Again, in psychology the conscious individual is said to lose and re-attain what is *called* equilibrium, but only by a stretching of metaphor. For psychical stability as lived is *sui generis*; the lower categories mentioned in connexion with a stick or stone do not apply."

W. "Don't mother me too fondly — get to the point. Don't I see whither we are heading? Anderton's explanation will carry us to the 'wheels within wheels' of the Imaginal Dynamic. For him as for me too much symbolism is waste of time. Anderton, Stark's Foreword has served its purpose. Tell me now what you know, or think you know, about the Power that turns the wheel of births."

L. "You came here, Wortvoll, with the eyes of a mole; you'll leave with those of an eagle. Anderton the oculist has done well."

A. "We have discussed already the Imaginal Dynamic, the veritable 'Universal and Irresistible Power' which Hegel, believing in cosmic logic, misnamed Dialectic.<sup>(5)</sup> This Power is just Divine Imagining at work in creative evolution. We can say of it exactly what Hegel said of his Dialectic, 'wherever there is movement, wherever there is life, wherever anything is carried into effect', there it is at work. Its field contains all those events in the external order touching which men of science make general statements known as 'laws of causation' or 'uniformities of sequence'. It contains also the events which occur in the histories of finite sentient beings such as ourselves. Hence its present interest to us four. While we cannot hope to penetrate into the heart of its working, we shall reach some conclusions not without value.

In Stark's lead-up to discussion of this 'Irresistible Power' use was made of mechanistic symbolism, *e.g.* of equilibration. This and allied terms are useful at the point of view he occupied. They are welcome even in metaphysics, provided that metaphors are not allowed to oust adequate thinking. I prefer, withal, words that fit my meaning more accurately. If I were to use the term equilibration to denote spiritual harmony, which is very different from the state of 'being balanced equally', I could hardly be said to be instructing my hearers.

Consider the Imaginal Dynamic as exemplified in a world-system. This system, conserved at the outset in God, is best described, not as in a state of equilibrium (as a compass needle might be to-day) but as in a rest-phase of spiritual harmony. Conflicts, inseparable from additive creation or evolution as men call it, are to arise. There ensues later the Divine Event, the 'imaginal solution' of these conflicts, which involve innumerable conscious lives as well as the vast system. To call this Divine Event the re-attainment of equilibrium would ignore the spiritual consummation achieved. The reality is one of divine achievement 'equilibrated' only in the sense that it has become stable.

Thus the Imaginal Dynamic, which is what the plain man calls the 'will of God', brings to pass conflicts on the great scale, and we have learnt already why. These conflicts are the price of additive creation and, incidentally, of the development



of souls. As Empedocles, whose words are noted by Aristotle, averred, but for conflicts all things would have been *one*; and that is to say that the drama of evolution would not have been possible. The imaginal account of evolution, it will be remembered, stresses this aspect of strife. Note now a truth of fundamental importance. *In these conflicts arise pains*; feelings which, as was explained before, colour thwarted consiring. Pain-attended conflicts are a most potent prompting to creation; hence Mephistopheles can be on friendly terms with Deity, as we observe in Goethe's *Faust*. I will say more about pain later. For the present accept it as a factor of evolution as basic and essential as any other. Like other factors it shows hideously in the 'running amok', but is an angel as well as a haunter of dark places. Man's high emotional development is due in part to its fruitful presence. That which determines the hierarchy of men, urged Nietzsche, 'is the ability to suffer deeply'. Pain, inflicted and endured, influences in a thousand ways the turning of the wheel. But its kingdom is in a world 'in travail', i.e. achieving stages of creative evolution. It tends to be absent from the rest-phases which souls enjoy between their lives on earth. Conflict then has ceased to torment.

Cosmic evolution is not an impenetrable mystery. The Dynamic or 'will of God' resembles one of those minor productive sequences we call causal to this extent: a like *vis creatrix* is present in both.(6) Successive imaginal solutions harmonise conflicts more or less, but for aeons no final solution will be reached and the creative unrest cannot be stilled. The great wheel, carrying within it innumerable big and little wheels, is forced to turn. It will turn until the *ἐνέργεια ἀκινήσις* of the Divine Event is attained.(7) A tiny cog-wheel, almost lost to observation among sextillions of others, is that on which the souls of men like ourselves are bound. It cannot vanish from reality; it cannot resist being turned. And the happiness and misery of its souls depend on the great wheel, the compulsion of which they have to accept. The tiny wheel did not make itself; it behaves in the main as it must. Predestination sets bounds to the freedom which all the subordinate souls display. Do you say that life is too hard and

cruel ? The Dynamic is supermoral. Denounced by pessimists for tolerating or compelling much that occurs in Nature and History it may seem worse than the worst of men. But such judgments are made by finite persons between whom alone relations such as we call moral obtain."

W. "What renders the drama worth while ?"

A. "The world-order can only be valued adequately in the Divine Event. Ask the question to-morrow."

W. "You speak of violations of harmony. But when harmony is being re-attained, what conditions have to be satisfied ? The answer may be of interest, not only in respect of cosmic problems but also of those raised by belief in the soul's plurality of lives."

A. "An important question. It directs thought towards what Hegel called the Divinity of Measure.

Consider once more the Initial Situation, that is to say the harmonious, unchanging world-content, as conserved in God before evolution began. The *ἐνέργεια ἀκινησίας* obtains. This rest-phase illustrates what Stark called equilibrium. It is the equilibrium or harmony of an imaginal field which expresses statically plan. The characters, relations and *proportions* of its constituent imaginals in no way conflict ; stability is not endangered. You will recall how this harmony was broken. The qualitative contents, being conserved with heightened intensity, acquired more quantity, strove to penetrate one another too forcibly, began therefore to clash. War of all against all ! The Divinity of Measure was lost ; unrest and evolutionary time-process dawned. Complete restoration of harmony on the great scale could not be achieved ; stages of fruitful creative novelty followed in a quest seemingly without end. This labour of Divine Imagining, complicated by finite initiatives, continues.

The Greeks stressed the divinity of measure in art and social morality, though not, so far as I am aware, in a cosmic regard. They had a saying : nothing in excess. The importance of proportion even for our workaday experiences was stated thus by Professor Bosanquet. [Torch lights a notebook.] 'All intelligent recognition of individual objects depends either on proportion or on some principle which involves

proportion. It is in this that the truth lies of the well-known Pythagorean doctrine that all things are embodiments of number. All things have aspects and effects which find generalised expression in number. . . . Even a human character or an artistic inspiration, though not itself susceptible of numerical expression, leaves traces in all its acts and products of an individuality that takes shape in proportion or qualitative quantity. An exhaustive statistical treatment of a man's life in all its tangible aspects would give, by the graphical method, not indeed his character, but a set of proportions penetratingly significant of his character.'”(8)

*S.* “What about proportions in chemistry; they seem rather important? And what of this illustration from biology, fruit of Professor d'Arcy Thompson's researches into Growth and Form? We learn that the form characteristic of one species of fish may be also that of another, the proportions of which have been altered quite simply. Differences of growth along the axes of bodies may account in great part for the origin of different related animal species. Incidentally this theory has a bearing on an old problem of ours; that of the 'descending' imaginal and the very numerous species in which it may be exemplified on the earth level.(9) Different adjustments are occasions for variations, tested by Natural Selection, that respond to different needs.”

*L.* “A Greek temple illustrates the Divinity of Measure; its proportions are right; nothing sins by excess or defect. If the proportions of the temple could be distorted and, after a career of ugliness, restored to their original charm, the demonstration would be convincing.”

*W.* “Look at the temple reflected in a curved mirror and then at the temple itself. But are illustrations drawn from physical things going to help us to understand the turning of the wheel and the vicissitudes of the souls bound to it?”

*A.* “A trifle perhaps. Return in thought to the world-system as it existed before evolution began. Consider now the soul-imaginal (or imaginals) that is among its constituents. The permanent souls rooted in this are unlike the temple in a very important respect. The temple is a completed existent

which is not to be developed through change. It has been created already in full, is a stable poem of architecture not to be modified. But the souls are inchoate existents, the creative development of which may require aeons. Each soul moves towards the ideal of the temple; that of a beauty which shall be complete. When the occasion of its 'descent' into the time-process has been prepared, it will light very many surface-personalities during palingenesis, ingesting through these a mass of completing experiences that it needs. It maintains itself also as permanent soul in the background, as the Augoeides that Novalis urged us to revere. Its predestined line of development is enforced, despite aberrations of 'running amok'. Along this line, righting often painfully blemishes of excess and defect in the proportions of its content, it is to realise Divinity of Measure."

*L.* "Thanks for helping me over the stile. But the soul's prospects cannot be conceived clearly till we have said something about the Divine Event."

*A.* "Quite so."

*W.* "This description of the soul, using phenomenal selves or surface personalities, ingesting content and righting excesses and defects, is in Anderton's best vein. But a soul does not accomplish its destiny alone. Vast numbers of other souls, major and minor, act and react on it amid the storms and strife of creative evolution. We can't follow closely that portion of its destiny which is fulfilled on other levels, but something might be said about its appearance in a series of phenomenal selves or personalities on earth. You have rejected various popular fancies connected with the old Indian 'doctrine of Karma', but what are we to accept in their place? Consider the case of a soul about to be 'born', i.e. about to annex a physical body and grow a new personality therewith. On what does its lot depend? Does its pre-natal past influence much its future? Are many of its pleasures and pains gifts of chance or imposed arbitrarily? To what extent is its higher development not of its own making but acquired by grace? What controls its relations with other souls in the course of its many lives? Other issues will suggest themselves to you no doubt, but I mention these as certainly worth our notice.

Follow any order that suits you in dealing with them. Only don't let them be ignored."

S. "Don't however expect Anderton to furnish you with a complete account of how 'the wheel' is being turned. The full truth cannot be approached by inquirers on our terrene level. He can show that popular explanations are faulty, but to criticise is much easier than to construct theories that work. Knowing him as I do, I am sure that he will not wish you to regard experimental suggestions as inspired statements."

A. "If certain suggestions haunt the hearer, I shall be content. A suggestion is often a guest that masters its host. Well; I find friend Wortvoll's request most reasonable. I continue.

I spoke before of a struggle of souls for birth, of a pressure towards annexation of physical bodies whereby these souls attain reflective consciring on this terrene level,(10) waking to experiences, at first petty and crude, such as their predestined world-lines require. Probably a long series of terrene lives, a veritable Calvary in the retrospect, is necessary. The *lower man*, remade for each new physical body, and so defective that he invents to explain himself legends like those of Genesis, is nevertheless of great importance. He is the candle of reflective consciring that shines against the dark background of the soul. This candle has to become a sun; and the sun is to light every hidden part of the soul. We students of earth-history can note only the candles; a few of these are flickering feebly, the great majority only make darkness visible. Just now we are considering this domain of darkness.

The struggle of souls for manifestation, the penetration and annexation of physical bodies, continues that conflict which arose in the primæval imaginal field and led to the passage of Being into Becoming, into what is called generally evolution. We reject of course the view that 'the war of all against all' — *e.g.* of imaginals competing with imaginals for occupation of the primæval field, of souls thrusting themselves into portions of this field after evolution has begun — is one of blind conflict. Schopenhauer whittles down God to an empty abstraction, 'Will', unaware of what it is and does, and in this way reduces the early stages of evolution to a riot in the

dark. But in fact Divine Imagining realises an overruling plan which makes use of conflict. Central control is never entirely lost. And the proportion of this or that constituent imaginal remains fundamentally such as the furtherance of plan requires. You will recall Mill's 'co-existences independent of causation'. His basic 'co-existences' body forth imaginals originally present in the world-system, and their proportions, I take it, are as stable as purpose dictates. Swings in the direction of excess and defect will occur amid the disturbances of cosmic evolution, but these local violations of Measure are righted, though not always without catastrophe. Over-multiplication, human and animal, furnishes an illustration of interest. It has to be checked; the cost in pain being of secondary importance."

L. "Pain is inevitably an accompaniment of the turning of the wheel; conflict brings pain, and conflict, Heracleitus averred, is the father of all things. Popular writers on the Indian doctrine of Karma are apt to ignore this truth."

S. "Overstressing unduly what they call 'ethical causation'. Anderton and I read in a work of this kind that man (animals were not mentioned) receives 'nothing which he has not earned'.(11) As a matter of fact the 'unearned', 'arbitrary' and 'unmerited' flow freely into the history of the human soul annexing a physical body. And, were it permissible to use the term 'unjust' in connexion with Nature, I should add that animal life in the struggle for existence teems with 'injustices' which, if inflicted by me, would be called atrocious. Roosevelt, the American President, observing 'the iron cruelty of life in the tropics', laughed away 'the pathetic myth of beneficent Nature'. All this pain is thrust arbitrarily on the victims."

W. "What misdeeds lead to a wounded animal being eaten alive by ants? But we talked of this before. It stands to reason that we must take note of the arbitrary in respect both of pleasures and pains. On with the talk."

A. "Of course content, pleasant and painful, is imposed arbitrarily on the great scale. And the soul itself that rejoices and suffers was not at first responsible in any degree for its doings; it was not its own conscious maker! It was made and bound to a cogwheel within the great wheel which began

then to move and subject it to 'unmerited' vicissitudes of fortune, good and bad. The soul never becomes unconditionally free. It is also the seat of experiments made by its sub-imaginal or group-soul, the members of which may be few or numerous. Men of science have credited even the humble germ-cell with trying experiments 'which we call variations', (12) and, seeing that this organism is of psychoid character, they may be right. But far more efficient experimenters may be at work including in their sphere of operations both the germ-cell and the soul. I refer to the group-souls and to those powers whom Plato referred to as minor gods. The results of such experiments are thrust on the soul and, while significant for its career, are certainly not 'earned'. As for the advanced soul we shall have to scrap popular karmic theory altogether and recognise betterment in the main 'by grace', to make use of a theological phrase. 'He that hath to him shall be given', whether he has earned it or not. Would a high soul profit by the niggardliness of justice?"

*L.* "It might be urged that betterment 'by grace' is compensation for the earlier flood of unmerited misery suffered by every soul. But we must not confuse such compensation with awards of justice. A victim is eaten alive by ants or burnt to death unasked. Long afterwards, we may say, he is to enjoy countervailing advantages. Justice, however, does not knock down an innocent man and settle the affair by offering him a shilling!"

*W.* "Good for you. On the other hand betterment 'by grace', which has no assignable duration, would be good in a much higher degree than the victim's Calvary was bad. The innocent man knocked out would be made a millionaire! This is not what the justice of courts would decree, but it seems to render the blow quite tolerable."

*S.* "The soul, which we described as 'descending' into the world-process and annexing a physical body, will often be a victim at first, less often a favourite, of chance. And all of us four here have felt how arbitrary the turning of the great wheel can be. Happily at this stage in our careers we can think about, but cannot actually recall, a prenatal past much of which would affright us. We are now in part the fruit of

experiments not of our making, have benefited also as weaklings through development 'by grace' quite irrespective of what, human critics will say, we deserve. As we make progress we seem to be less subjected to the arbitrary and ugly, to be emerging as free citizens of the cosmos. Our future will now be determined in great part by ourselves and we must see to it that our initiatives are such as promise well.

Respecting experiments, there appears to exist plenty of scope for these. You have doubtless read Dr. Prince's account of the famous 'Beauchamp case'. Several personalities, developed in connexion with the same organism and out of contents present once to an undivided self, differed greatly. Sixty contrasts between two of the personalities were noted. Suppose now that directed experiment with the contents of a soul is possible. What remarkable results might be achieved by superhuman agents having the requisite wisdom and power! These surface-personalities of ours might be bettered much without our being responsible for the change. It is well to bear such possibilities in mind."

W. "You won't be putting such experimenters into the witness-box."

L. "Be reasonable. We saw that belief in imaginings and their members, nay even in minor gods, is forced on us. And if a mere germ-cell can experiment, why not a god?"

A. "Experiments cannot always succeed. Mistakes may sometimes be made. But even these will be righted during the long-drawn-out progress of the soul towards Divinity of Measure. These higher agents are moral powers probably glowing with sympathy. They shield us maybe from the worst aspects of a world-system, violations of whose balance are occurring on the great scale. They are the source of all that man seeks for when he invents the myth of a supreme 'personal God'."

S. "A word more respecting evolution 'by grace'. We have to recall once again that the received theory of causation is unsound. There are no inflexible 'laws', no rigid uniformities of sequence; 'all the indications are that strict causality has dropped out permanently'. (13) Secondly, if we are right, nothing issues solely from its 'antecedents'; nothing is wholly latent *aliquo modo* in its conditions and merely elicited in the



'event'. Always there is a creative imaginal solution super-induced on what went before. A *vis creatrix* pervades reality. We descry its work clearly in many important results wherein human imagining plays a prominent part.(14) I repeat this contention, already familiar to us, in view of its capital significance for the topic of development 'by grace'. The old order provides *occasions* only for the coming of the new; the way to perfection is paved with *gifts*. And let none regret that progress is given on a greater scale than it is earned. After all, to be developed into perfect beauty is the consummation to be wished, not the manner in which success is attained."

W. "Let us get back to the soul that turns earthward. What forces this soul, which has once sampled earthlife, to return to it?"

A. "Its 'dispositions' (in the psychologists' meaning of the term).(15) Consider. Its rest-phase after death comes to an end, closes with the night of irreflective consciring. In popular language it becomes 'unconscious'. A new phase of fruitful change has, nevertheless, to dawn. How are the 'dispositions' to flower once more in conscious life? The line of least resistance is taken in the ensuing struggle for birth. An environment that furthers the 'dispositions' is secured. Connexion with the beginnings of a physical brain is achieved. The 'dispositions' that qualify the soul gain strength from those other 'dispositions' that are carried by the psychoplasm of the physical body. There are two streams of heredity that unite. The degree of consciring becomes more intense and the Fechnerian 'Threshold' is passed. Reflective consciring is re-attained, a crude and confused presentational continuum confronting it at first."

L. "And, if one wants to be rid of the need of regaining reflective consciring on earth, the soul's 'dispositions' must be modified and supplemented accordingly. The mystic has to orientate his soul deliberately. I note in the *Tibetan Book of the Dead* that earthlife is regarded as a nightmare to be avoided at all costs. Looking around to-day I am inclined to agree with this view."

W. "The old pessimist has his say. Instincts, however, still rule mankind and will keep the world full of martyrs."

A. "The drive of instinct is not countered easily by reason. For instincts are habits of imaginings, formed not only to conserve earth-species, but to forward realisation of the world-plan. The sexual instinct was described by Shelley as 'life's great cheat'. But I have yet to learn that Shelley mastered it. And he overlooked its value in the evolution of the sentiments and the provision of bodies for the use of souls. It will lose interest for men only when its work is done."

W. "Enough said! I pass on. You stressed rightly, on the lines of your philosophy, development 'by grace'. You are well aware of the importance of the ethical relations of the souls which are being turned on the wheel, but you claim that the cosmos comprises much more than morality and at long last may transcend it altogether. So far, so good. What I am now seeking is comprehension, however sketchy and vague, of the manner in which the ethically-related souls act and react *inter se* during a long stretch of the plurality of lives. Innumerable associated minor riddles — those of the histories of individual souls — await solution. Here indeed we confront a domain whence Divinity of Measure seems to have fled; a domain of excess and defect, of furtherings and thwartings, of triumphs and disasters, of nobility and degradation, in which seethes a perpetual unrest."

S. "Is the domain so utterly grim? The unrest is not in fact perpetual; all the souls concerned enjoy rest-phases, some perhaps very long ones. And equilibration, though violated necessarily in the storms of additive creation, tends ever to reassert itself in general and in detail."

W. "Once more that 'blessed word' equilibration! Can't you help me to form an idea of how the reality it stands for comes to pass?"

L. "Such equilibration, or better harmonisation, is no more mysterious in the case of the souls than it is as displayed in the evolution of a planet. But of course the histories of the souls as interrelated are complicated and beyond the reach of our powers of observation and analysis. There's the rub; otherwise we are not embarrassed in principle. Equilibration is incidental to the working of the Imaginal Dynamic, that is to say of the will of God guiding the world-system towards a

final harmony and beauty. The cosmic nisus to harmony after fruitful conflict is just the manner in which the divine will asserts itself."

W. "I find that statement terse and timely. What says Anderton? Is he able to develop the poet's intuition and light our path more completely? Can he mobilise science to any extent in support of his case?"

A. "Leslie has spoken to the point. Happily we are not required to unravel the complications of any individual soul's history; an adventure which would task the knowledge and industry of a god. On the other hand, we can make some general statements of value such as Wortvoll has just heard.

It is essential to bear this truth in mind. No soul exists in solid singleness; in a solitude whence it emerges from time to time when it has relations with other souls. All souls possess a common basis in Divine Imagining, in so far as It is manifested in this particular world-system. There is a continuity of events within this basis. As Whitehead avers [torch]: 'Every event extends over other events which are parts of itself, and every event is extended over by other events of which it is a part'.(16) This is why an electron is said to pervade the space-time in which its centre of influence is located. This is why a soul seeking rebirth is in touch with every possible body, however remote, that promises to further it. When we get below surface phenomena we credit the soul with penetrating, and being penetrated by, its world-system. Since all souls penetrate one another in a common ground, most being related distantly, some intimately, it is impossible to influence one without making a difference to the others. And the common ground is influenced as well. Are we to say with Lotze: 'Every excitation of the individual is an excitation of the whole Infinite that forms the living basis of the individual's existence'?(17). If so, a conclusion of vital import has been reached. The 'living basis', in restoring its violated equilibria, tends also to bring harmony into the minor conflicts that afflict the souls. The total world-system is at work in the service of the individual, whose free initiative, withheld, cannot be stilled and may prolong indefinitely the conflicts."

L. "Wheels within wheels, turning on the whole as required,

even though a tiny cogwheel squeaks horribly."

S. "Yes; separated souls, monads related from time to time across a void, belong to fiction. Souls act and react within a 'common ground'; the Imaginal Dynamic is sovereign of the world. I will now emphasise another truth which is essential to our understanding of the vicissitudes of the inter-related souls. *The creative power available within the 'common ground' is limited.* Bear with me while I dwell on this truth; for later you will have to apply it very often.

Let me consider the solar system, treating it for convenience as a closed system and making use at first of the term 'energy' with which I shall dispense later. My aim is to contrast once more the philosophy of Imaginism with the working concepts of popular thought.

A scientific generalisation asserts the conservation of 'energy' within this system; urging that a certain *thing* is conserved in a certain quantity, not to be increased or diminished, throughout its transformations. But, as we agreed long ago, science cannot point to any such abiding *thing*; the alleged transformations are observed, nothing more. What does Bergson say? That the generalisation expresses 'rather the necessity for every change that is brought about to be *counter-balanced* in some way by a change in the *opposite* direction'. It concerns the relationship of 'a fragment of this world to another fragment'.(18) Counterbalanced! At this point I dispense with the working concept 'energy' and return to the reality symbolised. Professor Bridgman, writing on physics, assures us that 'energy' does not exist here or there and that it does not travel. He calls it 'not a physical thing but . . . a property of a system as a whole'.(19) Quite so. We get back to the consciring that supports the system 'as a whole' and to the balancing of contents which the 'transformations' imply."

The electric torch lights the pages of a book, which are turned over hastily as if Stark fears that he is overtaking our patience.

S. "Ah! here's the passage from the book *Divine Imagining*: 'And these content-transformations, which are of course not mere relations of quantities but qualitative, are they quite

devoid of meaning ? Do they not belong to an order in whose changes a teleologic *nisus* towards harmony, constantly being frustrated, is as constantly reasserting itself ? In this protean flux there are more or less conservative 'equivalencies' between contents that come and contents that go ; the disappearing contents giving place to others just as if a vast cosmic balancing process — an immanent design making for 'divinity of measure' — were at work." (20).

W. " You have brought out well the contrast between your form of idealism and popular thought based on science. And it is certain that the creative power in the solar system symbolised by *finite* 'energy' is finite too. But what then becomes of Anderton's citation from Lotze in which every excitation of the individual is said to be 'an excitation of the whole *Infinite*' ? "

A. " I welcome the question. Lotze's statement must be modified by us. The 'living basis of the individual's existence' is not the 'infinite whole'. It is this particular world-system of ours whose contents, though lavishly rich and varied, are still finite. There may exist numberless other world-systems with which ours is not connected directly at all. An aspect only of God shows in each system.

The finite contents of our world-system express finite conscurring. *Creative power*, enforcing conservation and innovation, is limited in respect of range.

The degree of activity of this creative power is limited as well. It was intensified, we saw, at the dawn of evolution ; it will be intensified again, I shall suggest later, when the progress of evolution permits."

L. " I won't follow you into these depths. What I find important is that the 'living basis', whether infinite or finite, is common to the souls and has their destinies in its keeping."

S. " But knowledge that the degree of conscurring — of creative power — is limited is just as important for our understanding of the world. The limitation has its teleologic value ; the world upheld by very intense divine conscurring would be widely different from what it is now, as no doubt Anderton will be telling us later. Let me make use of a simple illustration. I am estimating, let us say, the mental capacity of a man.

Well, I can deduce from the symbolism of 'conservation of energy' (= creative power) that a high development in one region of mind will imply a lack of attainment in some other. Failure in this or that respect is entailed *by the limitation of the available 'energy'*. Hence excess signifies defect and defect excess, so far as normal folk are concerned. There exist indeed idiots. And there exist also geniuses whose prowess in several spheres is not to be denied. These supermen stand on a higher level of creative power altogether, but even they are marred by defects. Genius of narrow outlook, which violates badly the divinity of measure, nears madness. Limited creative power assigns to souls gifts and defects; gifts and defects are balanced by compensations."

L. "Ah! now I perceive the trend of your reasoning. Souls, you point out, allied with physical bodies, show gifts and defects due to limited creative power (camouflaged as 'energy'). They are in the realm of compensations; gaining they lack and lacking they gain. You will add that the countries, times and general conditions they live in also display characteristic gifts and defects. Limitation with compensations is always being imposed. And this process of allotment of gifts and defects, coloured with pleasures and pains, endures through the ages. It obtains not merely on this earth here and now, but as long as the Great Wheel shall turn."

W. "He follows the thread to the needle's eye. But, Leslie, you will have to assent to something that tells against your old pessimism. These 'compensations' make the lots of most normal folk on this earth pretty much on a level in respect of happiness. An illustration? You are a favourite of fortune, men say, and yet you grumble. The most contented peoples are poor and semi-barbarous; tried by adversity and devoid of anything that you would call culture."

L. "I live and learn, Wortvoll, and I am still hoping that you will be equally fortunate."

S. "You spoke of 'normal folk', Wortvoll, and you were surely right. But compensations are of many sorts and, distributed through the plurality of lives, raise grave problems. We can only deal with these problems on general lines, but an attempt to state and solve some of them may be worth making."

*L.* "You are referring to the compensations lived through as the souls act and react on one another during their many births."

*S.* "In the main — yes. Were only an isolated single soul in question, its lot, freed from complicated furtherings and thwartings due to agents like itself, could be indicated with no great difficulty. Its world-line would be traced according to the principles which we have discussed already. But the complications attributable to friendly and hostile agents, are serious, and are bound to give us pause. In fact I am glad to be asking Anderton to carry on once more at this juncture."

*W.* "Now look here — we spoke some while ago of an individual soul descending into the process of evolution and being embodied on this planet. Don't forget this pilgrim; make use of him again. Call him *S* which stands for soul. And now, Anderton, say something as to how *S*, furthered and thwarted by his own deeds and those of other agents, is to fare during the plurality of lives."

*A.* "It appears that I am to go over the top, while you three prudent tacticians stay in a dug-out, ready to point out my mistakes on my return. I may blunder badly in Noman's Land and I wish to say at once that any one of you is welcome to my job. Stark, I hardly like to rob you of this chance of covering yourself with glory."

*S.* "Or of wallowing legless in the mire of errors. No, no — over the top you must go to make the world of thought safe for Wortvoll!"

*L.* "Won't you smoke a last cigar? Try one of these; I can recommend them. . . . And now get going. It's grand, I'm told, to suffer, defying Fate."

*A.* "S (the soul selected by Wortvoll) has descended from the Platonic harmonious state into the storms of evolution. We held that it has a predestined world-line. This will be revealed clearly to it only at a late stage of its history; at the outset of its terrene career the mists of ignorance, the aberrations of the 'running amok', prevail. Co-operating with a brain *S*, the permanent soul, produces a phenomenal or surface self, the 'composite individual' which, according to Proclus, has only one life, fading out, we must add, quite slowly. Such

phenomenal selves, 'cribbed, cabined' personalities, are unfit to endure *as such* in a world-order safeguarding conservation of values. They supply novel content which furthers awakening of the permanent soul to reflective consciring. Then they quit the live specious present wherein reality is *being made* for that domain of *made reality* which is the Past.(21) Immortality is not for mere 'feelers' thrust earthward by the permanent soul. Would any sane man have it otherwise? Is a Legion of Immortals being recruited from the Dryopithecoid brutes of the Miocene up to the homuncules of to-day? What would such a medley of spiritual dwarfs be worth? What place would it fill in the cosmos?"

L. "This recruitment has always been a difficulty for those who, while believing in a future life, reject palingenesis. To untold millions of spiritual dwarfs are being added each year untold more millions — *cui bono*? 'They may be developed' is the retort. Precisely. But then palingenesis is seen to be the necessary *via dolorosa* along which development is secured."

W. "The sceptic saves himself a lot of trouble by ignoring souls and the future life outright. Maybe he is in the right."

L. "He ignores them at his peril and that of others. And a true thinker does not mind trouble, especially when the decline and fall of a civilisation are involved. No adequate hope, no high living. All becomes rottenness; the heartening beliefs of the past merely dead men's dreams."

A. "I continue. S's first earth-life in the Miocene must have been not far removed from that of an ape. I am ignoring it and also the long succession of shallow earth-lives and rest-phases that followed. S now throws off personalities strengthened by inheritance of pre-natal 'dispositions' and made more and more efficient, if only for practical ends, by the struggle for existence and power. The atmosphere in which he lives and in which he triumphs, to excess makes him hard and cruel (*homo homini lupus*). So far the S-personalities flout the divinity of measure on which we have laid such stress. The content of them is still poor; while its proportions, the qualitative quantities, are wrong. The total conscious indi-



vidual or phenomenal self, considered in respect of his fellows, is evil ; considered in an aesthetic regard ugly. Ugliness is the last and worst infirmity of the individual that the cosmic equilibrating or harmonising process has to cure. But not yet. Meanwhile in the background, sunk in the night of irreflective conscurring, sleeps the permanent soul.

Pass to the Middle Ages and consider one of S's most sinister earth-lives."

W. "A moment. You find that these S-personalities are very poor, just ugly ripples on the surface of the soul."

A. "The content is pitifully defective of course. And the limitation of creative power, of 'energy' as Stark labelled it, is hampering. The environment is hardly helpful. Result: a man of narrow outlook."

W. "And a bad one. But this development seems almost inevitable. You can't consider this individual as responsible for making its character. You might just as well blame the cobra, the pike, or the leopard which kills often for pleasure."

A. "Certainly such free choice as it has enjoyed has been very limited. But evolution has no favourites. A development of this kind is not 'blameable'; on the other hand, there are compensations. S profits at first by his qualities in the struggle for existence, but later these same qualities will be obstacles in the way of his advance. They will have to be sublimated or radically suppressed, and the process will not be an agreeable one. *Tout se paie*. Take the case of tillers of the soil who kill off insect-eating birds and so violate the divinity of measure in the sphere of species. They may be ignorant fellows, not 'blameable' in a moral sense, not 'punished' when a caterpillar plague ensues. They suffer from a compensation which occurs whether they are to be esteemed moral or not."

W. "What of the rest-phases between S's earth-lives?"

A. "I am not S's keeper! But I infer that they are poor (since the earth-personalities are so poor), cannot last long and tap the depths of the permanent soul not at all."

L. "S's private or tribal habitation after death, I take it, would seem to us absurd; just a creation of the crude imaginings which stir primitive man. On the whole it is well that he is rid of this paradise quickly, dies again and wakes up as a

babe to turn on Ixion's wheel once more. . . . But, Anderton, please continue."

A. "One of the worst S-personalities was Fulk the Black, Count of Anjou (987-1040), a miscreant at once satanic and prosperous. 'Neither the wrath of Heaven nor the curses of men broke with a single mishap the fifty years of his success', wrote J. R. Greene. Fulk was born with bad pre-natal 'dispositions' in a bad environment, but, at this stage of a soul's evolution, we must allow for a certain freedom of choice in 'responses to stimuli'. This man 'decked out in his gayest attire' took his wife to be burnt at the stake. Like another unpleasant character, Eccelin da Romano, and the Sadists of the 'Holy' Inquisition, he enjoyed inflicting pain. This joy in overcoming resistance to torture becomes with men of the baser sort a passion; one of the ugliest abominations that foul the 'running amok'. Unfortunately 'pure malevolence', as Bain contends in *Dissertations*, seems to be 'natural and primitive' bringing great pleasure, unless opposed by sympathy. We must suppose that the S-personalities, touched too rarely with sympathy, indulged in this primitive satisfaction to excess. The full flowering of the vice is reached in Fulk."

W. "Are you arguing for a verdict with extenuating circumstances?"

A. "There is no one, however bad, who is sole creator of his being. As I said to you during our chat this morning, the neo-theosophical view of Karma that a man receives 'nothing which he has not earned' is nonsense. I am reminded of Schopenhauer's remark about Greek Tragedy: 'it is not his own sins that the hero atones for, but original sin, i.e. the crime of existence itself'.(22) However, I am not, like Schopenhauer, a pessimist. It would be too much to say that Fulk was a mere by-product of the 'crime of existence' or even of what we call the 'running amok', in which monstrous things are engendered by chance. S, though barely present in this personality, possessed therein a limited freedom of choice. What I do say is that all such souls have had the trust on them a mass of impulse, not of their own making but derived from a very grim animal past. For the psychoplasm of the physical bodies originally annexed by them was tainted; it had a

history going back to the ancestors of the vertebrates that crawled out of the primaeval seas. When S and the other souls turned earthward, a great risk was taken. In many of these souls the filth of life's past on this planet was to well up as a polluting flood."

S. "An honest man, writes the author of *Adolescence*, will detect in himself 'the germs and possibilities of about every crime, vice, insanity, superstition and folly in conduct ever heard of'.(23) The worst impulses, which most men detest, must have roots such as Anderton speaks of. They become dangerous when the environment, into which a soul is born, is bad."

L. "*Tout savoir, c'est tout pardonner*, save that part of the evil which S by truly free initiative has brought to pass. But we men are not remotely competent to decide in what measure this monster was responsible. The fact that he was conscious does not help us. A cobra strikes as its body and the habits of its species dictate. The human cobra strikes for the most part on equally predictable lines. Your determinist friends at the University, Wortvoll, have the same explanation for these as for all happenings whatever. Thus they believe that strict causation controls the cobra and Fulk, both of whom cannot behave otherwise than they do. This is an easy and simple-minded way of disposing of a difficulty, but it seems to me as superficial as it is easy."

W. "I'm not a determinist now; I accept in the main your view of causation. Nay, I'll add that determinism and atheism appear to be ends of the same axis. . . . But let that pass. I'm interested in Fulk. According to determinists he was irresponsible, was just what he had to be. The universe was the perpetrator of his misdeeds! According to you he was responsible in part. But, whether determined or partially free, he does not, in your opinion, escape the equilibrating or harmonising process which can be terribly grim."

A. "Assuredly not. If the world-system is to attain beauty and harmony in the Divine Event, it cannot tolerate the ugly. But the process is not a moral one. I said just now that tillers of the soil are not 'punished' when they violate a certain equilibrium connected with species. They merely suffer — and non-violaters with them — in the events that follow. Similarly

when a geological equilibrium is violated and thousands of men perish, no moral factor need be involved. The victims suffer in the wash of adjustments that have to take place, while a new equilibrium is being achieved.

Fulk's case gives us pause ; in the turning of the wheel many little wheels within wheels are described. Restoration of equilibria will be achieved by the Imaginal Dynamic, that 'universal and irresistible power', and the complex process will include pain. But it is quite arguable that the villain of the piece, regarded from the most penetrating point of view, was himself in part a victim ; cast for the part by forces over which he had little control. Creative evolution often works amiss on the lower levels of this grim world."

L. "The miscreations on these lower levels are beyond counting ; some veritably diabolic. Schopenhauer could not exaggerate the ugliness of some of the happenings that taint the 'running amok'. And unfortunately the evolution of man goes on largely in the same atmosphere. Millions of personalities like the S-ones must be, in the main, outcomes of the primaeval struggle. They have to be transformed, and then the hard *via dolorosa* opens up before them once more."

W. "They are victims of chance with their woes 'unearned' ; but are to become in the remote future enjoyers of a splendour also for the most part 'unearned'. That seems to be your belief which is much superior to received Karmic theory. No one could 'earn' what awaits the developed soul as you conceive it. . . . But we are digressing. Anderton, can you suggest how the equilibration process deals with Fulk and his associates ? You can't furnish details of course, and I don't want them. My position is stateable thus. I understand clearly how a single soul, laden with its 'dispositions' and profiting thus by evolution, passes from life to life. This pilgrim's progress is just another phase of your conservative-additive world-order ; a minor current in the great river of becoming. But I am thinking now of claims and counter-claims, as a lawyer might put it, involving different, closely related souls ; of situations such as Fulk's, charged with excesses and defects, pleasures and pains, situations which will give rise to compensations of various sorts."

A. "We have reached a point where suggestions can be made; general statements only such as you desire. You will agree with me when I say that the perhaps tiresome hours spent on general metaphysics have been useful. The results reached then rendered possible our inquiries into the nature of the soul. They continue to aid us now.

I have answered Wortvoll's question in part before and shall be repeating some statements already made. But this repetition in so important a context is justified.

S and the souls of the victims exist in an imaginal field which comprises them and very much else. The continuity of events in this field is such that :

thou cans't not stir a flower  
Without troubling of a star

and of all other agents belonging to it. Nothing can happen to S and the souls of the victims which does not overflow into, and disturb in some way, this entire field, the 'living basis' which was mentioned just now. The field reacts. It reacts, however, with an 'energy' (=creative power) which is not inexhaustible but limited.

One more relevant restatement. Considering a portion of physical Nature, the solar system, Stark urged that a disturbing change therein is counterbalanced by a change of opposite direction. The symbolism of conservation and transformation of 'energy' masks rather clumsily, we saw, the truth. There exists no localised or travelling thing, *i.e.* object, answering to the word 'energy'. Cosmic *consciring*, the real 'élan vital', expresses itself in the balancing transformations of *content*.

Now *consciring* of cosmic scope expresses itself similarly when the actions and reactions of interrelated souls and of their 'living basis' take place, but the balancing events may be long-drawn-out during the many lives of the souls concerned.

The disturbance set up by S and the victims overflows into their total 'living basis', the reaction of which is that 'universal and irresistible power', the Imaginal Dynamic. The destiny of the interrelated souls — that part of their careers which was born with them — is modified accordingly. The larger

reality, in restoring its equilibrium, imposes such changes as may be required on the history of its parts. S's aggression is counterbalanced by a process of *opposite direction*. This process will entail compensations coloured with appropriate pleasures and pains, the latter in this case severe. That is the essence of what I have to say, since I can offer you only a Barmecide's meal of general statements. Question me further, if you wish. I suppose that the S-case will sharpen your interest in the problem of pleasure and pain."

S. "I don't regard pleasure and pain as likely to give us much trouble. We agree that they *belong to* conscurring; are not properly called conscita at all. Pleasure colours free or furthered conscurring, pain thwarted. Where there is pain, there is conflict; an inflamed nerve, a wound, indigestion, muscular strain, worry, anger, remorse, hard thinking are cases in point. Since the conflict phases of the Imaginal Dynamic comprise pain, often on a lavish scale, pessimists are encouraged to draw up indictments of conscious life. Pain withal is a useful sentinel in charge of the physical body and indispensable factor in the development of the emotions and sentiments."

W. "What interests me now is not the psychology of pain, but the appearance of Nemesis, like Death in the pictures of the *Danse Macabre*, in the career of S. Shoulder the mystic's burden, Anderton, once more."

A. "We are not without empirical clues as to the form in which Nemesis first appears(24), but the process as a whole, as I observed, is long-drawn-out, and only supermen could give an account of it. Fumblers such as we must not give the rein to private fancy. Enough for us to know that S is temporarily on the depressed or losing side of the balancing process. S indeed is opposed by reactions due to itself, and suffering of various kinds colours experience of these. Creative power, which is limited, ebbs away and arms aggression. As to Nemesis, this word meant at first merely 'distribution'. It meant later the bringer of *re-tribution*', pruning excess which entails faulty sharing of the goods of life. The divinity of measure can be violated seriously as in the case before us."

L. "In an imaginal world-system the possibilities are many and often grim. For it is a fact that we help to make our

environment even on this earth, and make it much more completely in those opening stages of the new form of existence that begins after death. The eminent German philosopher, Fechner, to whom we have made appeal often during these talks, wrote in *On Life after Death*: 'Woe to the man whom curses and execrations, a memory of terror follow! What followed him in this life will overtake him in death: this is part of the hell that awaits him.' I can dwell, not without satisfaction, on the manner in which the monsters are forced to understand the character of the great cosmos, so maligned in their insensate dreams. Think of the king who took joy in a heap of gouged-out eyes, of the noisome Inquisitors, minions of a creed which denied its founder, of Gilles de Retz and the tortured children, of warlords who would stride across a bloodstained earth, ruthless, shortlived fools who are to learn wisdom in the dark places beyond the grave. These men at any rate have been making whips for their own backs."

W. "Yet have a care. You were of opinion a short time ago that these men may have been victims too; victims of that 'running amok' of which we have heard so much. Their vile characters were only in part of their own making. You were a disciple once of Schopenhauer. But that thinker felt pity for all denizens of this planet alike: were they not all sufferers from the 'crime of existence'? He held that to console ourselves for suffering by torturing the author of it in his turn is merely cruelty. Suffering such as the law has to inflict ought to have in view the *future*, not the past."

L. "Schopenhauer's wish was to lessen suffering. If he could have had his way, he would have cured the 'crime of existence' by ending it. He was obsessed by the thought of pain, exaggerated the amount of pain in the world and overlooked its very considerable value for our development. Pain is useful as well as evil. But then why should he stress development when he wanted the world to be destroyed and all conscious beings to be snuffed out?"

When he considers the penalties inflicted by human justice, he rejects retributive punishment. The past for him is dead. He cares only for the future. Penalties (when they do not kill) ought to be reformative and deterrent. Many

miscreants have been successful beyond the reach of human justice. Penalties were not for them, and, in this respect, there was no addition to the pain of earth's denizens ; a consummation hardly to be wished even by Schopenhauer ! The S-personality, Fulk, enjoyed fifty years of success. But Gilles de Retz, who perhaps surpassed him in wickedness, was trapped. A word about this monster.

When this man has been executed with little or no suffering and his would-be imitators scared, the affair for Schopenhauer is closed. And perhaps human justice has done its best. But I feel vaguely that the requital has not been complete. So far the monster has got off too cheaply. The misery of the tortured children and of those who loved them confronts me with an enigma and keeps my resentment keen. I rejoice that the account can be settled after death and in other earth-lives. And this settlement will be such as secures the remaking of the monster, to be redeemed *through pain*."

W. " You credit the S-personalities with a certain freedom of choice, but in many respects you regard them too as victims. The measure of aggression, therefore, imputable to S is much more limited than we might suppose at first."

L. " That is so. And we may go further and say that, in respect of being in part victims, the S-personalities will profit later in the equilibration process. Compensations for them too ! At long last the monster may give place to a strong S-personality from which the cruel, ugly features have faded out. The saving magic of the Imaginal Dynamic lies in transformation. Along with slow transformation of the total world-system goes that of the finite experients in its keeping. All will be well with the evolution of souls. The aberrations and disasters to which we attach so much importance are passing incidents after all."

W. " No one on the rack, so far as I know, was consoled by this reflection. And I doubt whether the future holds any ' compensation ' for the ordeal of half an hour's really acute pain."

S. " Wait and see. Even a brief experience of one of the higher levels of consciring is instructive. The man whose testimony I cited(25) would find your scepticism absurd.



Don't limit the possibilities of this cosmos too rashly."

W. (evidently disgruntled). "Well; the 'compensation' won't be found within the life of the plain man anyhow. And witnesses who can't be brought into court or even named don't carry weight. Let's get on. Anderton, is the total amount of suffering of souls at any particular period of the history of this planet limited?"

A. "You state a riddle not solved easily. Populations wax and wane and with them the sufferers. But this can be said. We have stressed the divinity of measure belief in which, writes Hegel, gave rise to the Greek respect for Nemesis.(26) 'All human things' have their definite measure, which reality tends to conserve. Plato urges in the *Republic* that 'an excessive increase of anything' occasions often a reaction in the opposite direction. Now what underlies this conservation of measure is the cosmic equilibration process. Pain and joy are present as colouring the consciring of the human souls concerned. They *belong* to this consciring, as Stark remarked some while ago. Need I say more?"

W. "Since in your view there exists a hierarchy of superhuman agents, some sufficiently wise, powerful and benevolent to be called gods, the dynamic compelling equilibration may be tempered somewhat in our favour?"

A. "In these early stages of soul-development the dynamic might be a very hard master indeed. But man is not without his allies. He has always believed in interventions on the part of superhuman agents and, in my humble opinion, is right. The abuse of this belief by ecclesiastics was inevitable and need not concern us. We look and we pass on.

If a complete philosophy of history could be written, we should find probably that superhuman powers have done much to modify the course of events. The birth of new popular religions, the story of the nations, the appearance of great men and ages of culture, the quickening of thought and so forth, present fields in which their potent influence might be traced. Religions planted by them and watered with mythology would be among the most convenient methods of taming primitive man. Most creeds, however, have become corrupt and all alike have the defect of outliving the stage when they

were of value. Conservation, in the case of the herd-creed, is not easily modified."

W. "You attach great importance to evolution 'by grace'?"

A. "Yes; I have condemned the 'justice'-superstition, credited to the Indian doctrine of 'Karma', that man receives 'nothing which he has not earned'. He receives in fact vastly more and is laden, especially in his higher development, with gifts. He accepts these as we accept the sunshine on a fine day in the Alps, taking joy in that for which no sacrifice has been made and no return is asked. . . . But I have now said my last word and am off to bed. Wortvoll and Leslie, with packing, another talk and a flight awaiting them to-morrow, will do well to follow my example. And so, my three comrades of the air, good-night."

i

#### NOTES BY BASIL ANDERTON

(1) Stout, *Analytical Psychology*, vol. i. pp. 149-150.

(2) Cited by Bosanquet, *Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 202.

(3) *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 109.

(4) "The species of animals and plants, as well as the stable organic structures and functions, which further their persistence, illustrate comparative 'equilibria'. . . . But the mechanistic symbolism, which works so conveniently in discussions about lower levels of Nature, is less helpful in the sphere of biology. Thus the 'interaction', during which organisms evolve, as we say, arrangements such as the eye, reveals what Bergson very properly calls the 'solution of problems', or, as we affirm, creative imaginal invention which reaches stable results through difficulties."—Douglas Fawcett in *Divine Imagining*, p. 181.

(5) Cf. Chapter VIII. p. 155, and *Z.D.* pp. 399-402.

(6) Cf. on Causation and the Imaginal Dynamic, *Z.D.* pp. 379-402.

(7) It was Professor F. C. S. Schiller who stressed the value of this Aristotelian phrase for modern philosophy.

(8) Bosanquet, *Logic*, vol. i. p. 127 (2nd edit.).

(9) Cf. Chapter VIII. pp. 142.

(10) Cf. Chapter XII. pp. 255.

(11) Cf. Anderton's remark, Chapter XV. p. 329.

(12) "Just as an intact organism from Amoeba to Elephant tries experiments, so it may be that the implicit organism of the germ-cell tries experiments which we call variation."—Geddes and Thomson on *Sex*, p. 94. But high cosmic powers, working with imaginings, could try experiments with much better prospects of success!

(13) Eddington, *Nature of the Physical World*, p. 332.

(14) Cf. *Z.D.* pp. 397-402.

(15) Cf. Chapter XII. p. 267.

- (16) Whitehead, *Principles of Natural Knowledge*, p. 61.
- (17) Cp. Lotze, *Mikrokosmos* (Eng. trans.), vol. i. p. 381
- (18) Bergson, *Creative Evolution* (Eng. trans.), pp. 255-256. I have italicised the word "counterbalanced".
- (19) Bridgman, *Logic of Modern Physics*, p. 153.
- (20) Douglas Fawcett, *Divine Imagining* (1921), p. 17.
- (21) Cf. Chapter IX. pp. 171-172, and *Z.D.* pp. 444-448.
- (22) Schopenhauer, *World as Will and Idea* (Haldane and Kemp's trans.), vol. i. p. 328.
- (23) Dr. Stanley Hall, *Adolescence*, vol. ii. p. 68.
- (24) Cf. Chapter XIV. pp. 316-317.
- (25) Cf. Chapter XIV. p. 318. Professor Stark's witness is alive and enjoying his customary robust health. He has never been troubled with "nerves" and "hallucinations", but has enjoyed an "observer's" privileges in a quarter seldom discussed.
- (26) Cf. Wallace's *Logic of Hegel*, "Doctrine of Being", p. 172.





CREST OF THE MATTERHORN GLIMPSED THROUGH CLOUD

## CHAPTER XVII

### OUTLOOKS

"He hath awakened from the dream of life  
'Tis we, who lost in stormy visions, keep  
With phantoms an unprofitable strife."  
SHELLEY.

"There is a point where increase of reality implies passage beyond self."—BRADLEY.

"Isn't this brave universe made on a richer pattern, with room in it for a long hierarchy of beings?"—WILLIAM JAMES.

"I want to be myself, and yet, without ceasing to be myself, to be others as well, to merge myself into the totality of things, visible and invisible. . . . Not to be all and for ever is as if not to be—at least, let me be my whole self, and be so for ever and ever. And to be the whole of myself is to be everybody else. Either all or nothing."  
—MIGUEL DE UNAMUNO.

"I incline to accept literally the saying that 'all the world's a stage' and to believe that, when the play is over, the protests which it draws from a Buddha or Schopenhauer, lose their sting. The stage-show is ended and the theatre left for the greater reality wherein we become fully *awake*. The play? Divine Imagining plays all the parts; all the players are Its phases and disaster beyond remedy is impossible. All parts have their compensations and all alike, taken by themselves, are unsatisfactory and at long last intolerable. The Player, calling the company together after the last act, reveals fully what the play means. And it may well be that it possesses a value and in its main features is conserved."—DOUGLAS FAWCETT.

OUR last morning together in the hollow which overlooks the ravine wherein the Trümmelbach is born. In the afternoon Leslie and Wortvoll are to motor to Berne and fly thence to Munich; Leslie returning to Wengen for a few days' climbing in our old way with axe and rope. A perfect morning, with its gift of true alpine "visibility", is the delight of the pilot, who is very gay. Wortvoll seems depressed at the prospect of returning to the routine of University life. He resents not a little, I think, his subjection to discipline, while men like the poet live just as they list.

S. " Yes ; we have not done so badly in the short time Wortvoll has been with us. What fine sport ! And, in respect of our philosophy and the mysticism which grows out of it, our friend has certainly not spent his holiday amiss. Our topic has been the soul-riddle. Well ; we began by discussing cosmic metaphysics, indispensable prelude of any attempt to deal with the problem of the soul. Ultimate reality was found in God whose nature is described best as Divine Imagining, conservative, additively creative and, as we saw later, destructive. The Absolute, ' perfect, complete and finished ' , of so many Western and Eastern thinkers, was dethroned. The two inseparable aspects of Divine Imagining, consciring and conscita, were considered at length. Under consciring, irreflective and reflective, fall the ' superconscious ' , ' conscious ' , ' sub-conscious ' and ' unconscious ' of popular thought ; the term conscita refers us to contents present to consciring, *i.e.* to objects in general. These two aspects are allied in all human experients and throughout all phases of the finite worlds in space-time. I am not asking you to reconsider these topics. But the course of our thought is worth remembering ; statements about the soul had to be heralded by long and sometimes unwelcome toil.

Nay, still more preludial toil was imposed — not in vain. We attained illuminative insights into the nature of causation, freedom and chance, space-time, the imaginals and so forth, incidentally dealing successfully with two enigmas, said by experts such as Bradley and Bosanquet to be insoluble : namely that of time-succession and that of the origin and standing of finite experients. That is to say, it has become clear why Deity imagines, *i.e.* creates, in these manners. Active thus Divine Imagining is revealing Itself. Further, we replied to embarrassing questions put by pessimists in India and Europe. How much, before which theology feigns to be blind and deaf, is understood by those who discover that imagining can ' run amok ' ! (1) Again, in substituting for Dialectic, Hegel's ' universal and irresistible power ' , the Imaginal Dynamic we become aware vaguely but impressively of the fateful grinding of the mills of God. Other problems of cosmic importance were confronted and solved.

Thence we fared to contemplate awhile the dawn of evolution of that particular world-system in which we live; the system whose physical dimensions are measured by astronomy. We seemed to grasp in a general way how this system began and how a fragment of it was transformed into what confronts us on this planet to-day. We agreed that the evolution of biologist's organisms, as of the organisms of physics, cannot be explained on current mechanistic lines; the process is creative, presupposing also imaginings which 'descend' in Platonic fashion, as 'occasions' allow. A struggle for manifestation, comparable with that stressed by Darwin, obtains in this quarter. We showed anon that the human soul is an agent independent of the physical body which is appropriated by it *through struggle* for the uses of terrene life and which, annexed thus temporarily, becomes itself part of the soul. We went on to consider the radical meaning of Birth and Death; suggested the manner in which Man's history began on this planet and enjoyed a stirring discussion of the case for belief in the Plurality of Lives. Even Wortvoll conceded that one of our important contentions was sound: the permanent soul, credited plausibly with at least three lives, may have had, and is to have, very many more. But, if we believe in the Plurality of Lives, then Professor Schiller's warning can hardly be ignored. (2) Veritable 'nightmares' may be in store for us, if we take no thought for the morrow, careless of the risks with which our prospective adventures may be fraught. Our path, remember friends, lies still through regions of anarchy wherein imagining 'runs amok'! Therefore, with a practical as well as intellectual interest, we had to consider the Power that turns the Wheel on which, bound like Ixion, the souls suffer and rejoice. This Power, the Imaginal Dynamic or Will of God, 'universal and irresistible', is restorer of balance always being violated in general and in detail within the world-process. Live wisely as befits a philosopher, for the grinding of God's mills is not stayed by prayer and fasting."

L. "It is of the highest practical importance to follow Schiller's advice and try to learn something, if possible, about the preparation for our adventures in coming lives. At present we are inclined to allow the future to take care of itself. How



many there are, especially in the East, who long to escape from the Wheel of births on this planet, and how few, alas ! are bettering their prospects of doing so."

W. "Croaking again. I suppose you would like to see the human species becoming sterile and leaving the planet for 'fresh fields and pastures new'. Why not accept reality and make the best of it?"

L. "Because reality on this level is not sufficiently inviting. I would not care to be responsible for the birth of a child into this Hades. But that's a purely personal attitude which you need not take into account. And don't fear that this planet will be the scene of a birth-strike on a formidable scale. Instincts furnish the drive necessary; minorities only are sufficiently in earnest with mysticism to suppress them. There will always be those who decline to increase and multiply, but the 'massed mortalities' hold the field. Man seems sunk in a squalid adventure from which only the elect contrive to escape."

A. "Only the elect! That may well be so. But perhaps they have grown strong in the very struggle which earth-conditions impose. 'Sweet are the uses of adversity'. And what for you, the poet, is squalid may be 'natural' and pleasant in the eyes of the undeveloped man. Thus the ugly, unclean life of the nomad is popular — among nomads. Conservation has its devotees. Habit is a coat that fits the wearer passably well. I don't suggest of course that the coat is useful for ever. But it is worn awhile with more or less satisfaction to the user."

W. "Leslie is troubled by Kore's shriek when at the Eleusinian Mysteries she is carried off by Pluto; Kore symbolising the soul and Pluto this lower life. Anderton does not mind the shriek. He is hoping that Kore will profit by adversity, even if the process is too often unpleasant. But, after all, does adversity bring her rich compensations? Why is she being developed at all?"

A. "She is not at first sufficiently conscious to be aware even of the world wherein she lives."

W. "She has to attain full reflective consciring; yes, I understand. But *cui bono*?"

S. "That question has brought us to to-day's topic — Outlooks. Of late we have been considering the past of the soul. From retrospect we pass now to prospect, making full use of the results achieved during these talks. In part we know, or think we know, in part we have to prophesy; and the prophesying cannot be stinted. Friend Wortvoll, I trust that you too will give rein to speculation at times."

W. "I'm most useful as a critic; build inferences on our previous talks and I shan't grumble. I'll stand at your point of view as long as I can, exacting light. The order of discussion? Well; why do we stress these Outlooks? Because they provide the greater objects of thought and devotion which for men like us make life worth living. Begin with those that interest more or less unsophisticated folk, passing to such as may stir the philosophers."

S. "Outlooks must be adequate, if the gibes of the pessimist are to be countered. H. G. Wells avers hopefully that we are 'hardly in the earliest dawn of human greatness', but a greatness beginning and ending on this planet:

' A moment's halt, a momentary taste  
Of Being from the well within the waste '

would surely be life's very greatest cheat. The denier of survival asks us to take joy in a Barmecide's feast. Nothing in our human lot could be bettered sufficiently to make this earth-adventure worth living for its own sake. If we are to bear our crosses intelligently and vigorously, we must look beyond it."

L. (not without malice). "Wortvoll will have to reject this view. Like all good Nazis, contemplating the martyrdom of man, he takes refuge in the cult of the State, in which Hegel saw divinity as it exists on earth. Nay, another of his authorities, Treitschke, urged that the State can claim rightfully for itself all the powers of the individual. Men must suffer and bleed, provided that this State organisation, which has not a conscious existence of its own, seems to thrive. What an outlook to cheer the heart of a thinker! Faugh!"

W. "No, no. Hitler has improved what you call this cult; he says the 'supreme end' or outlook is not conservation

of a State organisation but of a race."

*L.* "We know all about that 'pure race'; a ruler's fiction which you would not dare to defend here. Actually the situation is quite simple. A State organisation has been captured. This organisation, having no soul of its own, cannot 'claim', think or feel, and for this reason figures as a fantastically empty god. Such intelligence as 'it' shows is drawn wholesale from a few men said to belong to 'it'. Can you ask me to find my 'supreme end' or outlook in adoring a god of this kind?"

*S.* "Even the god's borrowed mentality is unstable. The hollow idol may soon be the voice-tube of different priests."

*W.* (loudly and angrily). "Of course the State has no conscious life of its own, but leaders of men thus organised interpret decisively the general will. . . . Anyhow the State, as abiding reality, is much more important than its ephemeral members who come and go."

*L.* "Less important, less lasting than any single soul that uses it. Let me see, Wortvoll, you allow that the soul is independent of the physical body and has at any rate three lives. It may also have had very many lives, not open to our inspection."

*W.* "Well, yes; and what of that?"

*L.* "You are admitting then that the soul may endure indefinitely, while, as history shows, States are short-lived. Consider the souls which we supposed to annex physical bodies first in Miocene times.(3) What a permanence is theirs contrasted with the brief careers of Assyria and the Roman Empire! The souls that made use of these two States are active still, but the States, alas! belong to the vanished 'made reality' of the Past. A victim flayed alive in Assyria is continued in the child laughing in Berlin to-day. It is called an 'unimportant' individual who 'comes and goes'. In verity its soul will be important when the Reich has ceased to exist and once more central Europe is a wash with seas.

The State is a form of association. No souls, no State. On the other hand, a soul may change its State or be Stateless. Hotels need travellers, but travellers can often dispense satisfactorily with hotels. I have now said enough to show why

the outlook, gladdening my life, could not be on the State. The object suggested is not of sufficient importance ; it ' comes and goes ' during a few episodes in my career."

The thrust has told. Wortvoll, who is flushed, has clearly no answer ready. Can souls be more important than the State to which he and his family are asked to sacrifice everything at need ? He is a fool, he thinks, to have been lured into making admissions without seeing clearly to what they lead. Sloppy thinking unaware of whither it is drifting. . . . Or is it that the standing of individuals is in fact much higher than he and his friends believe ? The fundamental assumptions of authoritarian doctrine may be unsound.

He smiles insincerely, striving to mask an obvious embarrassment : " So you want to reorientate my mind politically. But it will be better, I think, if we keep philosophical gossip and politics apart. . . . Don't you agree, Anderton ? "

A. " Frankly, I don't. It seems to me that a sane individualism finds support, that cannot be ignored, in philosophy. Even the coercive State itself, indispensable for hundreds of centuries ahead of us, may be discarded by the humanity of the future. But by then we shall be men and not beasts, and every petty problem which torments the modern world will have been solved. . . . However, shall we turn to other outlooks which can be discussed with less warmth ? I will hazard only this further statement. Take care very thoroughly of your metaphysical basis, and at long last your political philosophy will take care of itself. You cannot give useful meaning to the phrase political progress until you have won working notions about ultimate reality and the place in it to be filled by men. Failing this insight, all initiatives are mere floundering in the shallows of instinct."

L. " I won't dwell on this theme. I am only mentioning, Wortvoll, our view that in many respects the individual soul is superior to the State. Since very many souls are associated in the history of a State, it is convenient to speak of this or that one of them *as if* it were unimportant, as from the standpoint of a statistician it is. Metaphysics compels us to revise surface judgments of this kind. And, with thought directing the attack, the walls of many modern Jerichos may crumble."

I look for a snarl from Nazi Wortvoll, but he lacks still the retort effective. Obviously his new beliefs are at war with his old and the time of reconciliation is not yet. Unless he spurns the new wine, the Nazi bottle will be found too old.

L. "In the search then for an arresting outlook I have to go beyond the State. Shall I find what I want in the prospective fortunes of Mankind? What say you, Stark?"

S. "Not in those of the 'Humanity' of positivist Comte, born to perish on this planet, and presenting thus the typical illustration of wasted effort. A struggle, which cannot possibly be successful, fails to please. If the martyrdom of man is to be held worth-while, we must suppose, to begin with, that souls survive physical death and that this persistence is in a world-system moving, albeit for us very slowly, towards harmony and beauty. The story of man has been and remains extremely black and can be justified, if at all, only by some far-off result unachievable apart from the risks and miseries so far incurred. We are now able, I think, to point out the beginning of the ascent out of the pit and to assert that the outlook is heartening."

W. (who seems to be licking his wounds still). "You think so? Your outlook evidently is on to more than we can perceive on earth."

S. "I warned you that prophesying must not be stinted, though its inferences, whenever possible, are to be checked rigorously. Meanwhile don't express disappointment with heaven, while you are in fact walking still on the burning marl of hell. The story of creation is not one of perfection attained at a stroke; it is one of the gradual overcoming and transformation of the fundamental evil of the Metaphysical Fall. Man's present history is a minor feature of this process, but one so full of conflict, frustrations and pains, that even Hegel called it a 'slaughter-bench'. When I study history closely, I am tempted to recoil in disgust. Consequently you will not be surprised that I refuse to limit my outlook to earth, irrespective of what my philosophical convictions may be. In *Riddles of the Sphinx* Schiller puts his trust in a 'life of perfected individuals in a perfect society', but takes good care to safeguard this outlook. The members have been developed

through many lives, only the earlier of which were passed in underworlds such as this.<sup>3</sup> They are beyond the lowly stage of existence in which physical bodies are of use. Fundamentally, as we saw, such bodies are needed to help souls to become conscious.<sup>(4)</sup> Our explanations of Birth and Death will be recalled with profit."

L. "One thing seems unclear. If physical bodies are devices for helping souls to become conscious and to begin to will, feel and think, Mankind treats them oddly. The destruction of these devices, for instance, in war simply flouts common sense. The minds of civilised men need to be orientated afresh. We seem in fact not yet completely sane, unable to grasp the significance of workaday life."

W. "No — no. Different masses of men have different ideals and may well sacrifice a few bodies now and then in realising them. Normally both parties think that they struggle for the right. But the clash decides."

A. "And only might and clever planning succeed, you incline to add. But there is a little mistake here. The clashing parties belong to that common 'living basis' which we considered before.<sup>(5)</sup> The equilibrium violated in this basis, in righting itself, alters also the standing of all the disturbing parties. Excess issues in defect and defect in excess. Creative power ebbs and flows with all the various readjustments, pleasures and pains, involved. A veritable *re-*'tribution' of the *vis creatrix* ensues. The mills of God grind often very slowly, but there is no stopping them, however long-drawn-out are the centuries. Be sure then that it is not the initial 'clash', but the Imaginal Dynamic, that 'decides' finally. A very long view is recommended to the wise man."

W. "Distant dangers deter few. A word now about the religions. The outlooks provided by these are certainly the chief consolations of enormous numbers of men. Schiller's outlook is speculative at best and interests only a cultivated minority."

S. "So be it. You are referring, it is clear, to the institutional religions or mass-creeds, Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, Mahomedan, Aztec, Egyptian and the rest, all having elaborate organisations, rites, ceremonies and traditions. . . . Yes, but

we found, you will recall,<sup>(6)</sup> that the term 'religion' (the basic suggestion is that of a tie) covers much else, including *e.g.* free men's religions, religions of 'Humanity,' the State, the Unknowable, Bolshevism, Art, Money, etc. There are religions which take no interest in topics such as God, the soul, pre-existence and a future life. Is a definition of the term required; one which is to be inclusive of all human attitudes? Religion then is 'attachment or devotion to the most useful or perfect reality present, or seeming to be present, to our experience'. The fetish-beater is interested only in a useful presence; Spinoza thrills with an intellectual devotion to God. The presence mastering us may be a creation of our own fancy or merely accepted, as in the cases of irruptions of mystical origin. It may also combine the play of a man's fancy and that of the fancy of other men with irruptions of higher source. It may incorporate, further, reasoned philosophy."

W. "Ignoring the crux as to how much of a creed derives from human fancy, how much from historical events, how much from philosophy and supra-intellectual, mystical elements, I have to consider its value. It may be very useful, even if mainly untrue. No doubt some institutional religions have proved a curse rather than a blessing to mankind. Thus the religions of Phoenicia and Carthage were disastrous. Thus the old American civilisations seem to have suffered from a 'general mental aberration' (H. G. Wells); the ugly Mexican religion in particular rioting in blood. For you this is a feature of the anarchy of imagining that 'runs amok'; it cannot be defended as part of a divine plan. Very ugly too has been much in the history of the greater religions in Asia and Europe. But, while a high price has been paid for them, the services of these institutional faiths have been considerable. They were indispensable at any rate in the dawn of civilised effort. Even now they dot with oases of happy dreaming the desert of earth-life. They console and encourage millions for whom the struggle for existence might otherwise prove too hard. And, when men are ready, naïve beliefs can always be replaced with religious philosophy."

L. "Truth is sought by Plato's 'spectator of all time and all existence', not by the hordes of plain men for whom

ignorance<sup>1</sup> may be bliss. A creed with appeal to the emotions but which, philosophically speaking, is poor, may alter the world's history. And, when discussing outlooks, don't let us forget that such a creed *may serve its faithful even beyond the grave*. It may flower for them in full development during the rest-phase that follows physical death. New reality after the heart's desire has been thrown off by human creators within a vast imaginal cosmos, in which even the most opposed religionists have room to live, move and have their being.<sup>(7)</sup> It resembles a house which, once having been built, serves for long as a home for its architect."

W. "So that no honest believer is cheated utterly even by the most foolish outlook. An imaginal cosmos has many mansions. That is a reflection of importance. Even so the very evil creeds must reserve grim developments for their faithful, if the Imaginal Dynamic works as you maintain; the aggressor giving rise to aggression against himself."

S. "I agree . . . but as regards the institutional religions, have we not said enough? Nobody here denies that some of them provide most valued outlooks, serving the faithful perhaps even beyond the grave. We might of course go further and regard these creeds as symbolism, veiling profound philosophical truth and having thus a claim on the allegiance of all future generations. But, alas! symbol-hunting is too often abused. Porphyry could find symbolism even in Homer's stories. I trust that we know how to use our time better."

L. "Wortvoll said that the popular religions, even when straying from truth, may serve usefully to cheer and console. Such beliefs ought to be respected. I recall looking into a little chapel set on the side of a mountain in the Valais. I had toiled up a steep path in search of quaint pictures of saints, demons, judgments, etc., such as one finds often in these places. I saw a peasant kneeling alone in prayer. She had come there perhaps with a burden which no one in her village could make lighter. What mattered it that the person addressed was a word and nothing more?"

S. "May she not be in 'telepathic' relation with some fellow believer who has passed on? On your own showing her prayer may be heard, though not by the legendary saint



addressed. Be that as it may, one thing is obvious. The hewers of wood and drawers of water need faiths and the faiths will thrive just as long as they are wanted."

A. "I'll close this talk about the religions with a word about religious philosophy. In the cases of the superior creeds Buddhist, Hindu, Christian, etc., philosophy tends to penetrate the faith-structure more and more with the march of time. Finally faith is often replaced by thought; doubters too, asserting their freedom, furnish philosophy with some of its most important recruits. Among these there are conservatives who wish, if possible, to maintain their old creed with modifications; there are radicals, again, who are glad to be rid of it altogether. None, however, are forced to take leave of religion which, we agreed, is devotion to what seems the most perfect reality present to their experience. Thus the imaginist remains profoundly religious, though public ritual and worship cease to interest him. Even Divine Imagining has an aspect akin to his free religion, to wit the affective aspect of Its 'radiance beyond reason'; the feeling-side of that infinite activity at the heart of the world.(8) God withal is not devoted to a supreme reality; God, as bliss-consciring, includes supreme reality in Himself. You will recognise once more that the variety of experience denoted by this term 'religion' is very great. . . . And now to fresh outlooks, friend Stark."

S. "I mentioned a short while ago Professor Schiller's outlook on the divine society, the members of which are souls freed from conditions such as impose petty, restricted lives on you and me. His sustaining ideal is that of 'perfected individuals in a perfect society', the evolution of men into finite gods. Even his supreme god, like that of Mill, is finite. His divine society, however, is too remote from us to be discussed at this stage of our talk. We ought first to consider the many minor higher societies which resemble more closely our own. These are formed slowly as souls are being released from the Wheel of births in the underworlds. Of course neither these souls nor their societies are perfect, but they exist nevertheless on exalted levels such as a Dante would be unable to describe."

W. "There have been other dreams like Schiller's whose 'perfect' society of 'perfected individuals' raises difficulties. Bradley denied that perfection could obtain in a society of souls. He found the union stressed incomplete, and reality ascribed 'in too high a degree' to finite appearances.

No perfection could be claimed for any of the minor higher societies. On the other hand, their formation is inevitable. Yes; on your lines I say inevitable. For, if souls persist indefinitely and are released at last from the Wheel of lower births, we cannot hold that each exists afterwards as a celestial hermit aloof from all the rest. The societies are formed and must be allowed for."

S. "What marvels those higher regions must comprise! Clearly you suspect, Wortvoll, that there exists in the cosmos much more than your agnostic friends would allow. Anyhow it is well to hold that human affairs may not be so important as our vanity suggests; that individual and social activities go on which are as far above our ways of living as ours are above the doings of bees. Philosophy cannot ignore this likelihood. Hence Plato, Plotinus, Proclus, almost all the Indian thinkers and Fechner proclaim stoutly their belief in the higher societies and gods, filling the 'void immense' between Deity and ourselves with a hierarchy of agents. Even Bradley, ordinarily so sceptical, allows in *Appearance and Reality* that 'organisms unlike our own, arrangements pervading and absorbing the whole extent of Nature, may well exist. And as to the modes of perception which are possible with these organisms we can lay down no limit'. William James too was for a 'long hierarchy of beings'. So are we."

L. "Since the idealist Bradley's 'Nature,' is mind-like, he could hardly say less. These concessions on the part of philosophers seem to me merely common sense. What is important to us four is that there is plenty of room in the universe for any sorts of higher societies and gods in whom we may have reason to believe."

W. "That's clear enough. But answer this question. These souls are not Leibnitzian monads. Conceivably they might brave many adventures and yet at long last perish. But you seem to take their immortality for granted. What in

last analysis guarantees that immortality

S. "It's your turn, Anderton."

A. "It is possible that the individual soul is immortal only during its life in one of the world-systems, not persisting *as such* if that life comes to an end. But this suggestion cannot be dealt with until our last outlook is being discussed.

Let us consider now why it persists at any rate during the long-drawn-out time-process within the system. Each world-system, as we saw, has its own time-process. I need not go into that matter again.

It might be held, as by Lotze, that everything will continue 'whose continuance is part of the meaning of the world and as long as it is a part'. The unessential, not required save by a passing phase of the world, will not endure. Some might say that not all souls are inevitably parts of the meaning. Some, again, might maintain that values are conserved and that all souls are potentially of value. It might be urged, as in *Zermatt Dialogues*, that each individual, already rooted in God, 'is the possibility of a unique perfection which is adorable and, as such, inevitably conserved. Its suppression would entail a sheer loss to the universe — would be equivalent indeed to the partial suicide of God.'(9)

L. "Divine Imagining, which expresses Itself in variety, underlies the bare possibility of individuals and their adventures. An enormous mass of content, emotional, volitional and cognitive, accrues to It through the channels of these finite lives. Nothing but finite experiences could provide the multiple points of view which diversify the real. Finite experiences, though they can 'run amok', are centres of creations not otherwise to be secured. And God's triumph lies not so much in the evolution of the natural order as in the perfecting of the free conscious individuals associated with it. These annihilated, His labour would be lost. There is planned (reading) 'not the construction of titanic world-systems of mere content, wherein Divine Imagining conspires things which are not conscious of themselves. More is required than characters which, like those in *Hamlet*, exist not for themselves but only for the artist. The supreme artistic triumph of evolution is the making of conscious individuals who, passing

at last into the divine life, are to swell and diversify Joy.'”(10)

A. “Thanks, Leslie. What you have been saying seems to me sound, but I have to add that the souls are not conserved, as a theist might suggest, by leave of a transcendent God. Let me explain.

I have to remind you of an important statement made during our talk about Birth and Death.(11) We had been discussing the origin and standing of the permanent soul. This soul, the Augoeides of some mystics, was found to be at once a centre of consciring and an organism, spoken of as the ‘highest body’, by aid of which individuation becomes possible. This organism, at first sustained by God, is sustained later by the individuated consciring that lights it. It is henceforth an indestructible expression of this consciring. We compared it, you will recall, with the superior Leibnitzian body, held to be inseparably allied with its monad.

Thus the fundamental guarantee of the immortality of the permanent soul, during at any rate the uncounted billions of years of its career in a world-system, is furnished by the permanent soul itself! Only this permanent soul can decree the passing of its ‘highest body’ and of the individuality which this body has rendered possible.”

W. “Thanks. I ought to have borne in mind better our talk about the origin and standing of the finite centre of consciring that lights the permanent soul. The soul does not require leave to persist granted by a transcendent God; it is in fact the conserving divinity itself.”

L. “Conclusive, but may I interpose with a reminder? Time is flying and so are Wortvoll and I this afternoon. These outlooks on to the minor higher and highest societies must not hold us here too long. Comments also must be cut. I am suggesting that we turn over all the responsibility for further statements to Anderton, at whose feet we can sit — or rather lie — appreciatively. I don’t want to quit this alp in a hurry.”

W. “Yes; we’ll take the risk of being puzzled by some dark statements. I’ve no more to say myself. I’m no seer, and can’t guess profitably beyond the point now reached.”

A. “Mists are gathering round the heights of our speculative thinking, and it is well that these dialogues, which have

been so useful, are nearing their close. I will add a few words respecting the higher outlooks, embodying all that a cautious philosopher cares to say. Those who find me too unenterprising have their remedy; they can become mystics and supplement my somewhat meagre suggestions for themselves. The difficulties to be overcome are formidable, but sooner or later all of us in this or a future birth will have to take thought about the great adventure. For those who know radical empiricism is the only wear.

Allow liberally for the passage of time. Nature is running down already as we talk; is passing into that thermodynamic equilibrium with which, on the physical level, the great indrawal begins. Entropy brings ever nearer, but very slowly, the day of doom. The stars too are melting perhaps into 'radiation', but in a deliberate manner; they are five to ten million million years old and their 'atoms' may have existed much longer.(12) The progress of souls is to be contemplated over against a temporal background which fills me, I confess, with awe. Souls set sail triumphantly over an ocean into whose depths falls the wreckage of states, continents, planets, solar systems, and even nebulae themselves. What becomes, for instance, of that short-lived Giant, Leslie's Bête Noire, the too coercive State? It vanishes very soon indeed. The truly important individual abides, forgetting that such a miscreation ever troubled his past."

Wortvoll frowned and shifted uneasily. But he was glad perhaps that we had agreed not to interrupt the speaker. For what, after all, was he to say?

"Let us consider S, the typical soul of some of our talks, as it moves across this vast temporal background. Long ago it has got clear, let us suppose, of the Wheel of petty lives such as we have on earth, and in like places. It has attained after strenuous development the level on which the members of the higher societies conspire. It may prefer at first a strongly individualistic career in this domain of freedom. It may, as it becomes a god, pursue only ends that interest itself. But we will suppose that, as the ages pass, it yields to the *nisus* that works for the ever closer union of souls, grows very great, and is indefinitely strengthened and enriched as one of the

myriads of allied centres of an exalted social whole. What sort of conscious life does it enjoy? I am reminded of the words of Plotinus respecting sentient within his Second Hypostasis or 'Universal Mind'; sentient each of whom expresses that whole in its own way: 'they see themselves in others. For all things are transparent, and there is nothing dark or resisting, but every one is manifest to every one internally and all things are manifest; for light is manifest to light. For every one has all things in himself and again sees in another all things, so that all things are everywhere and all is all and each is all, and the splendour is infinite'.(13) Only the divine or supreme society of our world-system could show the *complete* mutual penetration of its members described. Yet the citation is stimulating and suggestive. It draws attention to the widening and deepening of conscious life, within the hierarchy of societies; passage beyond mere personality being stressed. We come to suspect that, in the division of spiritual labour, we are workers for one another, and are destined to escape from our pettiness in the process. Note, however, that the individual centres of consciring persist. Centres, which even on the terrene level were open on a limited scale, are held to be open fully now to other centres, and to the contents that are enjoyed in common. The expression 'light is manifest to light' needs no interpretation. • The closed, substantial 'egos' of some schools of thought have no place in our metaphysics.

The histories within this hierarchy fill enormous stretches of time, not entering the ken of dayflies of our type. Only a few general statements are worth notice. Intimate mutual penetration of the centres goes with direct consciring of great range and intensity; and with the latter goes a corresponding intensity of feeling, of emotional life.(14) Ordinary students are familiar with accounts of 'ecstasy' in which feeling is of torrential strength. One of them, Max Nordau, held that 'the only normal organic sensation known to us which resembles that of ecstasy is the sexual feeling'. But Nordau, with degeneration as his theme, suffered from a restriction of outlook, and, lacking as he did relevant experience, had only medico-psychological abnormalities in view. I can assure you

that there are fully sound experiences, open to the healthy among ourselves, that declare their character beyond question. Glimpses of a level, conscired for the while independently of brain, they acquaint us with a poignantly glorious affective life, allowing us to understand better what the 'unimpeded activity' of an exalted society implies. You heard what Stark had to say some while back.(15) His witness is still alive. He reports that intensity of feeling pervades the whole spiritual life sampled thus; sensations from the side of the physical body do not intrude.

S, rising slowly through the hierarchy, does reverence still to the values Truth and Moral Goodness. He is borne also on the flood-tide of Beauty. Plato's spokesman in the *Banquet* avers that, once a man has perceived the fundamental Beauty, he finds in it his true life, and nothing in the lower world can matter to him again. But this Beauty, as was said before, is neither a Platonic Form, subsisting by itself changelessly, nor an imaginal. It is not something drawn from a celestial reservoir and distributed among objects. It *belongs*, as an affective aspect, to consciring, that alone which can be aware of the implied delight. An object, present neither to divine nor finite consciring, could not be beautiful. Forced to consider a definition of the necessarily inclusive character, we inclined to consider this: any whole, combining variety in unity, is beautiful if conscirable awhile with delight fully satisfied within the limits of the whole. 'Awhile' because the beautiful object is not always a 'joy for ever'. The objective conditions of such delight present a problem which falls outside that of the definition suggested.(16) What concerns us here is that the higher life now open to S provides the delightful whole in which Beauty and Love can flower fully. Since the interpenetrating souls, that share their wealth of delight, are adorable, they are adored and also adore. And who would question M'Taggart's view that there is nothing higher emotionally in the universe than Love? Shadows from the past, if they persist, serve as a contrast making yet brighter the radiant present.

This living of each in all and all in each tends to become consciring for which the separateness of the individual is







ABOVE THE MATTERHORN , THE GORNER GLACIER AND MONTE ROSA IN THE BACKGROUND

annulled. But the union of souls is still incomplete. Its consummation has yet to be indicated.

S, whose evolution in the main is 'by grace', development accruing as freely as the 'occasions' furnished by him allow, passes beyond all minor outlooks of the mighty and enters the divine or supreme society of this world-system. Professor Schiller's ideal of 'perfected individuals in a perfect society' may seem to be realised in this Cosmic Power, but it is not so. This society is still too limited, too subject to influences from without; the union of its constituent souls, which can still be discussed as 'they', is incomplete. But, though perfection is lacking, this Power is to be regarded as the overruling finite god in whom most men put their trust. James urged strongly that the god plain men need is a finite god. To Mill, with little interest in what men want, the facts suggest that, in respect alike of morality, wisdom and power, god is finite. Well; the divine society is the sympathetic ally whose aid is sought by man and not in vain. Man has also many other superhuman allies, great and small, and is in no sense the 'orphan' whose lot moves certain writers to tears — of ink. Pagan beliefs are probably closer to truth than dull philosophers care to admit.

West tells us in *Z.D.*(17): that the evolved god 'may be so limited indeed that very bad happenings which foul the world-system are beyond his (or its) control. When Buddha rejected the Brahmanic Ishwara (the Indian god which answers to the "Logos" of Hellenistic invention) he argued that, if the world had been made by Ishwara, there would be no sorrow and calamity. This is saying, of course, too much, because many sorrows and calamities subserve the evolution of organisms, will, thought and emotion, but it is true nevertheless that the *useless* miseries of life are very numerous . . . recall what Mill says of Nature which "impales men, breaks them as if on the wheel . . . and has hundreds of other hideous deaths in reserve, such as the ingenious cruelty of a Nabis or a Domitian never surpassed. . . ." Inevitably the concept of the limited and evolved divine society or god, such as I have suggested, imposes itself more and more forcibly on thought. I know of no evidence in favour of the view that a 'Logos' or Ishwara, issuing directly and in full glory from Divine

Imagining, is a precondition of the existence of our world-system. This is the Demiurgus of phantasy. On the contrary, the character of that system suggests that its specially controlling god, if such there be, is as yet far from mature (is perhaps, in du Maurier's words, only 'a scarce begotten child') engaged in a hard struggle, in which defeat is at least possible, to better the process in which it arose and in and through which it is slowly gathering wisdom and strength."

Leaving Wortvoll to reflect on this supreme society — supreme only in our particular world-system — I pass to our final outlook.

Our particular world-system is perhaps to have many rest-phases and phases of fruitful change. It may fuse at last with other systems and supersystems in a long series of transformations utterly beyond our power to forecast. We are too ignorant to be interested in these. But we are stirred profoundly by thought about the final destiny reserved for S, for the exalted centre of consciring which, sated with its limited existence, is to pass at long last, say the Buddhists and their sympathisers in Europe, into Nirvāna. It will seem then to fade out of reality. And yet, as we agreed, (18) it can fade out only by its own act. Why this act? What ought to be understood by Nirvāna

Where the silence lives

last and most impressive outlook with which we have to deal?

I suggested some while back that the soul is 'immortal' only during its life in a world-system. The ground of its individuation as *this* centre of consciring within the system has been discussed fully. (19) • The 'highest body' preconditions the individuation. When this body is destroyed, its destroyer, the centre of consciring, fuses with Divine Consciring. Nirvāna is attained. The centre has become reality of which neither mortality nor immortality can be affirmed. It is merged in That which, as stated before, *does not even exist*. Only finite things exist, begin and perish. (20)

Whence the urge issuing in the destruction? Bradley writes well that 'it is the nature of the finite to seek for that

which nothing finite can satisfy<sup>^</sup>, and Wordsworth's words,  
                   our being's heart and home  
 Is with infinitude and only there,

express the same truth. There is a far-off, ineffable Good, 'that at which all things aim' (Plato), whose shadow, falling on the soul, compels it to awake. The final mergence consummates the awakening. The stage-play of dark appearances — and with it Truth — give place to the sunlight of Reality.

Nirvāna has been called an 'eternity of nothingness'. Now most assuredly it is one of 'no-thing-ness'. But what of that? Full reflective consciring is for self-liberated spirits, no longer parted by differences such as are implied by the word 'they'; even world-lines conserved in the 'made reality' of the Past no longer divide those who traced them. You will note that Schopenhauer, who believed in palingenesis, but who had only annihilation to offer us at its close, missed the truth badly. And why? Because his philosophy of the unconscious, based on a blind Will, led him astray. Once more we see that a sound background must be discovered before we attempt to solve the problem of the soul. Return of souls to the infinite, ablaze with light, is one thing; return to the darkness of Schopenhauer's unconscious Will quite another. *Infinitely intense consciring, we were able to affirm, is fully reflective, (21) and with this reflectivity goes intense bliss.* Be sure that the labour of creation is not futile frenzy signifying nothing. The consummation awaiting the perfected Individual is beyond what any mere society, however exalted, could bring; to be (in Traherne's words) 'sole heir of the whole world' is to attain divinity in full. Yet this 'heir' disappears from among the appearances that merely *exist*!

Let us consider this consummation in another way. The finite centre of consciring is allied with a 'highest body'; a fragmentary object through which it conscires only as much of the universe as is able to penetrate this object. Its outlook is thus inevitably restricted; it is cut off from very much altogether. Nirvāna reached, it ceases to sustain this restricting body, and becomes the 'sustaining' and 'kindling' power behind all appearances whatever.

I have now said all that I care to say about this outlook. Let me close by citing the passage from which Traherne's words about the 'heir' were taken: 'You never enjoy the world aright, till the Sea itself floweth in your veins, till you are clothed with the heavens and crowned with the stars; and perceive yourself to be sole heir of the whole world and more than so, because men are in it who are everyone sole heirs as well as you. Till you can sing and rejoice and delight in God, as misers do in gold and kings in sceptres, you never enjoy the world.' Mystics will find much in it to give them pause."

There is a long silence as if tribute is being paid to these pleasant dialogues so soon to become things of the past. Then Wortvoll observes: "You take my breath away, Anderton, *Deus fio*. Miguel de Unamuno dreams quite in your vein. 'I want to be myself, and yet, without ceasing to be myself, to be others as well, to merge myself in the totality of things, visible and invisible.' A policy of spiritual expansion aiming at annexation of the universe! But somehow I like to keep most souls I am acquainted with at a safe distance."

L. "As they probably like to keep you. Anderton, however, is not concerned with the folk who 'reptilise', as Blake puts it, on this planet. He is thinking of exalted souls of great beauty who have been growing in spiritual stature, for perhaps billions of years; souls beyond comparison with the dwarfs who appear in Earth's story. We terrene folk are miserable creatures at best."

W. "Only the adorable are adored, as you have told us. But, given mutual adoration, the closest possible union might be a delight . . . we'll leave the matter so, hoping that the exalted, adorable souls don't live merely in our dreams."

Do you consider, Anderton, that pain has any place in the Infinite Imagining?"

A. "Well, pain is a radical factor in additive creation or evolution as it is called ordinarily. And the past with all its painful vicissitudes is conserved within Divine Imagining. Ought we to say that the Bliss of Divine Imagining includes and transcends pain, a subordinated contrast throwing its triumphant joy into relief?"

W. "Myers wrote about 'an ultimate incandescence where

science and religion fuse as one', but we cannot promote science to a level where abstract thought disappears. On the other hand, something akin to religion may show even within Divine Imagining, if I understood a previous remark of yours aright."

A. "Religion for the advanced man is devotion to the most perfect reality which seems to enter his experience. For Divine Imagining the most perfect reality is within Its own sphere. The rapture permeating Its conservation and additive creation is akin to religious devotion. If such rapture could be present faintly to the mystic and saint, it would certainly occasion religious devotion in them."

As we stroll back to the hotel, Stark asks me what I think now of our visitor. I reply that he seems open to argument, and that we must give him plenty of time to reflect. The bearing of some of our contentions on his political faith is disastrous. And, after all, the man has a wife and family to keep.

S. "Great is Truth and it will prevail — runs the old saying. But the victory of the wife and family is much more probable. Will Othello risk his occupation for love of Imaginism? I think not."

\* \* \* \* \*

Stark and I are on the tarmac at Belp aerodrome, standing beside "The Good Companion", in the cabin of which Leslie and Wortvoll are ensconced snugly. The travellers are talking through the left sliding window now open. It is a splendid morning, and the flight to Munich promises exceedingly well. The engine has been warmed up and run fast for some thirty seconds with good results. No need to waste time when the mountains of Bavaria are calling.

Leslie bids the ground-engineer pull aside the chocks. "Expect me back for dinner to-morrow." The plane begins to move across the tarmac to the turf. {

S. "Good luck, Wortvoll, and come back next year perhaps as a convinced imaginist. The future will be ours, you know."

W. "I wonder."

## NOTES BY BASIL ANDERTON

- (1) Cf. Chapter IX. pp. 189-190, and *Z.D.*, "The Riddle of Evil", pp. 459-481.
  - (2) Cf. Foreword, p. xix.
  - (3) Cf. Chapter XIII. p. 287.
  - (4) Cf. Chapter XII. pp. 252-253.
  - (5) Cf. Chapter XVI. p. 356.
  - (6) On "Religion and Divine Imagining", cf. *Z.D.*, pp. 137-159. For a definition, p. 151. "The word 'religion' suggests a bond or tie. And it is, on this tie, on this similarity of emotional attitude on the worshippers' side, not on features common to all the objects worshipped, that the seeker after a definition must lay stress."
  - (7) Cf. Chapter VII. pp. 108-109.
  - (8) Cf. *Z.D.*, p. 154.
  - (9) Cf. *Z.D.*, p. 491.
  - (10) Cf. *Z.D.*, p. 287.
  - (11) Cf. Chapter XII. p. 249.
  - (12) Sir James Jeans, *The Universe Around Us*, pp. 333 and 335.
  - (13) T. Whittaker, *The Neo-Platonists*, p. 52.
  - (14) Cf. Chapter VI. p. 96.
  - (15) Cf. Chapter XIV. p. 318.
  - (16) Bosanquet, *Logic*, vol. i. p. 243 (2nd edit.), wrote forcibly: "In a true work of art we have the bearing of every part on every other, the innumerable details, none of which could be altered without necessitating the alterations of others, all concentrated in a unity which is itself constituted by all these parts, and yet, as a whole prescribes the relations existing between them. And yet the whole is itself a comprehensive *fact*, and apart from it or outside it all these prescribed relations lose their necessity and disappear."
- But, unless this work of art exists for a centre of consoling, it comprises only so many related terms outside the realm of the beautiful.
- (17) Cf. *Z.D.*, pp. 204-208.
  - (18) Cf. Chapter XII. p. 249.
  - (19) Cf. Chapter XII. pp. 247-249.
  - (20) Cf. Chapter V. p. 51.
  - (21) Cf. Chapter VI. pp. 89-90.

THE END